Prima Secundae
Lecture 308: Merit, Grace, and Perseverance in Thomistic Theology

Transcript
================================================================================

Now, what would you think Thomas is going to say to this one? You might think that they're parallel, the two cases, right? What are they? Because the one who is going to merit an increase of this has lost the source of what? Merit, right? It doesn't have an impediment to it. To the eighth one proceeds thus, it seems that a man is not able to merit the growth of grace or what? Charity, right? For when someone receives the reward that he merits, there is not owed to him another merit, huh? Just as is said of some in Matthew 6, they have received their what? Reward, right? If therefore someone merited the growth of charity or grace, it would follow that grace being augmented cannot what? Further expects another what? Reward. Which is not fitting, right? He says, To the first, therefore, it should be said that the reward is the what? End of what? Merit, right? The limited merit. But there is a two-fold limit of motion. To it, the last limit, right? And the middle, right? Which is both a beginning and a what? Limit, huh? It's the beginning of what comes later and the term which comes before. And such a term is the reward of what? Growth, yeah. For the reward of what? Human favor is like a last term to those who are constituted in the what? That's the one that's the end of your life, right? When they receive no other mercy, right? The other one is something in the middle, which you'll explain more in the thing here. They said contra there from what in Augustine, huh? Against this is what Augustine says upon the epistle of John, huh? The charity merits to be what? Increased. And increased, it merits to be what? Perfected, huh? Therefore, the growth of charity or grace falls under what? Merit, huh? Now, the second objection is one little more for a philosopher to understand. Nothing acts beyond its own what? Form, species, huh? But the source of merit is grace or charity, as has been said above. Therefore, no one can, what? Merit a greater grace or charity than the one he has. Then it'll be acting beyond its what? Yeah, yeah, yeah. And that's the distinction that Thomas gives here now in the second objection. The second should be said that the increase, huh? Of grace is not above the, what? Power of the pre-existing grace, although it's above the quantity of it. So I have a lesser amount of grace, right? Which is therefore inferior to the grace I would have if it grows, right? In quantity, but it's not beyond the, what? Power of the lesser grace, huh? That's kind of an interesting distinction, huh? Just as the tree, although it is above the quantity of the seed, is never a mass, not above its what? Yeah. That's the quantity of, quantity of species, right? Yeah, yeah, yeah. It's like the premises in the beginning of Geometry or something like that, right, huh? They're much less than in the first book of Geometry, let's say, huh? In quantity, right? But in power, they are what? Extend to the conclusions of Geometry, huh? Moreover, that which comes, fair objection. Moreover, that which comes under, what? Merit. A man, what? Merits through each act proceeding by grace or, what? Charity, huh? Just as by each such act a man merits, what? Eternal life. If, therefore, the growth of grace or charity comes under merit, it seems through any act informed by charity, some, when merit, say, what? Yeah. But that which a man merits, he achieves infallibly, right, from God, huh? Unless he be impeded through a subsequent, what? Sin. For it is said in the second epistle to Timothy, chapter 1, I know the one to whom I have, what, believed, right? And I am certain that he is, what, powerful to give thee, what? Is that part of the word, the depositum there, I think? Okay. Or they translate that in the English text, some of the, yeah. I am certain that he is able to keep that with that community. Yeah. Thus it would follow that through any meritorious act, grace and charity is increased, right? Which seems to be unfitting because sometimes meritorious acts are not very, what, fervent, right? That they suffice for the, what, growth of charity, huh? Therefore, the growth of charity does not come under, what, merit, huh? Now, Thomas says, oh, interesting answer to this. To the third, it should be said that by any meritorious act, a man merits an increase of grace, just as he merits the, what, consummation of grace, which is eternal life, right? But just as eternal life is not rendered at once, but in its time, right, huh? So neither is grace increased at once, but in its, what, time, when someone is sufficiently, what, disposed for the growth of, what, grace, huh? Maybe light. Something like this in philosophy, you know, like, I'm rereading, as they say, the Summa Conor Gentiles, right? Am I understanding these things better now than I did the last time I read it? But sometimes you read a text, you don't seem to be understanding any better than you did the last time you read it, right? But you may be getting prepared all of a sudden, ah, now I see something I didn't see before, right? Deanna is supposed to point something out to Deconic there, philosophy of nature, Deconic and his great humility. How could I have taught this for all these years and not seen this? I mean, it's like, you know, I'm kind of, you know, just going through the Summa Conor Gentiles, I don't know how many times I read it, but I say, oh, Jack, I forget how much is in there. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, but sometimes you read it. Or sometimes I read the thing, you know, you know, I'm reading, I read it twice, right? I mean, I read the paragraph or something like that, and then I read it again and even sing it, right, huh? Because they're the ret, the latin, word order is different than the... You see something, you didn't see it, you know, and you read it a second time, right? So you're being disposed, right, by the first reading. And then you're ready to see something in the second reading, but you didn't see the first reading, right? But the first reading was getting you disposed to see something. But something like that, huh? With grace, the fervor of the soul, right? Sometimes the soul is kind of dry, you know, but you continue to try to pray, right? And then you get, what, the fervor, right, huh? And then maybe you get the increase of grace. What does it happen there? Is it Teresa of Avila there? You know, always heard there's an increase of grace. It's kind of a trial of some sort, yeah. It feels the same thing. Whether it's a career of ours, you have some diabolic torment. Oh, must be a big fish coming. Must be a big fish coming. Yeah, that's because it's the contrary here again. We said Augustine, but he's quite an authority here. But again, this is what Augustine says upon the epistle of John, that charity merits to be increased, so that what? Increased, it merits to be what? Perfected, right? Therefore, the growth of charity or grace does fonder merit. Now, I answer it should be said, Thomas says, that has been said above. That comes under the merit of what? Condignaia, of worthiness, to which the motion of grace extends itself, right? But now, this thing that we said about the two terms, the motion of some, what, mover, not only extends to the last term of the motion, but also to the, what, whole progress, huh? The whole going forward in motion. You got a question there? Okay. Now, the term of the motion of grace is eternal life, huh? It's bringing up into eternal life, as Christ says in the Gospel of John there. But the progress in this motion is according to the growth of charity or what? Grace, huh? According to that, and it's a beautiful quote now here, from Proverbs chapter 4, verse 18, right? That the semitah, the paths of the just, right, are like a light splendens, huh? It's like increasing, right, huh? You know, like the sun when it rises, right? It gets more and more beauty, huh? And it grows, uskwe, to the perfect day, right? Which is the day of glory. It was kind of taken from the metaphor there from the sun, right? Rising, sun rising, not the earth turning us, actually. And that's a, what do you call those guys that have got a bad thing about grace there? Yeah, yeah, that's what they would say, you know. I didn't even see her turning itself. Now it's the sun rising, huh? Shakespeare has these beautiful sonnets there about the sun casting the gold in their lakes and so on. Okay. Thus, therefore, the, what, growth of grace comes under the marriage of worth. It's a marvelous thing, huh? But he argues, because it disposes us for what? Its motion extends to eternal life, right? So therefore, it extends to the, that's a merit, right? You're meriting the eternal life. So you're meriting the stepping stone. Well, what you got with that, Thomas? So, it's pretty good. Good, another name, another article here? Article 9, oh my goodness, I'm going to be through with this. What are we going to do? I think the world is going to stop. To the ninth one goes forward thus. It seems that someone can merit, what? Perseverance. You would think so after the last answer. Yeah. Now that which a man obtains by asking for it, right, can come under the merit of one having grace. But by asking for perseverance, right, men obtain this, what, from God. Otherwise, in vain would one ask from God in the petitions of the, what, Lord's Prayer, as Augustine expounds in the book on, yeah. So Thomas Einstein takes the one, let the kingdom come, right, you know? The kingdom comes only if you persevere. So you're asking for his kingdom to come, right? Therefore, perseverance can come under the merit of one having grace, huh? Thomas answers, to the first therefore it should be said, that even those things which we do not merit, we ask for by what? Right. For God hears what? Right, yeah. Asking for what? Forgive us for their sins, which they do not, what, merit, huh? So we say forgive us our trespasses. We've got to do that every day for the daily sins, right? Okay. Because it's clear for Augustine upon that of John 9, we know that God does not hear sinners, right? That was said in defense of Christ, right? You know, yeah. Otherwise, in vain would the publican have said, right, God be propitious to me, a sinner, as it said in Luke, and that thing was heard, right? And likewise, the gift of perseverance, someone by asking for God, right, for himself or for others, although it does not come under what? Merit, huh? He said, since there's a lot of things that we get from now without merit, we can ask for things without merit. Yeah. That's a good point, huh? You know? That justifies the statement, God is more ready to give than we are now. Moreover, it is greater to, what, not be able to sin than to not sin, but to not be able to sin comes under merit, for one merits eternal life, of whose definition is impeccabilitas, huh? You become impeccable at that time, huh? Yeah. Yeah. And who are the saints here saying the deathbed? Ah, I shall sin no more. Ah, I shall sin no more. Okay. Therefore, much more is one able to merit that he, what? Yeah. Which is to persevere, right? Thomas sees a distinction here, right? To the second, it should be said that the perseverance, which will be in, what, glory, is compared to the, what, meritorious motion of free will as its term, right, huh? But not the perseverance of the road, and on the way, for the reason for said, which we'll see in the body of the article, I guess. So you're seeing the distinction between meriting this perseverance in heaven and in the road, right? And the third one, I have to read the body of the article, I guess. Let's look at it anyway. More or greater is the growth of grace than perseverance in the grace which someone has. But someone can merit a growth of grace, as has been said above, and therefore more is he able to merit perseverance in the grace which he has. Now, we'll have to see what the body of the article is to see what this will be. But against this is that everything that someone merits, he, what, achieves from God, unless he be impeded by sin. But many have meritorious works who do not, what, obtain perseverance. Nor can it be said that this comes about in account of the impediment of sin, because this which is to sin is opposed to, what, perseverance. Thus, therefore, someone had merited perseverance, God would not permit him to fall into sin, right? Therefore, perseverance does not come under, what, merit, no? Marvelous, marvelous, though, huh? Answer, it should be said, that since man naturally has free, what, will, that is flexible to the good and to the bad, right, huh? In two ways, someone can obtain perseverance in the good from God. In one way, do this, that the free will is determined to the good by consummate grace, huh? Which will be in glory, right? That your will will be filled, right, huh? There won't be room in there. Everything else. Got to be all in all, right? See it, see it, this is where got to be all in all. In another way, on the part of the divine motion, right? Which is on the road, I guess, huh? Which incline man to the good, usque infinitum, right, huh? Now, just as is clear from the things that have been said, huh? I might text you first, if articles five and eight. That which comes under human merit, huh? That that comes under human merit, that is compared to the motion of free will directed by God moving as a what? But not that which is compared to the foregoing motion as a what? Beginning, right, huh? Once it is clear that the perseverance of glory, which is the term or the end of the foresaid motion, right, comes under what? Merit. But the perseverance of the road does not come under what merit because it depends only upon the divine motion, which is the beginning of all what? Merit. But God, gratuitously, right, gives the gift of what? Perseverance to whom he, what? Gives it, yeah. Largitura, largitura. So he distinguishes between the perseverance of the end and on the road, huh? The perseverance in the end is that your heart is then what? Completely filled, right? No room for anything else but God. You know, when you eat too much, there's no room for anything more, you know? You want Thanksgiving, you know? I'm going to walk around more than you. Some stuff, you know. Your will is full more fully than your stomach at Thanksgiving, right? At the end, huh? But on the road, right, huh? the perseverance of the road does not come under merit because it depends only upon what? Divine moving of us, right? Which is the beginning of all what? Merit, huh? He's got to keep on moving us. I've got a text here at the bottom of the page here from the church documents, the Council of Arusa. The auditorium, the aid of God also, right, should be implored for those reborn, right, or healed, right, huh, that they might arrive at the good end or that in the good they work, they're able to, what, perdure, huh, to persist. Tenziger. Which gift of perseverance elsewhere is not able to be had except by the one who is potent, huh, to make the one who stands that he stand, right? Behera, stand. Because you might not continue to stand, huh? That he persistently stands and the one who falls to can be restored, huh? You can't know this with absolutely infallible assertitude unless you learn it from a special revelation. These are different, the ones here, I don't know, they're different quotes from Tenziger 806, D-26. Here's Tenziger 8-26. If someone says that someone's justified or without the special aid of God in his, what, receive justice, perseveres, or can persevere, or with it he's not able, anathema sit. It's a silver thought, huh? Yeah. This is an older edition, referring to different numbering and I don't know what it's referring to. Yeah. I've got a little one like the little Tenziger, I'll put it up there. I'll put it through that but I'll read it again. I'm sure I missed it. That's useful. Yeah. That's what, as they say, blessed, blessed, called a little Marmion. That's what you used to do with table reading and then different things. No, it's just a little. So it distinguishes then between the perseverance of the road and the perseverance of the term, right? At the end. Okay, now, I'm sure you want to know where the temporal goods come under merit. To the tenth one goes for it thus. It seems that temporal goods come under what? Merit, huh? For that which is promised to some as a reward of justice comes under merit. The temporal goods are promised in the old law, right? As a reward of what? Justice. This is clear in Deuteronomy chapter 28. Therefore, it seems that temporal goods come under what? Merit, huh? The ad primum there, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said that as Augustine says against Faust in the fourth book, huh? In those temporal, what? Promises. Promises were figured, right? The future, what? Spiritual things which are fulfilled in us, huh? That carnal people, huh? Yeah, present life. And of them, not only the, what? But also the life was, what? Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. It's like more a figure of what you get in the new. So the figure's not true, right? There was a text there, was it? It was in John, I think, yeah, where he gives about three, at least three different meanings of true. And one meaning of true as opposed to what? False. Okay. What other meaning of true, right? True as opposed to figure as false. Yeah, and I figure that's another one, yeah. And then true in terms of what is so essential and what is so by participation, right? We might say that Christ is a true son of God, right? And we sons of God, you know, that's what John said, you know, but we partake of sonship, right? Yeah. Yeah. It's kind of funny there when they're talking about you making yourself equal to God and so on, you know, he's the son of God and don't we call these other people? Yeah. Yeah. He doesn't develop the whole thing there, you know, but you can do that and you can call me that, right? You know, it's just too much openly about how he should be said so in a fuller way, but it's a great old rule there, you know, for what? Distinguishing the sense of the word that Aristotle gives in the logic, right? It's got more than one opposite. It's got more than one meaning, right? You should talk about liberal, right? That's an example in class, right? What's the opposite of liberal? Well, politics is conservative, right, huh? But another opposite of liberal is servile, right? And then another example, opposite of liberal is stingy. Stingy. Stingy, yeah. So liberal has at least three different meanings, right? Because there's three different opposites, right? So that's a very important rule. But Thomas is in a sense using that, right? He taught me about the word true in scripture there, huh? And the commentary on God? Yeah, yeah, yeah. Oh, a lot of things in there, you know? Yeah, I read it. I read it. Yeah, there's just so much. Mm-hmm. You have to go back. Yeah, yeah. Thomas says somewhere, you know, he never does. He doesn't really fully enfold the words of Christ, huh? Okay. So we're down to the first objection. Yeah, the second objection, all right? First man that takes to Augustine. More of that seems, second objection. That seems to come under merit, that God just gives back to someone for some service that he has made, right? But God sometimes recompenses, right, men, for the service made to him with some temporal goods. So he said in Exodus 1, and because the, what, yeah, feared God, he built for them, what? Houses, huh? Whence the gloss of Gregory, huh? Now, he's a pretty important guy, I guess, that Gregory. It says Moralia, that it's of the bedenity of God, right? Yeah. Wasn't it to be, what? Paid an eternal life, huh? But for the guilt of what? Life. Life. They did to save the babies, I think. Yeah. They received a temporal recompense. And Ezekiel 29, it said that the king of Babylon, Babylon, served, what? Served? By a great serenity against Tyre. And a reward was not rendered to it. And afterwards, there was a mercy for, I mean, a reward for the army. They gave them land of Egypt, for which they, yeah. Therefore, temporal goods do come under merit, huh? The second should be said, those paybacks are said to be divinely made, according to a comparison to the divine, what? Motion. Not, however, according to respect to the malice of the, what? Will. Well, and especially as regards the king of Babylon, who did, what? Not, as it were, wishing to serve God, right, huh? But rather that he might, what? Serve dominion over it. Similarly, the nurses, is it? The midwives. Midwives. Although they had a good will as regards the liberation of the boys, nevertheless, their will was not wrecked as far as the lie that they, what? We'll see that, maybe they get the body of the article, we'll see what that is. Moreover, just as good has itself to merit, so evil to demerit. But on account of the demerit of sin, some are punished by God, by temporal punishments. That he or his father, you know, that he was born blind, isn't it? Okay? Just as care about the sodomites, huh? Therefore, temporal goods come under merit, right? To the third, it should be said that temporal evils are inflicted in punishment for the, what? Epius. In so far as that through them, they are not aided for the achievement of eternal life. But to the just, who are aided, what? Through these evils. They're not punishments, but more medicines has been said above, huh? But against, okay, third objection. But just as a good has itself to merit, so bad to demerit. Oh, okay. I said contra, rather. Excuse me, that's why he replies to that. But against this is that those things. which come under merit do not have themselves in the same way to all, but temporal goods and have themselves similarly, likewise or likewise in fashion, to the good and to bad according to what? Ecclesiastes 9. Universa equae, all things equally come to the just and the impious, the good and the bad, the clean and the unclean, the one and one contemning sacrifices. Therefore, temporal goods do not come under merit. To the fourth, it should be said that all things equally come to the good and the bad as regards the substance of good or temporal goods or evils, but not as regards the what? End. Because the good through things of this sort are led by the hand. There you go. Mani d'Axio, that was Monsignor Lian always talking about mani d'Axio, to the beatitude, but not the bad. In hecta moralibus in commune dicta sufficiente. Prima secunde, right, is in commune, but in the secunda secunde, you do it in particular, right? Let's look at the by the article now. The answer should be said that that which comes under merit is a, what, reward or merit that has the notion of some good, right? Now, the good of man is twofold. One, simplicitare, and the other secundum quid, huh? Now, simplicitare, the good of man, is his last end, according to that of Psalm 72. For me to adhere to God is good, huh? And consequently, all those things which are ordered is leading to this end, right? And such things, simplicitare, come under, what, merit. But the good secundum quid and unsimplicitare of man is what is good for him as now, right? Or what is to him in some way secundum alliquid, good, right? And these do not come under merit simply, but some way. According to this, therefore, it should be said that if temporal goods are considered insofar as they are useful to the works of, what, by which we are led to eternal life, according to this, they directly in simplicitare come under, what, merit, just as the growth of grace in all things by which man is ordered to, what, arrive in beatitude after the first grace. First, to such an extent does God give to just men of the goods of time, and even also of evils, as expedient for them, right? For arriving to, yeah, so Paul had something he was complaining about, didn't he? Yeah. Which is keeping him from being swollen from the revelations, the greatest of the revelations. And insofar as they are simpler, what? And in this respect, right? They are simply, what? Simplicitare good, these temporal things, right? Once it is said in Psalm 33, that those, what, fearing God are not, what, very good, yeah. And in Psalm 36, they do not see a just man. Yeah, that sounds like the guy talking to Job. But if one considers these temporal goods as such, lest they are not simplicitare, the goods of man, but secundum quid, eh? And lest they do not come simplicitare under merit, but secundum quid, insofar as men are moved by God to doing some things, what, temporally, in which he is, what, yeah, God-fearing. That just its eternal life is simply the reward of the works of justice in relation to the divine motion. So the temporal goods, considered in themselves, have the ratio of a reward, respect being had to the divine motion, by which the wills of men are moved to pursuing these things. Although sometimes in these things, men do not have a right but intention. So work hard, you get ahead, right? So both the goods, the good is simplicitare. Yeah, I guess so. What reward do you get for finishing this one? Echta morali bussinti mini dicta. You get common knowledge of moralia, not particular knowledge. A little break there.