Prima Secundae
Lecture 303: Instantaneous Justification and the Order of Nature

Transcript
================================================================================

look at the physics, there must be two, what, a time in between, right, you need two different hours. Therefore, the justification does not come about all at once, but successfully, right, huh, okay. So, there's a time in which I'm ignorant before I know, right, huh, and therefore, that time doesn't go on forever, so there's a last instant in which Perquist is ignorant of something, right, okay, and then there's a later time where he knows the Pythagorean theorem, right, huh, so there must be an instant which is the beginning of that time in which Perquist knows that, right, and the last second in which Perquist is ignorant of the Pythagorean theorem, right, can't be the first instant in which he knows it, therefore, there must be two different instances, right, and between two instances, there must be some time, just like between two points, they're really distinct, there's a line, right, yeah, this might be what Aristotle says, right, because he solves this, right, huh, okay, let's see the beautiful text of Thomas then. To the fifth, it should be said that the succession of two opposites in the same subject is different and ought to be considered differently in those things which are subject to time and otherwise in those things which are, what, above time, time, right, huh, now in those things which are subject to time, there is not a, what, last instant to be given in which the form, right, the prior form is in the, what, subject, or in my example, there's not a last instant which I'm ignorant, but there is a last time to be given, right, and a first instant in which the form following is in the matter or the subject, right, and the reason for this is because in time one cannot take a, what, another instant immediately, what, preceding it, huh, in that instances are not, what, following each other in time just as neither, what, points in a line as is proven in the, what, sixth book of physics. So the sixth book of physics is the book on, what, the continuous, right, and division of it and so on. And Thomas will often come back to this, right, and it comes up, you know, like they say, you know, when, in the Eucharist, right, it's, it's bread and then it's the body of our Lord, right, well, it's our last instant in which it is the, is bread, in which it is the body of our Lord, right, there can be a last time now, but the end of that time is the first instance in which it is the body of our Lord, right, but if you say, you know, there's no, there's no time between, what, if you had, if you had two different instances, right, then there'd be some time in between them, which would be neither bread nor the body of our Lord, right, so it's all kinds of problems, right, huh. So Aristotle solves it by saying that there is a, what, first instant which, and, but there's not a last instant in which it is not, huh. That's a hard thing to see, right, huh. And if you say there's no time between the two, right, there's no time between which I am, what, neither ignorant nor knowing the Pythagorean theorem, right, well, then you have to say, if you think there's a last instance in which I'm ignorant, and a first instance in which I am, what, knowing it, then there's an instant in which I'm both, what, yeah. And this is the way Hegel says that all change is a contradiction, right, that's the start, you know, for Marx, right, I see Marx gets it from Hegel, right. So if the last instant in which I am ignorant is the first instant in which I am, what, knowing it, then in that instant of change I am both ignorant and knowing, which is a contradiction, right. And if it's not, if it's not the same instant, well, then there's some time between, yeah, but there can't be any time in which I'm neither ignorant nor knowing, see. So there must be an instant in which I'm both. You see what I mean? It's just this. Just as reasonable. Yes, yes. But since you're coming to know, when the activity of coming to know is completed, you know. So there is a first instant in which you know, but not a last instant in which you're, what, ignorant, huh? It's a very subtle thing to see, right? But Aristotle, in the sense, solved the difficulty of Hegel, right, huh? Hegel says all becoming is a contradiction. Was Hegel's, the earlier thought, was there any utility that was built on by Hegel or some of his intellectual sons, like Marx? Yeah. Was there any sort of utility to that mistake at all? Well… That's the philosophy of the revolution. Yeah. That's all I did. Conflict. Right. That's what we go for. The total dialectic. Yeah. Yeah. But I guess I was thinking of something constructive as far as, not destructive, but yeah. Yeah. That's the illusion of the illusion. In other words, was there anything positive so that people, subsequent philosophers, were fooled into thinking that there was real validity to this, which is really there? Yeah, yeah. I mean, they're really denying the basic thing that something cannot both be and not be at the same time in the same way, right? They're denying the fundamental thought of the human mind, really. Everything is really based upon something cannot both be and not be at the same time in the same way, right? Yeah. That's what Father Owen reminds us of. And nobody learns that. I mean, you might come to learn how to name that and think it out, but you take a toy from a child and you say, mine! No! Mine! You know, it can't be both yours or mine. Nobody taught him that. He didn't know it. Well, I used to quote Hamlet. Everybody shared the thing, to be or not to be. That is a question, right? He's thinking of suicide, right? But I've got to screen with that so much. I say, to be or not to be, that is a question. I say, it's a question because you can't both be and not be. Right. You know? If you could both be and not be, it wouldn't be a question, to be or not to be. So when Shakespeare says, to be or not to be, that is a question. I say, why is it a question? Because you can't be both. What if it was Shakespeare and not Hegel having? No, no. Hegel would have said, to be and not to be. That's the solution. That's the answer. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. I guess it's become now the thing there, you know, that wives should agree that their husbands, you know, can have a few affairs, you know, and they're talking about it. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. in the newspaper is now, you know? And this is going to strengthen the marriage, right? I mean, it's got a contradiction here, right? What is destroying the marriage in a sense is, you know? Apparently, I know some famous actress or whatever it is, she wanted more children, he didn't want any more children, so they agreed that they could have more children, but then he could, you know, have once a month or whatever it was. It's absolutely crazy, I mean, Rush Lubbock would say this is crazy, you know, but he said this is what's going on, you know, I mean, he's always, yeah, yeah, yeah. But people rejoice in these contradictions, right, huh? Yeah, that's the same alcohol that he reprobates in. Yeah, yeah. In the old days, you know, she loves me, she loves me not. One to the other. But again, one to the other, you know, and which one you end up being when you pull the petals from the flower, you know, but… I came across a number of highly educated people who were saying, oh, come on, grow up, everybody does it. You know, adultery, in other words, cheating on your spouse, you know, it's a mature thing, is what they were applying, and yet it just seems to be quite young. Okay, let's go back here now. So, in those things which are subject to time, right, huh? One cannot give a last instant in which the prior form is in the subject, huh? But there can be given a what? Yeah. And a first instant in which the following form, right, the sequined one, is in the matter or the what? Subject, huh? The reason for which is because in time one cannot take, right, before one instant, another instant, preceding it immediately, right? There's always some time in between, right? In that instances do not follow each other consequent there. That's just a technical term there, right, without something of the same kind. So between any two points there's always a line and other points possible. Just neither are there points next to each other in a line. Well, you know, just to touch them on it a bit there, huh? Can two points touch? They have to touch if there's nothing in between them, right? Can two points touch? Aristotle kind of uses an either-or syllogism, right, huh? Either part of one touches part of the other, or part of one touches the whole of the other, or the whole of one touches the whole of the other. Well, does the point have any parts? That's the definition of point, though, which has no parts in Euclid, right? So the only way two points could touch would be for the whole of one to touch the whole of the other, which would be to coincide, and you'd have only one point. There's no way for two points to touch, right? So there must always be, what? If there are two of them, there's some distance between them, right? There's always a line between them, right? And then it carries over to time, right, huh? Two nows, right? If you take the now as being the indivisible in time, right? The now in the strict sense, right? Aristotle sometimes says we use the word now, you know, in a loose sense, right? Like now we're having class, right? But class is gone, part of it has to come. But the now in the strict sense, right, huh? That doesn't include any of the past or the future, how long is that? See? That's right. It's like a point, you know? It's not long. It's not long. Yeah, yeah, yeah. It's not long. And so two nows cannot be, what? Together, right? There's always some time between them, right, huh? And so when there's a change, you know, from, you know, like dying, right, huh? Is there a last instance in which I'm alive? Yeah, yeah. See? But the first instance that I'm dead, right, pertains now to the subsequent time which I'm dead, right? There's not a last instance in which I'm alive, huh? That might sound good now. There's no last instance in which I'm alive. I'm never going to die. Well, that's a misunderstanding, right, huh? But there's no last instance in which you're, of your life, but the first instance of you're dead, yeah. But, of course, okay. But time is what? Terminated at an instant, right, huh? And therefore in the whole time preceding in which something is moved to one form, it is under the opposite form, right, huh? And in the last instant of that time, which is the first instant of the sequent time, it has the form which is the terminus of what? Motion, right? But in those things which are above time, it is another way, right? For if there is a succession there, right, huh? Of affections, right? That refers to the appetite of the will. Or if there is a succession of what? Intellectual conceptions, right? As in the angels, right, huh? Such a succession is not measured by what? Continuous time, huh? But by discrete time, right? That's a very hard thing to understand, right? The angels, huh? Just as those things which are measured are not themselves continuous, as has been had in the first, when he talks about the angels. Let me go back to the angels there, right? Whence in such things there is given a let, a last instant, right, in which the first was, and a first instant in which that which follows is, huh? Nor is it necessary to be a middle time, right? Because there is no continuity of time there, right? Which requires this, huh? Now, the human mind, huh? The spiritual part of man's soul, which is justified, in itself is above time, right, huh? But karachidens, it is subject to time, huh? Because of the connection with the senses. Insofar as it understands with the continuous and time according to, what? Phantasms. So we don't think without imagining, huh? In which it considers the intelligible species, as has been said in the first, huh? So sometimes I say, you know, the proper object of our mind is that what it is is something sensed or imagined, right? And so we think about what something is, we imagine or we're sensing, right, huh? Something. So I think about the squirrels there, right? What the hell are they eating out there, you know? And therefore it should be, what, judged, secundum hope, right? About this change according to the condition of what? Yeah. That we say that there is not a last instant in which guilt is present, but a last time, right, huh? But there is a first instant in which grace is in us, right? In all the time preceding, guilt is in us, right? So it's the first instant in which I'm cured, right? Washed away. Well, that's quite a mouthful there, huh? Chew upon that, right, huh? Okay, let's look at the body here now. Well, let's look at this encounter first, huh? But against this is that the justification of the impious comes about by the grace of the Holy Spirit justifying us, huh? But the Holy Spirit subito, right, comes to the minds of men, huh? According to that of Acts 2. Factu ses repente. There was made suddenly, right, from the heaven sound of a spirit, what? Coming as vehement. Whence the gloss says, huh? In my text there, in the footnote there, it's the Ambrose, huh? That, what? The grace of the Holy Spirit does not, what? No little targets things, huh? It's all at once, huh? Therefore, the justification of the impious is not successive but instantaneous. You're looking at Molumina there? Yeah. Yeah. But it needs both for a week. So it's not slow efforts to increase the Holy Spirit, okay. But he says, the answer should be said, by the article, that the whole justification of the impious consists originally in the infusion of grace, through which free will is moved and guilt is what? Emitted. But the infusion of grace comes about in the indivisible instant, right? Without any succession. Because the reason for which is because some form is not subito, impressed upon the subject, happens because the subject is not, what? Disposed, huh? And the agent needs time nor that it might dispose the, what? Subject. And therefore we see that when the matter is disposed through the preceding alteration, that the substantial form is acquired in matter, right? And you've got to be careful there, like, you know, when, is the fertilized egg a human being, you know, or is it the seed of a human being, huh? You know, does the matter have to be disposed before it's the proper subject of the, what, soul? Because the soul is the first act of an actual body composed of, what, tools, right, huh? So unless the body has, what, some distinction of tools, right? It's not yet the proper subject for the soul, right, huh? But it is the seed of a human being, right, huh? The seed of the body of a human being, huh? Not the seed of the, it's not the seed of the soul, right? Would it be appropriate at all to argue that there aren't any tools looking at the gain of the body? Because you're looking at the structures within the cells, mitochondria, things like that that are tools working towards the development of the, uh... One time I'm talking about the first fertilized egg, right, huh? See, it seems to me that it's more a seed than a body composed of tools, right, huh? That it needs to be disposed that way, right, huh? Now, apparently, when God became a man, right, it was all at once, right, huh? But there was reason for that, right? It's not appropriate that he assume a body, you know, that was not really human yet, huh? But in us, it seems to me that the fertilized egg is really the seed of a human body, right, huh? And then when the organs are, what, suitably distinguished enough for the, you know, to be the proper subject of the rational soul, that's obscured exactly when, you know, huh? When it is, huh? But certainly, you know, when you've got arms and legs, it seems that you've got the subject and then the soul is there, right? But sometimes I think the pro-life people, you know, they don't realize the difficulty of saying exactly when the soul is there, right? You know? Is the soul there in the fertilized egg, you know? Or is this where we see? Well, when we see there, it's different, it's just the vegetative part that's the atomic part? Yeah, yeah, it's ready to grow then, right? It's almost growing right away, you know? But, yeah, yeah, yeah. But I mean, it's maybe not clear what distinction and disposition of organs is necessary, you know, before God puts a rational soul in it, you know? And therefore, we see that once the matter is disposed, huh, by the alteration preceding, substantial form is acquired in matter, right? And the same reason, like, for example, I'll take, you know, to say, you know, you're heating up the, you know, the paper, you know, and then I'll set it first into flame, right? You know, once it's disposed. And by the same reason, because the diaphanous, right, is in itself, right, disposed to receiving light, huh? It at once is illuminated by the, what? Yeah. Now, it's been said above that God, in order that he might, what, pour grace into the soul, does not require some disposition except the one which he himself makes. Now, he makes a disposition of this sort that's sufficient for the reception of, what, grace. Sometimes, what, suddenly, right? Sometimes, paulatum, and what? Successively, right? As has been said above, huh? Now, that a natural agent does not suddenly dispose the matter, right, huh? Happens from this, that there's some disproportion for form which in the matter resists, right? The virtue of the agent. And on account of this, we see that when the virtue of the agent becomes more strong, then the matter is more quickly, what, disposed. But since the divine power is infinite, it can, what, dispose, what, any created matter suddenly for form, right? And this is what he might do in the case of God becoming man, right, huh? Okay. And much more can he, what, all at once, yeah, dispose the free-willed man, right, whose motion can be instantaneous according to nature. Thus, therefore, the justification impious comes about by God in an instant, right? Okay, well, that's the thing to... Shoot, we've got to stop now, I guess, huh? Shoot, we've got to stop now. In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, Amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, Guardian Angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. God, our Enlightenment, help us, God, to know and love you. Guardian Angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, or to illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor, help us to understand knowledge you have written. Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, Amen. So up to Article 8, I guess. To the 8th one proceeds thus. It seems that the infusion, the pouring in, I guess, of grace is not first in the order of nature, among those things which are required for the justification of the impious. First argument. For that is before, to recede from evil, then to accede to the good. According to that of Psalm 36. Declina, decline, from evil, and then et fac bonum, right? But the emission of culpe, of guilt, I guess, pertains to the recess from evil. Therefore, the infusion of grace pertains to the pursuit of the good. Therefore, naturally, before is remission of culpe in the infusion of grace. Well, for a guy who looks before and after, this dummy, that's so far as he can look before and after. That sounds pretty good. Now, what does Thomas do, huh? Well, before you look before and after, you have to see the distinction. To the first, therefore, it should be said that the recess from the term and the excess to the term are able to be considered in two ways. In one way, on the side of the thing that is movable. And thus, naturally, the recess from the term precedes the excess to the, what, term. For before is in the mobile subject that the opposite be, what, taken away, huh? Gotten rid of. And afterwards, that that which is, what, acquired, right, through motion, the mobile acquires through motion, right, comes naturally next, right? So, I'm not altogether sinning by looking at the objections first, right, huh? They're moving the bad things, right? That would lead you astray. And then we see in the body. But on the part of the agent, it is the, what, reverse, huh? For the agent, through the form which pre-exists in it, that is an agent, acts for the removing of the, what, contrary, yeah. Just as the sun, through its own light, huh, acts for removing the, what, darknesses. And therefore, on the side of the sun, before is to enlighten, then to remove the, what, darkness. But on the side of the air, first is to be purged from darkness, then to, what, tame light, huh? In the order of nature. Although both are single in, what, time, huh? Two different senses there of, what, before. In one case, they're single, right? In other case, one is before, but one on the side of matter, one on the side of the agent, huh? Okay? You know how in the second book of the physics here, Aristotle talks about nature as both matter and form. So sometimes what is before for matter, right, is said to be before by nature, right? And sometimes what is before by form. But it's two different senses of nature, right? And therefore, two different senses of before, right? Same way, too, we talk about, you know, the, the, Aristotle gets one of the corollaries about the causes, right? That there can be many causes of the same thing, per se, and then one thing can be, two things can be causes of each other. Well, therefore, they're both before the other, right? But different senses, yeah, but a different kind of cause, huh? Okay. So the, the end is first in, what, intention, there, before anything. But in being, right, the agent there is before the end that it makes, right? I mean, not all ends, but the house that he makes or something like that, huh? And because the infusion of grace and the remission of guilt are said on this part of God, justifying, who's the, what, not the mobile subject here, but the agent. Therefore, in the order of nature, before is the infusion of grace and the remission of, what, guilt. But if one takes these things on the side of the man justified, it's a reverse. For before in the order of nature is liberation from, what, guilt, then the consecution of the, what, justifying grace, huh? So you've got to make room there for the grace, huh? Before you can receive it, and you have to, therefore, get rid of the junk in you, okay? Or it can be said that the terms of justification are guilt as that from which, and justice as that to which. But grace is the cause of both the, what, remission of guilt and the adeption of, what, justice. Yes, that's okay. Well, let's get away with that, Thomas, huh? I'll see what you can do with the next one here. Moreover, disposition precedes naturally the form for which it disposes. Well, I can see why you had the other objection first. But the motion of free will is a certain disposition for the reception of grace. Therefore, naturally, it precedes the infusion of grace. But the second should be said that the disposition of the subject precedes the reception of the form in the order of, what, nature, huh? But it follows, nevertheless, the act of the agent to which also the subject is disposed. And, therefore, the motion of free will in the order of nature precedes the attaining of grace, but it, what, the infusion of, what, grace, huh? Kind of subtly saying there. So it distinguishes between infusion of grace and the, what, attaining of grace by the soul, right? Because infusion of grace is talking about the God pouring it in, yeah. And that's also disposing it, right? But you must be disposed for you can receive the grace, huh? Yeah. Okay. Moreover, the third objection. Sin impedes the soul lest to tend freely towards God. But before it is to remove that which prohibits motion, the motion follows, huh? If I don't move something and it's screwed down with nuts and bolts and so on, you've got to remove those things first and then you can move it, right? Or if it's stuck to the ground, right, by some kind of sticky substance, right? Therefore, before, naturally, is the omission of guilt and the motion of free will against sin, right? And the motion of free will towards God and the infusion of grace, huh? Well, to the third, it should be said that, as the philosopher says in the second book of the physics, why is he quoting this old guy for in the, in theology, huh? Well, that sounds like a great thing. It's just as the philosopher says in the second book of the physics, in the movements of the soul, entirely, what, precedes motion in the beginning of, what, speculation or in the end of action. But in exterior motions, the remotion of the impediment precedes the, what, achievement of the end. And because the motion of free will is the emotion of the soul, before, in the order of nature, it's moved towards God as an end, and then to removing the impediment of, what, sin. You mentioned that a number of times some of the questions go about making God an end before if sin is to make something else for him, that's sort of what he's talking about. But against this, the cause is naturally before the effect. But the infusion of grace is the cause of all other things which are required for the justification of the impious. Therefore it's naturally what? Four. Let's see what Thomas says in the body of the article here to be fully illuminated. It's in some impediments to earth that gave and removed. Hence it should be said that the foregoing four things which are required for the justification of the impious in time are simul, together, right? Because the justification of the impious is not a successive thing as has been said. But in the order of nature which is the second sense really of before. One of them is before another, right? And among them in natural order first is the infusion of grace second the motion of free will towards God, right? Third is the motion of free will against what? Sin and then fourth is the remission of guilt. What a ability to look before and after this guy yet, huh? The reason for this is because in any motion naturally first is the motion of the mover. Second, however, is the disposition of matter or the motion of the mobile, right? but last is the what? Or terminus of motion to which the motion of the mover terminates, right? The motion, therefore, of God moving is the infusion of what? This has been said above. I must have used the word motion of God, huh? Yeah, I was going to say about this, right? But he has to do this, right? To manifest it. The motion or disposition of the mobile is a two-fold motion of what? Free will. And the terminus or the end of the motion is the remission of what? Guilt. As is clear from the things that's said above. And therefore, in the natural order, first in the justification of the impious is the infusion of grace. Second is the motion of free will toward God, huh? Third is the motion of free will against sin because on account of this, the one who is justified detests sin or is sin because it's against God, huh? Once the motion of free will in God precedes naturally the motion of free will against what? Sin. It is the cause and the reason for it. And fourth, and last, is the remission of guilt to which the whole transformation is ordered as a two-way what? To an end. Put that in your pipe and smoke it out a little bit, huh? Mm-hmm.