Prima Secundae
Lecture 302: Justification of the Impious: Elements and Instantaneity

Transcript
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Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Okay. Now, what about the next article here? To the fifth, then, one proceeds thus. It seems that for the justification of the impious is not required the motion of the free will in sin, right? Huh? Yeah. Yeah. Well, if we say the confession, they'll say, you know, they want you to say the creed. I mean, the act of contrition. Yeah. Yeah. And this is tied up with this here, right? You're supposed to have moved against sin before you got into the confessional, right? But he makes you say that again, right? So you have it there. And even have a text there. There's a light there. In case you don't know the... To the fifth, then, one proceeds thus. It seems that for the justification of the impious is not required the motion of free will in sin. Now, that's kind of ambiguous, the words there, right? It means you're against sin, in a sense, right? Okay. For charity alone suffices for the deletion of sins. According to that of Proverbs 10. Universa delecta, huh? All what? Feelings, huh? All sins. Charity, what? Covers, huh? But not in a Lutheran sense, right? You got that word. Cover, I think, is kind of in trouble there. But the object of charity is not sin, right? Therefore, it is not required for the justification of the impious, the motion of, what? Free will with regard to sin, huh? Now, in the reply, Thomas points out, to the first, therefore, it should be said that to the same virtue pertains the pursuing of one of two opposites and the refusing of the other, right? And therefore, for charity, it pertains, what? Yeah. So that also one detests sins, in which the soul is separated from God, right? Yeah. When Thomas expounds the creed, you know, he usually gives articles of the faith and then the fundamental heresies, you know, against that one, you know, because it kind of pertains to the same knowledge there. Moreover, who tends to the things before should not look at the things in the past, right? Okay. Okay. You can't turn back once you start to go one way. According to that of the apostle in the Ephesians, who looks back, right? I mean, forgetting the things that are in the past, right? Oblifesians is, you know, obliviating, right? Forgetting. To those things which are before extending myself, right, huh? To the destined prize, you might say, of the higher vocation, I pursue. But tending injustice backwards are the sins that are in the past, right? And therefore, why not to forget them, right? Forget your sins. Nor, in them, we ought to want to extend by motion, if you will, right? To the second should be said that to the past things, a man not ought to return by love, right? But yet, in this respect, right? Forget them, right, huh? That he may not be, what? Yeah, or tinted. Yeah. Okay. Yet, however, to record them, right, huh? By consideration that he might, what? Detest them, right? For thus he recedes from them, right? Right? That's the way he understands what Paul is saying there, right? But then Paul, remember, they persecuted the church at the time. That's the least of them then, because I was forgiven because of my ignorance. Moreover, in the justification of the impious, there is not permitted one sin without another. For his impious, right? For the impious, right, is the one who, what? Yeah, or it's just a half of forgiveness, I suppose, huh? Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. If, therefore, in the justification of the impious, is necessary for free will to be moved against sin, is necessary that one think about all his sins, huh? Well, that's a long story, which seems unfitting, right, huh? First, because it requires a magnum tempo, so not a great time. Meaning a long time, not a good time, not a great time. Magum tempo. For this thinking of these things, right, huh? And then because of those sins of which man is, what? Forgotten, right? He could not have, what? Forgiveness, right? Therefore, the motion of free will in regard to sin is not required of the justification of the impious, right? To the third, it should be said that in the time preceding justification, it's necessary that a man, the individual sins that he committed, he should detest, right? But those of which he has, what? Memory, right, huh? And from such a preceding consideration, there follows in his soul a certain motion of detesting universally all sins, what? Committed. Among which also are included the sins that have been handed over, right? To oblivion, right? Because a man in that state is thus disposed that even about those that he does not remember, right? He would be, what? Yeah, he would be broken down, yeah. If they were in his memory, right, huh? And this motion runs together for what? Justification, huh? Now, the text is very clear there, the one in this encounter, right? But against this is what is said in Psalm 31, huh? You know how Thomas divides the Psalms, huh? You know, he discussed a number of ways of people have divided the Psalms, and then he adopts the division of what? Augustine. A division which is into what? Three, yeah. And Augustine notes that the 50th Psalm, the one that Teresa Adel is so fond of, right, is a sin asking, I mean, a psalm asking for forgiveness of sin, right? And then the 100th Psalm was a psalm of what? Good deeds in advancing in the life. And then the 150th Psalm was one of resting in God, right? So, Augustine says that the 50th Psalm is a clue to what the first 50 are about, right? And the 100th, the second 50 is about, and the 150th, the third, right? And so, Thomas is commentary on the psalm, that's where he adopts that business. And you can see it, he got to about the 54th Psalm, huh? One text is the 51st, and then they found a, I mean, in my lifetime, like the 52nd, the 50th, or 54th, that's as far as he got, right? But you can see, and actually, the first 50s are divided into decades, right? Each decade has a certain meaning, right? And as far as I guess, you know, I think the Roshi, right, was kind of, you know, for the commoners who couldn't go to chapel and sing the 150 Psalms, right? You're giving them kind of a, what, something, yeah, yeah. That's why you start out with 150, what, Hail Marys, right, and decades and so on. So, it kind of, you know, kind of annoys me, you know, that they adopt the, when I was a little boy, it was known as a Protestant number, right, as opposed to a Catholic number. And I'm always getting mixed up with what the number is, because I have a hard enough time remembering it without having, you know, two things. So I used to say, I try to use the Catholic numbering, as it was known as, and I call it the correct numbering, you know. You can see that the minds that, you know, don't see this as important, right? They don't really realize the importance of dividing into three, right? In the way both Augustine and Thomas did that with the Psalms, huh? Kind of a beautiful thing. Okay, we've got to look at the body of the article here, right? But in the same contra, huh? I confess against myself my injustice, right, to the Lord, and you remit the impiety of my sin, right? The answer should be said that the justification of the impious is a certain motion of which the human mind, huh? And men's error doesn't mean just mind in our more narrow sense, right? Mind as opposed to the will. But it involves the will, right? The rational part of the soul. Which the human mind is moved by God from the state of sin to the state of, what? Justice, huh? That's the changeover, by the way. Transmutatio. Insubstantiation. It's a changeover, too, but a little different one. Now, it's necessary that the human mind have itself to both of these extremes, right, according to the motion of free will, just as the body has itself in locomotion, being moved by someone to the, what, two terms of the motion, right? Black to white, or from here to there, right? Now, it's manifest in locomotion of bodies that the body moved recedes from the term from which, right, which is my house when I come up here, and it exceeds to the term to which. So how can I come towards you guys without leaving my house? How can I go back to my house without leaving you guys? That's life, you know? It is. So Thomas is very concrete here, very simple, right? Whence is necessary to the human mind when it is, what, justified that by the motion of free will he recede from sin and accede to, what, justice, huh? Turn away from your sins, right? Toward, what, justice, huh? Now, recess and excess in the motion of free will is not locomotion, but it's taken according to detesting and desire, right? For Augustine says upon John, expounding that, the mercenary hover flees. The affections, our affections, right, are motions of our, what, souls. So that's how he carried the word motion over there, right? I was talking last night, I had the student over, came on Wednesday night instead of Tuesday night, because Tuesday night we're at this, this, uh, visitation house dinner, the bishop, the bishop, comes to these things. But anyway, um, yeah, yeah, I was talking to him about how, um, Aristotle's arguing there in the Eighth Book of the Physics, you know, to the unmoved ruler, right? And, uh, and, uh, but sometimes, you know, Aristotle will say, you know, the parallelhood is reduced to the per se. So something that is moved by another is reduced to something that moves itself, right? And Plato takes this, that the first cause, uh, moves itself because it knows and loves itself, right? Well, knowing and loving are verbs, and, and as you know from the logic there, from the perigaminius, the noun signifies without time, right? And the verb signifies with time, and time is the number of motion, right, according to before and after. So sometimes we speak of the act of the, what, uh, of loving or knowing as being kind of a motion, right? And it's reflected in our language, right, when we use a verb, which signifies with time, right? It's not really motion as we define it in the physics. It's not the act of what is able to be insofar as it's able to be. Because motion, in a strict sense, is an imperfect act, right? And I always take a simple example, you know. When you're walking home, have you walked home yet? And when you have walked home, are you walking home? See? So, so long as you're walking home, your being home is imperfectly realized, right? And when you finally are at home, you're no longer walking home, right? But in understanding and loving, and even in sensing, right, when I'm seeing you, have I seen you yet? Yeah? And when I, I'm understanding something, have I understood you yet? And I always say to my girls, to mention, when you're loving someone, have you loved them yet? Oh, yes. You know? It wouldn't make any sense to say, I'm loving you, but I haven't loved you yet. See? See? But when I'm making a house, have I made a house yet? See? When I'm making dinner, have I made dinner yet? See? When I'm driving here, have I driven here? Yeah? So when Plato says that the thing that moves itself is the first mover, right, he's using moving in a, what, different sense, yeah, yeah. Veristyle is more apt to, you know, to be speaking, you know, strictly, you know? So it's the word motion here, right, huh? Doesn't mean it's motion in the sense of the definition of motion in the third book, huh? Shakespeare has in mind, he says, things in motion, sooner catch the eye, the what not stirs, huh? Okay? It's kind of carried over, you know, when you get to the concubisal appetite and the irrational appetite, right? Well, concubisal appetite is named from desire, from wanting, right? Which seems more like a, what, emotion, right? And liking something is not so much emotion, right? But wanting something, that's kind of emotion, right? And anger is, you know, very much emotion, you know? And so even there, things in motion, sooner catch the eye, the what not stirs, right? And Shakespeare, you know, defines reason, first of all, by discourse, which is like a, what, motion, huh? And the act of reason that is named from reason is reasoning, right? And reasoning is the act of reason that is like emotion, right? Or understanding is something, you know? It's more skill. Yeah, yeah, it's a little more, you know, obscure, right? So he's talking about emotion here, right? But he's comparing it, right, to the sensible emotion, right? I can't come to you without going away from my house, right? I can't go to my house without going away from you guys, okay? So he says it's manifest that in locomotion of bodies, that the body recedes from the term from which, right? And exceeds the term to which, right? So I recede from the term from which, my house, and I accede to the term to which, you want to stay here, okay? This room, huh? Whence is necessary that the human mind, huh? When it's justified, that by the motion of free will, it recedes from sin, which is like the term from which, right? Terminus aquo. And exceeds to what? Justice, huh? But the recess and the excess in the motion of free will is taken according to detestation, right? And desire. For Augustine says in, upon the Gospel of St. John, I guess, huh? The mercenary, what? Flees, right, huh? That the affections are emotions of our soul, right, huh? The titsia is a diffusion, right, huh? Spelling out, so to speak. Timor is a flight of the soul, right? For we, what, go forward when we desire right, we flee when we, what, fear and so on. It is necessary, therefore, that in the justification of impious, there be a two-fold motion of free will. One by which one tends by desire to the justice of God, right? Another by which one detests, what? Sin, huh? That's clear enough, huh? Thomas is condescending to make it very clear to us, isn't he? Yeah. Okay. Article 6, you want to take a little break here? Oh, to that freshen. Okay, we're up to Article 6, right? To 6, then, one goes forward thus. It seems that the remission of sins ought not to be numbered among those things which are required for the justification of the impious. For the substance of a thing ought not to be, what? Numbered with those things which are required for the thing. Just as a man ought not to be, what? With his soul and his body. But the justification of the impious is the remission of sins, as has been said. Therefore, the remission of sins ought not to be computed among those things which are required for the justification of the impious. To the first, therefore, it should be said that the justification of the impious is said to be the, what? Remission of sin, according as every motion takes its species from its term. But nevertheless, to obtaining the term, many other things are required, as is clear from the things said, what? Above, huh? This is kind of like the end there, you know, rather than something presupposed to it, right? Probably just bring it out in that body of the article. Moreover, the same thing is the infusion of grace and the remission of, what? Guilt. Just the same thing is illumination and the expulsion of darknesses. But the same thing ought not to be numbered with itself. For the one is opposed to, what? Multitude. Therefore, one ought not to number remission of guilt with the infusion of, what? Grace, huh? Very philosophical objection. To second, it should be said that the infusion of grace and remission of guilt can be considered in two ways, huh? In one way, according to the very substance of the act, and thus they are the same thing. Thus they are the same. For by the same act, God both bestows grace, huh? And remits guilt. In another way, they can be considered on the side of the objects, right? And thus they differ according as a difference of guilt, which is taken away, and of grace, which is what? Yeah. Just also as in natural things, generation corruption differ. Although generation of one is the corruption of, what? Another. So they're the same thing, right? But they're different objects, huh? So is coming to know and losing ignorance the same? Because I read the Summa Karajan Thiles and I'm coming to know some things. Is this also losing some more ignorance? Yeah. But is ignorance the same thing as knowledge? Hmm? Yeah. I fell in my wine glass. Getting rid of that emptiness there. So you compare it to generation corruption, right? So in the old science there, when, what? Air becomes fire, right? Becoming fire is the corruption of, what? Air? When carrots and broccoli become human flesh, right? Corruption of broccoli and carrots. Yeah. More of the emission of sins follows upon the motion of free will towards God and again, you guard sin, yeah. just as an effect to, what? Its cause. Through faith and contrition, sins are, what? Remitted. But the effect ought not to be numbered with its cause because those things which are numbered together as it were, are divided, right? Against each other. Those are things that are seem of, what? Nature. Therefore, the emission of guilt ought not to be numbered with other things which are required for justification. of the impious. To the third, it should be said that this is not a numbering, right? According to the division of a genus into species in which it's necessary that things numbered together are, what? Seemal. That's been one reason why Aristotle talks about before and seemal there, right? Because the genus is before the species, right? But the species that come under the genus by one division are seemal, right? So play is divided into tragedy and comedy, right? And they're seemal, tragedy and comedy. But play is before, as John knows, before the particular. So they're not a division of the genus into species, but according to the difference of those things which are required for the completion of something. in which enumeration something can be, what? Before and something, what? After. Because of the beginnings and the parts of a thing that is composed, there can be something before another. illumination of the body of the article, right? But against this is that in the enumeration of those things which are required for a thing, we're not not to omit the end, which is most potent in each thing. But the remission of sins is an end in the justification of the impetus. For it is said in Isaiah 27, 9, this is all, what? Fruit, huh? That one takes away, what? His sin, huh? It's interesting the word of fruit, fructus. I talk about how when I first started reading the Nicomotan Ethics of Aristotle, right? And in the English text, of course, you say happiness, right? Aristotle's going to figure out what happiness is. Well, when you start reading Thomas, of course, they're talking about phlechitas, right? And then in Greek, you know, the Greek word is their eudaimonia, right? But phlechitas comes from what? Fruitful. Fruitfulness, right? You've got the word fructus here, right? It's very much like an end, right? It's the last thing produced, you know, from the fruit tree, right? And it's used here, so it's very much the end, huh? Therefore, the remission of sins ought to be numbered among those things required for just the case of the impetus, that that is the end. So is knowledge required for the teaching of the ignorant? But I mean, he's saying there that we're not to omit the end, right? That's what it's all about, huh? Teaching. If you're ignorant, you need to know. Yeah, yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Can they be teaching of the ignorant with no knowledge? They just can't be if they still be ignorant. You don't succeed in teaching sometimes if the students don't learn, right? They don't acquire some knowledge they didn't have before, but that's the end of teaching, right? To give some knowledge to somebody. What's called higher education and essentially they're teaching ignorance as opposed to... How do I say education? What crimes are committed in thy name? That's a good one. They teach them how to emote. You scratch the surface, you discover horrible things, right? Horrible things going on. Answer, it should be said, that four things are enumerated which are required for the justification of the impious, huh? Four things, huh? Okay. To it, the infusion of grace, right? The emotion of free will to God, right? Through faith, right? And the emotion of free will towards sin, right? Against sin, I guess, huh? Nobody says inbakatum. Sounds like... This is absolutely what he wants to say. In relation from Latin... In regard to, you know... When we say credo, we have one thing. Yeah, yeah, yeah. That's one meaning within. Yeah. But notice now, in regard to the rule of two or three, right, huh? In the middle here, you've got two things that pertain to the motion of free will, right, huh? By the gratia infusio, that's not really something that I do, right? So, yeah, I don't exactly remit my guilt, I don't think. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So there's a way to twist this, you know, into shakes. Ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha Now the consummation or the arrival of the term of this motion is implied by the remission of guilt in which the justification is what? Consummated, right? So there he's dividing into three, right? Maybe I'm a fanatic about two and three, I don't know. Ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha Ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha And the part of the student, the learning, right? And then the end, which is some knowledge, right? Three things. Now we get to Article 7. We've got time for this. With the justification, the impious comes about in an instant or successively. What would you answer before you look? What? Yeah, I think so, yeah. I just got through reading in the Summa Congenitalis this morning there, in the second book there. He's taking up creation, right, huh? And he's showing that creation is not, what, no succession there, right? It's all... He was no evolutionist. Yeah, yeah. And you know how he used the term re-creatusa? Did we say that before the word? Created again, re-recreated. I suspect it means that creation, right? Re-creation is an instant too, right? I know that's what Chrysostom says. It's the initiation of the baptism, it says it's divine power. It's instantaneous. Yeah. It's not a succession of it. Well, it starts here, then we say some other prayers, and then finish it over there. But Thomas has a chapter in there, you know, that creation is not a motion, right? Or a change, right? Because they are successive, right? They're not all at one. So, to the seventh one proceeds thus. It seems that the justification of the impious is not an instant, but successively. Because as has been said, for the justification of the impious is required the motion of free will. But the act of free will is to choose, which presupposes the deliberation of consul, right? As has been said above, huh? That's why we always object to the so-called pro-choice people right now. They don't allow the women to give counsel. They don't give any counsel, right? Don't let them see what the little thing inside is, you know, and so on. Since, therefore, since deliberation implies a certain discoursum, right? That's Shakespeare's word, discoursum. So, that's where he got it, right here, from Christ to Article 7. Just dawned upon him when he traveled down to Italy. There's a theory that Shakespeare went to Italy, you know. You know so accurately Italy in the plays like Romeo and Juliet and so on. And he might have met those terrible Catholics, you know, down there. We don't know. Nobody knows exactly. Since, therefore, deliberation is a certain discourse, which has a certain, what, succession, right? It seems that justification impious is successive, huh? Well, that convinces this dummy over here, huh? Speak for yourself. Assassination by association. Yeah. Your teacher's a dummy. Wait. Yeah. There used to be, but Kassirka's kind of warning me, and I went up to Laval, you know, that he ended up kind of for, always making little jokes about each other, you know, and that he'll probably save the class like that, and I'll say, well, what's my teacher said? Well, then he can't be any good, you know. I had to come jurist by some, which Kassirka never did, you know, but I mean, Kassirka's kind of warning me that I might get into some of these things. To the first, therefore, it should be said that the motion of free will, which runs together to the justification of the impious, is consent, right, to the detesting of sin and to acceding to what? God, huh? Which can consent, huh? Subito fit, huh? Comes about instantly, right? Now, it can happen that what? That there, sometimes, that there precedes some deliberation, right, huh? which is not of the substance of justification, but a, what, road, huh? To justification, right? Just as local motion is the road to, what, illumination, huh? So Aristotle, and Tom was following him, too, thought that enlightenment was all at once. It didn't take time, right? And so the only reason why it takes time is because the sun's got to come over the horizon, right? But the illumination, right, is all at once, right? So that's why he compares it to that, right, in that thing. So he's saying that justification is, what, all at once, right? Even though there might be something, what, that takes time that precedes it, right, huh? But the consent is, that's something indivisible, right? And he compares it to something that was very common in their thinking, kind of ingenious, the way they measure speed of flight, you know, by the scientists, you know. I've read the descriptions of it, you know, but I still don't. I thought he couldn't, you know, reproduce that experiment, huh? Thank you, sir. I think maybe they left it up the edge to writing it to Margaret. My Aunt Margaret said when the weather would get weird, she'd always say, it's all that stuff they left on the moon, that's what's causing it. So, finally, we're over. Okay, now let's go to the second objection, huh? Moreover, the motion of free will is not without some actual consideration, but it's impossible at the same time to understand many things and act, huh? For a human being, that is to say. Since, therefore, for the justification impious has occurred both the motion of free will in diverse things, right? To it, towards God, huh? And towards sin, it seems that the justification impious cannot be accepted, cannot be in the instant. Well, is there a way that we can sometimes understand two things at the same time? See, if I know that a dog is not a cat, right? When I think of what a dog is, I can't be thinking about what a cat is. When I think about what a cat is, I can't be thinking of what a dog is, right? But when I know that a dog is not a cat, or a square is not a circle, do I know square and circle at the same time? I couldn't know that a square is not a circle unless I was thinking of square and circle at the same time. Now, when I square, when I define square, right, I'm thinking the definition of square. I'm not thinking the definition of circle, right? But when I say square is not a circle, do these two together, right, huh? To second, it should be said, that it has been said in the first book, nothing prevents two things being understood, simul, right, in act, according as they are in some way one, right? Just as simul, we understand the subject, the predicate in a statement, right? Okay? So in the first act of reason, which is understanding what something is, when that precedes, right, understanding the statement, then there's not together, right, simul. I don't understand what a square is and what a circle is together. But when I get to the second act, and I say a square is not a circle, I must be knowing square and circle together, right? I was like, I couldn't know that a square is not a circle, right? But I say, Michael is not, what, Peter? Patrick, I mean. Yeah. Patrick? Yeah. Then I would have to know both of you in some ways, right? And I suppose the opposite would be if you were to say something that was false, if you said a square is a circle. In some way, you'd be knowing together, but you would be a false statement, but you would, you know, Yeah. Apparently there's some difficulty now, but I think I know that a man is not a woman, you know? There's some difficulty now. It depends on who it is. It's a matter of choice now, they say, you know. It depends on who you're talking to. Pro-choice is taking on, you know, really nasty, you know, the readings, you know, today, you know. The people who are choosing what they're going to be. Yeah, really going crazy out there in California. Anyway. So nothing prevents two things to be understood together according as they are in some way one, right? Or when you make a comparison, right? And you say, well, you know, Mozart is better than Beethoven or something, right? Okay. They're understood together, right? Simo. Subject and predicate, right? Insofar as they are united in the order of one, what, that affirmation. Even, you know, when you see a syllogism, you find you judge a syllogism to be valid, and you see the conclusion does follow from the premises, then you're knowing the conclusion and the premises. Now, this is even more than the second act, right? It's the third act. When you're first reasoning, you know, you're not at the same time knowing the premises and the conclusion, right? When you're finally able to judge this as a good syllogism, right? Then you're seeing that the conclusion follows from those premises, right? And then you're knowing them together, right? Yeah. And in the same way, free will is able to be moved in two things all at once, right? According as one is ordered to the other, right? So I want money to buy candy. Money and candy are together all at once, yeah? Now, the motion of free will against sin, we'll say, is ordered to the motion of free will towards God, right? I think Tom should get a little problem with his prepositions there. An account of this, a man detests sin because it is against God to whom he wishes to adhere, right? And therefore, free will and the justification of the impious at the same time, huh, Simo, is detested sin and he converts himself to what? God. Just as a body at the same time is receding from one place and acceding to the what? Other, right, huh? I used to say the students there, you know. You're going home for Thanksgiving? Yeah. Now, what's your mother saying? You shouldn't say you're going home. You're coming home. Yeah, yeah. So you and your mother have a different language or what's the problem, I said? Yeah, I'm talking to you. Yeah. It's not the same way, boy. Yeah, yeah. Why do you call it going home and she calls it coming home? Yeah, yeah, but it's the same thing, though, isn't it? Yeah, yeah. So my detesting sin and my tending towards God, right, are really the same what? Oh, shit, yeah. They're together, right? So therefore, free will and the justification of the impious, simul, together, detests sin and converts itself to God. It's just to the body, simul. It's receding from one place, you know, and acceding to another. So the guy who's at the school is, what, the term from which, right? And the mother's at the term to which, describe it differently. Warver. Hey, this guy's got five objections, what? Isn't that something like I heard, like I said, it may not be the same thought, but I mean, it's, the motion's the same, it's just the term of it. Yeah, yeah. You've got to be careful there, right, huh? For me to go from my house to the monastery, and to go from the monastery to my house, is that the same motion? No, the same motion, the same road. Yeah, same road. Those days didn't have. It was split highways, yeah. It's funny, huh? Thomas's got five objections here, right? Now, usually he just has three objections, huh? Moreover, a form which receives more and less, right? Like heat, right? Successively is received in a subject, right? That's when I put the water on in the morning, and make tea, you know? It's cold. It's gradually so, right, huh? And wait till it whistles at me, you know, so. Okay? It whistles, you know. It's pretty. Okay? Just as it's clear about whiteness and blackness, right, huh? But grace receives more and less, as has been said above. Therefore, it's not received subito in subject. Not at once, huh? The church doesn't canonize somebody subito either, do they? Doesn't mean it's right. Since, therefore, for the justification of the impious has required the infusion of grace, it seems that justification of the impious cannot be in the, what, instant, huh? Instant is the indivisible of time, right, huh? But now in the strict sense, huh? To the third, it should be said, huh? This is not the reason wherefore a form is not received subito in matter, right? Because it can be more and less, huh? For thus light would not be received subito in error, right? So you have the same example, right? Which can be more or less enlightened, right, huh? But the reason is taken on the part of the disposition of matter, or the subject has been said, huh? Well, that's something that I look for the body corpus of the thing, too. So we'll let Thomas pass, temporary pass here, right? Okay. It's not going to get out. It gets every three. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Well, then, moreover, the motion of free will, this fourth objection, which concurs, right, runs together for the, what, just in case of the impious, is meritorious, right? And thus is necessary that it proceeds from grace, without which nothing is, what, meritorious. But before is it something that achieves the form, then that acts according to the form. And therefore, before grace is poured in, and afterwards, the free will is moved in God, and in the detesting of what's in. Therefore, justification is not all at once, right? Okay. To the fourth, it should be said that in the same instant in which the form is acquired, the thing begins to operate according to the form, just as far the minute it, what, is generated. And once when it's generated, it moves, what, upwards. And its motion would be instantaneous if it were completed in the same, what, instant. But the motion of free will, which is to will, is not successive, but what? Instantaneous, huh? That's going to be said, it says in the body of the article. And therefore, it's not necessary that the justification of the impious be, what, successive, huh? Look at that reply to the fifth objection. That looks beautiful. It's going to be so nourishing, huh? You can see that. Now, moreover, if grace is poured into the soul, the fifth objection, it's necessary that there be some instant, be given, in which it first is in the soul. Likewise, if guilt is remitted, it's necessary for there to be a last instant to give. Yeah, this is the one that Aristotle solves, right? It must be given, in which the man is what's subject to guilt, right? But it cannot be the same instant, because then opposites would be together in the same thing, right? Therefore, it's necessary for the two instances to be succeeding each other, among which, according to the philosopher, in the sixth...