Prima Secundae
Lecture 295: Wisdom, Discourse, and the Divine Attributes

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In the name of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, Guardian Angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. Dios, gracias. God, our enlightenment, Guardian Angels, drink the lights of our minds, or the luminary images, and arouse us to consider more quickly. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor. Pray for your rest. Help us to understand what you have written. Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, amen. Let's get a little scriptural thing here, if you don't. My little thing here. St. John's Gospel has three accounts of Christ's appearance to the apostles after his resurrection. And the first one is when he appears to all of them except for the doubting Thomas, right? And the second one is when he appears with the doubting Thomas being there, right? And the third one is in this chapter 21, right? He doesn't appear to all 11 of them, but he appears to how many? Well, Andrew's not there. Andrew's not there. I'll show you where I am. I believe it's six. Minus five. It seems to me there's five or six, but I don't know. There is seven. Seven. Oh, I should have known. Now, let me give it to you, right? The first one is Simon Peter, right? Second is Thomasa, the twin, right? Okay. Now, the third one is Nathaniel from Cana, or Caldea. Now, is Nathaniel one of the 12 apostles? Yeah. But he has listed on that name of Bartholomew. What? Yeah. Some say that Nathaniel is the same as Bartholomew, right? Now, Nathaniel appears earlier in the Gospel of John, right? And it's Philip that, what, tells him about him, right? And so I was curious about that. I was talking to Warren about it. He thought that Nathaniel was the same as Bartholomew. But anyway, I looked it up in the little Catholic encyclopedia there, right, to see what they said. And they gave the, they said that it's generally accepted. He's the same as Bartholomew, right? And one thing they point to is this chapter here, right, that he's among all these other apostles, right? And the other thing they point to is how he was so, what, dramatic, his introduction to Christ. And they always seem to be one of the apostles, right? And the third thing was, I guess, in the enumeration of the 12 apostles, right? They're kind of enumerated in pairs, you know? And he's always, Nathaniel's always enumerated with, in Bartholomew, right, I mean. He's always enumerated with Philip, yeah, Philip and Bartholomew, right? And it's the same order, apparently, in all three Gospels, the synoptic Gospels, right? And so they, they, and the tradition of the Church, I guess, has been that he is Nathaniel, right? Okay. So you've got Peter, Thomas, the twin, and Calmer, the Thomas' daughter. Nathaniel, right, from Cana, huh? Of course, in John, it's the only account of the Gospels, the miracle of Cana, huh? And John's thing here. That's three, right? And the two of Zebediah, which would be James and John. And then others from the, another two from the, what? Disciples. It doesn't name them, though, okay? So that makes how many? Seven, okay? Now, is there significance in the number, what, seven, huh? I guess it's a number that signifies perfection, right? I don't know exactly why, but it does, huh? And so we in the Church Fathers here in the Katana Aria, they all stop upon and observe that there's seven there, and that this, among other things, means that those who are going to build up the Church, right, are seven because they're, what, moved by the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit, right? Of course, you have seven sacraments, which is another example of seven, and the Ten Commandments, we put three and seven, right? We put seven, so there's a lot of examples of seven, right? Philosophies divide into seven parts, you may know, okay? Three parts of looking philosophy, three parts of practical philosophy, and then logic, right? There's seven. And it says in Scripture, you know, there are seven angels that stand before God, and so it's a symbol of wisdom, right? You know the connection between wisdom and reason, right? Wisdom is the highest perfection in reason, right? But what's the age of reason? Seven. Seven, yeah, yeah. And Thomas says that the square of a number has the same significance as the first number. What's seven times seven, which is the year when Aristotle said the mind is passed at the age of 49. And how old was Thomas when he died? 49, huh? The date seemed to be 1225 to 1274, so that's only to be 49, right? Very appropriate, right? And so all the church fathers stopped upon the seven apostles, right? It's kind of striking, because you've got, you know, almost the full contingency in the first two ones, right? And except for, you know, Judas, of course, and Thomas is missing the first time, but not the second time. But here you have to have seven, right? So they're very struck by that, right? Of course, you know how at the end of the seventh, the 21st chapter there, Christ kind of foretells Peter that he's going to be crucified, right? And then he turns and he says, what about, yeah, yeah, yeah. And Christ says, well, I want him to remain until I come. What's that to you, right? And so you're struck here by the, you know, the nearness of Peter and what, John, right? The two that run to the tomb, right, huh? And you see it here, right? And that, you're very familiar with it, yeah. And then the Acts of the Apostles, you find them very closely associated in the early church and so on. So I said, gee, let's actually really reread the next, you know, scripture reading here, the canonical epistles, right, huh? Okay. So I started, you know, reading the first, the canonical epistles, right? Now, how many canonical epistles are there? Yeah. Ha, ha, ha, ha, ha. No. Yeah, I see. That was my reward, right, for reading the Contenium Orient, the Church Fathers, talking about the seven people at the third appearance, right? Because it's significant if you have just three appearances. That's enough, right? Three is the first number about which we say, what, all. And all is like whole, and all is like whole, therefore, right? Which is, as Aristotle says in the third book of the, what, natural hearing, the so-called physics third book, that whole and perfect mean almost the same, right? Well, I was thinking about all those things, and then I started reading the first of these ones, which is the one of, what, James, huh? Apparently this is not James, the son of Zebediah. No. This is the other James, right, huh? And so, there's a couple little things here that's, you know, from this particular, no, I got my bookmark in there. That's what I'm looking at right there. Okay. He's talking in the very beginning, huh? First verses here about take it all joy when you run into things and so on, and how this produces what? Endurance and so on, right? Okay. But here he says, Endurance, huh? Has a ergon, a work, teleon, a perfect work, right? In order that you might be, what, teleoi, this is perfect, right? Kai, holo, klei, right? Yeah, yeah. Now, holo, klei, right, is a very demonstrative way of saying, oh, that all the parts are there, there's nothing missing whatsoever, right? And he goes on to say in the same sentence, huh? In maidenly, in nothing, leipomenoi, wanting nothing, right? So he uses a very strong word there for whole, holo, klei, right? If you look it up, it gives us meaning, you know, whole. And then later meaning perfect, right? So much, those two come together, right? But just like Aristotle there, as I said, in the third book of natural hearing, where he says perfect and whole mean almost the same thing, right? He says... He says... Te leoi, te leoi, kai holo klei roi. Perfect, and they translate holo klei roi, entire, right? Okay. Wanting and nothing, right? So you have those two... Yeah, yeah. But very joined, like Aristavo joins. And Thomas has always coined that text of Aristavo. And it's more clear, you know, to see that the whole is more perfect than a part, right? A whole car is more perfect than a part of a car. A whole chair is more perfect than an arm or a leg of the chair, you know? And in general, right? You know, in Quebec, they'd say, repas complais. That means a little appetizer made for us and some kind of dessert. Maybe just jello, but there's... Here's the three parts, right? And you get the number three, yeah. I was kind of playing around, you know, how I remark how the chapter 28 is where Thomas begins to talk about the affection of God, which is a perfect number, 28. I was talking about the chapter 21 in the last chapter. It's three times, what? Three times seven. Well, of course, I guess the chapters go back to the University of Paris, right? Nevertheless, that's kind of a nice way to remember chapter 21, huh? So, you see the harmony there between Aristotle there and the third book of the physics or the natural hearing as it says in the Greek and the first epistle here of James, huh? Okay. Now, okay. This is, again, chapter one here, but it's verse, what, 17, which is 10 plus 7, right? As far as I know, the numbers that they usually attribute us to perfection to is three, most of all, right? And Aristotle in the book on the universe says that we use the number three in praising God because perfection is the number three. And some thought Aristotle was talking about the Trinity, you know, but Thomas says no. Three has that natural perfection, right? But three, Aristotle says, is the first number about which we say, what? All. And that's, all means almost the same thing as you've got the whole, right? And so that's perfection. And then seven, like we're talking about there from the last chapter in John, right? And 10 is also sometimes said to have perfection, right? And 100 and 1,000, right? Because they're multiples. What's interesting, 10 is three plus what? Seven. And Augustine explains the numbers. Sometimes he takes the, what, factors, and sometimes he takes the parts, right? So he might explain the significance of 10 from three and seven. More like when he talked about the apostles, you know, there are 12. And he says, well, 12 is three times four. And they preach the Trinity to the four corners of the world, right? That's one of the things he does, right, huh? Okay. So 17 is 10 plus seven, right? But anyway, I give you this. But anyway, that's not the point here. But you know how we always say God, our enlightenment, huh? Is there a starting thing here? So he says, every giving, every good giving, right? Passa dosis agathe. And every, what, perfect gift. Pan doema. Teleyan, huh? Is from above, right, huh? Katabainon. Kata. Coming down. Apu tu patras, huh? Ton foton, huh? The father of lights, yeah. So it's good to be, you know, father of lights. And guess what the rest of that sentence is? Change, yeah. No change. Yeah. With whom has no place there's not any paralaga, that's one of the words for change in Greek, para-alaga. Paralaga. Or tropes, which means turning, right? I was saying to Warren on the phone, I was saying, we're always turning our mind to something else, right? God. Like turning a channel. Yeah, yeah, yeah. But God's mind never turns, you know, one direction, you know? My friend, Washington Irving, you know, uses the expression, you know, for some people, their turn of mind, right, huh? He's like, God doesn't have any turn of mind, right? There's no change, huh? No change. There's no, what, aposchiasma, no shadow, huh? Not even, what, least amount, you might say, of change, right, huh? Okay? Now, usually that's the text that the most common authority to say that God is unchanging. I mean, the army of authority, right? It's always, Thomas always quotes this chapter, this verse here, 17, huh? It's a beautiful thing there because it just tells us how it's the perfect gift coming down from, the light of reason, the light of faith, you know, the light of glory, all these wonderful gifts, right? They're all wonderful in their own way, right? And they all come down from the Father of Lights. What a marvelous name that is, right? You were darkness once and now you're light, you know, as they say. Yeah, it's a beautiful, beautiful thing. Beautiful thing. Okay. Many years ago, he was trying to study to be an amateur magician and he asked me what a who's any number between one and ten. I said three. He goes, aha! Do you know that from what I've been learning that that is the number that almost everybody, that most people choose? Yeah, yeah. Which is interesting to tell that it's a little bit. Yeah. And I know that you do. Yeah. Now, I'm not saying to Warren today, I'm saying, I've tied the knot, I said. Well, I'll give you this a little bit. In fact, I'm interesting. I'm chatting a little bit about what wisdom is, right? So we spoke before about the connection between reason and wisdom, right? Because wisdom is the, what, highest perfection of reason, huh? Now, reason, as you know from Shakespeare, is the ability for large discourse, looking before and after, right? Now, whose discourse is the largest of all? No God, no motion God. We just have the, not even the shadow of change in God. no discourse in God. no. I wouldn't say the angels do much. What about the word between discourse? Well, interestingly, I was thinking about the word discourse, which comes from the act of the legs, right? It means running, right? Okay? And, you know, why did you take it from running? Well, it's because of the swiftness of the mind compared to the movement of the body, huh? I can go over here to the moon right now, right? Or go to Earth, to Mars, a little bit right now, in my mind, right? I can't do that with my body very quickly. I can go over here to my house right now, you know, in my mind. You're the best. Whoa. Yeah, I mean, compared to my body, you know? Yeah, yeah. Driving right there. And, but, you know, so the word we use for the mind, Herman Purchase's definition of reason is the ability to understand reason and order yourself and others. Well, understanding goes back to what? Standing under. Comes with the legs again, right? Yeah? So discourse from the Latin word for running, which is an act of the legs and understand in English comes from to stand it seems to me, huh? You stand under something, huh? That's kind of interesting, huh? So whose discourse then, right, is the largest, huh? Yeah, yeah. in how many of the six senses of large, there are six senses which a discourse could be said to be large, remember? Of course, this has to be divided into what? Yeah, to see how there could be six senses, right? And there were, first of all, what? A discourse could be called large because it's about the large, right? Or it could be called large because it, its limit, its beginning or end is large, right? Or it could be called large because the discourse itself is long. Each of those can be divided into two, right? When you say the discourse of reason is about the large, you could mean that it covers a large area. That is to say it's a discourse about the universal. The universal is a set of many things, right? Or it can be a discourse about large in the sense of great things, right? Large as opposed to small, as in small talk. Talk about little and important things, right? And so to give the full power of what reason can do, right, you've got to see they can have a discourse about the universal and about the infinity of things, right? When I say no odd number is even, right, I've got an infinity of things being covered there, right? But I could also have a discourse about great things like the universe, right? And Gael Leal says the whole is better than the part. So a discourse about the universe is greater than any other discourse, but God is even better than the universe, right? But we can have either a discourse about the soul and even about God, right? That shows a magnificent power of reason, huh? Now in another sense, the discourse can be called large because it's what? Beginning or end is large, right? Either because, you know, like I heard the expression sometimes, but we're not thinking of Shakespeare's definition at all, but they speak of a large induction, right? So just, you know, for many signatures, right? You're inducing a universal. Or they speak of a, what? Principle that has many applications, right? Okay. I always take a simple example, you know, the mathematical, what, equation. Force equals mass times acceleration. We can deduce the infinity of, what, forces and masses from that, right? Based substituting numbers in. I mean, the whole is more than a part. That extends to infinity of things, too, right? And then the third way that a discourse can be large is because it's long. Either that you go through many steps, right? Or you go between things that are very far apart, right? Okay. So, in these six senses of large, in what senses is the discourse of the wise man larger than anybody else's discourse? Yeah. It's about the most universal, right? So Aristotle shows that wisdom is about being in one, right? Which is said of everything that is, whatsoever, right? But also it's about the greatest thing, because it's about the first cause, which is God, right? About the immaterial substances, the angels and so on, right? So it's about the largest things in both senses, right? The most universal things and the best or greatest things, okay? Now, you know, when Monsignor D'Anne was lecturing on a texture of Albert the Great, huh? He says, some sciences depend upon experience, like natural science, political philosophy, and so on. Others you can do in your head, like geometry, right? The experience of these things, you're not going to find a flat surface out there anyway. Okay? But then he gave wisdom as among those that depend upon experience. See? Monsignor D'Anne said, what does he mean by experience here? He said, he doesn't mean the experience of being! Hell no! The experience means you're getting something more universal from what? From many more particular things, right? And all the lesser sciences, right, are the experience that's required for the wise man before he begins wisdom, huh? So in that sense, the discourse of the wise man is the largest, right? From the many things you have to have, right? To do wisdom, okay? It's also, because of its universality is going to, and its causes that extend to all things, is going to be, what, applicable everywhere, right? So, its beginning and its end is infinite, right? Now, what about the remaining two senses? Well, the discourse of the wise man doesn't necessarily go through the most steps. I think the geometry might go through more steps, you know? People say, I want to know the Pythagorean theorem. Well, that's Proposition 47, the one I know. You've got to do most of these before, not all of them, right? And it goes on and on and on, the chain gets longer and longer. But that's not really perfection, you have to go through many steps to get to something, right? But the wise man reasons from motion, which hardly is. It's the act of what is able to be, insofar as it's still able to be, it's hardly an act. And he reasons all the way to God, who is the, what, first act? The pure act, huh? So, in five of these senses, his discourse is what? The largest, right? Now, going back to the first two senses there, why should the discourse of the wise men be about not only the best things, right, but about the most universal things, huh? Why should the same man have the largest discourse in those two senses? Because they're two different things, aren't they? Why should he discourse about what is said of all, like being, huh? And also, he'd be about the best things, huh? The greatest things, huh? Why should he, why should he do those two? Well, the best thing turns out to be the first cause of all things. So, his causality extends to all things. So, obviously, he's going to talk about the best thing and the first cause. He's got to talk about the, what, all things to know what his causality extends to, right? God is the cause of being as beings, okay? So, all things tie together, right? Okay. Okay. Now, I'm just going to lead up to the great discovery of Burkwest, okay? But you have to have these things in mind, right, huh? Okay. Now we go to the second part of the definition there, the last part of the definition of reason, huh? Looking before and after, right? Looking before and after, right? As we pointed out, looking before and after includes looking for what? Distinctions. And I base that upon the axiom of before and after. That nothing is before or after itself. So, you must see some distinction between what is before and what is after before you can see that this is before what? That, huh? Okay? If you can't distinguish between water and wine, you can't say wine is better than water or vice versa, can you? Now, if you take the wise man insofar as his knowledge involves a discourse about the most universal things, and about being, I guess, right? Okay. What are the first distinctions of being that the wise man has? I mean, set aside the distinction between being as such and accidental being, right? But what are the two main distinctions of being as such? It's Aristotle for solace. What are the two fundamental distinctions of being as such? No, it was to say that, you know, the accidental being and even being in reason only, right? I mean, take being in general. What are the two main distinctions of being in general? Hmm? That gets into, none being is being only in reason, right? I told you how my old teacher, Kasirik, used to joke about philosophy only subject you can get paid for. for talking about nothing. You can make a true statement about nothing and say nothing is nothing, right? Nothing is not something. Something is not nothing. You can't get something out of nothing. You can't get nothing out of something yet. You know? Well, one of the two main distinctions is the distinction of being according to the figures of what? Predication of being set up, right? And this is the distinction of being into substance, quantity, quality, relation. There's six more, which are much less important, but especially those first four, right? Substance, quantity, quality, relation, right? Aristotle is much more about concrete. What it is, how many or how much, how it is, towards what, right? Okay? But those four, right? That's the distinction of being according to the figures of predication, right? Yeah, yeah. And so, in the seventh and the eighth books of wisdom, he talks about substance, mainly, right? And in the ninth book, he talks about ability and act, right? Now, I've already touched upon a little bit of, not only the distinction of substance, quantity, quality, relation, but the, what, order of them, right? Because he puts substance before accidents, right? And in some ways, quantity seems to be closer to substance than quality, at least those qualities that presuppose quantity. Like the sense qualities, right? And like shape, right? That presupposes quantity, right? Okay? And those powers that have a body organ, right? And so on. And quantity and quality come before what? Relation, right? Because some relations are based upon quantity, like double and half. And some upon qualities, like father and son, teacher and student, and so on, right? Okay? Now in the ninth book of wisdom, which is my favorite book of wisdom, I'll tell you it to God, of course. But there, the book has, of course, three parts, right? Okay? And this is marvelous where Aristotle's ordered this, huh? In the first part, he talks about the distinction of abilities for motion. So it's a more particular consideration, right? Okay? He's not talking about any act except, what, motion and the ability for that act called motion. And so the fundamental distinction is between the ability to be moved and the ability to move another, right? Okay? And then he distinguishes between the natural ability to move others and the rational ability to move others, right? Because the natural ability is limited to one and the rational ability is open to opposites, right? I can, you know, the problem there with doing even the toast, right? And how much you toast it, you can burn it, right? Okay? Doctor can save your life and end it, you know? Yeah. Okay? Then what's he doing in the second part? Well, then he ascends to a universal consideration, complete universal consideration of act, right? And then you see that there are many senses of act other than motion, even though that's the sense that's most known to us. He started that, right? Things in motion, so we catch the guy and what that stirs and that's where we start. And so you find out that, what? There's an act called, what? Form. So the shape of the chair is the act of the wood, right? And then you find out that there are operations that are not really motions. As Aristotle points out, you know, when you're walking home, you haven't walked home yet. But when you understand something, you've understood it. When you love someone, you've loved them. Okay? When you see something, you've seen it. You've heard something, you've heard it. But when you're walking home, you haven't walked home yet. So you see the difference between motion and what Thomas calls operation, right? But a perfect act as opposed to this imperfect act as motion. And the distinction between motion and what form, right? So he has a universal consideration of act. And then there appears other senses of ability in addition to those that he saw in the first part, right? Well, it's got to be a third part to complete the work of looking before and after, which is to look before and after. And in the third part of the ninth book, he shows all the ways in which act is before what? Ability, huh? It's before it in knowledge, right? It's before it in goodness or perfection, right? It's before it in what? A cause, huh? Well, the only way that ability is before act is that the thing that goes from ability to act is an ability before it's in act. But it goes from ability to act because it's something already in act. So simply, Aristotle sees that ability is after act, right? And therefore, the first cause must be, pure act will eventually be reasoned out in the twelfth book where he finally talks about God, right? See? Now, let's come back now to my favorite book, the Summa Contra Gentiles, right, huh? Where does he begin? Well, you've got to know that God exists otherwise there's not going to be any theology if God doesn't exist, right? So, he's going to reason to the existence of God, right? And in the Summa Contra Gentiles if you compare it to the Summa Theologiae, right, he not only begins as he does in the Summa or the Summa, from what? The argument for motion that Aristotle developed, but he, the first two arguments, right, are from motion in the Summa Contra Gentiles. The Summa Theologiae just takes the first of those two ways, so there's an emphasis upon, you know, reasoning from motion, right, and then there's other arguments that were difficult to see, right? But he arrives at God, right, huh, okay? And then he starts to generalize it, right, to realize that this is in accord with act being before what? Ability, right? And so he comes to understand what do you think the first thing he knows about God? If God is pure act. Good friend here, St. James said, huh? He's unchanging, right? Now if you go back to the definition of motion, it's the act of what is able to be as far as able to be. So if you know the definition of motion from natural philosophy, the first thing that strikes you if God is pure act, there's no motion, right? Okay? And it's a little more difficult to see that God is all together what? Simple. He's not put together in any way, right? But that's quite as quick to see that as an ocean, isn't it? But he says if God is put together, one part would be to the other part his ability to act if it was say matter and form, right? Or if it was substance and being, right? Or at least all the parts would be to the whole of God his ability to act. So there's two ways, right? It's something you put together, right? Okay? So when I put together, you know, the letters C, A, and T, right? Well, you can't say that one letter is to the other part his ability to act, right? But the three letters are to the word cat his ability is to act, right? But if I put to make a chair, then what? The shape of the chair is to the wood as act is to ability, right? So there's got to be some ability in what's put together, right? Passive ability, right? The ability to be actualized, that is to say, right? Not the ability to act upon something, huh? Okay? Well, therefore, if God is pure act, he's completely simple. There's no composition, okay? And now he can argue to the third thing, right? That God is what? Perfect and therefore good, yeah? And he can argue from what? That act is better than ability, right? So if God is pure act, right? His being itself, he has all the perfection of being. And there are many other ways you can argue that's kind of marvelous when you see the Greek word here in Aristotle or in James, the Greek word for perfect there is teleos, which comes from the Greek word for in, telos. Well, Aristotle shows in the ninth book, of course, that act is the end of what? Yes, or perfect, the ability, right? And if God is the end of the whole universe, universe, then he's most perfect, right? So there's many ways of seeing this. So act is the perfection of ability, right? And the whole is perfection of the parts, right? So he's got those three things perfectly ordered, right? And Berkowitz likes the idea of three, right? But now the great problem for Berkowitz who likes to emphasize the rule of two or three or both. And I'm not a fanatic about this rule. I mean, I always say, you know, that a rule can be very useful if it's true for the most part, right? Even if there's an occasional exception, right? So I would defend, you know, the usefulness of the rule of two or three or both, right? Even if there's some exceptions to this, right? Some distinctions that must be understood as more than three and can't be understood as being three or two in any way, right? I'm not saying there is, but there was, right? So being, you know, fanatic about this rule, I'm a little bit shocked. You're a fundamentalist. Yeah. I'm a little bit shocked or scandalized, right? That Thomas in both Summas divides the consideration of the substance of God before you take up his what? Operations, right? Into five, right? And the order's a little different in the two, right? It's into five. So you have the, to take the order in the Summa Contra Gentiles, you have God is unchanging, right? God is simple, not composed in any way. God is perfect and therefore good, right? And then that he's what? There's only one God. And then that he's what? Infinite, huh? In the Subma Theologiae, it was a little different. You should take up first that he's what? Simple. And then that he's what? Perfect, right? Then that he's infinite. Then that he's unchanging. Then that he's what? One, right? So Perquist is really, you know, really, really, really, really scratching his head, you know. Well, maybe this is the, the, this is really, you know. How did Thomas? The Exception. Yeah, yeah. This is the, this is, this is. The financialist, yeah. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So. So the occasional rule of five. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. But Perquist, you know, noticed something about this, right? Because sometimes to one of these five, something is attached, right? Now, when Thomas takes up, for example, that God is unchanging, like our friend James said here, right? He attaches to that in consideration of the eternity of God, right? See? And that's very clear to a man who studied natural philosophy because he knows that there's a connection between motion and, what, time. And things that have, you know, begin to be or cease to be are measured by time, right? Things that are in motion. So if you take away motion, you negate motion, you've got to negate time, right? So, that's why you arrive at eternity is to unchanging things, like being in time is to motion, right? And so the definition of motion, we say that there's no beginning and no end, I mean, it's the end of eternity, and there's no before and after, right? In the way, if he says that eternity is the, what, totusimus perfecta possessio vitae interminabilis, right? It's the all-at-once and perfect possession of an ending life. It's a life that has no beginning, no end. And a life that has no before and after in it, huh? Yeah, we're going to partake of that eternal life, huh? It's strange. It's going to be interesting, you know? Our minds really, you know, those men are for theyself, and our hearts are restless till they rest. It's true about our mind, too, huh? Our mind is restless, huh? Discourse all the time. Pointing from one thing to another. Turning your attention all the time. Right? In God, there's no purpose, no turning, huh? So I noticed that, right, huh? Well, then I noticed that when Thomas talks about the infinity of God, right? You have to point out that he's not infinite, like a body that goes on, you know, length and depth, right? Even though sometimes, metaphorically, God has said to, you know, go on like that. He talks about the infinity of God in terms of its, like it's almost a property of its, what, perfection. God's perfection is, what, endless, right? See? And it's not end in that sense of the limit of a continuous thing, right? But it's not limited to any genus, right? It's not limited to an end that's other than itself, right? It's the end of all things, and so on. So I said, well, maybe you could say that the infinity could be attached to what? God's being, what, perfect, huh? Nah, now it's not. Now you're collapsing. Yeah, yeah. Now I see. And one could be reduced to his being, what? It's quite simple. Now, he had a brother in the religious life theory, Reginald, I guess it was. What was Reginald? Anyway, who, you know, was kind of assigned to help him, you know, and write things down sometimes for him and so on. And this guy wanted to get a little summary of theology that I could, you know, carry around with me and consult it in my free moments, you know, because it's kind of interesting, this stuff. And so he wrote the Compendium of Theology, right? Well, you pick up the Compendium of Theology, and the unity of God is in the treatise on his, what, simplicity. Now I've got the God. Ah! You've got the new super division. So we can say, can we reduce the treatise and stuff to five parts, right? Three parts, and you put the unity of God with the simplicity of God in that part, and the infinity of God with his, what, perfection, right? Okay? Some people used to wonder, you know, you'd say, what's happening? We're just looking at God. Why don't you get bored after a while? But you'll realize that the perfection of God is endless, right? You're never going to be bored with this person. This person's, okay? But still, you know, why didn't Thomas do that in the Summa Contra Gentiles then, right? Because he seemed like doing something like that at Parstides in the Compendium, right? I said, why did he do this, you know? I said, Dwayne was puzzled right then, okay? Well, let's go back now to the second division of what being is such, or the other division of being is such, which is into substance, quantity, quality, relation. Four. Four, sorry. Four. Four, okay. Now, in logic, of course, we would distinguish between, you know, substance and accidents, right? And the accident would be divided into those three, right? Or it could divide action again into two again, absolute and relative. Okay? So there's no problem. Thomas divides the ten categories. He divides them always into two or what? Three. If he first divides them into three, then he could divide them into two. That's why I give the rules two or three or both, right? You could divide it into substance and accident, right? Or as Thomas divides it, according to the figures of predication, what is said of individual substances as regards what they are, something outside of what they are, but in them, and something outside of them, right? Into three. Then he subdivides always into two or three. Perfect. Perfect. Perfect. Perfect. Perfect. Perfect. Perfect. Perfect. Perfect. Perfect. Perfect. Perfect. Thomas doesn't goof there at all. Okay? But why the hell does he do what he does here, see? He was writing. Now, to puzzle me, right? Now. Wait till Bergman gets to be 80, then he'll figure it out. Yeah. Well, Thomas says, you know, when he takes up the simplicity of God, one of the articles you'll find in the Summa, two Summas, that God is not in any genus. He's not confined to any genus, right? When you're in a genus, you're really stuck, right? If you're a dog, you're in the genus of substance, and you can't get in the genus of quality, right? And if you're the knowledge of triangles, we call it geometry, and so on, that's a quality, right? And that's where it is. You can't get out of there, right? Yeah. Yeah. And they kind of used to like the thing. It's kind of a, you know, one of these strange... things for an abstract term, predicament, right? That's what the, you know, Albert the Great's work on the Category Zero Style is the predicament teach, right? I can bring it in here, I'll be bringing it in someday. And it goes back to the Latin word, you know, to be said of, right? I just got somehow into daily speech, right? I'm in a predicament, you know, my, you know, I can't fuck my income tax or something, I'm in a terrible predicament, I'm going to jail or something. And there's no way out, you know? But that's what a predicament is, right? There's no way out, huh? See? Well, God's not in any, what? Genus, right? He's not confined to any of these genera. But whatever there is of perfection, you know, in any of these genus, God has it, right? Okay? He has the perfections of all genera in a simple, what? Well, amazing, amazing, amazing one, huh? God is really amazing. Okay? Well, now what do you say, right? See? When you talk about the substance of God before his operations, right, huh? It's like the distinction between substance and quality, right? When you get into God's operations, then you get something like quality, right? Except it's not confined to that genus. So you learn that God is wise. Even Aristotle is talking about God alone being wise, right? Only God in the full sense, right? God is just, right? God is merciful. God has the ability to understand, right? He is understanding. He has will, you know, Jews and so on. Well, these are all things that in us are qualities, right? But in God, they're the very, what? Substance of God, right? But notice they correspond in a way to our genus of, what? Quality, right? And then followed upon that, you begin to see there are certain relations in God. Now, because God makes the universe and so on, there's relation of God, which is not actually real, real relations, it's relation of reason. But the creatures are really related to God, right? And then because of that, we speak of a relation of God to them, but it's according to reason, right? Because Aristotle first saw that possibility, right? He says that knowledge is relative to knowable. Knowledge is knowledge of something, right? And then that something is said to be, what, knowable by knowledge, right? But that's not real relation on the part of the thing known. But I have a real relation to the thing I know, okay? So God doesn't, the creatures have a real relation to God, but not face-to-face. That's very hard to understand, right? And then you find out, the last thing you study is the Trinity, right? And you have to understand the Trinity in terms of relations, right? Father and Son, okay? And in terms of what? You know, the Son proceeding by way of understanding and the Holy Spirit by way of love and so on. And that presupposes what was like qualities, right? Okay? Now, you might say, but is there anything corresponding to quantity in God? See? Because quantity would seem to be either discrete quantity, right? Or continuous quantity. Well, there's no continuous quantity in God, because God is not a body, right? You see, not a surface or a line, right? And there can't be number in God, because the number arises from the division, the continuous. And because the continuous is divisible forever, number can go on forever, right? So at first sight, there might seem to be nothing corresponding at all to quantity, right? But maybe there's a certain, what? Dim likeness, huh? You know, let me ask you this question, right? How many legs do you have? Yeah. And how many hands do you have? And how many heads do you have? Now, I don't find any difficulty in saying that last question, right? Just one, right? Now, someone might say that when I ask it about your head, I'm asking a lawyer's question, right? Lawyer's question. Have you stopped beating your wife? You know, that was a kind of standard thing, right? And if you say yes, well, then you seem to be admitting that you had been beating her in the past, right? If you say no, and you're still beating her, either case, you're guilty of something, right? You see? Now, strictly speaking, that's an appearance, right? Because either I have stopped beating my wife or I have not. It's got to be one or the other. Now, if you ask me, Duane, maybe, if you stop beating your wife, I would say no, if you want to speak truth. Because since I've never even done so, I haven't stopped, right? But the Irish person would think if I say I haven't stopped beating her, I'm still beating her, right? Okay. So you might say, you know, when I ask you, how many heads do you have, right? Well, many means a number, right? So I'm really asking you, what is the number of your heads? It is no number of your heads, because one is not strictly speaking a number, right? That's why Shakespeare says, you know, the number was killed by love, because it made the lovers one, you know? And the reason is puzzled by this, you know? But anyway, so what are you going to say, you know? Well, you see, one, strictly speaking, is not a number. A number is a multitude composed of units, right? Or measured by the unit. But proportionally, right, you could see a certain likeness of one to a number. And by proportion, meaning a likeness or ratio, so one can be to a number just like a number is to a number. So one is to two, as three is to, one is to two, as three is to, yeah. So one can be to a number, two, like a number three is to number six, right? So there's a likeness there between one and what? Number, right? Yeah. Okay. It's analogous. It's not, it's equivocal to call one a number. But it's not equivocal by chance, right? There's a likeness there. And so that's why I don't find myself, you know, forced to say, how many heads do you have, right? Say, say, well, I don't have any heads. You know, I don't think I have to do that because I'm kind of already thinking of one as being like a number, right? So one is like a discrete, what? Quantity, like a number. And then, what? Infinity. Now, I was looking today again at the Fourth Lateran Council there, and Thomas, you know, has a work on the Fourth Lateran Council. And, of course, there God is called immense. Yeah. See? Yeah. See? But if I say it's an immense mountain, you know, I go back to the definition there of reason. Remember how we said that large is what? Opposed to small. And one sense of small is that found in the expression small talk. And opposed to small in that sense is large in the sense of what? Great, yeah? So I may speak of a great mountain in the ninth. That's quantity in the strict sense, right? Great mountain. But then I speak of a great man. Abraham Lincoln was a great man, or George Washington is a great man or something. Then it's a different sense, right? But is it completely equivocal? How large is God? Yeah. But you can speak of how large God is, right? See? Yeah. And maybe even more cleared in English with how great is God, right? I mean, isn't there a song where the words go? Yeah. Yeah. And when Thomas talks about the infinity of God, he speaks of what? Spiritual magnitude, right? Well, magnitude is originally the name of what? Continuous what? Quality, right? So in saying that God is one, and saying God is infinite, right, has some remote likeness to discrete quantity with one, number, and continuous quantity with what? Infinite.