Prima Secundae
Lecture 263: Rational Causes of Ceremonial Precepts and Sacrifices

Transcript
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Go to question 102. Then we're not to consider about the causes of these ceremonial what? Precepts, huh? And about this, four things are asked. I'm sure you all have asked these things, huh? But notice, the first two of these are more, what, general than the last four, about those four ones that he had in the previous, what, article, right? So first, whether these ceremonial precepts have a cause. You didn't know that, Thomas, or not, huh? Okay. And if they do, whether they have a cause in the letter or only a, what? Yeah. I'm always trying to be careful of that word, literal, right? Because we use it in a different way, huh? When we talk about the literal sense of scripture, I think people are eliminating, what, metaphor from that, right? But Thomas says that's the sense of the letter. So I like to translate literal sense to sense of the letter rather than literal sense because we use literal sense in opposition to the figurative sense, right? When you say, the Lord is my rock, you know, is that, what's the sense of the letter? He's a rock? You know? What it signifies is a rock, right? Because in the case of the metaphor, it signifies something which in turn signifies something, right? So that, for Thomas, would still be among the sense of the letter, right? The fundamental sense of the letter. It's not that God is a rock. Well, what that metaphor signifies. So we'll see what that means better when we get to the article. Then the last four is about the cause of the sacrifices, right? The cause of the sacraments. The causes of the, what? Things that are sacred, right? But not sacraments or sacrifices. And the causes of the observances, right? So as Thomas looking before in this question, in the fifth sense, the quotes that Aristotle gives, right? You know, which I leave aside in the second sense, but it's not fifth in order. You see the division later on of grace. He talks about grace in itself and then the causes of grace and then the effects of grace, right? And that's very much looking before and after, right? The thing. To the first end one goes forward thus. It seems that the ceremonial precepts don't have a cause. Because upon that of Ephesians 2, chapter, I mean chapter 2, verse 15. Emptying out the, what? Law. Yeah. That is the glossism. That emptying the old laws regards the, what? Fleshly observances on decrees. That is what? Yeah. Oh, by the decrees. That's the way it was translated very well. Okay. That is by the angelical precepts, which are reasonable, right? Ex ratione. But if the observances of the old law were from reason, in vain, right, would be, what? Emptied or evacuated to the reasonable decrees of the new law. And therefore, should the ceremonial observances of the old law don't have any, what? Reason, right? That makes sense, right? Emptying out that nonsense, right? Meaningless. Meaningless. Moreover, the old law succeeds to the law of what? Nature. But in the law of nature, there was some precept that had no reason except that it might, what? Prove the obedience of man, right? There's some precepts given in the obedience of man was tested, you might say, which had no reason in themselves, right? Moreover, the works of man are called moral, according as they are by reason. If, therefore, there was some reason for the ceremonial precepts, they would not differ from the, what? Moral precepts. It seems, therefore, that the ceremonial precepts do not have any cause. The reason of the, what? The reason for some precept is taken from some cause, right, huh? Okay? This guy always messes the thing up, huh? Doesn't he, huh? But against this is what is said in Psalm 18. The precept of the law is, what? Lucid, huh? Enlightening the eyes, huh? Illuminating the eyes. But the ceremonials are, what? The precepts of God. Therefore, they are lucid. Which would not be unless they had a reasonable cause. Therefore, the ceremonial precepts have a reasonable cause. I remember I started talking about some guy. He says, you don't exercise the mind like you exercise the body. You know, you exercise the body, you don't exercise the mind. I think Gerstau gives us the first meaning there. Or use of the, you know, dialectics, right? You exercise the mind, right? It's exercise the mind, right? Especially if you gave him just the thing here and let him stew for a while before you give him the body of the article, right? So he says, I answer it should be said that since it belongs to the wise man, the wise one to order, right? Sapientis it ordinari. According to the philosopher in the first book of metaphysics. It's in what you call the premium, right? To wisdom. He gives a six-part description of the wise man. And the culminating one is this one here. And Thomas quotes that, you know, in the beginning of the commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics before he divides order into those four that I was talking about and knowledge and the basis of that. And so he quotes what Aristotle says here. It's a very famous statement. He says, why is that? Well, wisdom is the highest perfection of reason and it's proper to reason to no order, right? Therefore, the wise man most of all orders, right? So that's beautiful, right? The wise man most of all looks before and after, right? Yeah. Because they're in false order, yeah. Now, since it belongs to the wise one to order, those things that proceed from divine wisdom must be, what? Ordered, huh? As the apostle says in the Epistle of the Romans, chapter 13, verse 1. Thomas is a quote such on the Latin, quaea deo sunt ordinata sunt, huh? The things which are from God are ordered, right? Now, to this, that some things be ordered, two things are required. First, that they be ordered to a suitable end, which is the beginning of the whole order in things to be done. For those things which happen by chance, huh? Apart from the intention of the end, or which do not come to be for anything seriously, but in play, right, huh? Are said to be in order not done. Disordered, yeah. Yeah. And secondly, it's necessary that that which is ordered to the end be proportioned to the end. And from this, it follows that the reason for those things which are for these. end is taken from the end itself, just as the reason for the disposition of the what? So, is taken from cutting, which is the what? End, as is said in the second book of the what? Yeah. Now it is manifest that the ceremonial precepts, just as all other precepts of the law, are instituted from the divine wisdom. Whence it is said in Deuteronomy 4, this is your wisdom and understanding before the people. Whence it is necessary to say that the precepts, the ceremonial precepts, are ordered to some end? Which we've got to discover, right? From which reasonable causes of them can be what? Able to be assigned, yeah. Okay? Now I think Shakespeare would approve of that, right? That whole article. Especially the first part to the sapientist, ordinary, right? That's where the case of the little thing says, boom, out of order. I don't think that. Now, what about that first one about, it seems that sometimes they don't have any reason for them, right? The first, therefore, it should be said that the observances of the old law can be said to be, what? Without reason, in this regard, huh? That they are what? They don't have a reason in their own, what? Nature, right, huh? For example, that a vestment should not be, what? Yeah. But they can have a reason from their order to something else, right? Insofar as either, what? Something through this is signified, right? Or something is, what? Included. But the decrees of the new law, which especially consist in, what? Faith and love from their very nature are, what? Reasonable acts, huh? This is what we're talking about, you know, the natural law. What is the natural law about, right? Why is it called natural? Well, because it's about things that are, what? By their very nature, good or bad, right, huh? It's about what's naturally good and naturally bad, right? And something that you also, what? Naturally know, right, huh? So the reason there is in the very act itself, right, huh? It pertains to it in itself. But the ones, the new ones, they have their, what, the decrees of the new law, which is especially consistent in faith and love of God, are of their very nature, from their very nature, reasonable acts, right? So is it reasonable to go around killing little lambs, sacrificing them in itself? It might signify something, right? To second, it should be said that the prohibition of the, what, ligni, I guess, the wood or the tree, of the knowledge of good and bad, was not made an account of this, that that tree was naturally, what, bad, huh? But that prohibition had some reason from its order to, what, else. Insofar as through this, something was figured out. And thus also, the ceremonial precepts of the old law have a reason in ordinate agliot, huh? In order to, something else, yeah. To the third, it should be said that moral precepts, secundum sum naturum, according to their very nature, have reasonable, what, causes, as you should not kill, you should not commit theft, and so on. But the ceremonial precepts have reasonable causes ex ordinate agliot, from the order to another, as has been said, right? You all satisfied with that? To the second one goes forward thus, it seems that the ceremonial precepts do not have a literal cause, but a figure of one only. For among the ceremonial precepts, especially our circumcision and the offering up, immolation, of the Paschal Lamb. But immolatio, that's like the burning up, right? I mean, the offering up. The idea is that you destroy it, right? When you make a sacrifice. But both of these do not have except a figural cause. Because each of these is given as a what? Sign. For it said in Genesis 17, verse 11. Chukum chidetis, cut around the flesh, right? The preputium. It might be a sign of your compact between me and what? You, right? The animals in the cattle country. That belongs to me, right? Is that in itself? I mean, if there's nobody else around, why would you do that? You know? But it's a serious matter there in the West to steal my cattle, right? Even one of my cattle, right? If I find my stamp on the one that you've got in your bin, you're going to be, you better, you better explain this. Say the least. Because my sick shooter is coming out. Just taking the law in your own hands with these things. It was okay in those matters. And in the celebration of the, what, Passover? Is that? Phase? Passing over. Exodus 13. This will be a sign in your hand and as we're a monument before your eyes, right? Therefore, much more of the other ceremonials do not have accepted figural causes, even these most important ones. That's the argument from the Morseau. Theodical place, huh? Exercise the mind. Theodical place is useful for that, right? Moreover, effects are, what, proportioned? Should be proportioned to its cause, right? But all the ceremonials are figurala, as was said above, huh? It's question 101, article 2. Therefore, they do not have except a figural cause, huh? Moreover, that which is of itself indifferent with it be done thus or not thus does not seem to have any literal cause. I think a better way of translating that, huh? But some things in the ceremonial precepts, there are some things in the ceremonial precepts, which do not seem to differ whether they have been done thus or thus, as of the number of animals to be offered, and other particular things of this sort's circumstances. Therefore, the precepts of the old law do not have a what? It's funny, I used the word there. But against this, just as the ceremonial precepts figure Christ, right, so also the, what, historic accounts of the old testament. For it is said in 1 Corinthians, omnia and figurum, everything and figure happen to them, right? But in the histories of the old testament, apart from the mystical sense of the figure one, there's also the sense of the, what, letter. Therefore, also the ceremonial precepts, apart from the figural causes, there are also, what, literal causes, huh? Don't leave me here, Thomas, I'll be in confusion the rest of my life. I won't be able to get a good night's sleep because my mind will be, yeah, my mind will, all night long, I'll be thinking about this. Yeah, it would be cruel to leave me without a resolution here. Well, let's see what the Master does, huh? The answer should be said that it has been said above. The reason of those things which are ordered to an end necessarily is taken from the end, right? Now, the end of the ceremonial precepts is twofold. For they are ordered to the worship of God for that time and also to figure in Christ. Just as also the words of the prophets respect or regard the present time, but that they are also said in figure of, what, the future. As the great Jerome says, huh? Who wrote the epistle on the scripture there at the feast of St. Jerome? Which one is that? Who wrote the epistle on the scripture studies that's dedicated to Jerome? He's called the great one of the popes. Yeah, yeah. As Jerome says upon O.C. I like this O.C. He's kind of a good, interesting prophet. If, therefore, the reasons for the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law are, thus, therefore, the reasons for the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law can be taken in two ways, right? In one way, from the reason for the divine worship that was for that time to be observed, huh? And these reasons are said to be, what? Yeah, okay. Or would they pertain to avoiding the cult of idolatry or to, what, removing some? Remembering, yeah. God. Or to insinuate the divine excellence, right? Or to designate some disposition of mind, which is required in those, what, at that time, worshipping God, huh? Another way, the reasons can be assigned according as they are ordered to figure in Christ. And thus, they have figural and mystical reasons, huh? Thomas used that term mystical sometimes in the sense, the spiritual sense of scripture, huh? Whether to be taken from Christ himself in the church, which pertains to, what, allegory? Or whether it pertains to the morals of the Christian people, which pertains to the moral sense, huh? Or whether it refers to the state of future glory, insofar as in it we are introduced through Christ, which pertains to the enagogical sense. That goes back to the sense of even the first question of the Summa. Now, to the first objection. To the first, therefore, it should be said that just as the, what, understanding of metaphorical speech and scriptures is, what? Yeah. So that's how you should translate that, as I said, sensible letter, right? Because of this confusion in our language here. So also, the meanings of the ceremonies of the law, which are commemorative of the benefits of God, and the account which is instituted, or of other things which pertain to that status, right, huh? Do not transcend the order of, what? Yeah. Once that one assigns the cause of the celebration of the Passover, which is a sign of liberation from Egypt, and that circumcision is a sign of the, what, pact agreement that God had with, what, Abraham. Pertained to the literal, what, cause, huh? To the second, huh? That argument proceeds as if the ceremony of precepts were given only. Two, what? Figuring the future. Not to, in the present, worshiping God, huh? To the third, huh, about these little particular things. Two birds, you sacrifice, or so. To the third, it should be said that just as in human laws, what is said in universal has a reason, right? But not as regards the particular conditions. But these are from the, what? Judgment of those instituting it. Yeah, so also many particular determinations in the ceremonies of the old law do not have a, what? Literal cause, but only a figurative one. In common, though, they have also a, what? Yeah, this would be more clear as you go into the four. What's a particular, huh? Take a little break here before. Okay, where are we now? We're in the body. Article 3, huh? Okay. We'll begin the particulars now. To the third one goes forward thus. It seems that there cannot be a suitable reason to sign for the ceremonies which pertain to sacrifices. For those things which are offered in sacrifice are those things which are necessary for sustaining human life. Just to certain animals and certain, what, breads, I guess, huh? But such a sustentance God does not need, right? According to that of Psalm 49, nor do I eat the, what, flesh of bulls or the blood of goats. Do I drink these? I mean, of course not. Therefore, unsuitably, are these sacrifices offered to God, huh? Moreover, in the sacrifice divine, are not offered except from three genera of four-footed animals from the genus of, what, cattle, is that? Sheep and goats, yeah. And about birds, commonly, what, the turtle dove, I guess? And the dove, yeah, especially one. Especially, however, in the cleaning of, what? Yeah. They came a sacrifice from, what? Spurls. But many other animals are more noble than these, right? Since, therefore, everything which is best should be offered to God, it seemed that only one of these things should, sacrifice would be offered to God. Moreover, just as man has dominion over the birds and the beasts, so also over the fish. Therefore, inconveniently, are fish excluded from the divine sacrifice. Well, I'm in favor of excluding fish. Especially salmon. I read these accounts, you know, of the early, you know, invasion of the West there, that Washington Irving has, you know, and, of course, all these Indians are gathering salmon, you know, and they really preserve it, you know, and they have an offer to the white man. Moreover, indifferently, are offered, what? So, just as one offers the, what, the little ones, I guess it is? What? Yeah, the young, yeah. So, also, they should, what? Get the young of the... Oh, my goodness, there's 14 objections here. So, it's getting really into particulars here, huh? Yeah, yeah. Moreover, God is the author of life, the life not only of men, but also of animals, as is clear through what is said in Genesis 1. But death is opposed to life. Therefore, we're not not offered to God animals that are killed, but more living animals. Especially because the apostle acknowledges us in Romans 12 that we show or exhibit our bodies as a living host, holy, pleasing to God, huh? Moreover, in animals, huh? If animals are, what, offered to God in sacrifice, only those that are killed, there seems to be no difference in how they are killed, right? Therefore, unsuitably is determined the way of immolating them, especially in birds, as is clear in Leviticus 1, huh? Moreover, every defect of an animal is a way to corruption and death. Therefore, if, therefore, animals killed or offered to God, unsuitably does one prohibit the offering of an imperfect animal, of one who is lame or blind or some other way injured. Moreover, those who offer hosts to God ought to partake of them, according to that apostle. The apostle says in 1 Corinthians, are not those who eat the, what? Yeah, partakers of the altar. Inconveniently, therefore, certain parts of the hosts are offered, are subtracted from the ones offered, they can't eat them. As for example, blood and the, what? Fat. Fat and the, what? Is that the shoulder? That's the skull? Breast bone and the right shoulder? Oh, breast bone and the right shoulder. Moreover, just as holocausts are offered in honor of God, so also the peaceful host. Yeah. And the host for sin. But no animal of the feminine sex is offered to God in holocaust. Oh, holocaust. But they come about holocausts from the four-footed animals as well as from the birds. Therefore, unsuitably, in the peace offerings and for sin are offered animals of the feminine, what? Sex. And nevertheless, in peaceful offerings, are not offered, what? Birds. Birds, huh? That was the objection of the medieval national organization of women. Moreover, all hosts, peaceful offerings, are seen to be one kind, right? Therefore, why not not to lay down this sweat? Difference, that of some peaceful flashes ought not to be, what? Next day, yeah. Of some, however, they can be, as is commanded in Leviticus 7. Moreover, all sins in this come together, that they are, what? They turn them on away from God. But for all sins in the reconciliation of God, one genus of sacrifice ought to be, what? Yeah. Moreover, all animals which are offered in sacrifice in one way are offered, namely killed. It does not seem, therefore, suitable that from, what? Yeah. In a diverse way, that comes about an offering. For now, they are offered, what? Now simila. Simila. Now bread, right? Sometimes cooked. Yeah. Sometimes in the, what? Yeah. Sometimes in the, what? Kratikula. Never that is. Gridiron. If I'm a pan and gridiron, there you go. However, everything which comes into our use ought to be, what? We ought to recognize to be from God, right? And so it will be there for parts of these animals, only these are offered to God, bread, wine, oil, and salt. Moreover, the bodily sacrifice expressed inwardly the sacrifice of the heart by which a man offers his spirit to God. But in the inward sacrifice, there is more of, what? Sweetness, right? Which honey represents, than of, what? Sharpness, which salt represents, huh? For he said in Ecclesiastes 24, 7, my, what, spirit is? Sweetly more than honey. More than honey, yeah. He ate the scriptures, too. They turned out he don't, or something. There was a beautiful custom one. I guess. Yeah. A young boy who learned to read the Hebrew, he's allowed to touch the book once. And so what they do is they move over to the scroll, and they put it in honey, and they put it in the mouth. Therefore, unsuitably, it's a unprohibited sacrifice to add, what? Honey. Honey. Which also makes the bread savory. And they are commanded there to add salt, which is biting, I guess. So, end. Is that incense here? Yeah, which has a bitter savor, right? Therefore, it seems that those things which pertain to the ceremonies and sacrifices do not have a reasonable cause. I'm convinced, aren't you? Fourteen reasons. Yeah, yeah. Against this is what is said in Leviticus 1.13. All things offered, right, huh? The priest offers upon the altar in a holocaust and an odor most sweet to the Lord. But it is said in Wisdom 7, verse 28, God loves no one who doesn't dwell with wisdom, from which it can be taken that whatever is acceptable to God is with wisdom. Therefore, all those ceremonies and sacrifices were with wisdom as we're having reasonable causes. Okay, Tots. That's a good answer. It covers all the faces. Yeah. Hmm? Look at that. Yes. This is going to be the last article of the day here. Answer, it should be said, this has been said above, the ceremonies of the old law had a two-fold cause. One in the letter, to the letter, according as they are ordered to the, what, worship of God. Another figuratively, or mystical, right, according as they are ordered to figure in Christ. And from both parts can be suitably assigned a cause of the ceremonia, which pertain to, what, sacrifices, huh? Which is what this article is about, right, that particular one. Now, according as sacrifices are ordered to the worship of God, a two-fold, what? We're going to take in two ways, a cause of sacrifices. In one way, according as to the sacrifices is represented the ordering of the mind to God, to which the, what, one offering, the sacrifice is, what, aroused, yeah. Now, to the right ordering of the mind to God pertains that everything which man has, he recognizes to be from God as from a first, what, beginning. And it's ordered in God, as it were, in a last end, right? So they use the word circle there, right, right? Heraclitus says, the beginning and the end are the same, right? And this is represented in offerings and sacrifices. According as a man from these things has his word recognition that they are from God, he offers them, what, honor God. According as it is said by David in the first book of Perilipomena, yours are all things, right? And what we have taken from your hand we give to you. So when you brought the newborn, the firstborn, did you bring them to the temple, right? Got to give them back to God? Maybe God said, well, you can keep them. Yeah. And therefore, in the offering of sacrifice, a man professes that God is the first beginning of the creation of things and the last end, to which all other things are, what, referred. And also, you're commanded to look before and after, right, huh? You should be orally and you look before and after, right? So where should you first look before and where first after? See, I'm going to look before and after, because I've been taught this by my master there, Shakespeare. And what should I look before of, and what should I look after first? Your experience, you look before. Oh, should I look before yesterday, or should I, that's the first thing I should look, or should I look before, you know, first active reason? What should I do? In the second sense, especially before you cause an effect. Well, shouldn't you look and see what is before, before and after? Well, no. No, because that's going to be looking after, see? What is always before, seeing a before and after? What do you see always before? Yeah, yeah. So, is distinction before order? For example, there is a distinction of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. But Thomas argues that there's no before and after, that the Father is in no way before the Son, right? So, there could be a distinction without a before and after, but there can't be a before and after without a distinction. So, you know, I mentioned how Thomas there, I think, is in this, one of the sentences, the text I have, where Thomas says, you know, the first thing that pertains to order is distinction, or rather it's presupposed to it, right? You know? Okay. So, you're looking before, before and after, right? And what do you see before every before and after? Distinction. Now, what comes after looking before and after? Yeah, I could say order, yeah. It's almost the same thing as seeing before and after, seeing order, right? But then you can say, you know, reason can look what? What comes first and what comes last, right? Or what looks, you know, for the beginning and the end, right? Because that's kind of a continuation of it, right? See, when Aristotle's in the book on the poetic art there, he talks about what? Beginning, middle, and end, right? And Homer has taught the other Greeks to make a plot that has a beginning, middle, and end, rather than it's about one man, right? Because sometimes one man goes through things that don't have any connection, right? Okay? So, that's, then Aristotle defines beginning as what? Before something, but not after anything. And end is after something, but not before anything. And then the middle is both before and after, right? So, he's talking here. Primum principium, right, huh? You know, you really gotta, yeah. And then ultimus, but ultimus means the last end, right? Yeah. So, you're looking for what is first and what is last, right? But you're looking for what? The first beginning and the last, what? End, huh? That's really, to look for what is first and last, or what is the beginning, what's an end, and then what is first beginning, and the last end, is to, this comes after, right, huh? You should do that, right? You know, when you say that, that, they have two things, like before and after. Don't they come before something that negates these? Doesn't the affirmative come before the negative? So, if you say, I'm not a carpenter, you know what a carpenter is first, don't you, doesn't it? You know, a carpenter comes before our knowledge, not a carpenter, right, huh? So, in logic, right, huh? You first learn what a genus is and what a species is, right? If the same thing can be a genus and a species, then you ask, but is every genus a species? Is every species a genus?