Prima Secundae
Lecture 253: The Threefold Division of the Old Law's Precepts

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I guess they were told, you know, today, when the Pope comes in, don't be taking your hand to try to shake hands on them, you know. And they weren't supposed to, you know, clap, but they did clap, and they stood up and clapped sometimes, you know, and so on. So they got carried away a little bit. Ceremonial laws, right? Okay. The second one goes forward thus. It seems that the old law does not contain moral precepts. Now, they're always going to argue against this. For the old law is distinguished from the law of nature, as is had above, right? He distinguished those, didn't we? But the moral precepts pertain to the law of nature. Therefore, they do not pertain to the old law. Because before he was saying there was a part of it, you know, maybe he's going to solve it that way, but we'll see what the Houdini does. Okay. Moreover, there it ought to what? Man, the divine law, right? Where human reason is failing, right, huh? Falls short, huh? Just as it's clear in those things which pertain to faith, which are, what? Above reason, huh? But for the moral precepts, the ratio of man seems to be, what? Suffice, huh? Therefore, moral precepts are not of the old law, which is a divine law, right? Moreover, the old law is said to be a law of killing, right? What the hell kind of law is this? This is clear in the second epistle to the Corinthians. But the moral precepts do not kill, but vivify, right? Give life. According to that of Psalm 118, in the eternal, man, do not forget my justifications, because in these you will, what? Make me alive. Therefore, the moral precepts do not pertain to the old law. You all convinced, gentlemen? They don't speak as if wisdom began with you. That's what Thomas says. But against, okay, but against this is what is said in Ecclesiastes 17, who adds, what? Discipline to these, right? Inherits the law of, what? Life, huh? He bestows his inheritance upon them. But dishekina pertains to more as discipline, where he's set in glass to Hebrews 12. Ominus disciplina. That disciplina is the, what? Learning of morals through difficult things, huh? That sounds pretty good, the definition of it. Therefore, the law given by God contains moral precepts. Now, what does the master say? Answer, it should be said that the old law contains the, what? Certain moral precepts, huh? Quedum moralia, right? As you should not kill. You should not steal, huh? So on. And this reasonably, huh? For just as the principle aim or intention of the human law is that it make for friendship of, what? Men to each other. So the intention or the aim, huh? Of the divine law is that it be constituted chiefly a friendship of man to, what? To God, huh? Now, since likeness is a reason for what? According to that, Ecclesiastes, Ecclesiastes, Ecclesiastes only has 12 chapters. Every animal loves what is like itself, right? That's why I said, I like you because you're like me. Yeah. It is impossible for there to be friendship of man to God, who is the best, huh? Optimus. Unless men be made good. My first child says the highest friendship is the virtuous, right? Whence it is said in Leviticus 19, be holy because I am holy, right? What's the first command? What's the first request there in the Our Father? What's the first request in the Our Father? Yeah. So be holy, huh? I am holy, right? It's also the first thing in the prayer there after communion, right? Anima Christi, sanctificame, corpus Christi, so. But the first thing is sanctificare, right? So you're seeking friendship with God, huh? It's the purpose of receiving communion, huh? To receive growth and charity. But that's the kind of friendship, huh? When Thomas takes up charity, he says it's a kind of friendship, right? Yeah. Yeah. So, you've got to be holy there. But the good of man is virtue which makes what? Yeah. That's what Aristotle says even. Okay? And therefore, it's necessary that the precepts of the old law, right, huh? Also, to give what? Precepts of the old law about the acts of virtue. That creates a Latin word order, right? You can tell the guy's reading Latin too much by the fact that it's English word order. And these are the moral precepts of the law, right, huh? So, he's syllogizing here from the end or purpose, right? There's a kind of friendship between man and what? God, right, huh? So, if that's the purpose of the law, then the law's got to be encouraging us to be moral, right? To be good. To be holy. It's holy to the Lord's day, huh? It's interesting that St. Alphonsus mentions it more than once too about how God actually has to command us to love them. Yeah. It shows how little we know of them. Yeah, I used to talk about that too sometimes because I'd say, you know, you know, if another person said, I command you to love me, he'd say, who the hell that you are? You know? You know? But to love God, in a sense, is to love the common good, right, huh? Why, no human being is not the common good, right, huh? I mean, you know, Allah is for the sake of the common good, right? But to love me is not to, I'm not the common good, right? But to love God is to love the common good, huh? He's the good of every good, as Augustine says, wherever he is, yeah? Well, I guess he is. Secure African. Yeah. Does his hippo still exist in Africa, I wonder? I don't know. I guess the vandals are coming in at the time when Augustine was dying, as they say. Not too encouraging his sight. So you get the word vandalize, you know? Okay. Now, what's about the first objection? It says, no, that pertains to the law of nature, right? The first thereof it should be said that the old law is distinguished from the law of nature, not, as it were, being entirely alien to it, right? Something entirely outside it. But as it were, adding something to it, right? For just as grace presupposes nature, so is necessary that the divine law presupposes the, what? Natural law, right? That's why I can reason, you know, that the natural road is the first road, right? So what is the first road in our knowledge, right? The first road is going to have to be the natural road. And then you're stuck too hard. The natural road for an animal that has reason would be the, from the senses which animals have to. The natural road for an animal that has to be the natural road for an animal that has to be the natural road for an animal that has to be the natural road for an animal that has to be the natural road for an animal that has to be the natural road for an animal that has to be the natural road for an animal that has to be the natural road for an animal that has to be the natural road for an animal that has to be the natural road for an animal that has to be the natural road for an animal that has to be the natural road for an animal that has to be the natural road. The natural road for an animal that has to be the natural road for an animal that has to be the natural road for an animal that has to be the natural road for an animal that has to be the natural road for an animal that has to be the natural road for an animal that has to be the natural road for an animal that has to be the natural road for an animal that has to be the natural road for an animal that has to be the natural road for an animal that has to be the natural road for an animal that has to be the natural road. To reason. You can syllogize that. Okay, I'll go on with that, Thomas. You won again. Okay. To second should be said. I know it's the second objection there, right? Yeah, yeah. And you don't need it. To second should be said. To the divine law it is suitable that not only does it provide for man in those things to which reason is not capable, but also in those things where it happens that the reason of man can be, what, impeded, eh? For the reason of man about the moral precepts as regards the most common precepts of the law of nature cannot be mistaken and universal. But nevertheless, an account of the accustomed, eh? Of sinning. It's obscured in particular things to be done, eh? That's correct. But about the other moral precepts, which are, as it were, conclusions, deduced from the most common beginnings of natural law, the reason of many men, what, wanders about, right? Got the air robot, the robot in there. So that, what, certain things which in themselves, they couldn't even say, as such are bad, the reason of many judges to be, what, licit, eh? I was down, down in front of the abortion clinic last night, you know, and this is kind of a kickoff for the 40 days, you know, thing. You have, you know, certain cars go by there, you know, as you're praying, the rosary, and other things, and sometimes they honk, you know, I can agree with you, you know. Sometimes they yell, it's a lot of sin to you, you know. But it reminds me this year of those people that yell, you know, some sin to you, you know, about in support of abortion or something, you know. It's necessary against both defects of man, right, to come to the aid, to the authority of the, what, divine law, right? Just as among those things, what, are not only those things which reason can attain to, right, reason cannot attain to, as God to be three, right, but also those things which right reason is able to attain to, as example, that God is one, right, to excluding the error of human reason, which happens in many, huh? Okay. There's a text there, isn't there, or isn't there, in the, in the, the anima there, you know, where he's talking about the early Greeks, and he says, they tried to assign the reason of knowledge in man, how knowledge takes place in man, right? He says, but he didn't explain how mistakes took place, huh? And therefore their, their consideration is, is, you know, lacking in something, right? And to be mistaken is the usual state of man. I don't realize that, you know, you know, they have all these candidates there, or the Republican Party, you know, because people are asking, well, who's going to be dominating, you think? And one guy thinks this guy, and the other guy thinks that guy, and the other guy thinks that guy. So most of them must be mistaken, you know, huh? But you ask them, you know, questions about things, and you forget, mainly wrong answers, right? Even look at the Greek philosophers, right? I mean, they're all saying something, it's somewhat different, as to what is the beginning of things, right? So they must all be, or most of them, all but one. Mistaken, maybe all of them are mistaken, in the history of modern philosophy. I remember, I remember, because Sirk said, yeah, what if I'm deconic, he says, and he says, he feels like jumping off the bridge there. He's been reading the modern philosophy, I said, yeah. Okay, we get the answer to that, okay? To the theory it should be said, that as Augustine says in the book on spirit and what? The letter, now I don't understand the name of the book. Also, what? The law. As regards the moral precepts, right? He said to kill, what? Occasionally. Yeah, which is a name for a, a accidental clause, right? Okay. Insofar as it commands what is good, but not giving the aid of grace to what? Fulfill it, right? Okay. And now for the law article. To the third one goes forward thus, it seems that the old law does not contain ceremonial precepts apart from the moral precepts. For every law which is given to men is directive of human acts, but human acts are said to be moral, right? As had been said above, that doesn't mean necessarily good. Because moral has a broader sense than that. Therefore it seems that in the old law given to men, there ought not to be contained except what moral precepts are. Moreover, precepts which are said to be ceremonial seem to pertain to the divine cult or worship. But the divine cult or worship is an act of virtue, to wit, of religion. Which Thomas suddenly speaks, I think, of that virtue as being closest in the way to the articles, to the theological virtues, right? Faith, hope, and charity, right? Which, as Tully, Cicero himself, says in his rhetoric, brings what? Yeah. Since, therefore, the moral precepts are of the acts of virtues, as has been said, it seems that the ceremonial precepts should not be distinguished from the moral ones. They pertain to the virtue of what religion? I rest my case. Thomas overthrows me. Moreover, the ceremonial precepts seem to, what? Figuratively, yeah. But as Augustine says in the second book on the teaching of Christ, the doctrine of Trina Christiana, the words among men obtain the chief role in signifying. Right. Yeah, I don't use sign language too much to you, what they call sign language. The signs I use most of all are words, right? It's just people driving by. Yeah. Your prayer vigil. Just, just, yeah. Yeah, I feel good. You said, if you're all these things, can you expect this to happen, you know? It's things you've got to laugh about, you know? But, um, therefore, no necessity was there in, what? That be in the law, there be contained ceremonial precepts in the law about some, what? Figurative acts, right, huh? Well, I suppose the ceremonial laws involve something besides words, saying words, then. Okay. So what do we need them for? We've got the signs of the words. But against this is what is said in Deuteronomy, chapter 4. I have written ten words. I guess he's in the Ten Commandments, right? In two stone tablets, right? And they always say, now, it's not written in stone. Well, this is written in stone. You better know that. And, what? He commanded to me, right, in that time, that I, what? Should teach you the ceremonial and the judicia, which you ought to do. There's the two others besides the moral precepts, I guess. The next one would be about the judicia, but the Ten Commandments of the law are moralia, right? Therefore, apart from the moral precepts, there are other ceremonial precepts. Well, the argument of authority is the strongest argument in theology, so. The rest of my case, now, on the other side. I'm not a very restful, not a very restful life with this Thomas, do you? I'm not very restful. He's always... He's always one way and then the other. Yeah, yeah. Yeah. I think people are getting forced to say this. I think Thomas is kind of... He has a hard time making up his mind. He's conflicted. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Well, let's see what the Master says here now. The answer should be said, that as has been said, the divine law is principally, or in English we say chiefly, right, huh? Because the prince is the chief, that's English, right, chiefly. Instituted to ordering men to God, huh? But human law, chiefly to ordering men to, what? Each other, right, huh? And therefore the human laws do not care to institute something about the divine cult, except in order to the common good of, what? Men, huh? And on account of this, also, many, what? The things they can fix, yeah, it's probably not too much basis for it, right, huh? About divine things, huh? According as it seems expedient to them to inform the, what? Morals of men, right, huh? Just as it's clear in the rites of the, what? Gentiles, right, huh? But the divine law does reverse, right, huh? Because it orders men to each other in a way that is suitable to the order which is to God, right, huh? Which they chiefly intend, right, huh? Now, man is ordered to God not only through the inward acts of the mind, and mind has taken in a broad sense, right, to include the will, which are to believe, to hope, and to love, huh? But also is through certain exterior works by which man professes his being subject to God, right? His divine servitude, right? His servants. And these works are said to pertain to the, yeah, which cult, cult, worship, are called, what? Ceremonies, huh? Let me still use that word, I guess, huh? Ceremonia. As it were, what? It is Adonai, yes, right? Okay. And Ceremonia, which is, what? The god of fruits, right? Yeah, the goddess of fruits, as some say. In that first, from the fruits, offerings were made to God, right? Like I suppose even one guy did and one guy didn't do so good, right? Or as Maximus Valerius, that famous Latin writer, refers, the name of Ceremonia is introduced to signify, what? Divine worship among Latins from a certain, what? Yeah, which is called Cere near Rome. In that Rome, captured by the Gauls, right, then, those sacred things, right, of the Romans were taken away. Yeah. Lest, therefore, those precepts which not all pertain to the worship of God are especially called, what? Yeah. The word is not too much clear in itself, huh? But he's talking about what you mean by the ceremonial precepts, right, huh? They pertain to the worship of God, right, huh? Now, to the first, it should be said that human acts extend also to the, what? Divine worship. And therefore, what? About these, it contains precepts, the old law, given to men, right? My word order is getting kind of bad there. And therefore, the old law, right, contains, what? Some precepts of these given to men, huh? The first objection was saying that, what? Every law is directive of human acts, right, huh? And that these acts are just human, or the robbers are called, but ceremonial acts are acts of men, right? So genuine reflection is an act of men, right? So genuine reflection is an act of men, right? So genuine reflection is an act of men, right? So genuine reflection is an act of men, right? So genuine reflection is an act of men, right? So genuine reflection is an act of men, right? So genuine reflection is an act of men, right? So genuine reflection is an act of men, right? So genuine reflection is an act of men, right? To the second it should be said, that it has been said above, the precepts of the law of nature are, what, common, right? And they need, what, determination, right? They are determined both through, what, human law and through, what, divine law, right? So the speed limit is something about not killing people, right? And that's by the human law, right? And just as those determinations which come about through human law are not said to be of the law of nature, but of the positive law, right? So 30 miles an hour or whatever I have to do. It's 45, right? I was driving up here and I said, gee whiz, there's a car behind me, it's got a little light up there and so on. He says, I don't know if that's a police car, I want to go to the right speed here. But it is a, whatever the speed limit is, if it's 30 miles or 45, whatever it is, is that a law of nature that we should drive at 30 miles an hour in the city? No, it's not a law of nature, is it? No, but it seems like a reasonable determination of how to preserve life and everybody's driving a car around, right? So also there are what? These determinations of the precepts of the law of nature which come about through the divine law are distinguished from the moral precepts which pertain to the law of what? Nature. For to worship God, since it is an act of virtue, pertains to a moral precept, right? But the determinations precept that one worships, right, with such, what, offerings and such gifts, this pertains to the ceremonial precepts, right? You know, there's different animals that are... And therefore, the ceremonial precepts are distinguished from the moral precepts, though. So that's why these are given after the moral precepts, huh? To the third, it should be said that as Dionysius says in the first chapter of the celestial archery, divine things are not able to be made known or manifested to men except under some sensible likenesses. Now, such likenesses more move the soul when they are not only expressed by word but also are what? Offered to the senses. And therefore, divine things are treated in the scriptures not only through likenesses expressed by word as is clear in metaphorical accutions, right? But also through likenesses of things which are proposed to the eye which pertain to the, what? Ceremonial precepts, huh? So what about this? Incense. That's a prayer going up, right, huh? Mm-hmm. You know? Does it say it in the Psalms? There, you know, it's an evening prayer, right? We say it every night, yeah. Yeah, yeah, I'm sending it. We're gonna do that one or we gotta stop here or what? Okay. The fourth one goes forward thus. It seems that apart from the moral precepts and the ceremonial ones, there are not some judicial precepts in the old law. For Augustine says against Faust, that there are in the old law precepts of a life to be lived, we'd say nowadays, and significant precepts of life. Significant of life, right? But the precepts of life to be done are morals, right? The precepts of life to be signified are the ceremonial. Therefore, apart from these two general precepts, there should not be placed in the law some other judicial precepts. Now, of course, if I was doing this, I'd say, besides these two precepts, there must be a third one, because three is the first number about which we say all. Aristotle uses that when he's talking about the three dimensions, right? Yeah, okay. Moreover, upon that Psalm 118, I did not decline from your what? Yeah. That is from those which constitute the rule of living. But the rule of living pertains to the moral precepts. Therefore, judicial precepts should not be distinguished from the morals. Moreover, judgment seems to be an act of justice, according to that of Psalm 93, until justice be converted into judgment. But the act of justice, just as the acts of other virtues, pertains to the moral precepts. Therefore, the moral precepts include in themselves judicial ones, and they should not, therefore, be distinguished from them. But against this is what is said in Deuteronomy 6, 1. These are your precepts and the ceremonial judicia. Preceptor autum, antonomastice de kuntum moralia. Therefore, apart from the moral precepts and the ceremonial ones, there are also judicial ones. We say that commands, too, how commands are probably made by antonomastice. It's a law that you should genuflect when you go into church. Command that you should genuflect. That's something ceremonial, I'd say, huh? Right, to antonomastice. It's a law, right? But it's a, right to antonomastice, you'd think of not committing adultery, that's a law. I have the hardest time stealing from anybody, you know? I have the hardest time. I can't get to do it, you know? It's green to me. It's in steel. Even calling the church is money, I can't, I just can't, I can't get into the spirit. You don't love it that way, you don't love it that way. I answer it should be said, but it has been said, huh? To the divine law it pertains that it order men to each other and to God, right, huh? Now both of these, in general, right, pertain to the, what? Dictate of the natural law, right? To which are, what? Referred the moral precepts. But it is necessary that both be determined through both divine law and what? Yeah. Because the principles or beginnings naturally known are common, both in speculative matters as well as in active, huh? Quantity is equal to the same to each other and that sort of thing. Aspect of the T, this is looking matters, right? Thus, therefore, the determination, the common precept about the divine cult comes about through what? Ceremon precepts. So also the determination of the common precept about justice to be observed among men are determined through the what? Yeah. According to this, this is necessary that to lay down through tria, precepta, legis, vedi, there is three precepts, right? Okay, three groups. To wit, the moralia, which are of the, what? Dictate of natural law. Ceremonia, which are determinations of the divine cult. And judicialia, which are the determinations of justice among men to be observed, right? Whence, when the apostle says, Romans 7, I have said that the law is, what? Holy. He adds that the command is just and holy and good. Just as regards the, what? Judicial ones. Holy as regards the ceremonia. For holy is said what is dedicated to God, right? And good, that is honestum, as regards, what? Morals, huh? So, we've got another three, huh, to enjoy. Three, huh? The first therefore, it should be said that both the moral precepts as well as the judicial ones pertain to the direction of human life, huh? And therefore, both are contained under one member of them which impestimates down to wit under the precepts of the life to be led, right? To the second, it should be said that judicium signifies the carrying out of justice, which is according to the application of reason to some, what? Particulars, in a determined way. Whence the judicial precepts come together in some way with the moral ones insofar as they are derived by reason and in some way with the ceremonial insofar as they are also certain determinations of common precepts. And therefore, sometimes under the judicial ones are comprehended the, what? Both the judicial precepts and the moralial ones. Here, Israel, ceremonias at cojudicia, sometimes the judicial and the ceremonial as in Leviticus, make my, what? Judgments and serve my precepts, where precepts refer to the moralia and judicia to both the judicial and the ceremonialia. To the third, it should be said that the acts of justice in general pertain to the moral precepts, but the determination of them in special pertains to the judicial precepts. My teacher, Kasurik, you know, used to meet with some group of lawyers in St. Paul there and they'd have a dinner together, you know, and they'd study the treatise on the laws, right? I could say, the lawyers always had a difficulty with the natural law, right? Because that was kind of foreign to them, you know, but the law in the city of St. Paul or the state of Minnesota, you know, county of Ramsey, that was known to them, right? It's what they think of when they think of law. If they were more familiar with the history of the Western law, especially the English common law, they would have seen that it's very much based in the natural law. The policies behind the law are very much entwined in the natural law. Yeah, yeah, yeah. But you can't simply, you know, deduce them in some cases, you know? But every time they invent something that is of danger to human life, right, I keep seeing on TV, you know, if you tried Xerox or something, you know, and you're dead or your loved one is dead, you may have a case, you know? But I mean, there are laws, you know, governing, you know, shooting your gun off in the city, you know, and where you can shoot your gun off, right, and how fast you can drive your car and whether you can practice medicine without a license and so on, right, because you might be a danger to your patients, a danger to the life of your patients, right? Should we stop now or what? name of the father son holy spirit amen thank you god thank you guardian angels thank you thomas aquinas deo gratias god our enlightenment guardian angels strengthen the lights of our minds or illumine our images and arouse us to consider more correctly saint thomas aquinas angelic doctor help us to understand what you've written so that good advice there from the seven wise men of greece know thyself that good advice so to whom is that addressed those words know thyself what's there someone who's capable of knowing himself and maybe doesn't know himself or know himself well enough right now it seems to me it's attributed especially to the reason right because reason's the only part of man it can know itself and so when reason knows that it's the ability for a large discourse looking before and after reason knows itself right and is it in some way like god and knowing itself yeah because god knows himself right much better than we know ourselves but like there's a proportion right reason knowing itself by the definition of reason right is like god knowing himself right yeah now of course there's a couple differences right and one is that god in knowing himself knows the best thing there is to know but reason in knowing itself isn't knowing the best thing that there is right and secondly god in knowing himself by knowing himself knows all other things and does reason by knowing itself know other things do i know the pythagorean theorem by knowing the definition of reason but nevertheless to some extent huh reason can um know how to come to know other things right by discourse and by looking before and after right and i was kind of struck you know by the fact that over at the great divides of logic right into the art of defining and these are the two main kinds of what discourse now thomas doesn't do that right he follows the order of aristotle's books right and therefore in elbert's uh division of logic there's a part of definition in the art of defining right as well as the categories and it's a goge of porphyry right but for thomas in the first act you just have the work of aristotle in the categories right where does aristotle take up definition when he gets to the third part he gets to demonstration posterior analytics right and then he talks about uh how definition is the beginning of syllogism but especially of demonstration right and then he brings out eventually that both definition and demonstration is by knowing clauses and then he comes to the famous thing says that a complete definition differs from a what demonstration by position only so if you had a complete definition that included all the causes of the thing right you state it as one definition then you'd have what all the causes but in a demonstration you might demonstrate one cause by the other cause right so you see a knife is a tool for cutting the tool for cutting is made up of a blade and handle right where you're demonstrating one cause from another cause right but if you're giving a complete definition of knife you'd say it's a tool composed of a knife and what remember blade and handle and uh for the sake of cutting right and it's kind of mind of this you know aristotle teaches that in the second book of the um posterior analytics right where he divides the famous questions you know does it exist and if it does exist what is it is this that if this is that why is this that right but he says that the question of what and why are both in a way looking for what causes of of course those are the two main kinds of discourse right and causes tied up with looking before and after that's the senses of before and after right cause and effect okay now what do you think is the most important before and after to see the one that is going to carry you the furthest into knowing what's the most important before and after is the before and after of coffee and and tea is the before and after of mozart and beethoven what's the most important before and after to see that's very important yeah but this one is going to help you to see that i'm not saying which one of the senses of before and after but the before and after of what things right huh yeah what's the most important one to see take you the furthest of all you know not equal to god by knowing you know the definition you know this but you're taught to look before and after but where should you especially look for the before and after before and after of what man and woman apple and uh and orange or before and after fruits yeah very universally yeah and because this is tomorrow the feast of the what guardian angels and tuesday was a feast of gabriel michael and ray fiorite it comes up in the ninth book of wisdom which you always thought was an honor to the orders of the angels right so what's the before and after there the ninth book of wisdom yeah yeah yeah and aristotle shows in many ways that act is before ability right in being right in perfection and so on right and from that seeing that before and after aristotle says for example that although in the thing that goes from ability to act it's an ability before it's an act right in that way built is before act but it goes from ability to act the reason of something already in act so that's simplicity there speaking simply hapless um act is before ability and that leads you to see that the first cause right that you're looking for right is going to be what pure act right and that leads you to the what now just later on the substance of god right because you know if you want to be a little bit careless and see there's five things you can say about the substance of god but if you see basically there's three things you say right that god is altogether simple he's what perfect and therefore good right and that he's what unchanging right and therefore eternal right you can see all three of those things by his being what pure act right if he's pure act can he be put together no because things when they're put together one part is to the other has act to ability like matter and form right or else at least the parts are to the whole his ability is to act right so if god is pure act he's altogether simple right does he have any accidents he added habits qualities no because then they'll be built in act right in him right okay okay and how do you know that god is perfect right the perfection of thing is its actuality right and god is pure act then you're seeing his perfection there for his goodness and as god's change