Prima Secundae
Lecture 238: Derivation of All Laws from Eternal Law

Transcript
================================================================================

Now to the third article. To the third one goes for this. It seems that not every law is derived from the eternal law. For there is a certain law of the, what, poems. We never know how to translate that. That's kind of law in a kind of almost metaphorical sense, right? But it, however, is not derived from the eternal law, from the divine law, right? Which is the eternal law. For to it pertains the, what, prudence of the flesh, huh? About which the apostle says in the epistle of the Romans, they cannot be subject to the law of God, right? So, therefore not every law proceeds from the, what, eternal law. Well, it makes sense to me, huh? I'm easily taken in, of course. You're a little angry. Moreover, nothing iniquitous, huh, can, is able to proceed from the eternal law. Because, as has been said, the eternal law is, by which, right, it is just that all things be most, what? Ordered, huh? But some laws are iniquitous, huh? According to that of Isaiah 10. Woe to those who, what? Someone will quote that to the Supreme Court sometimes. Say, to Congress, children of the law. Yeah, yeah. To the president. They put that over, over, over the entrance. Therefore, not every law proceeds from the divine law, right? So, it's a law admitting, you know, making lawful, sort of, abortion. Is that really a law? You know, people should be stacked on that, right? When they use the word law there, right? More of Augustine says in the first book on free judgment that the law, which is written right for ruling the people, rightly, it permits many things which are, what? Would be punished, I suppose, through divine providence, or could be vindicated. But the ratio of divine providence is eternal law, as has been said. Therefore, not every law that is right proceeds from the eternal law. That was a question, though, whether a Catholic could vote for a restriction on abortion. And the church said yes, huh? And they might make clear that you're opposed to all abortion, but you can still, you know, that's the best you can do, right? You can say, have an abortion after three months or some, you know, well, whatever. Some restriction is good, even if it's not permitting at all, right? You know, it does some good that way. But against this is what is said in Proverbs chapter 8, verse 15. Divine wisdom says, huh? Through me kings rule. And the, what? Makers of law discern just things, huh? Okay. But the ratio of divine wisdom is the eternal law. Therefore, all laws proceed from the eternal law. Well, let's see what the master says now. He says, take what Perkwa says with a grain of salt, he says. To his who had, he said. Be able to distinguish what I said from Perkwa. He's taken in by these infections. That's not the purpose of that, at once. That can be shown by students, you know, that sometimes the part is more than all. He says, oh, yeah, yeah. The answer should be said, as has been said above, law implies a certain, what? Thought? That is directive of actions towards their end, right? But in all movers that are, what? Ordered, right? In outward movers. It is necessary that the virtue or power of the second mover is derived from the virtue or power of the, what, first mover. Because the second mover does not move except insofar as he's moved by the, what, first. Aristotle talks about that in the beginning of the ethics there, right? Once in all governors, we see the same thing, that the reason of the government is derived from the first one governing to the, what, seconds, huh? Just as the reason of those things which are done in the city is derived from the king through precept to the, what, lower administrators, huh? In a better example, the army, right, huh? Interesting how Aristotle compares the order of the universe to the order of the army, right? Because the order is more manifest there than it is in the city, huh? And in artificial things also, right? The reason for artificial acts is derived from the architect on the chief artist to the lower artists, right? Who operate by, what, hand, huh? My father's company, you know, and he would start a new product or a new procedure, you know? So one guy was telling me real smart, he'd show everybody else how to do it, and then they'd all follow him, right? Very valuable figure my father had done. He was kind of a natural, actually addicted to these things. Yeah. Since, therefore, the eternal law is the, what, reason for the governing in the supreme or highest governor, right? One governing. It is necessary that all the reasons of government or governing which are found in the, what, lower governors are derived from the, what, eternal law. And these reasons of the lower one's governing are whatever other laws there are besides the, what, eternal law. Whence all laws, insofar as they partake of right reason, insofar they are, what? Right. Yeah. Yeah, I didn't say it. Translated it or what? Whence all laws, insofar as they partake of, what, right reason, insofar as they are derived from the eternal, what? That's what they are derived from. Yeah. Yeah. They partake as much of right reason as they are derived from the eternal law. Sweet. Yeah. In account of this, Augustine says in the first book of the free judgment, free will, that in the temporal law nothing is just or illegitimate or lawful that is not but derived, right? And then they have not derived for themselves from the eternal law. The Supreme Court I mean, the law. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah, two quotes there. Mm-hmm. To paraphrase Shakespeare, do not revolt from two births stumbling on abuse. Mm-hmm. Yeah. It's pretty good for our learns. Now, the first thing there. about that kind of a strange use of the word law. The first, therefore, it should be said that the phones, right, have the ratio of a law and man insofar as they are a, what? Punishment, fouling, what? Divine justice. And according to this, it is manifest that they are derived from the eternal law. Kind of an unusual way of being derived, right? But insofar as they are inclined to, what? Sin. Thus, they are contrary to the law of God. And do not have the notion of law, as is clear from the things said above, huh? We're back to question 91, article 6. So it has the idea of law in a very diminished sense, huh? As far as it's a punishment, huh? Following divine justice, huh? Yeah, yeah. I know it's because we, our reason, we are not subject to God, then it should be subject to our reason and will are not subject. I wonder what I hear on the radio, there is a time to appear. Once a day, somebody dies from over a drug dose in this state, I guess, something like that. Yeah. They can't control themselves, right? You know? You have to take people away and put them away for a while. It's some kind of a thing where they try to calm them down and get to... A lot of people can't control their anger, you know? A lot of people can't control their incubus, it's a desire to drink. Okay. The second thing here about these liquidities, liquid laws. The second should be said that human law, to that extent, has the notion of law, right? Insofar as it's according to, right, what? Reason, huh? And according to this, and by this is manifest that it is derived from the eternal law. Insofar as it receives some reason, right? Thus it is said to be a, what? A wicked law, right? And thus it is not the notion of law, but more of a certain, what? Violence, huh? So this thing about abortion, is it really a law or is it a violence, huh? Yeah, yeah. Institutionalized violence. It's interesting. There's no way the violent had the sense of something outside of nature, right? I mean, even if, you know, you're supposed to own up, you know? It's against the natural law. That's a violent, yeah, as opposed to... It's a force against the natural. Yeah, yeah, they call it a violent thing, you know? Kind of interesting word that he uses there, violent. Yeah, that's what I always thought of. Because I think violence, in one way I've seen it, the force applied against a natural inclination. So all contraception, even if it's consensual, is a kind of violence. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Natural inclination. Is there any sort of etymological relationship between violence and, like, violation? Those two words, any sort of... Well, that's violence, too, yeah. It's, uh... Violence comes from... Latin violencia. Violent. Violent. In your style, in your style, in your style, it's talking about violence, right? It's something that's opposed to the natural, right? Because I know it's seen that violence is opposed to the natural inclination and coercion or coaction against the voluntary... Yeah, it's not according to the natural inclination of the thing, right? It's just that this is violently pushing the rock. Yeah, yeah. So the Supreme Court decision is what we call that. Yeah, violence. And nevertheless, in so far, in that, what, iniquitous law insofar as it observes something of the likeness of law, right? An account of the order of the power of the one who makes the law, right? According to this, also is derived from the eternal law, for all power is from, what, the Lord. Christ says this to what? Yeah, yeah. Yeah, he claims to have the power over him, right? And Christ, in the sense, admits that he does in some way have it, but from God, right? To use it, not to abuse it. Yeah, yeah. But he does say it's from God and he kind of sovers up him a little bit, right? Again, that's a diminished sense of the law, right? You know, you always take the famous example, you know, of the word perfect or complete, right, huh? And a house caught on fire and it's completely burned. Yeah. But, yeah, you say completely, right? My house is as far as it can be from being complete once it's completely burned out, right? Totally your car. Yeah. My car is a complete total wreck. Total wreck. A total wreck, yeah. All the pieces there on the highway, you know? I always got to remember to call and say a prayer to my guardian before I drive because I get an old now and I got to start making mistakes or something or not being alerted of, you know, but me and my guardian can see me from a few collisions or something. I didn't need another driver, you know? A chauffeur. Yeah. You see, those little cars have been driven around a little bit now. They've tried themselves, you know? Yeah. I'm kind of nervous about it. The first computer glitched to have the huge lawsuit that the computer malfunctioned and I cried. Yeah. It's kind of annoying. No, you can see. No, it's in both the first and the second objections. He's saying that they're law only and it kind of diminished with sense, huh? Yeah. I mean, Aristotle, you know, when he talks about being, right, ends up by saying kind of like the last sense of it, you can be blind, right, or something like that, right? You can be ignorant, right? That to be, or, that's a very, very loose sense of to be, right, huh? It's a being of what? Reason, right, huh? See? But still, you know, it's true to say that so-and-so is blind, right, huh? In the gospel day, he was blind, right, at Christ. But if it's true, you know, there's got this very diminished sense of being there, right, huh? To be ignorant, huh? To be blind, huh? To be dead, huh? Is that to be? Yeah, yeah. Because reason takes as if it were something, right, huh? It's something in reason only. In reality, outside reason, it's nothing, huh? Is it something to be dead? In Spanish, there are two different verbs to be. One is sort of a baby ghostly. The essence of something, another sort of a temporary state, if I remember correctly. In point of which, you would say the more permanent sense would be, I am an American, I am a man, or something. But if you answer the phone, the way they answer the phone, they use the other verb, which means I'm here. Like, right now, I'm here. So they answer the phone, literally, they say, I am, but they use the temporary sense of, that's how they answer the phone. When we say hello, they just say, I am, show. But it's the sense of the temporary, transitory sense. See, Thomas, you know, when he talks about Aristotle there in the fourth book, Aristotle's saying being is in many ways. But Thomas says, you know, this plethora that Aristotle has there, basically four ones, right? You have substance first, and then you have accidents, and then you have coming to be, right? So, is there coming to be in this world? So, is there coming to be, right? Because coming to be, in a way, is not yet being, right? And yet, coming to be, you know, in the grandchild. So, this grandchild is coming to be, right? And then finally you get, what, negations, right? That's the least sense of the four, right? You know, it's just going to be, join the army. Yeah, see. It's one of the advertisements we had recently, some years ago, anyway. See, we can be said to be in this room, right, huh? Which is, when the accident's right, one of the categories, accident. But, when you're walking, you said to be somewhere, and then it's no more. Yeah. You might be coming to be somewhere, but. Like the bread is rising, you know. Yeah. Because the bread is coming to be bread. Yeah, yeah. So, it's not strange that, you know, that law can be used in these, what, very diminished senses of even being can, right, huh? I was reading, reading the one in the sentences there where he's talking about this name is most proper to God, who is, right? I am, who am, right? And Thomas goes on about four reasons, I won't go into all of them, but the first one, which I think was from Jerome, he's saying, well, most of your life is in your past or in your future, but you don't really have that life anymore, do you? But God has all his life at once, right? And most of our life is, we don't have it. It's gone or it's, you know, maybe it's somewhere to come, you know, but it's, that, that isn't here either, you know. So, I don't have much in my life, right? Being is very, very, you know, I hardly am, don't think of it, you know. I don't even have today. I don't even have my life today, you know. Part of my life today is gone. Part of my life to come, I... How much does that exist? There's several of the changes. How much of that exists? By the time you just think about it, it's gone, you know. Okay, you've got the third objection now, right? Yeah. Okay. To the third it should be said, you know, that human law is said to permit some things, right? Not, as it were, approving of them, right, huh? But as not being able to, what? Direct them, right, huh? For many things are directed by divine law, which cannot be directed by, what? Human law, huh? Whence this, that human law does not, what? Enter into these things, right? About which is not able to, what? Direct comes from the order of, what? Divine law, right? It would be different, however, to prove those things, which the eternal law, yeah. Whence from this it should not be had that human law is not derived from eternal law, but that is not able to, what, follow it perfectly, right? It would actually be a big scandal, didn't it? Didn't both Augustine and Thomas say that they should allow houses of prostitution, you know? Because if they don't allow houses of prostitution, then innocent people will be attacked, and wasn't there the famous incident, too, in the Old Testament there, right? People there who wanted, they wanted the men, you know, and since they gave a woman's dead, you know, it was less for her. It's right, it's right, it was done, weren't it? Yeah, yeah, yeah. I mean, there's some things that the human law cannot really, what, control, right, huh? So it permits them, but it does not, what, approve of them, right, huh? I know what these bishops and people want to, you know, approve of these things. They want to permit them, you know, you know? It's, it's, it's, it's going to be... It's one thing somebody who makes a sin, anybody who can commit a sin, any sin, but then they say, it's okay. Yeah, yeah, they kind of say, it's okay, yeah. That's justifying sin, and that's cooperating people, and that's, that's what Augustus said. One thing you're missing, you defend the sin with your reason, you're committing to sin. Yeah, yeah. Problem is, you can do that directly or indirectly, because by carefully parsing your words, some bishops, from what I've heard, I've heard some bishops actually talking about, having some sort of mechanism to allow for same-sex marriages, you know, because they're just decent people, most of them, and, you know, they can't help it or whatever, but just even any sort of approach that you're taking to try to approve of that, to say that it's okay to keep away from it, and to just let it happen, all of these things are condoning it, essentially, and approving of it, and working cooperating and cooperating. Yeah, people read the question about, you know, in Paul's letters, he's talking about slavery, you know, and talking about how the slaves should behave to their masters, and so on, and say, well, you know, say, well, he should be attacking slavery as being, you know, unjust or something, you know, and maybe in society in that time, right, you couldn't really, what, abolish slavery, right, eh? And so the question is how a master should treat a slave, and, you know, and how the slave should, you know, respond to his master, and so on, right? But is that, you know, that to be understood as permitting something, you know? What's fascinating, too, is that just the natural trajectory of Christianity is not compatible with slavery? Sure, there were attempts in, you know, in the Hispanic world, with slavery, colonial times, and the American South. There was Christianity that rooted it out in one way or another, through feudalism in Europe, and through Christian intervention in the 19th and 20th centuries. And only Islam was that really slavery anymore, of the old type, anyway. So you wonder about just that natural trajectory of Christianity, that slavery stays forever, once Christianity was born. There's a cyclical of the 13th, right, the little volume that they have of some of our famous cycles. There's one where he's dealing with slavery there, you know, and I know they're abolishing it in Brazil or some place, but occasionally we need to say something about this, you know? I haven't read it years ago, but I just have to look at it again. I think some earlier folks had spoken about it when, earlier on, when they first were discovering the Americans. I've read about some folks, wrote about it. Well, who was it to ask Christ there about the, Moses gave them permit to suicide their wife, and the reason apparently was that if they couldn't divorce him, they'd have to kill him. They killed the wife, right? And therefore, it's to avoid the killing of the wife that they permitted the book of repudiation, was that? Isn't that the way that they explain it? I mean, that he was permitting something that was, it's not the way from the beginning, the Lord says, right? And that he, you know, who, you know, marries someone, I mean, who had been married to someone else, is committing adultery, right? I mean, he seems to defend Moses, right? As he's permitting the lesser evil to avoid the, yeah, it's better to allow them to have a book of whatever it was of repudiation. than to have them killing their wives, isn't it? I don't know about that part of the law. It's in the Gospel of Matthew. Matthew, but he doesn't mention about the reason why. He just said he permitted it because of your heart and his heart. I don't know the passage in the Old Testament about the killing of the wives. I think that was the reason for it, you know? You know, there's crazy music we have around. There's crazy music, you know, should we permit that? That some people need it, you know? Aristotle talks about music at the end of the Eighth Book of Politics, right? He talks about the kind of music people should be brought up and so on. But he seems to speak as if he could allow for the hoi polloi, the crowd, some of this, you know... Trash. Trashy music, you know? I don't know. It's kind of like smoking cigarettes again because you're really stupid. I really don't. Yeah. It wasn't John 23rd, wasn't he famous who was saying, you know, you correct some things and some things you can correct, you know? Other things you permit, you might say. Not saying you're approving of it, you know? I see one eye open and one eye closed. I see a problem where people's focus on the perfect thing, the perfect enemy of the good, the good, the enemy of the perfect, however it goes. For example, with the abortion issue, if there's a candidate who is for limiting abortion, but there are no candidates who are completely against abortion, then morally, again, it would be acceptable to vote for the candidate who would limit it, as opposed to just saying, no, I'm not going to vote at all. And so, even worse date of abortion will be established or maintained. If you say you can't prevent all of it, you can prevent some of it, right? And then you're committing the other to exist, because you can't control it, right? Right. And if you try to abolish it all, you get none, nothing happens, right? Right. But if you get limited in some way, then... Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. That's where, that's the difference, I think, when I'm on Burke, when he was in St. Louis, put a letter out, and he made the point. It's never, because people are often, in a kind of sloppy way, in a sloppy manner of speaking about it, they'll say, well, you just vote for the lesser of two evils. And he said, we never vote for evil. We never approve of evil. We vote for the restriction of the evil, as much as is in our power. So it's like the gay marriage, I can't stop people from doing that. I can't control the legislation, but I don't mean, I'm never going to approve of it. I'm never going to just wink and nod and say, well, you go ahead, we'll approve of this for you. No way. There's no cooperation on that. That's the difference. We're never approving evil. We want to restrict people. Right. Exactly. But we don't want to approve. It'll break your number. Okay. Thank you. the fourth one goes forward thus it seems as necessary necessary and eternal things are subject to the what? for everything reasonable is subject to what? reason that sounds good but the divine will is reasonable since it is just therefore it is subject to reason but the eternal law is a divine what? reason, thought therefore the will of God is subject to the eternal law but the will of God is something eternal therefore also eternal necessary things are subject to the eternal law this guy can really tie you up can't he? moreover whatever is subject to the law is subject to the law of the king but the son as he says as he said in the first epistle of the corinthians was subject to God and the father when he treats hands over to them their kingdom therefore the son who is eternal is subject to the eternal law well that's maybe gonna be get two natures there there's a way out of that that's quite quite so taken in by that argument moreover the eternal law is the what? reason behind the divine providence right? but many things that are necessary are subject to the divine providence as the permanence of bodiless substances right? and of the celestial bodies which they thought were eternal right? therefore even necessary things are subject to the divine law against all this those things which are necessary are impossible to be otherwise to have themselves otherwise that's the way the Latin goes all you tear that starts in fluency or English then all you're reading whence it does you do not need what? to be controlled right? or to be restrained yeah held in check but there is law imposed upon man that he might be what? restricted from bad things therefore those things which are necessary are not subject to the law I answer it should be said as has been said above that the eternal law is the reason behind the divine governing but whatever things are subject to the divine government therefore whatever things are subject to the divine government are subject to the what? eternal law those things which are what? not subject to the eternal law are neither what subject to the divine law right? now the distinction of these can be noted from those things which happen about us around us for those things are subject to human governing that are able to what? come to be by men but those things which pertain to the nature of man are not subject to the what? government to it that man has a soul or a hand or hands or feet yeah thus therefore to the eternal law are subject all things which are in the things created by what? God whether they are what? yeah but those things which pertain to the nature or the essence the divine nature to essence are not subject to the what? eternal law but are really what? yeah yeah okay makes sense you know take a similar problem here does God have any is there any purpose for God? or is there any purpose for the the Trinity? now I was seeing in the sentences one objection against the Trinity was one God is enough right? and you don't need more right? this is something you say with regard to an end right? so I mean the objection is saying if you need a second or third it's because the purpose requires that right? but that's not why there's three persons in God for some purpose or need right? because something is per se necessary so does God have any purpose? we can say he acts for purpose when he creates right? but that purpose is himself right? because he himself ordered some purpose it's kind of hard to understand so he's saying the divine nature which is what? necessary to be as it is right? isn't what? subject to the divine law right? but it is the law right? in that way you could say the divine nature is the end of the whole universe right? God is not for the sake of some end but he is the end for which everything else is it's a strange strange one now to the first objection it should be said that we can speak of the will of God in two ways in one way as regards the will itself and thus since the divine will or the will of God rather is his very what? essence it's not an accident of it right? it is not subject to the divine what? nor to the eternal law but it is the same thing as the eternal law right? another way we can speak of the divine will is regards those things which God wills about creatures which are subject to the what? divine law insofar as the reason for these things is found in divine wisdom and the reason of these things the will of God is said to be what? reasonable otherwise a reason of him he himself it more should be said to be reason itself see so actually does God act wisely well with respect to us he does he pours his wisdom out upon things but as regards himself does he act wisely or should you say that no he is wisdom itself better said than God also tries to I wonder if Christ's human nature could be said to be trying to live wisely. But even someone who can't fail, right, could still be trying to. Was he obeying God in his human nature? Was he as man obeying God? It seems to me, yeah. Not my will, but thine be done. Not my will there means what it's human will, I guess, huh? So God acts wisely with regard to the creatures, right? More so than to himself, huh? Rather there he's wisdom itself. To the second should be said that the Son of God is not, what, made by God, but he's naturally generated from him, huh? And therefore he is not subject to, what, divine providence or to the eternal law. But rather he himself is the eternal law, right? Through a certain appropriation, right? This is clear through Augustine in the book on religion. He is set over to be subject to the Father by reason of his human nature, according to which also the Father is said to be greater than him, huh? So the Aryans have said, oh, no, no, you know. Now the third objection, huh? We concede, huh? What is that third objection? Well, saying that some necessary things are subject to divine providence, like the permanence of the bodiless substances, right? And the heavenly bodies, huh? Well, maybe we shouldn't have conceded that, but Aristotle had a mystery there, right? But he helped him to see that there is no last instance of things. To the fourth, it should be said, right? That's the, what, said contra, right? So he's answering both objections, both sides. To the fourth, it should be said that, as the philosopher says in the fifth book of metaphysics, that some necessary things have a cause of their necessity, like the conclusion of a demonstration. And thus, this that is impossible, and that, therefore, this that is impossible to be otherwise, they have, what, from another, right? And this itself is a, what, restraint that is most efficacious for whatever things are, what, contained, are, to that extent, said to contain insofar as they are not able to, what, do otherwise than is disposed about them. Because the democratists said, you know, about necessary things, you should look for a reason. And Aristotle said, well, there are some things that are necessary, what, to another, right? And therefore, for those things, you can look for a reason. And the example was a demonstration, right, where the conclusion is necessary, but, you know, the theorems in the nuclear are necessary, but they're known to other statements, right? Good time for another article, or no? Okay, number five here. Ahem.