Prima Secundae
Lecture 235: The Effects of Law: Command, Prohibition, Permission, and Punishment

Transcript
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to consider about the effects of law right and about this two things are asked first whether the effect of the law is to make men what good huh that's what it should be i think second with the effect the laws the effects that's probably effective in the plural sense there right are to what command to prohibit to permit and to punish him as the legis spiritus says one experienced in the law to the first one goes forward thus it seems that it's not of the law to make men good for men are good through virtue for virtue is what makes its ever good in its own act good as a style says in the full definition there in the second book of the ethics but virtue is in man from god alone for he makes it in us without us that's really infused virtues i guess but anyway this has been said above the definition of virtue taken from augustine therefore it's not of the law to make men good but uh yeah the virtues moreover law does not help man unless he obeys the law but this very fact that a man obeys the law is from his what goodness and therefore goodness is before in man to the law therefore the law does not make men good now this man's looking before and after right now he says at all will not profit you unless you obey the law right but you obey the law because you're a good guy yeah so you got to be good before yeah well i suppose before you obey the law freely right now but the little kid you know he's going to be punished if he doesn't obey the law i just take off my belt you know i just whack the table like that and they sober up the kids moreover the law is ordered to the common good but some have themselves well to what in those things which pertain to the commune right which nevertheless in their own things do not have themselves well right therefore it does not pertain to the law that make men what good so i know so some men who politicians who do good for the city or country and get in their private life yeah yeah moreover some laws are tyrannical as the philosopher says in his politics huh but the tyrant does not intend the what goodness of the subjects but only to his own usefulness therefore is not of law to make men what good huh but against this is what the philosopher says huh in the second book of the ethics that the will of each legislature is this that he might make the citizens what good i answer it should be said this has been said above the law is nothing other than a what dictate of reason in the one presiding right huh by which those subject are governed but of each one what subject the virtue is the virtue is that he be what yeah yeah thus we see that the virtue of the irascible and incusible consists in this that they are being obedient is what's going to say obey well reason right and in this way the virtue of each subject is that he be well subject to the what the prince right as the philosopher says in the first book of the what politics huh you should listen to the pope okay listen to the bishop what did uh padre spiel say about that woman in wisconsin people should obey their bishop oh did he say that yeah yeah they asked they asked him about it you know all he said was people should obey their bishop he was she was not obeying her bishop right and she stopped going to church them like that is i don't know despite her apparitions so called you know but he didn't say anything about their apparitions are real or not he said people should obey their bishops or to the wise is sufficient i guess okay whence it is manifest right okay to this therefore are ordered each law that it be obeyed by the what yeah once is manifest that this is proper to the law to lead the subjects into their proper what virtue since therefore virtue is what makes its haver what good it follows that the proper effect of law is to make what good those to whom it is given either simply or what secundum quid if the intention of the one bearing the law tends to the true good which is the common good according to what currently it would follow through the law that men become good simply if however the intention of the legislature is born towards that which is not good simply but useful or delightful to himself or repugnant to the divine justice then the law does not make men good simply but only secundum quid right to wit in the order to such a regime thus the good is found even in what per se malis things that are as such bad as someone said to be a good what thief who acts in a way that is suitable to his end now to the first it should be said the two-fold is virtue as has been said above namely the acquired one right from repeated acts and the one poured in by god right okay now to both of these something what to be accustomed to deeds does right but diversely huh because the virtue which is what acquired acquired it causes right it's caused by repeated acts as the virtue aristotle talks about but to the infused virtue it disposes right huh and it helps to preserve it and what advance it yeah and because law is for this given that might direct human acts insofar as human acts are done for virtue right to that extent to that extent the law makes men what good huh once the philosopher says in the second book of the politics that the law givers by customing men in a certain way makes them what good to the second it should be said that not always does someone obey the law from the perfect goodness of virtue but sometimes from the fear of punishment sometimes from owning the dictator of reason right which is a certain what beginning of ritual which is a certain thing that is a certain thing that is a certain thing that is a certain thing that is that is a certain thing that is a certain thing that is a certain thing that is a certain thing that is without having the, what, the virtue, right? Sometimes men just want to do what's good for the command of reason at all. Okay, so that's the same with the child, right? He's obeying, you know, because of the... And sometimes the only, the, what, dictative reason, right? Okay, the third argument now, that the good of each part is considered in proportion to its whole, right? Whence Augustine says in the third book of Confessions that ugly is every part that is not, what, fit its whole. Since, therefore, each man is a part of the city, it is impossible that some man be good unless he be well, what, proportioned to the common good, nor can the, what, be able to, what, consist to, yeah, consist to, well, unless it be from parts that are proportioned to it, right? Whence is it possible that the common good of the city has itself well unless the citizens are virtuous, at least in regard to those, what? Yeah, to those things to which it is, he's governed. It suffices, however, as regards the good of the community that others are so far virtuous that they obey the, what, commands of the princes, right? Therefore, the philosopher says in the third book of the politics that the same is the virtue of the prince and of the good man, but not however is the same as the virtue of each, what, citizen and of the good man. And Maristow will say that in the best city, the virtue of the good man and the virtue of the good citizen are the same, right? But in these disordered communities, the virtue of the good citizen is not the virtue of a good man. Now, to the fourth, it should be said that the lex tyrannica, right? Since it is not according to reason, it is not, simplicity there speaking, the law. But more is a certain perversion of the law, right? But nevertheless, insofar as it has something of the notion of law, it intends that the citizens be, what? Good, huh? For it does not have the notion of law except according as it's a dictate of someone presiding, right, over his subjects. And to this, he aims that the one subject to the law, the one subjects, rather, are very well obedient to the law, right, huh? Which is to make them good, not simply. But in order to such a, what? Rule, yeah, yeah. On Easter Sunday there, on TV at the evening there, they had the whole of Gone with the Wind, you know. That movie, which you tend to think again about, you know, the old South, you know, and so on. I guess actually the slaves were, actually liked their government down there, kind of, you know, for the most part, you know, they were ready to take up arms more in defense, you know, in the South. Yeah, many of them did. Yeah. You should think of these communist countries, you know, where citizens are very obedient, huh? But they say, if it isn't forbidden, it's mandatory. If it isn't mandatory, it's forbidden. That's a communist. D.J. Castricius used to say, you know, the old saying is, come the revolution, we'll all eat strawberry shortcake. But who likes strawberry shortcake? Come the revolution, you'll like it. Okay, shall we stop now? In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, Amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, Guardian Angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas, deo gratias. God, our Enlightenment, Guardian Angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor, and help us to understand all that you have written. Father, Son, and of the Holy Spirit, Amen. Now, in the Summa Contra Gentiles, you have two arguments from, what, motion, and then one from the, what, maker, and then you have one, like, like the fourth argument in the Summa Theologiae, tied up with the, what, being, right? So it's the same three, right? Except one of them is divided, the one that's divided into two is the one from motion, right? Why, in the case of the Summa Theologiae, it's the one from being, right? That's divided into two, right? Then the fifth argument is similar again. So you divide the fifth one against the first four, and the first four you divide into three, and one of the three is subdivided into two. So you have one division of two, and one of the two is divided into three, and one of the three is divided into two. So it's two divisions of two and one of three, right? Not as complicated as the categories, right? Okay. About eight divisions of two or three that he gives there, Thomas. And the ten, how can you get ten? I mean, you and mine can't possibly understand a division to ten, can it? Why should there be ten, say? Well, Thomas says something is said of something, either because of what it is, right? Or because it's something in addition to what it is that's in it, or by reason of something, what? Outside of it. Okay. So you, for example, man is said of you by reason of what you are. You're a man, aren't you? Okay. But let's say you're a cook or a geometer. By reason of something in addition to what you are, right? But something that's in you, right? It's a knowledge of how to do a hamburger or something, right? Hot dog. Maybe something more advanced, right? Okay. Or you know the Pythagorean theorem, right? Or something less exalted. But then you're also said to be, say, clothed, right? Is this the reason of what you are? No. Clothing is not a part of what you are, is it? Yeah. But they don't. And they're not even in you like your geometry is, right? Or your health, right? Okay. If you're sometimes healthy and sometimes sick, then health is not what you are, is it? But sometimes it's in you, sometimes it's not. So there's that kind of thing, right? So that's the first division Thomas gives. And it's into three, right? Now the first of those three, substance, he doesn't divide anymore, right? In terms of the gener, right? You can divide the genus into its species, but I mean, they don't. No, not three higher gener. Now the second one he divides into what? Three. Quantity, quality, and what? Relation. But actually Frisk divides quantity and quality against relation, the absolute against the relative, right? And they subdivides the absolute into what? Quantity and quality. Quantity being the size of something, right? And quality being the disposition of it, right? Okay. It takes care of everything, right? So you have two divisions into two there, right? You have a division to three, and then one of them is let to stand by itself, right? It's only one genus substance. And then the next three are divide the absolute against the relative, and then the absolute to two. Now you get four of the ten, right? And then the last ones, usually you divide one of the five against the other, one of the six or other, against the other five, right? Because it's man's category, right? And being clothed, you know? Other animals are supplied by nature with their clothing, right? Their fur, right? And they don't have any clothing unless, you know, we dress them up, you know, like in a parade or something, right? And the girls dress up a little kitty cap when they're, they're, they're, they're like. And people always place a little blanket around a dog or something in the winter when it's cold, right? So that's the curious thing for man, right? A man's category, okay? And then the other five are divided into what? Two and three, right? You have the ones that are based upon an extrinsic measure, like you are in this room, right, huh? Okay. Or you are, what, sitting, which is the arrangement of your parts and place, right? And then you're here in the, what, between two and three or something, right? Time, right? But time already has the idea of order, so you don't have to have a, another category there. But for place, you need place and position, right? You could be in this room laying down, you could be in this room standing up, you could be in this room sitting down, right? So the arrangement of your parts, which is called position, right? Gets that, right? I have to explain to the students that it's based upon something outside of you, right? Because if I jump out of the, what, airplane and going down, right? Am I standing? No. Intensically, my body would be in the same shape as it is now, right? But to be standing, I've got to have something outside of me than standing on, right? Okay. And are I sitting now? Oh, man. Am I sitting? Although my body's getting in the position of a man sitting, right? The intrinsic arrangement of my body is what? Like that, a man sitting. But to be sitting, you've got to have some kind of a sport. Thank God. The difference between sitting and squatting, right, as they say, right? Okay. And then you have acting upon undergoing, which are talking about something outside of you that you're acting upon, or something outside of you that you're undergoing something from, right? So by kicking you and you're being kicked, right? By shoving you and you're being shoved. So you divide this last six into one and five, right? That's a division of two. The five into three and two, that's a division of two, right? And then you divide the two into two, and the three into three. So you've got just about eight divisions, right? So I was thinking how we called that third kind of cause, the mover, usually, Aristotle begins, but then he brings out the maker, right, as being the same kind of cause, right? But there's a distinction between motion, which is the effect of the mover, and form, which is the effect of the, what? Maker. And the, but both motion and form are a kind of, what? Act, right? So I'm able to be in motion now, but when I get up and start walking around, I'm actually in motion, right? And the wood is able to be a chair, but when it gets to form, it's actually a chair, right? Then there's this third act, which is being, right, or existence. God, you know, God's substance and his being are the same thing, but the creatures, they're something different because they get the existence of God. So you have motion, form, being, right? And you get three different arguments, right? For the existence of God. But in the Summa Theologiae, you divide the third into two, and in the Summa Contra Gentiles, the first one, motion, into two, right? There's two arguments for motion. Two reasons of God. So you're still dividing into two, or what? Three, right? When Thomas divides the Bible, right, he divides the Bible into two, right? And on the basis of what, I guess, John says, right, huh? The law was given by Moses, but grace and truth came through Jesus Christ. So he divides the Old Testament on the basis of the law, right? And usually into two, the law of the king and the law of the father. and then the New Testament he divides in the basis of grace the origin of grace which is Christ and the four Gospels then the nature of grace which is the epistles of St. Paul and then the effect of grace which is the church and that's divided into three its origin in the Acts of the Apostles its growth is seen in the canonical epistles of John and Peter and so on and then its final state in the apocalypse if you look at Vatican II when it divides New Testament he touches upon Thomas' division it mentions the Gospels first as being the greatest part of the New Testament and then the epistles of St. Paul and then other ones which talk about the origin and growth and some of the church so you divide into two or what? three so you can become a fanatic if you want to about two or three I have a nice passage there in one of the books there of Heisenberg you know he's probably the greatest scientist after Einstein right? in the modern world and he says for a physical system he says you always need three units you know we can decide of which the three units shall be in different ways he says but you must have three he even talks about you know we've got in modern physics now these two great constants the speed of light and the quantum of Max Planck there must be a third one he says it's kind of the way these great minds work right huh you know he doesn't actually do that the newest research says light is not probably a constant yeah yeah well it's always always questioned about these things you know you know so we didn't know we didn't have three laws you know we talked about three laws Newton now goes back to Aristotle and he divides the the plays up and he says you have a beginning middle and end right and then later on he says two parts tying the knots and untying them when he comes back you know to dialectic in the third book of wisdom he says you know we first tie the knots and then we untie them right that's what Thomas does here right he ties at the beginning of each article he went to a number of knots right and then he unties them right on the basis of the body article he unties them and they reply to the objections so you agreed I put my doctoral thesis on the three roads in looking knowledge right there's a natural road in our knowledge the road from the senses into reason and then there's a common road of reasoned out knowledge which is studied in logic and then the third road or roads is the private roads of the what reasoned out knowledge of particular kinds it's the way of defining a natural philosophy and the way of defining and geometry and the way of defining and wisdom are all different and the way you judge in all three is different and the order of consideration or determination is different natural philosophy goes from the general to the particular and towards what matter wisdom goes just absent towards the immaterial right and to some extent from the less universal to the more universal and I always take as a beautiful example that is the ninth book of wisdom you know where he takes up act and ability in terms of motion right and then in the middle part he expands act you know to form and to operation and all these other things and so you're going in a sense from the less universal to the more universal and he takes up substance there in book 7 and 8 he deals with material substance first right and then he ascends to universal understanding of substance which prepares the way you know for talking about the immaterial substance so far as our weak mind can know them right so ok Let's look now at question 92, article 2. Whether the acts of law are suitably assigned. That's where I guess we were just left off. To the second one goes forward thus. It seems that the acts of law are not suitably assigned. In this that is said that it's an act of the law to what? Command. To prohibit, I guess. To permit. And to what? Punish, right? For, this is the first objection now. For every law is a what? Common precept. As the legis consults it says, right? This must be some great book of the Middle Ages, right? But it's the same thing to command as to what? What? Precept. To be cheaper, yeah. Therefore the other three are what? Superpholous, right? Moreover, second objection. The effect of law is to lead those subject to it to the good. But counsel is about a greater good than precept. Precept is like another word for empire, right? Commandment, right? Precept, no? Precept's the law. We use that word sometimes in our speech, not too common a word. So, counsel is about a greater good than the precept, right? So, you have the young man there, right? Who wanted to say, what more can I do, right? He was kind of flattened by what Christ suggested, right? Therefore, it more pertains to the law to give counsel than to what? Command, right? Sure, the law would be concerned about the greater good, right? Moreover, just as some man is, what? Incited to the good through what? Punishment, so also through awards. Therefore, just as to punish is laid down to be an effect of the law, so also to what? Reward, huh? That makes sense to me. Because I'm only a nitwit, you know. I'm not a wit. Moreover, the intention of the legislator is to make men what? Good, as has been said above. But the one who only by the fear of punishments obeys the law is not good, is he? For the servile or slavish fear, which is the fear of, what? Punishments, right? Although it makes someone do something good, it does not, however, make him do it well, right? Okay? As Augustine says, huh? I love, well, he says those things, Augustine does. And he says, well, although it makes a man do what is good, it does make him do it well, right? Therefore, it does not seem to be proper to law that it, what? Punishes somebody, right? Because that does not make you good, right? You're just doing it because you're afraid of being punished, right? It's like the marine guy going behind you and saying, you know, he does, you know. Because we, you know, my son's got always booked, you know, the different military people, you know. What about patting now? And he said, I'll be there behind you, you know. With this gun, you'd go for it. We'd also be a, you know, a dead hero rather than a, you know, dead coward, right? So he'd go for it. But I was, I don't have a choice, yeah. But you know how much of that goes on, right? You know how much of that goes on, right? You know how much of that goes on, right? You know how much of that goes on, right? You know how much of that goes on, right? You know how much of that goes on, right? You know how much of that goes on, right? You know how much of that goes on, right? Even Washington, I heard him threaten that once, you know, you know, one of the books on Washington I was reading. Interesting. But against this is what the famous Isidore says, right, huh? In the fifth book of etymologies, huh? People make a joke about it. They think some of these etymologies are not correct, but... Okay. For every law either permits something as a what? Strong man asks for a what? Reward. Or it what? Yeah. That no one is solicited to ask for the marriage of the sacred virgins, right? Even the Romans had sacred virgins, right? Okay. Or it punishes, huh? As who strikes somebody, I guess, right? What's the word, cedum, now? They have that. Okay. Capite plectata, right? That's all this had. Now, what does Thomas say? I'll see what he says here. See if he can untie this horrible mess that he's created, right? The answer should be said that just as a what? Enunciation is a what? Saying of reason, right? By way of enunciating, right? Now, I like myself in English, you know, I don't like the word enunciation. I like the word statement, right, huh? Okay. You make a statement, you state something to be so, right, huh? Or not so, right, huh? Okay. That's more pertaining to the looking reason, right, huh? The practical reason, huh? The law is the saying of reason, but by way of what? Commanding, I guess, right, huh? Percipiendi, right? What do they do? Is the word commanding there? Is that the way Thomas said it? Yeah, okay. Now, it's proper to reason that it leads one into something from something, okay? Now, what part of the definition of reason that our teacher, the witch Shakespeare, has, huh? Yeah, discourse, yeah. Because discourse is from one thing to another, right, huh? Okay. So, it's proper to reason, right, huh? That it leads one to something from something, right? Okay. So, you know, in logic, the discourses we study most of all are defining and reasoning, right? And in the art of counting and calculation, right? You know, talk about adding, subtracting, multiplying, dividing, right? But you're being led from one number to another number, right? Whence, just as in the demonstrative sciences, the sciences that show something, right? It's interesting, huh? The etymology of the word demonstration is what? Showing. And the same with the Greek word for demonstration is apodixis, right? But apodixis from showing, right, huh? Now, you ever seen the slogan there from Missouri? Yeah. I'm with Missouri. It kind of showed me, right? It's kind of, you know, demanding rigor, you know? Show me that it's so, right? Okay, show me that God exists, right? You know, or show me that the soul is immortal or something, right, huh? Or even show me the Pythagorean theorem, right? The theorem, right. Yeah, yeah. That works sometimes, too. One day I had an assumption there, I was sitting in on the mathematic professors' calculus course, you know? And I said to him, I noticed in the beginning there you used the Pythagorean theorem. He says, yes. And I said, now, can you really teach calculus without the Pythagorean theorem? And he says, no. He says, now, how many of your students could demonstrate Pythagorean theorem? Part of very few. I said, what are you doing? What are you doing? That's very easy, he says. Anyway. So, the word demonstration comes in the Latin word to show, right, huh? Okay. So, in demonstration, you show the mind that it must be so, right, huh? Okay. Her style defines a demonstration, or apodixi says, hey, what? Syllogism, right? Making us know the cause, and that of which it is the cause, and that it cannot be, what? Otherwise, right? Okay. And these is demonstrations to see, are those in, what? Geometry and arithmetic, right? But there are demonstrations elsewhere. Whence, just as in demonstrative sciences, reason is led that into, what? Assenting to the conclusion through certain, what? Beginnings, right? So, also, right? One is led into, what? Assenting to the precept of the law, to command of the law, through something, right? Okay. So, he's talking about what's common to, what? The works of reason, right, huh? That is proper or private reason that induces us into something from something else, right? Okay. And that's true of both looking reason, right? Which leads you into the conclusion from the premises, right? And, what? Practical reason, right? Or something leads you into obeying the, what? Command, right? So, it's from this to that, right? You're being led into obeying the command from this, whatever that is, right? Okay. Now, the precepts of the law, he says, are about human, what? Acts, huh? In which law directs us, huh? As has been said above, huh? But there are, what? Three, huh? There are, however, three differences of human acts, huh? This is a distinction that Thomas sees, right, huh? A distinction of three, or into three. For, as has been said above, some acts are good from their genus, from their kind, huh? And these are the acts of the, what? Virtues, right? So, a courageous act, right? A just act, huh? A temperate act. These are good from their, what? Genus, huh? And, in regard to these, there is laid down this act of the law, which is, he takes, I guess, the synonyms, huh? Precipere vel imparare, to command, or to what? I don't know if we have two words in English, huh? What are they? Yeah. They're kind of taking the Latin word there, right, huh? Okay. For the law commands all the acts of the virtues, as is said in the fifth book of the, what? Ethics, right? That's the book where Aristotle talks about justice, right? Where you're obeying the law, right? Which commands all the virtues, huh? Now, of course, our laws may be very imperfect, right, huh? I mean, there's some laws against intemperance, right? Like driving under the influence, right? Or raping somebody, right? Or something of that sort, right, huh? Okay. There are laws about, what? Justice, aren't there? Paying your debts and so on, right? Okay. I don't send you to debtor prison anymore, I guess, but punishments, right? Okay. And there are laws about soldiers being courageous in time of battle, right? Yeah. They get punished, right? Court-martialed, right? Coward. It's one book, I read the book, I'm patting it on, because he always cussed the case out. You yellow-bellied cowards, you know? He's got all these strong words, you know? So strong, you know, Eisenhower kind of forced him to apologize or something. He's got all these strong words, you know? He's got all these strong words, you know? He's got all these strong words, you know? He's got all these strong words, you know? He's got all these strong words, you know? He's got all these strong words, you know? He's got all these strong words, you know? He's got all these strong words, you know? He's got all these strong words, you know? He's got all these strong words, you know? He's got all these strong words, you know?