Prima Secundae
Lecture 232: The Definition and Elements of Law

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what's the best band for the job, right? But Thomas points out that the family and the city don't have the unity of my body, right? When the action of my hand is an act of me, you know. But not every action of the part is an action of the family, right? Or every action of the family is an action of the city, right? Now we've got a third part of the definition of what? Law, right, huh? It's something of reason, right? And it's what, for the common good, right? And it's made by what? The multitude or the, who was in charge of the multitude, right? St. Louis of France, right? Or was it, who was the great guy in England there? Edward, yeah, who was it? The, uh... No, not Alfred. Look at that. Yeah, Alfred, wasn't it? Alfred, King Alfred. Yeah, I think so, yeah, yeah. I think he even translated it some way, the issue. Hadn't been a good, yeah. Good man. Now we need one more thing, which is the idea of promulgation, right? Let's come back a moment to the idea of a common good, huh? Just a little bit about what a common good is. In the full sense, a common good is a good that many can share in, right? Without diminishing it all, right? So, if we go and buy a pie, you guys and I, we can all share in that pie, right? But none of us is going to get the whole pie. So it's not, it's a common good, but not in the fullest sense, right? But if we get out our friend YouTube there and we learn the Pythagorean theorem, you can know the whole of it, right? And the whole argument for it. And you can do the same, right? And you and you and me. And it's not diminished in any way, the truth, right? Truth is a common good in the full sense, right? And we might even understand better with the help of each other, right? Because one of us sees something someone else doesn't see, right? So I ask people, is the Pythagorean theorem, is that the good of Pythagoras? No, it's the good of all of us, right? And in no way is it diminished by being shared with many, right? Is God a private good? Private good of the monks? Is something lost by sharing this good with many? Okay, won't pay enough God left for the rest of us. We've probably hardly, all the Holy Communion, we've hardly taken a little bit off his finger. I think his finger. We don't have to do that much. In a way, a piece of music, right, or a play is a common good too, right? In the sense that we can hear the same piece of music and it's not diminished, right? In fact, we enjoy it more than we sit here together in a concert. But, you know, you get to pay more attention to a piece of music maybe than you do when you're sitting at home or something. Okay, but now the fourth element, where the promulgation is of the notion of what? Law. To the fourth one proceeds thus. It seems that promulgation is not of the ratio of what? Law. For natural law, most of all, has the notion of what? Law. What was called the unwritten law, right? By the great Sophocles. Sophocles is the greatest of the Greek poets after Homer, right? He and his. I was fitting around the library one time and I ran across this Greek expression, you know, that Sophocles is Homer writing tragedy and Homer is Sophocles writing epic, you know? I mean, the two of them, you know, they saw that connection between those two, you know? And you read the plays of the Greeks, you know, you can see the Sophocles is the best of the right play, right? He speaks of the unwritten law, right? And Aristotle will quote him, right, when he talked about the natural law, right? This other law. Antigone, right? That's one of the Greek plays. So natural law, most of all, has the notion of what? Law. And if some law of the city is opposed to natural law, it's really not a law. It's a mislaw. But the natural law does not need promulgation, right? Therefore, it's not of the notion of law that it be promulgated. The word promulgation is going to be somewhat analogous, right? Natural reason makes this known, right? So someone says, I didn't know I was supposed to do good and avoid bad. You know, if you're ignorant of that, you know, you need a punishment, right? Really punishment, right? It's not enough. You can do good. Aristotle says, you know, that it's always bad to disown your parents, right? Always bad. Adultery, he says, and murder is always bad. And stealing is always bad, right? And even more generally, you know, to do bad, right? It's bad to do bad. But if you don't know that, you need a punishment. Not need of argument, right? Get some more government money to send in the school. Yeah, yeah. Moreover, it pertains or belongs to law properly to obligate, right? Something to doing or not doing something, right? But not only are those obligated to defund the law before whom the law is promulgated, but also others. Therefore, promulgation is not of the notion of what? Law. Moreover, the obligation of law extends also to the future. Because laws place necessity upon future, what? Negotiations. But promulgation comes to the present, right? That's why Obama doesn't want to be in the Constitution. Yeah, it does. That's history. Therefore, promulgation is not of the necessity of law, right? But against this is what is said in the decrees. This is in Gratian, right? That the laws are instituted when they're promulgated, huh? The answer should be said. This has been said, huh? Law is placed upon others by way of what? A rule and measure. But a rule and measure are placed upon something through this, that they are applied to those who are what? Ruled and measured. Whence, in order that law would obtain or obtains the power of what? Obdicating, which is proper to law. Well, it must be applied to men who ought to be ruled according to it, huh? Now, such an application comes about through this, that they are led into a knowledge of these things from the promulgation. Whence the promulgation is necessary, in order that the law might have its own, what? Power. Okay. Now Thomas ends up the whole, what? Question here. And that's from the four things foresaid, one can, what? Gather it together, huh? And you often find when they're talking about discourse, they use the word, collativa, colligere, you know? You're bringing together, in reasoning, you're bringing together the major and the minor premise, and then deducing to the conclusion. Well, likewise, the definition, right, huh? So from these four things, one can collect, huh? The definition of law, which is nothing other than a certain, what? Ordering of reason to the common good by the one who has care of the community, and what? promulgated so you need all those four parts in the what definition now you've been ruled by the laws but now you know what a law is huh so next time the judge you appear before the judge ask him what is the law judge see if he knows what the law is crazy law is what you're supposed to do you couldn't define it now to the first it should be said that promulgation of the natural law is from this that God what has inserted in the minds of men that it be known what naturally yeah but this is because the word promulgation here is being used in an analogous sense right you go out there and bang bang in the city post you know that's a promulgation right or you get you know blow the horn and then you announce you know that you shall drive on the right side of the street that's promulgation that's kind of more known right huh you see okay but ignorance of the law is no excuse right then probably promulgated of course you know washington's making so many rules now that they can they get they get you out of their pockets you know because they yeah yeah and when they don't want you they don't like you you know so they say you broke this you broke the rule and such and you're going to pay for it now with this and this and this it's yeah yeah i know i mean these agencies make their own rules too some extent and to those before whom the law is not promulgated are obligated to observing the law insofar as it comes to their knowledge to others right or it can come through what now the promulgation present that's extended in the future through the firmness of what the written law right which in a certain way is always what promulgating it now when cizador says in the second book etymologies that law is called from what legendo that's what it means reading huh that's what you never know what these these what these are correct according to the the etymologist because it is what yeah yeah etymology i guess comes from the greek word for what the cause right the idea yeah take a break Now we come to question 91 here, the diversity of the laws, right? Then we're not to consider about the diversity of the laws and about these four things are asked. First, whether there is some eternal law. Secondly, whether there is some natural law, right? Third, whether there is some human law. I mean, like the positive law they call sometimes. Fourth, whether there is some, what, divine law. I suppose that means now. It doesn't mean the same thing as Lex Eterna, what's Lex Divina mean here? It means, you know, like the ones that you have, these particular ones that you have. And whether it is one, only, or many, that's Lex Divina, I guess. Sixth, whether there is some law of sin. Now what the heck is that about it? I don't know about St. Paul. Law and Life in Burr. Yeah, I know. There was some, was there an article there? There was a little volatility about the Marxists taking over the Lex Piccati, you know, and enforcing it. Now, as when Aristotle talks about the law, he usually begins with Lex Humana, right? And then he goes to Lex Naturalis, right? So the order here is what? Theological order, huh? And not the philosophical order, right? I told you my teacher, because Siric there was, we'd be meeting once in a while, we'd have a dinner, and then talk about the law, you know. And of course, the lawyers, I mean, the first stage of the law is the, we've written down law, the laid down law, yeah. To the first end one proceeds thus, it seems that there is not some eternal law. For every law is placed upon some people, right? Some people. But there is not from eternity some into my law. Yeah. For only God is from eternity. Therefore, no law is eternal. That convinces me. I don't want to dim what I'm not the wit here. Moreover, promulgation is of the notion of what? Law. The very definition of law, right? But promulgation cannot be from eternity, because there is not from eternity someone to whom we could be promulgated. Therefore, no law can be eternal. Well, that convinces me too, right? I'm not the last word, though, on what's true or false. Okay? Moreover, law implies an order to an end, but nothing is eternal that is ordered to an end. For only the last end is eternal. Therefore, no law is, what, eternal. So this is touching upon that part of the definition that says it's ordered to the common good as an end, right? But in general, it's ordered to an end. And then the second objection is against it from, what, promulgation. And the first one is in terms of to whom is this law being given, right? God doesn't give himself a law, does he? But against this is what Augustine says in the first of his book about free judgment, huh? The law which is named or called the, what, highest reason, right? Cannot be, what, to anyone understanding, right? And not be seen, what, yeah, for the unchangeable and eternal, right? They go together, unchanging and eternal. What the heck is he going to do now? I answer it should be said that as has been said above, nothing is a, what, nothing other is law than a certain, what, dictate of the practical reason in the prince, right, who governs some perfect, what, community. But it's manifest over that supposing the world is ruled by divine providence, right, as has been had in the first book, that the whole, what, community of the universe is governed by the, what, divine reason. And therefore the, there was a question how to translate it, it rots you there, right, yeah. And therefore the reason for the governing of the world, let's say, in God, existing in the, what, prince of the universe, right, the beginning of the universe, has a notion of law. He's talking about how God is, what, maybe conceived eternally, right? The law he's going to impose upon the universe, or what? Anyway. And because the divine reason, or mind, conceives nothing, time, but has a, what, eternal concept, as is said in Proverbs 8, hence it's necessary that this law of this sort must be called, what, eternal. Let's see how he gets out of the objections. He's not out of this, uh, the way yet here. The first, therefore, it should be said that those things which are not in themselves, they exist before, what, God, huh? Insofar as they are foreknown and foreordered in the mind of God, huh? According to that of Romans chapter 4, who calls those things which are not as those things which, what, are. So I got called when I was not. I was thinking this morning of how, um, and if I asked you this question, you know, from your great knowledge of inn, is the genus in the species and the species in the genus, what would you wisely answer? Huh? Yeah. But it can't be the same sense of inn, right? Okay. So the genus is in the species as in a, what, composed whole, right? But the species is in the genus as in a universal whole, right? Okay. And the genus is actually in the species, right? And the species is in the kind of potency in the genus, right? It's not action until you make the difference, right, huh? Okay. So quadrilado was in square, right, as the genus in its definition, right? And square is in quadrilado as a species is in the universal genus, right? Okay. So, is, um, creatures in God or is God in creatures? Well, we say in him we live and move and have our being, so we're clearly in him, right? But is God, when we say that God is infinite and there for everywhere and everything, in another sense, God is in everything, right? As power is in the thing, it has power over, right? And knowledge is in the thing that, you know, we speak of a penetrating mind, right, that knows things, and God's mind is the most penetrating mind that I know of. So, those things which in themselves are not exist before God insofar as they are foreknown and foreordered, right? You call those things which are not, there's those things which are. He chose you in himself, right? Thus, therefore, the eternal, what? Concept of the divine law as a notion of a, what? Eternal law according as by, what? God He chose you in himself, right? He chose you in himself, right? He chose you in himself, right? He chose you in himself, right? He chose you in himself, right? He chose you in himself, right? He chose you in himself, right? He chose you in himself, right? it is ordered to the governing of things foreknown by him, huh? So it's kind of God's plan, right, huh? It'll be a little bit like maybe the king, you know, thinks out the law that he's going to impose upon the city, right? And he hasn't imposed it yet, right? Another damn law here, you know. Taxing us or whatever it might be, right? But how do they think of these things, you know, huh? They always think of some new thing to tax, right, huh? Yeah. Now, secondly, it should be said that promulgation comes to be both by what? The spoken word, I guess, and the written word, right? And in both ways, the eternal law has promulgation on the part of what? God promulgating it. Because both the, what? Divine word, yeah? I know, I'm reading the, the, the, the Raitate, you know. Of course, they don't, in the Latin text that I got off the thing, they don't have verbum capitalized. It should be capitalized, I think, like this, because it's Tuna Messia, you know. Um, because the divine word, huh, is eternal, right? And the, what? The writing of the book of life, huh? Because we've got an article on the book of life there in the, the Raitate, too. I don't know what the book of life is. It's eternal. But on the side of the creature, hearing, or inspecting, right? It cannot be a eternal, what? Promulgation, huh? That guy's, interesting what he's saying there, right, huh? It's promulgated in the word he said, huh? Which is the second person of the Trinity, right? There's a promulgation there. Yeah. You hear my little poem, right? God the Father said it all in one word. No wonder when that word became a man. He spoke in words so few and wise. He was the brevity and soul of it. A little borrowing there from Shakespeare, of course. I told you what I found in the, like, it's the 13th book of wisdom, you know. Aristotle says we should say some things better than our predecessors, and other things, try to say them as well as they said them, you know. I always quote that thing of Augustine, Thou hast made us for thyself, and our hearts are restless, until they rest in you. And you can't say anything better than that. But Shakespeare says things, too, you can't think of a better way of saying them, you know. Even Abe Lincoln says some things so well sometimes, you know, that you say, I can't really improve upon that. It's really disgraceful not to say things as well as your predecessors said them. That's what most philosophers I hear, they don't say as well as others have said before them. Okay. To the third, it should be said that law implies an order to the end, what? Actively. Insofar as through it we are, some things are ordered to the end. Not, however, what? Passively. That the law itself is ordered to an end, except, what? Her arched ends. In the one governing whose end is outside himself. To whom it is necessary, or to which it is necessary, that his law be ordered. But the end of the divine governing is, what? God himself. Nor is his law something other from himself, huh? Whence the eternal law is not ordered to a, what? Another end, huh? You want to do another article? Okay. Whether there is in us some natural law, it seems that there is what? Not in us a natural law. So Aristotle was mistaken then. For man is governed sufficiently through the eternal law. For Augustine says in the book on free judgment that the eternal law is that by which, what? Is just that all things be most ordered, right? But nature does not abound in the superfluous. Just as it does not fail in necessary things. Therefore, there is not some law which is what? Natural to man. Moreover, through the law, man is ordered in his acts to the end. But the ordering of human acts to the end is not by nature as happens in the irrational creatures, which only by natural desire act for the sake of an end. But man acts for an end through reason and will, right? Therefore, there is not some, what, natural law for men. Sounds like Kant would like this objection, it seems to me. More, the more one is free, the less one is under the, what, law. But man is freer than all the animals on account of free judgment, right? Which he has before all the other animals. Since, therefore, the other animals are not subject to natural law, either is man subject to natural law. I can scan A for his objections, huh? But against this, Romans 2, it says, when the Gentiles, huh, who do not have the law, right? Notice the way the law there is used, right, huh? I mean, you see, the law is going to be said of all these different kinds of law, but when it's used here, you're talking about what? Those laws that are written in the Exodus or the Deuteronomy or something, right? When they naturally do those things which they do, right, huh? The gloss says, huh, that although they do not have the written law, they nevertheless have the unwritten law, as my friend's topic, they should say, right? Which is the natural law, by which each one understands and is conscious to himself what is good and what is what? Bad. So the people naturally understand that you should do unto others as you should have them do unto you. No one that could be mean to me, make me cry, huh? Well, therefore, I shouldn't be mean to other people, should I? You think I shouldn't be? Just somehow? Sometimes. It's a short change. Well, right is the spice of life, huh? I guess that was kind of Obama's slogan, like, change. We need irrationality in the White House. Well, the answer should be said, as has been said above, law, since it is a rule and measure, can be in two ways in something, right? In one way, as in what is ruling or measuring, right? And I suppose that's the way eternal law is in God, right, huh? It's the one ruling and measuring. In another way, as in the one ruled and measured, because insofar as it partakes something of the rule or measure, or is thus ruled or what, measured, huh? When, since all things which are, what, subject to divine providence, are ruled and measured by the eternal law, it is manifest that all partake in some way, right, the eternal law, insofar as from the, yeah, from the pressing upon of it, huh, have an inclination to their own acts and their ends. But among others, huh, the rational creature is subject in a more excellent way to the divine providence, huh? Because the others are ordered to, what, to partake of God's goodness in some way, but the rational creature is ordered to God himself, huh, to know and love him. I guess that's how I were made, to know and love him. Um, but also insofar as he becomes a partaker of, what, providence, right? Providing for himself and for others, right? Whence also in him eternal, the eternal reason is partaken of, right? To which he has a natural inclination to a suitable act and an end, huh? And such a partaking of the eternal law in the rational creature is a, what, natural law. That's kind of a definition of natural law that maybe our style wouldn't use, right, huh? But, um, it's a theological definition of it, right? Okay? Just like if you define man as imago dei, right, you know? It's a theological definition of man, huh? For the flaws, you just say, well, he's an animal and he has reason. Funny, in the metaphysics, Aristotle calls him a two-footed animal. That's what he calls him. Whence the psalmist says, huh? Sacrifice, right? The sacrifice of what? Justice. Which has, what? Some people seeking. What are the works of justice, huh, they're supposed to do? He says, many says, who will show us good things, or what is good? To which question he responds, sealed upon us is the light of your, what, face, I guess, huh? Lord. Because the light of natural reason by which we discern what is good and bad, right, which pertains to the natural law, is nothing other than a pressing upon of the divine law on us, huh? Whence it is clear that the natural law is nothing other than a partaking of the eternal law in the rational, what, creature, huh? Now, he says, the first objection, huh? That man is sufficiently governed by the eternal law. He says, that argument proceeds if natural law was something diverse from the, what, eternal law. But it is not, however, except a certain partaking of it, huh? To the second it should be said, that every doing of reason and of will is derived in us from that which is according to, what, nature. So, in the case of reason, there's natural understanding, right? In the case of the will, there's a natural will of happiness, huh? In the will of some other things we naturally will. Because all reasoning, oh, he's saying that. Because all reasoning, I didn't look ahead, I didn't, I plead innocent, innocent, don't punish me. But you're tainted, you've read it more. Well, it's the same thing he's teaching me in the De Veritate. For all reasoning is derived from beginnings, huh? Not from principles, but from beginnings. We're moving the words now, you see, we're making progress, huh? From beginnings, naturally known. And every desire of those things which are for the end is derived from a natural desire of the last end. And thus also is necessary that the first directing of our acts to an end comes about through the, what, natural law. Now, to the third, what about the animals in us? It should be said that also the irrational animals partake of, what, the eternal thought in some way, just as a rational creature. But because the rational creature partakes of it in an understandable and rational way, right? Or understandable and reasonable way. Let's get this down into English, huh? Therefore, the partaking of the eternal law in the reasonable creature is properly called, what, law. For law is something of reason. as has been said above. In the unreasonable creature, the reasonless creature, it is not partaken of in a, what, reasonable way. Whence it cannot be called law, except by, what, a certain likeness, huh? Okay. So what about these scientists talking about the laws of nature, right? That's a different sense, but there's a certain likeness there, right? Why do they talk about the laws of nature? There's no lawgiver. They're in their place, huh? I saw a quote from Heisenberg that I couldn't download for some reason on the computer there, but he's saying, you know, you know, the beginning of a drink, you know, it's easier at the beginning of a drink to put God out in the picture, right? But then at the bottom of the drink, he says, the drink of modern science he's talking about, but at the bottom of the thing, you find God again. I was kind of surprised that Heisenberg would say that, you know, huh? You know, he, you know, the first step, you know, kind of intoxicated, you know, and there's no God, you know, and then you find it at the bottom of the glass, though, and you... It's kind of interesting. But, when I talk about a law, there's no lawgiver, right? You know, there's no mind there. If the laws of nature are something of reason, whose reason is it? All good things must come to an end, huh? Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm.