Prima Secundae
Lecture 223: Punishment, Guilt, and the Distinction Between Mortal and Venial Sin

Transcript
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that they be built up in what? Punishment, we're scandalized in guilt. That's a beautiful phrase, huh? Yeah, that's what it says. It is clear from the example induced about David. Article 7. To the seventh one goes forward thus. It seems that not every punishment is an account of somewhat guilt. For it is said in John 9 about the man born blind. Neither he has sinned nor his parents that he be born blind. That was the question, right? Because they never had... Was the apostles asking that question? Was it his sin or his parents? Yeah, like every one of them, you know? He said, well, neither one. And likewise, it seems that there are many boys, huh? Some, even baptized, that suffer, grave, what? Punishments. As fears, oppressions of the demons, and many other things of the sort. When nevertheless, there is no sin in them after they have been, what? Baptized, huh? And before they are baptized, there is not in them more of sin than in other boys who do not undergo these things. Therefore, not every punishment is for sin. That's convincing, right? Moreover, it's like they're tying you up, you know, and they tie you up really good, you know, they tie you up once and they go around. That's how it keeps on tying you up more and more, huh? Moreover, it's the same reason, it seems, that sinners prosper and some innocents are punished, right? But we find both of these things often in human affairs. For it is said about the iniquitous, the bad, in Psalm 72. They are not in the, what? And with men, they are not, what? Scourged. And Job 21, 7. The impious live, are raised up, are comforted by their wealth. In Habakkuk 1, 13, huh? Wherefore do you regard, what? Yeah. And silent when the, what? He stops underfoot. Yeah. More just. Therefore, not every punishment is inflicted for, what? Guilt. Guilt, huh? Moreover, about Christ it is said, 1 Peter's 2, that he did not make sin, nor is he found, right, with deceit in his mouth, huh? Nevertheless, it is said that he suffered for us. Therefore, not always is punishment dispensed by God for, what? Guilt. Guilt, huh? But against this is what is said in Job chapter 4. Whoever, what? Perished, right? Or when were the right, righteous, huh? Deleted, right? When rather, one sees that those who do wicked things, God-blowing, right? Perished, right? And Augustine says now, huh? There's a great Augustine in the first volume of his Retractions, right? And if that isn't humility, right? How many guys have written a book of Retractions? I mean, Kant and Descartes, the rest of them, their whole writings would have to be retracted. And every punishment is just, and for sin, some sin, one is what? What else time I'm going to get on this mess? The answer should be said, this has been said, punishment can be considered in two ways, huh? Simply and insofar as it is, what? Satisfactory. Now, satisfactory punishment, that's when you don't voluntarily undergo, right, isn't it? It's in some way, what? Voluntary, right, huh? And because it can happen that those who differ in the, what? Debt of punishment. That one, that they be one according to the will by the union of, what? Love. That's the first effect of love. We studied love a long time ago, didn't we? But the first effect of love that Thomas talks about is union, right, huh? Hence it is that sometimes someone who has not sinned carries the, what? Punishment voluntarily for another, right? Just as we see in human affairs that someone, what? Hands himself over for the debt of a, what? Another, right? If, therefore, we speak about punishment simply, according as it has the notion of punishment, thus it always has order to one's own, what? Guilt, yeah. But sometimes to one's, what? Actual guilt. As when someone has, what? Is punished, either by God or by men, for a sin committed. Sometimes with regard to original guilt, right? Now, is that referring to that original sin? And this either chiefly or principally, or as a consequence, huh? For chiefly, the punishment of original sin is that human nature is left to itself, destitute of the aid of original, what? Justice, right? But to this follow all the, what? Penalties which happen from the defective nature in men. This goes back to original sin. It should be known, nevertheless, that sometimes something seems to be a punishment or punishing that, nevertheless, does not have, simply speaking, the notion or definition of punishment. For punishment is a species of what? Of the bad. This has been said in the first book. But evil is the lack of good. Sinceover, there are many goods of man, to wit of the soul, of the body, and exterior things. That's a division into three, right? And that goes back to the, what? The Greeks, right? Aristotle talks about that, right? That's a famous division. It happens sometimes that a man suffers detriment in a lesser good that he might increase in a greater good. Just as when he suffers the detriment of money on account of the health of his body, right? People are willing to pay money to get medicine and get the doctor's attention. Or he says in both of these, meaning the, what? Goods of the body and the exterior goods, on account of the, what? Health of the soul. On account of the glory of, what? God. And then, such a, what, detriment, is not simply the evil of man, but it's one, what, secundum quid, huh? That's a helpful distinction Thomas has in mind, huh? Gets about a lot of problems. If you leave this room, you'll cease to be, in some way. Secundum quid, right, huh? Cease to be in this room, right? I assume you will not cease to be. There's a man out there with a knife. Once it is... is not said, simply the, what, definition of punishment, but of medicine, right? For doctors, push astere potions, right, upon the, what, sick, the infirmary. Infirmary, I used to call it, what did they call it, place for the infirmary? Yeah, yeah, the place for the infirmary, that they might confer. Yeah, so is that a punishment, I give you a bitter potion that's going to cure you? Is that a punishment? I'm going to punish you now. Yeah. You see, I told you, kind of faithfully, though. And because things of this sort do not properly have the definition of punishment, they are not led back to guilt as to a cause, except to this extent that what? That it's necessary to exhibit, right, punishing medicines, right, to human nature, is from the corruption of nature, right? And that's a punishment of what? Original sin, huh? But in the state of innocence, it would not be necessary for the, what, to do someone to develop virtue, to, yeah. So exercise wouldn't be punishing? Wouldn't be. No pain. Yeah, that's what I mean, yeah. This is wonderful, this is wonderful. Whence that there's something, what, punishing in these things is reduced to original guilt as to a cause. So go down to the local place and tell. It's the result of original sin. No pain, no gain. I said, yeah, to return to Eden or something. This is the road back. Okay, so now we go to the first objection about these poor little boys who are born with defects or undergoes these things. To the first effort should be said that defects of this sort, of those who are born, right, or also of boys, right, are effects and punishments of original, what, sin has been said. And they remain even after baptism on account of the cause said above. And that they are not equally in all happens on account of the diversity of nature, which is what left them, right? But defects of this sort are ordered according to divine providence, right? To the salvation of men, either of those who suffer them or of others who are admonished by these, what, punishments. And also to the glory of, what, God, huh? To read these cases, you know, of people, you know, born with these defects and the rest of the family taking care of that one defective baby or something, you know, the wonderful things it does for their character, you know? To second should be said that temporal and what? Yeah. Are some goods of man, right? But parva, money isn't everything. That's a small good, a small good of man, money. But spiritual goods are magna, magna. Somebody's describing to me the way they sing, you know, in the seminary when the bishop comes, you know, magna, you know, because of this thing. Yeah, so they really raise their voices, you know. So, it pertains, therefore, to divine justice, huh? And that he give, what, spiritual goods to the virtuous, right? And of temporal goods and evils, so many does he give to them that are sufficient for, what? Virtue, right? As Dionysius says in the eighth chapter of divine names, that it belongs to divine justice to not, what, soften, right? Strength. The strength of the best, huh? Right here. Yes, it's terrible. Yeah. He's quite a guy, he's Dionysius. God doesn't coddle. Yeah, yeah, yeah. To others, this, the temporal things they're given, gives rise to, what, the evil of spiritual things, huh? Whence in Psalm 72 he concludes, and therefore, what, pride held them, right? I was thinking, you know, that thing we were talking about last time, about the connection between humility and charity, right, huh? You know, the two prayers I kind of grew up with, one was the prayer for charity, you know, come Holy Spirit, fill the hearts of thy faithful, kindle them the fire of thy love. Another prayer was, Jesus, make an humble heart, make a heart stack unto thine. Maybe we should put those two prayers together, you know, prayer book, right? And say the two of them together, right? Because you can't have one without the, what, the other, right? So you shouldn't maybe ask for one without asking for the other, right? So you ask for charity, and at the same time you, what, ask for humility, right? That's kind of interesting. I'm going to arrange a prayer book, right, on the base of that text, right? That's kind of interesting, I think, to think of that, huh? The third, it should be said that Christ, of course, sustained satisfactory, what, punishment, not for his own, but for our sins, huh? I wonder if that's a shock to the Muslims too, huh? But I think the idea of us being pantheists, right, that we've got to be eliminated, you know, it seems like, you know, they're doing something good, right, huh? They're getting rid of these pantheists, right? That's a convenient excuse for it, anyway. Yeah, as you can see, you know. He's serving a God. But was there some evidence of this in the Koran that he was... Well, that he set himself out, that's why he's insisting on the one God. Yeah, yeah. That he's aiming at the Christian, because God doesn't have a son. Yeah. If there's a son, that means there should be many gods. Yeah, for they should be eliminated. Did he just go on and say that then, or what? That's interesting, because that kind of gives a little background, yeah. By way, for the background too, it seems that he's a historian of heresy that he was familiar with. That concept of God somehow being God, but just a man. And he never met an Orthodox Catholic, but anyway. So his understanding of Christianity was erroneous. Yeah. I mean, that would be less reason to regard us as, as, if we don't really think that the son was God, right? If you hadn't run into the, you know, the Orthodox position, right? That the son is God, right? Then you've got, then you've got pantheism, right? It seems, right? It's very hard to understand that, huh? It might be, also, it's a mystery, but God, the son, God being one, the Trinity, well, it seems like you could say that one way of looking at it is that it makes more sense than, and perhaps to even a Muslim than having this son who is sort of a man, but sort of God-like, but not truly God, and there's a, it depends on how you look at it, I guess, but that seems kind of pantheistic in a certain way as well. Yeah. I was talking to Warren Murray today on the phone, and I was talking about something I'd read there in Thomas there, and he's quoting Avicenna, right, huh? And Avicenna, of course, thought that the heavenly bodies, you know, had souls, right, huh? And, but that the end of man's intellectual life is to be united to one of these souls, right? And therefore, and Thomas, you know, doesn't try to argue against thereby reason. but he just says this is against what the church teaches, right? Where to be joined to God, right, the petevic vision, right, is the end of man. It's not to be joined to some kind of angelic character thing, right? And so Warren's saying, you know, that the Muslims don't think, well, they agree with that. Part of Avicenna's teaching about the souls. He doesn't think that we can see God as he is. It's not possible. It's impossible for man to see God as he is. Therefore, that can't be the end of man, right? Whether they take this other thing or just go to the 72 virgins or whatever it is. But it's something, you know, less than that, right? And maybe an ascendance position is even too high for them too, you know. But certainly apparently their idea that you cannot ever see God as he is face to face. Their paradise is just more material creation, essentially. Their paradise is just more material creation. Yeah, yeah. Thomas criticizes it as being of that sort, you know. Therefore, being more human in the sense of, you know. Yeah. Yeah, well, one thing is, it's not a hard point of, too, that not only Islam is Nestorian in its origin, but also, he said, Mormonism is, which I didn't know. What is it? Mormon? Mormonism originates from the Nestorianism. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. And he traces it in some way to the fact that he said, when he was teaching at a Lutheran seminary with all these PhDs in theology, and he said, well, how many Gospels are there originally? Well, there's four. He said, no, there's 15. Because there's all the Apocryphal ones. So, basically, how do you weave them out? And that's the story of all these troubles. The story is, I guess, what they're most buying up there. Mm-hmm. Could we go to another one or take a break? To the eighth one goes forward thus. It seems that someone is not punished for the sin of another. It seems that someone is punished for the sin of another, rather. For it is said in Exodus chapter 20, verse 5. This is the famous text. I am the zealous God, right? Visiting the iniquity of fathers on their sons to the third and the fourth generation. Those who hate me, right? And in Matthew 23, that there come upon you all the, what, just blood that has been poured out upon the earth. Moreover, human justice is derived from divine justice. But according to human justice, sometimes sons are punished for their, what, parents. Justice is clear in the crime of, what, gang. Yeah, yeah. So you lose your, your, your, your longer count or longer the barren or the, whatever it is. So it doesn't pass down to your sons, right? Therefore, also according to divine justice, one is punished for the sin of another. Moreover, if the son is said to not be punished for the sin of the father, but for his own sin, insofar as he imitates the paternal malice, right? This would not be said more sons than of extremist people, who are, by similar punish, similar punishment, punished by those, to those whose sins they have, what, imitated, right? They're punished in a similar way. Therefore, it does not seem that sons are punished for their own sins, but for the sins of their parents. But again, this is what is said in Ezekiel chapter 18, verse 20. The son does not carry the, what? Yeah. I answer it should be said that if we speak about punishment that is satisfactory, huh? Insofar as they are in some way, what, won by the bond of love, right? If, however, we speak of punishment inflicted for sin, insofar as it has the notion of punishment, thus, only is each one punished for his own, what, sin. Because the act of sin is something personal, right? If, however, we speak of punishment, which has the definition of medicine, thus, it happens that one is punished for the sin of another. That's an interesting distinction he's got here, right? Okay. It has been said that the detriment of bodily things, or even of the body itself, right, are certain, yeah, ordered to the salvation of the, what, soul, right? Whence nothing prevents someone being punished by such punishments for the sin of another, either by God or by man, huh? So that the sons for the fathers and the, what, servants, I guess, for their lords, insofar as they are things of them. So that's kind of the idea of the boy is something of the father, right? Thus, however, that if the son or the, what, one subject, servant, is a partaker of the guilt, right, huh, then the punishing defect of this sort has a notion of punishment as regards both, both of the one who is punished and the one for whom he is punished. But if he be not a partaker of the guilt, it has the ratio of punishment as regards the one for whom one, what, punishes. Insofar as the one who is punished, it has only the ratio of, what, medicine. Except ratchet ends insofar as he consents to the sin of another. It is order, however, to the good of the soul if he patiently, what, sustains it, right, huh? But spiritual punishments are not medicinal only, right? Because the good of the soul is not ordered to another better good, right? Whence in the goods of the soul no one suffers detriment without his own, what, guilt. And on account of this, by such punishments, as Augustine says in the epistle to Avitum, which I'm sure you're familiar with, one is not punished for another, right? Because as it guards the soul, the son is not a thing of the father. Whence the Lord is signing the cause of this says, all souls are mine. Now, to the first, therefore, it should be said, that both things said seem to be referred to, what, temporal punishments or body punishments, right? Insofar as sons are things of their, what, parents and successors, predecessors, huh? That's kind of foreign to our modern way of thinking, isn't it, huh? Yeah, yeah. But if you're a chip off the old block, then you're something of your father, aren't you? That's right. But if they refer to spiritual punishments, huh? This is said in account of the imitation of the guilt, right? Or there's some sin, therefore, in the son. Whence in the exodus is added to those who eat me, right? And in Matthew, he said, in you, fill up the measure of your fathers. He said, well, he's rough. Now, the sins of the fathers are said to be punished in the sons because the sons are nourished in the, what, sins of the parents. And therefore, more prone to, what, sinning. And both an account of custom as well as an account of, what, example, following the authority of their, what, fathers, huh? So Kennedy was after a woman like his father, right? That's what they say, anyway. So they are worthy of more, what, punishment. If seeing the punishments of their fathers, they are not, what, corrected, huh? And therefore, he adds, in the third and fourth generation. Because so long are men accustomed to what live, that they see the third and fourth generation. I don't know. And thus, mutuo videri posent, huh? Together, they're able to see, what, the sins of the son, oh, and the sons imitating, right, sins of the fathers. And the fathers weeping over the punishment of their sons. Yeah. So the parents immortalize themselves in their offspring, right? This were to be new made when thou art old, and see thy blood warm when thou art old. feels too cool the art day mother's class and she and thee calls back the lovely april of her prime you forget that you know so what's the purpose of marriage anyway i think the purpose of marriage in one word is children right and so the generation of children and the feeding and clothing of them and the educating of them right is the end of end of marriage yeah i say um is end of marriage the love of the of the husband and wife well i would say more of this that the husband and wife should love each other very much right and they should love their children very much right and if they don't love each other very much and love their children very much there's going to be some difficulty in achieving the purpose of of marriage right huh but should you really say that the love of the husband wife is the purpose of marriage or even the love of the children is the purpose of marriage right you know it's really kind of the children right now that's not really said nowadays you know i mean if you talk to a young couple who's getting married you say what's the purpose of marriage you know well we love each other you know something like that i don't know to say but but they're not going to say children probably you know unless they're really well brought up you know selfless yeah i think of for the others truly the children's well children uh today we're only thinking about ourselves yeah yeah yeah so too selfless to think of just that's too selfless for the following in the race than just today especially today especially today and around the beings you know which is you find the attempts you know to defend what they call traditional marriage you know and and they say you know the the uh congress did pass something saying that marriage is between a man and a woman right now but but why is marriage between a man and a woman well it's because the purpose of children and if you don't say that you can't really give the reason why it's that it's just kind of a blind adherence to tradition there right without seeing the what reason for it right yeah so if they got divorced they can't say i'll take my part of the child you take your part you know if i got divorced i take my books back them take my my part of the child of them you know that's one reason why the husband and wife should love each other because they immortalized each other in the children right now and it's kind of the idea that child is something of the parents right and especially in terms of their body right now we're up to the second objection now the second should be said that those punishments are bodily and temporal which human justice inflicts to one on account of the sin of another right huh and they are remedies or medicines right huh against what else either of those who are punished or others who are what prevented from similar guilt so to third it should be said that we are more said to be punished for the sins of others near near ones than the extraneous ones because the punishment of those near in some way redunds in those who have what sinned just like the rich man there and wants his brothers to be told not to come here because that's going to make him more miserable right insofar as the son is a certain thing of the father and according to his body right not according to his soul then also because domestic examples and domestic punishments more move once when someone is nourished in the sins of parents he more vehemently what follows them right you they see you know this wife beating you know if you seen your your father beating your wife well then you're gonna do that with your wife right and uh um and if he's not what deterred from the punishment to them he would seem to be more what once worthy of more greater punishment tough talking around this time so the cicero say the son is always in debt to his father that took for his sins take a break now a little bit De peccato viniali and mortali. There's this sinful tract here. Then, because sins are distinguished, what? Vigna and mortal sins are distinguished according to what? Guilt, I guess. Or punishment due them, right? It ought to be considered about them. What? And first, we ought to consider about Vigna in comparison to mortal. Secondly, about Vigna secundum se. Thank goodness. Psychiatrist says it belongs to Thomas to treat everything formally. It's what he does. About the first six things are asked. First, whether venial sin is suitably divided against mortal. What kind of a distinction is that? Secondly, whether they're distinguished in genus. As opposed to being distinguished in species. They have the same genus. Third, whether venial sin is a disposition to mortal. Why know that it is? Fourth, whether venial sin can become mortal. I hope not. Five, whether circumstance aggravating the sin can, what? Like a, you know. Six, the other side, whether mortal sin is able to become venial. Wouldn't that be great? Wouldn't that be great? Okay. To the first, then, one proceeds thus. Or to speak an issue. To the first, one goes forward thus. It's a wonderful word. Procesis. Remember how back in the Tweet of the Trinity, right? He said the, what, persons are distinguished by the relations of proceeding. And then, I think it goes back to proceeding, right? So the first thing we take up is the process and write the proceeding. Of course, you know, the logic professor up there was talking about the way of proceeding, common to all the sciences studied in logic, right? And the way of proceeding that's private to this, that's science. And then, once you and John came into class, the next day or so, you have to have more to proceed there. So I really had a quick proceeding, huh? Thumbed into my head, you know, the importance of the word, right? Of course, it goes back again to the continuous. For Augustine says in the 22nd book against Frost, see why Augustine insists upon the importance of heretics for the development of theology, that sin is something said or done or wanted, desired, against the eternal, what, law. It's a theological definition, huh? But to be against the eternal law gives to sin that it be, what, mortal. Therefore, every sin is mortal. Therefore, venial sin is not divided against mortal. More would the apostle says, 1 Corinthians 10, whether you, what, eat or drink or do something else, do all for the glory of God. But against this precept, whoever sins, yeah, whoever sins. But against this precept, right, one acts whoever sins, right? For sin is not an account of the glory of God. Since, therefore, to do something against the precept is a mortal sin, it seems that whoever sins, sins, what, mortally. Moreover, whoever adheres by love to some things inheres in it as, what, or as enjoying it, huh? Or as using it, huh? This is clear to Augustine in the first book about, what, Christian doctrine, huh? But no one sinning adheres to a, what, commutable good as something to be used, huh? For it does not refer to the good which makes us blessed, which is properly to be used, as Augustine says there. Therefore, whoever sins enjoys the, what, changeable good. But to enjoy things that should be used is human perversity, right? Or to use things that should be enjoyed. To enjoy things that should be used. As Augustine says in the book of the 83 questions, huh? Isn't there a book of 88 questions, though? Since, therefore, perversity names a mortal sin, it seems that whoever sins, sins, what, mortally, huh? If you eat too much candy, I wouldn't say you're perverse, but it's too much, yeah. You know, the seven wise men of Greece said, what, nothing too much, huh? So, I always like to ask people, you know, can you love God too much? He said, nothing too much. So, you shouldn't love God too much, right? You don't want to be a man. You monks love God too much, right? And, but, no, so I think that's an important thing to say. I mean, it's a nice question to ask, right? But the answer is, you can't love God too much, right? Why can't you love God too much? Yeah. You can never love God as much as he's lovable, right? So, you can, therefore, never love God too much, right? Okay. I seem to like to ask the same question about, can you know God too much? You think about God too much, but you never know God too much, right? Okay. The next question is, can you love God enough? Or what? Or can you know God enough? See, I like to think about God, you know, but don't you know enough about God now? Can we stop now? I think you have enough. Aren't you always supposed to be trying to love God more, right, huh? So can you ever say that, well, now I love God enough. I don't have to strive to love God any more than I do. I know God enough. If someone, you know, maintained, you know, that he loved God enough, right? I love God enough. I can turn to other things now. Would that be an example of pride, what would you say? What kind of a disorder is that? Is that a disorder of pride? In other words, aren't you attributing to your will, right, this excellence, right? You know, obviously if you said you love God as much as he's lovable, you'd be attributing to your will an excellence that you don't have, right? And the same if you said, I know God as much as he's knowable, right? I know all about him. And both of those, I would be attributing to myself an excellence that I don't have, or an excellence to my will, or to my reason that they don't have, right? But if I said, I know God enough, right? Or I love God enough, I shouldn't try to love God any more than I do. I shouldn't try to know God any more than I already know him, right? Yeah, aren't you, in a sense, still trying to make love over your will and reason with God? Aren't you trying to do that? Isn't that really kind of pride? In a bad sense, huh? You can't love God enough, right? You can't know God enough, huh? I think you're going to love candy too much. You're going to love wine too much. I shouldn't love wine enough, I think. I don't think I need to love wine any more than I do. I mean, if anything, I'd love it too much, but I shouldn't love it enough. Maybe I love it too much, I don't know. Maybe I love tea too much, I don't know. I should go on my reading in the morning, so maybe it's okay. But I only drink a mug or two a day. When you come to God, I don't think it can never be enough, right? Let alone too much. Let me see, test it. Okay, that was the third objection, right? Moreover, whoever exceeds to one term, from this he recedes from the other. But whoever sins, exceeds or approaches a changeable good, right? Therefore, he recedes from the unchangeable good. Therefore, he sins mortally. Therefore, not suitably, is venial sin divided against what? Moral. Now, in Shakespeare's definition of reason, right? We said that just as when he says it's the ability for a larger discourse, this includes what? Yeah. And when we say it's the ability to look before and after, right? We include this ability to look for what? Distinctions, right? So here now you're raising the question about, is this distinction valid, right? Is there really a distinction between mort and venial sin? I remember, you know, somebody in the academic world there, I can't remember. He is in doubt about the distinction between commands and counsels. Yeah, he says, you know, that distinction was any good, you know? That's a real problem. That's a real problem. For some people? Well, if you don't make that distinction. Yeah, yeah, yeah. But he was denying that this was, you know, a meaningful distinction or, you know, he was kind of questioning that, you know? What you do with these people, you know? So does that mean he was going to move all the counsels then? Yeah, usually I know the process of objection to the council because it's a presumption that you're more than you're commanded. So they always use, this is built in the Anglican Congression to this day, but this presumption and arrogance to say you can do anything more than you're commanded, because that's what our Lord said. At the end of the day, I've done nothing while I'm commanded. I've been commanded. Okay, so if celibacy is commanded, I mean, there should be some of it. Well, that's what they'll get out of it and say, I didn't command it, blah, blah, blah. Whatever. I don't know how they get out of it, but they reject works of super-efficient. Now shall not kill the council. Now shall not kill the council. Now shall 1088 really thought that that was just a good idea. But again, this is what Augustine says in the 41st homily upon the Gospel of St. John. That crimen, I guess, which I guess might be used here for mortal sin, huh? Yeah. That's where you get the word criminal, though, isn't it? But it's kind of a serious thing to be a criminal, I guess, huh? I mean, if you go over the speed limit, do you know five miles that makes you a criminal? If you go out of the bank, then you're a criminal, right? Yeah. But a crimen is what does merit damnation, right, huh? But the venial is what does not merit damnation, huh? That's a pretty big distinction, if you ask me. But crimen names mortal sin, nah, that's what we interpreted, yeah. Therefore, venial sin is suitably divided against mortal. That seems to me that's a very important distinction. You don't hear about much to these days, do you? I remember Gassir talking to me. He's talking about some guy who's talking to him. This guy says, I don't think God's going to punish me if I'm not going to Mass on Sunday, you know? Gassir says, you know, he thought he was going to punish him, you know, pretty severely, you know? But isn't that a moral sin to not go to Mass on Sunday? Yeah, I'd be surprised, yeah. I'd be surprised how many people think of him. Yeah, yeah. It's a nice thing. Somebody said to me, I said, we don't go to Lent. Well, I started going back to church. I said, well, going to church is being Christian, that's not Lent. I said, I said, I'll go to church for Lent. So he said, I don't think God's going to punish me. So he said, I told him I thought he would punish him. What do you think, Duane? I said, I think so too. The answer should be said, that some things, according as they are, what, properly taken, do not seem to be opposed, huh? Which, if they are taken metaphorically, yeah, this is a strange way to begin. Where is he going? I'll give him the benefit of a doubt, Thomas, eh? Yeah. Just as to, what, laugh, right, is not opposed to that which is to, what, dry up. But according as to laugh is said more metaphorically. Thomas often gives this example of a metaphor, right, for various purposes, huh? About the field, right, huh? An account of its, what, flourishing, and its, like, its figure, yeah, is opposed to that which is to, what, dry up. Likewise, if mortal is taken properly, insofar as it refers to the bodily death, right, it does not seem to have opposition with, what, vigno, nor to pertain to the same genus, huh? But if mortal is taken metaphorically, according as it is said in sins, mortal is opposed to that which is, what, vigno, right? Because if one is mortal, the other is immortal, huh? Since sin is a certain infirmity of the soul, as it's had above, some sin is said to be mortal to the likeness of, what, sickness, which is mortal from this that it brings in an irreparable defect through the, what, taking away of some, what, beginning, right? As has been said, huh? This is a thing here, I have this whole collection of texts from Plato and Aristotle about the importance of the beginning in philosophy, right? So this is a thing that is talked about a lot, huh? Now, the beginning of the spiritual life, which is according to virtue, is the order to the last end. That's the beginning of the whole thing, huh? Which, if one is destitute of that, one cannot, what, be repaired to... intrinsic beginning but therefore only through the divine power this has been said above because the disorders of those things which are towards the end are repaired from the end just as the error which is happens about conclusions through the truth of the what beginnings on premises and the start off makes a comparison right okay the beginning is in practical matters with the premises and first premises the defect therefore of the order to the ultimate end cannot be what to anything else repaired which is more principle than that just as neither an error which is about the principles first also says if you're mistaken about the principle contradiction and you and the only alternatives they turn to the state of a plant right my aunt margaret thought that was very funny you know yeah you can be a plant right you can grow without taking any position about this and therefore these sins are said to be mortal as being irreparable but the sins which have a disorder about those things which are towards the end with the order to the end being conserved are able to be repaired right and these are called what venial both because the sin has what venial I guess with forgiveness whence the what when the debt of punishment is taken away who sees which which seizes with the sin sitting right this has been said according to this therefore mortal and venial are opposed as what now of course a distinction into two right is very common according to plato right and socrates is in the dialogues there that are like the sophists and so on where he emphasizes the tool of division right as a way of approaching definitions he always divides into two right and uh aristotle criticizes that one should always divide into two right but um there's a good reason to divide into two and that is that you divide by what opposites right so you can divide you know um men into human beings into good and bad or maybe male and female right but good and white or something don't make any sense to the opposites right and uh so if you divide by opposites opposites are two well then makes a lot of sense to divide by two right so there's a great probability that one should always divide by into two right now i can say for dividing into three is that what three is the first number about which we say all which is a very weak argument right just a sign right that maybe three is necessary sometimes huh because we say all about three right if you and i are going to the store we're both going right but for you and i and you are going we're all going right you know the three of us are going we're all going and pythagoras said it has the beginning middle and end saying that's three right that's complete leave out the beginning or the middle or the end you left out something right so and i say this he says okay repairable and irreparable by a what inward beginning right not however by comparison to a what divine power right because even the mortal sin is repairable right through the divine power right but i'm saying inside of us right now which is able to repair every what sickness both bodily and spiritual right now and so when these when god's uh when christ uh cures somebody's body right now there's sometimes apart from the sense of the letter a what spiritual sense right now you see it in the commentary in matthew right so that uh the thing that the thing which is signified by the sense of the letter in turn signifies something else right okay like leprosy might signify sin and so on an account of this opposition then right you can say pope to hope can account of this meaning this opposition of repairable and irreparable by an inward beginning right you gotta you can add that right suitably venial sin is divided against mortal sin right well i'm convinced by that right now what about these opposite arguments to the first therefore it should be said that the division of mortal sin and venial sin is not a division of genus into species which equally partake of the definition of the genus right so this is not a division of the genus into species huh so when you divide numbers say into odd and even is one of these more a number than the other they must be equally so right now and when you divide triangle into scalene and isosceles and equilateral is an equilateral triangle more a triangle than a scalene triangle or you divide quadrilateral into square and oblong and rhombus and rhomboid and even trapezium right are they what one more quadrilateral than the other when you divide animal into dog and cat is a dog more an animal than a cat or a cat cat yeah so notice of very importance now this this this little reply to it primo right huh and and and and from the point of view of it once in india used to say you got to read the other works of thomas to get a full understanding of logic right because it belongs to logic to distinguish the kinds of what division right and uh kinds of distinction so on right and uh so the division of mortal and venial sin is not a division of genus into species it's not the same as a division of number into odd and even right it's not that kind of division why not because they don't equally partake right of the idea of sin right why species partake equally of the what genus right and you know one of the beautiful examples of that is is uh even with numbers right two is before three and three is before what four right and three is more than two and four is more than three right but is four more a number than three because the definition of number is a multitude composed of ones right but three is just as much as for a multitude composed of one even though four is composed of more ones right see but uh they're equally a number right even though two in some senses before three right that's kind of striking thing right but here they're not equally right so this is part of the idea of whether in the strict sense the division of a genus into species they have to equally partake of the nature of the genus right the ratio of the genus but of analogy in which something is said of things secundum prius of posterius see the importance of our great friend there shakespeare right looking before and after right thomas is seeing before and after he's definitely doing that yeah and therefore the full or perfect ratio the full or perfect definition of sin which augustine lays down belongs to what mortal sin right now he's talking about the definition there in the first objection right now okay it's against the eternal law right so he's eating too much candy against the too much candy against the root wall wall wall wall wall wall wall wall wall wall wall wall wall wall wall wall wall wall wall wall wall wall wall wall wall wall wall wall wall wall wall wall wall wall wall wall wall wall wall wall wall wall wall wall wall wall wall wall wall wall wall wall wall wall wall wall wall wall wall wall wall wall wall wall wall wall wall 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