Prima Secundae Lecture 218: Death and Natural Corruption in Human Nature Transcript ================================================================================ one proceeds thus it seems that death and defects of this sort are natural to man right for the corruptible and incorruptible differ in kind or in genus right as is said in the 10th book of wisdom the 10th book after the books of natural philosophy but man is of the same genus with the other animals which are naturally what corruptible therefore man is naturally what corruptible moreover everything that is composed from contraries is naturally corruptible as having in itself the cause of its own corruption but the human body is of this sort therefore it is naturally corruptible more heat consumes naturally the wet but the life of man is conserved through heat and humid since therefore the operations of life are carried out to the act of natural heat as is said in the second book about the soul it seems that death and these defects are natural to man right you get withered you know get with it up and you die that's it you dry it up and that's it yeah yeah he's not going to be providing these objections either but it'll be clear from the body article but against this whatever is natural to man god made in man but god did not make death as i said in the book of wisdom therefore death is not natural to man moreover that which is according to nature cannot be called what punishment nor evil because to each thing that is suitable that is natural to it but death and these defects are the punishment original sin as has been said above therefore they are not natural to man moreover matter is proportioned to form and each thing to its end but the end of man is perpetual beatitude as has been said above and the form of the human body is the rational soul which is incorruptible as even aristotle knew and therefore the human body is naturally incorruptible he says the answer it should be said about each thing it is corruptible we can speak what two ways in one way according to universal nature another way according to particular nature for nature that is particular is the proper what for active virtue and it is conservative of each thing and in this way every corruption defect is against nature as is said in the second book on the universe because this virtue intends the being and the conservation of that which it is but the universal nature is the active virtue in some universal principle of nature as in one of the what heavenly bodies you know kind of amusing you read you know they talk about the the different plants and what they do you know and thomas kind of gives you a little summary of what they say you know it's kind of interesting huh so the universal nature is the active power in some universal principle of nature as for example in some one of the celestial bodies right like the sun now affects all the plants from plants from growing and so on okay which power intends the good and conservation of the universe to which is what necessary and alternation of generation and corruption in things and according to this the corruptions and defects of things are natural not to it according to the inclination of form which is the beginning of being and perfection but according to the inclination of matter which proportionally is attributed to such a form according to the distribution of the universal what agent huh it's all clear to you now this is the second nature to tell us because he's involved in what there is tell us about these things things and although every form intends to be perpetual so far as it can right huh no form of a corruptible thing can what perpetuity of itself apart from the fractional soul in that it itself is not subject entirely to what bodily matter just as other forms are nay rather it has its own immaterial operation right like we're i was saying you know that the brain is not really the organ of what universal thought might be the organ of imagination right but not of the universal reason that knows universal as to say whence on this part of its form which is immortal right it is more natural to man in corruption than to other what corruptible things that their forms are not perpetual but because it also has matter composed from contraries from the inclination of the matter there follows what corruptibility in the whole and according to this man is naturally corruptible according to the nature of the matter left to itself but not according to the nature of his form right you know he says the first three arguments or reasons right proceed on the part of matter right the other three proceed on the part of the what form whence to the solution of them it should be considered that the form of man which is a reasonable soul an understanding soul shakespeare says according to its incorruptibility is proportioned to its end which is a perpetual what the attitude right but the human body which is corruptible according to will considered according to its nature is in some way proportioned to its form and in some way what not for twofold is this twofold condition can be noted in some matter one which the agent chooses another which is not what chosen by the agent now comes standard an example here but it's according to the natural condition of the matter just as the what make korea to making the what he chooses a matter hard and moldable uh which can be made more subtle right that'd be apt for cutting right and according to this condition matter proportion to the yeah but this that is breakable and contracted it rusts right now follows from the natural disposition of iron and the artist does not choose this in the matter right he chooses it for the reason right but he would more what repudiate it if he were able to right now if he could make the metals it doesn't rust you any getting resting around here in the house yeah everybody's got in their house some some resting right then the car rusts right now we had a car one time we were putting on that uh kind of that plastic paint you know they did that cloth you know yeah it's the most patched up car in the whole churchyard you know it's falling apart you know you put this kind of a metal tape you know on there and you know it says this part went and this part went and it's kind of a joke because it was actually the most taped car churchyard for a parking lot now i don't have to keep cars quite that long so okay once this disposition of matter is not proportioned to the intention of the artist nor to the intention of the art right likewise the human body is a matter chosen by nature's regards this it is of a, what, temperate complexion that can be a most suitable organ for the sense of touch, which is a foundation of senses, right? And for the other sense powers and motor powers. But that to be corruptible, this is from the condition of matter, nor is it chosen by nature for that reason, right? But rather nature would choose an incorruptible matter if it could, right? Okay. No, no connection there, the likeness there of nature to art right now, which is a comparison Aristotle often makes. But God to whom is subject every nature in the institution of man supplied for the defect of nature, huh? And by the gift of original justice he gave to the body, a certain incorruptibility, right? As long as he ate the food he should, right, he would last. And according to this it is said that God did not make, what, death. And that death is the punishment of sin, huh? So he talks about that in other places, you know, but I mean it's like you could, with probability, yes, right, that God would give us, what, a body suitable for our soul, right, huh? And since our soul is immortal in order to a perpetual beatitude, right, that he would supply for the deficiency of our body, right? And that's what he in fact did do, right, huh? But even for a natural reason you could see there's some basis for thinking that God would give us something to compensate for the defect of the, what, body that couldn't last forever, huh? But he could have given, he could have made matter so that it didn't corrupt, so... Well, not in this universe, given the matter that this universe is made out of, right? Well, then what happens with the resurrected body? Well, then you're given a gift, right? A supernatural gift, right? To make the body more suitable to the soul, yeah. But, I mean, the resurrected body of Christ would not be like the same as the body given to Adam, right? No, no, but I mean, you know, it's going to be immortal without having to eat, right? So I'm sorry, sorry, that you're... I remember one time when Warren Murray joined some gourmet society, right, to see what it was like, and they went to the annual dinner of them, you know, and before the dinner began, he got talking to this guy across the table there, you know, who was in the green room. He was talking about how they had difficulty flying this in from there, and this thing flying in from there, you know, and you could see he was very disturbed by the fact that they almost didn't, you know, fly in all the ingredients that they were going to have in their annual bank that so Warren put the society. He said, how boring that? You know, he didn't... That interested in food, you know, I mean, you could see the guy was just, you know, kind of, you know, talking about it, I guess, he knew about the difficulties in procuring all the special ingredients that they needed. But it's, you know... Or it's like, I couldn't belong to that society, so he likes interesting food. So even in the state of medicine, they animated food. Right, but it's... But in the... But the supernatural, I guess we'll get in... Well, yeah, listen, I think about the resurrected body, it seems we know things by their properties, right? Yeah. And if things that are different have different properties, Yeah. But the resurrected body is going to have different properties than we have. Yeah. So, is there like a substantial, is it a substantial change? No, no, but it's something supernaturally added to the body, right? A supernatural addition. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. So it's not like now... So it's not like a transfer, not like a substantial change? No, no. Okay. Because I was thinking if it were, then it wouldn't be the same nature. Yeah. Yeah, but that's... Four characteristics of the resurrected body. It's impassable out that those are the realms we have and have that from the body. Right, right. Which would be different properties than we have now. I can't offer... Well, they're not proper. They're not proper to nature. They're supernatural. That's the point. Supernatural. Yeah. Okay, they're not proper to nature. See, the soul is naturally the form of a body, right? So it seems unnatural, right, that the soul would exist forever without the body, right? And so it's reasonable, right, what the church knows by revelation, you know, would be the state of the body. It's interesting, even in the damned, their bodies will be immortal, right? But they won't have all those gifts, you know. So matter itself is given something supernatural in the resurrected body. Yeah, yeah. Maturing the universe itself is somehow raised supernaturally. Yeah. And you wonder what Aristotle thought, because he knew the soul was immortal, right? And the soul wasn't actually in the body, right? You know, the body, the soul would be separated from the body given the kind of body it was, right? Thinking of Plato and Aristotle, that kind of, you know, leads up to Christianity, right? There's a certain problem there, right? Yeah. In other words, he would have found Christianity reasonable, right? It had been presented to him. Yeah, yeah, yeah. I've often wondered if Thomas ever said a prayer for Aristotle. You know, you'd go in there. Was it Gertrude or Mechthild, one of them, who asked our Lord, what about Aristotle? Oh, she did? Yeah. So what did he say? And he said, don't inquire the counsels of my mercy. Or something like that. Yeah, yeah. Where did I read that? Was it Gertrude or Mechthild? Well, you know, Aristotle put up a plaque, you know, a memorial to Plato, right? And he says, the first man to show by both, what, word and deed, that the virtuous life is the happy life, right? That's quite a compliment to Plato, right? You know? I mean, you'd think, you know, these men, you know, in God's mercy, right, would have some chance for the attitude. I mean, Dante had him in heaven, didn't he? No. He put up with a, oh, he was in heaven. He was in heaven. He was in heaven. Yeah, kind of a, kind of a, you know, happiness, there was a, not supernatural happiness we had. Okay. Didn't make him happy, though. Well, Dante's in heaven, Aristotle. So, let's take a few more questions to go before we get to the, to the law of this. Yeah. So, number two. son holy spirit amen thank you my god our god thank you guardian angels thank you thomas aquinas dio gratias god our enlightenment guardian angels bring the lights of our minds or illumine our images and arouse us to consider more correctly saint thomas aquinas angelic doctor help us to understand all that you've written holy spirit amen now we look at article six here again just to refresh our minds a bit here in question 85 whether death and other defects are natural to man right to the sixth then one goes forward thus it seems that death and defects of this sort are to man natural right now in the second book of natural hearing right but people call it the physics right from aristotle um he works out the definition of what nature right which is what the nature is a beginning and cause of motion and rest and then which it is first as such and not by happening but then he goes on to say that nature is said both of what matter and what form and first of all is said of matter because that's more obvious right okay and uh then he goes on to show that it's said of form even more so because by matter something is a natural thing only in ability only in potency but through what form it's actually this or that natural thing so if nature is that which something is natural than that which something is natural actually is even more but nature right now okay well as thomas will point out in the reply to the objections here in the body of the article it's a little different the way it is the first three objections are taken from nature in the sense of what matter right and the objection on the other side from nature is four right so it's kind of interesting you know if you think of that in terms of these being the two main senses of what nature right and this is brought out again in the fifth book of wisdom right where he talks about the word nature among the names of causes and so on so he says corruptible the first objection it seems that death and defects of the sword are natural to man that's according to nature in the sense of matter corruptible and incorruptible differ in what genus as is said in the tenth book of the metaphysics huh now sometimes you know even uh what's his name porphyry says that in the in the asagoge that genus is to difference as matter is to what form and so corruptible and incorruptible differ in genus well that's tied up with matter right but man is of the same genus with other animals who are naturally what eruptible so animal is said univocally of man and what dog okay i mean sometimes you keep the word animal to man to the animals right because that's all they have right we have something god-like in the reason right but in general animals said univocated to living body with senses and therefore a man is naturally corruptible that's perfectly convincing right to me moreover everything that is composed from contraries is naturally corruptible changes between what contraries is we learn in the first book of naturally as having in itself the cause of its own what corruption but the human bodies of this sort is composed of hot and cold wet and dry and so on therefore it's naturally corruptible that's convincing too if you weren't convinced by the first argument you're suddenly convinced by the second argument right there's a little more bigger ideas here of the ancients moreover the hot naturally consumes the what moist but the life of man is conserved by hot and cold huh for since the operations of life are carried out through the act of natural what heat as is said in the second book about the soul it seems that death and defects of this sort are to man natural now nature meant only matter and not form we'd be but yeah we'd be completely you know mortal but against this whatever is natural to man god has made in man god is responsible for human nature right for man but it says in the book of wisdom chapter 1 verse 13 that god did not make death therefore death is not natural to man it was adam or the devil or something that made death it wasn't god right yeah okay more that which is according to nature should not be said to be a punishment nor something what bad for to each thing is suitable that which is natural to it but death and defects of this sort are the punishment original sin and then you see something like that to him he's gonna die because of this sin well therefore they're not natural to man therefore they're not natural to man it's a nice argument huh i'm convinced of that right yeah yeah moreover matter is proportioned to form in each thing to its end but the end of man is perpetual beatitude this has been said above and the form of the human body uh substantial form is the reasonable soul right which is incorruptible as it's had in the first book i'm just starting the sixth book there of natural hearing there with my students that come on tuesday night and i was talking about how uh the first part of the book the first four readings as thomas divides it are concerned with the philosophy of the continuous right and aristotle is going to argue there that the continuous is never put together from indivisible things right and of course it can't be something indivisible itself right but anyway there comes out two definitions of the continuous one of which is the continuous is that whose parts meet at a common what boundary right so the two halves of the circle might be sent to meet at a diameter in the middle right and the two parts of the line at a point and the parts of the body right at a surface and that's the definition of continuous given even in the categories he distinguishes continuous quantity from what numbers right because in the number seven the three and the four don't meet anywhere right but then in the sixth book you'll develop the second argument for a definition rather of um the continuous is that which is divisible forever i said now this is an amazing thing to know not only for understanding the continuous but for reasoning that our reason is not a what continuous thing that our reason our universal reason that is to say is not a what body right the brain is not the uh the uh reason that uh our friend the washington irving no excuse me shakespeare defines right and um now how do you do that right huh well i take the definition of square right which is and equilateral and right angled quadrilateral now do the parts of the definition meet at a point or a line or a surface so this is a rather strange thing now right because by the definition of square i understand very distinctly what a square is and perhaps the man in the street couldn't define it as distinctly there is as euclid does right um are you knowing a continuous thing which is a square. What? You're knowing it by definition that is what? Not continuous, right? So you're knowing a continuous thing very well in an uncontinuous way. Was that due to the thing being known? Well, no, it's continuous, right? It must be due, therefore, to the knower, right? So why is it that something continuous, once received into the what? Mind is received in a non-continuous form. That's a very strange thing. That continuous thing should be received in a non-continuous thing. What shows that the mind is what? It knows the universal. It knows what a square is, right? Is not what? Continuous. Now, if you know a little bit of logic, like when you take up the reason why they're our highest genre and so on, right? You can see that definitions are not divisible, what? Forever, right? So it's not continuous. You can see from the other definition, right? So I said those two definitions are continuous, right? Can be used to syllogize, right? That the ability for a large discourse, discourse about the universal, is what? Not a body, right? Is not something continuous, is not the what? The brain, huh? Kind of a marvelous thing to see, huh? I was talking to Warren Murray on the phone this morning. I was talking a little bit about, you know, his experience with, you know, some reasonably competent scientists, you know, and how they don't want to admit, you know, that nature acts for an end, huh? Even though they use it in their thinking, right? And you happen to be in the discussion where you're talking about what they call vestigial organs, right? And these organs now are no longer serving the purpose that they originally did, right? Whoops! Whoops! Yeah, yeah, yeah. Whoops! Of course, they didn't have that. Whoops! Yeah, yeah. See, we can rephrase that. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So they're always running into, you know, something that they've got to kind of talk around, huh? And yet, that's what this digital organ means, right? It's like something you might keep around the house, you know, it no longer works, but it's kind of, you know, artistic or something, you know? It must have had a purpose, but it no longer serves the purpose that it had. And so he says, you know, some days he's putting the guys down, and why they don't want to admit that nature acts from them. And they come right out and they say, well, then we have to admit that there's a God. And the question is, so what? Well, then they just get into rhetoric, you know? The argument is, they just, they don't keep moving. Yeah. But this is part because we're talking about humility right now. And he says, what you really have in these guys is a form of pride, right? And then they're pretty smart guys, you know? I mean, these scientists, some of them are pretty smart in there, but they do, you know? But their, their whole freedom, you know, of thought and freedom of life, you know, and what they do would be, it would be changed and narrowed, you know? If someone had made them and someone had, you know, holding them responsible to this or that course of action, you know? But it's kind of amazing, you know, that the, he's giving other examples of that, you know, from people at Harvard and other places, you know, where they, they, they, they fully admit, you know, openly that, that they avoid this because we need to God and we don't have to happen, you know? God forbid. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. But how, how can, yeah, how, how can that be though, you know, that they could be so? But it's a, pride there is really a, a cause of deception, right, huh? Yeah, I was just reading, I was just reading, I was just reading, St. Thomas does a little book from, just in passing, and it's from me in the Job, but he did, I just read it, reading the primary of the Gospel in John. It says the same thing, the philosophers knew these divine attributes, and one of the things he talks about is they knew nature acts for an end, he just used it, he just takes it for granted, because the ancient philosophers, they recognize this, you don't need divine revelation through supernature, you do it for nature, you can see it. I read an amazing quote from a modern scientist, he had this conviction of, you know, everything is material, it's a faith, you know, we just have to believe it, and he was actually saying, you know, like an anti-faith, you know, you have a conviction that we cannot, you know, let go of every end of the journey. That's like, that's, that's, that's, that's, that's on the heart to make an interesting comment about why Christ works miracles, so your faith would be reasonable, but these guys demand faith without reason, that's what they're demanding. That's what they're demanding. Yes, contrary to reason, they're demanding faith. That's why it's kind of an anti-faith, anti-reason. So the third argument there, matter is proportion to form, and each thing to its own end, but the end of man is perpetual beatitude, often known as eternal life, right? And the form of the human body is the rational soul, the reasonable soul, which is incorruptible, as it's had in the first book. Now just showing how you can argue from the two definitions of the continuous, right? So if the human soul, if the body is proportioned to the form, then it should be, what, naturally incorruptible, right? Only such a body would seem to fit the soul, right? So there's a real problem here, right? How do we resolve this? Now Tom starts off here with a difficult distinction. The answer, it should be said, that about each corruptible thing, we are able to speak in two ways. In one way, according to universal nature. Another way, according to what? Particular nature, right? That distinction comes up a lot when they talk about the tides there, you know? Is it natural for water to do this? Well, not water in its particular nature, rise and go like that, but under universal nature, like in this case, maybe the moon, they say, right? It's natural, right? For the water to be moved in this way, huh? So the rise and fall of the tide, I guess, whatever it is, is something natural, right? But in one of these senses, right? Not in both, yeah. For the particular nature is what? Its own act of what? Power. And it conserves or tries to preserve, right? Each thing, right? And according to this, every what? Corruption defect is against what? Nature. So all things resist their corruption, right? I remember at kindergarten there with the, the sister was, Sister Aquinas. I always said my first teacher was, was Aquinas. People look at me, you know? But one time, Sister Aquinas got a, a, a coconut, right? And she wanted to show the second side, but she couldn't open it, open it down. It resists being destroyed though, you know? Bang, bang, bang. And according to this, every corruption and defect is against nature, right? Because the virtue of this sort intends being and the conservation of that of which it is, right? But the universal nature is an act of power in some universal principle of nature. As for example, in one of the heavenly bodies, like the moon in the example I was giving there. Or of some superior substance, right? According to this also, God, by some is called what? The Tura Naturans, right? Nature giving, the nature, yeah. Because God is the source of nature in that sense. Which power intends the good and the conservation universe? To which is required the alternation of generation and corruption in things. Of course, you can see that in the fact that the animals eat the plants and bigger animals and smaller animals, meet them all. And according to this, ... The corruptions and defects of things are natural, not to be sure according to the inclination of form, right, which is the beginning of being and of perfection, but according to the inclination of matter, which is proportionally attributed to such a form according to the distribution made by the universal agent. And although every form intends to be perpetual so far as it can, right, nevertheless, the form, no form of a corruptible thing is able to, what, achieve its own perpetualness, huh, yeah, apart from the, what, human soul, right, in that it itself is not subject entirely to bodily matter as the other forms are, right, once it has its own operation remaining within it, which is understanding the universal and so on. You're asking me that, as was had in the first book, huh? Whence on the side of its form is more natural to man in corruption than to, what, other corruptible things. But because he has matter composed from contraries, from the inclination of matter, there follows corruptibility in the whole, what, man, but not in his, what, soul. And according to this, man is naturally corruptible according to the nature of the matter left to itself and not according to the nature of the, what, form, huh? Now, the first three arguments, he said, proceed on the side of, what, matter. The other three, the last three, proceed on the side of form, right? Whence, for the solution of them, it should be considered that the form of man, which is a rational soul, according to its very incorruptibility, is proportioned to its own end, which is perpetual beatitude. But the human body, which is corruptible according to its very nature, considered, is in some way proportioned to its form and in some way not, huh? Now, you can explain this, huh, by going back to something more known, right? In art, right? That sometimes art takes a matter, right, that is suitable to the form you're going to give it and the purpose of that form, right? But the matter has some other quality that is not suitable, right, huh? Okay. For a two-fold condition can be noted in some matter, one which the agent chooses, another which is not chosen by the agent, but is according to the, what, natural condition of the matter, just as the worker right to making the, what, hammer, is it? Knife. Knife, okay, good knife. Chooses a matter that is, what, hard, ductile, you can, this one's big house, which is able to be made more, what? Yeah, more lighter, yeah. That might be apt for the purpose of the knife, which is cutting, right? And according to this condition, iron, I guess, huh, is the matter proportioned to the, what? Knife. But that this form is, what, breakable, or that it rusts, huh? Follows for the natural disposition of iron, huh? Nor does the artist choose it for that reason, right? The artist doesn't choose this in the matter, in iron. But more he would, what? Reject it. Reject it if it were possible, right? Whence this disposition of matter is not proportioned to the intention of the artist, nor to the intention of the art, huh? You know, there's pianos, you know, they get out of tune after a while. So that's chosen. You chose something to get out of tune. That's the end of music there, you think it could be out of tune? No, it's just some musician's tune. I suppose it might be due, in some part, the wooden frame of the piano, I didn't have thought about that before. He moves with the weather. But he's choosing some material that makes a beautiful sound, that's got the right tension, and so on, right? But that it gets out of tune, right? It's something he's got to put up with, and that's why they have the tuner, you know? Tuning boards. Okay, now he's making, he's making, what? A likeness there between, or pointing out a likeness, I should say, between art and nature, right? Similarly, likewise, the human body is a matter, chosen, you might say, right? By nature, as he regards this fact, that it is of a, what? Temperate complexion, right? That's the way Shakespeare speaks of it, too, huh? You know the praise there of Buddhists at the end of the play, huh? So well mixed up, huh? That it might be a most suitable organ for, what? Touch, huh? So of course, you know, even the higher animals, they tend to get to, what? Stable temperature, right, huh? And a lot of them don't, right? So this is part of having a body that's suitable for, what? Sense of touch, which is the foundation of all the senses, huh? And the other sense powers and motives, right, huh? And you have bones here, too, huh? Subo for their purpose to support the body, right, huh? Can't have any bones. You'd be a sack at the bottom, yeah. But bones, as you know, can be, what, broken and other things can happen, you know? But that's not why they're chosen, huh? So this body that is able to, what, serve all these purposes is, what? But it's also corruptible, and this is a condition of matter, nor is it chosen by, what, nature? Strickly, they use the word chosen by nature, right? Because rather, nature would choose an incorruptible matter if it were possible, right, huh? Okay. Now, the last thing he says here, huh? But God, to whom all nature is subject, right, huh? In this institution of, in the very institution of man, supplied the defect of nature, right? And by the gift of, what? Which is injustice. He gave to the body a kwanda, huh? A certain incorruptibility. Apparently, the incorruptibility of the Garden of Eden was that as long as you ate of the tree, right? Or tree. Not the wrong tree. The right tree. Long tree. You would go on, right? You'd never die, right? So it wasn't the same incorruptibility that you have, you know, with the beta vision, right, huh? Because you don't have to eat anymore to be incorruptible, right? So that's why he says kwanda, right? It's a little different, the incorruptibility that Adam had, right, before the Vedic vision, right? And according to this, it is said, back in the projections there, God did not make, what? Death, huh? And that death is the punishment of, what, sin. Now all things are clear, right, huh? It's a marvelous guy, this is Thomas, right, huh? Wodini, Wodini of the mind, huh? Yes.