Prima Secundae
Lecture 201: Passion, Sin, and the Problem of Moral Culpability

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right, and some rich wealth has died, right, you know, and they're all waiting to hear what he's left them, you know, and the lawyer says, he took it with him. I heard a variation on that was the rich man's dying and the first way to find out is how much he leaves. You know, see, here's the term, the imagination, right, which is one of the internal senses, as our money, or not as vestium, that brings in the ladies, I guess, and other things of this sort, and this soulful, well, concupiscence is called the concupiscence of the, well, eyes. Would it be understood as the concupiscence of the eyes, that is the vision itself, right, which comes about the eyes, that he referred to what, curiosity, according as Augustine expounds in the, what, 10th Book of Interfection. Or he refers to the concupiscence of things which are proposed exteriorly to the, what, eyes. He refers to cupidity, right, according as expounded by others, right? So we invited in here at somebody's house, and we're saying, what a nice house this is, you know. Ha-ha. Nice furniture. Nice design, you know. Ha-ha. Ha-ha. Ha-ha. Ha-ha. But the disordered desire of the, what, bony ardue, the difficult good, right, pertains to the pride of life, huh? For pride is the disordered desire of excellence, as will be said, what, below, right, huh? So a man wants great honors, right, huh? No-hit game, pitch a no-hit game. Pit, pitch a no-hit game, right? Ha-ha. Politician, right, wants to be president or something. Landslide. Ha-ha. Ha-ha. And thus it is clear that to these three can be led back all passions which are causes of sin. For to the first two are reduced to all passions of the, what, concupiscible, right? To the third all passions of the, what, irascible. Which, therefore, is not divided into two. Because all passions of the irascible are conformed to, what, animal concupiscence, huh? Different with the soul, right? I think we mentioned before how the irascible is closer to reason, right? Than, what, in the concupisal appetite, right? In the concupisal appetite you have these two, right? To desire for the things which are more, calls natural there, right? To food, drink, and reproduction, right? And then you have these ones that are more, what? A little more spiritual, right, huh? See? Money, you know? Beautiful clothes and so on, right, huh? Beautiful houses, huh? Kind of funny with these advertisements they have on TV, you know, for these cars, you know. They're really kind of, they're feeling to this concupiscence oculorum, as it's called here, right? There's one that I think is really kind of funny because there's a beautiful girl, you know, a really interesting girl, driving the car off, you know. There's a new beauty in town, and of course, you look at this beautiful girl driving the car, you know, and now you see this beautiful car, you know, showing up in this beautiful car, you know, and people are all jealous of you, you know, and then they see people, you know, driving up to a fancy restaurant, something like that, with this car getting out, they look at the car, you know. So, one guy's got a new, one neighbor's got a new car, the other guy wants to, what? We don't want to get even near to it, you know, in the car, you know. I first met my friend Warren Murray, you know, he was in biology class, right? He really knew science, right, huh? And he asked some questions. Okay, Murray, tell him the answer that, you know, God would say. So I said, study and study, you know, for the exam, right? I said I could beat Warren, you know. That's the arduous right now, you know. Stay up, you know. If I could beat him, that would be something, you know. That's how he got to be friends. Thomas has defended three as being all, right? Pretty good example of three, right? No, probably these silly objections now. To the first thereof it should be said that according as cupidity implies, universally the desire of any, what? Good. Thus also the pride of life is contained in the cupidity, right? There was a text that was saying that cupidity is the root of all, what? Evils, right, huh? Now in what way cupidity, according as it is a special vice, which is called avarice, is the root of all sins. That's another thing that you see in scripture. This will be explained below later on. Infra. Now, to the second should be said that the concupiscence of the eyes is not said to, here, concupiscence of all things which can be, what? Seen by the eyes, like the girl, right? In this New York street. But only of those things in which there is not sought the, what? The what? Yeah. So if you're going by the bakery, you go, you know, that's not concupiscence of the eyes, you see. That's concupiscence of the, what? The flesh, yeah. Okay. But only of those things in which there is not sought the pleasure of the flesh, huh? Which is according to, what? Sense of touch, huh? But only the pleasure of the eye, that is of any, what? Grasping power, right? So it mentions the imagination there, huh? Mm-hmm. That's delightful. Pleasing to the eyes. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Now, to the third, huh, the way of understanding the words, visus there, right? To the third, it should be said that the sense of, what? Sight. Sight is more excellent among all the senses and extends to, what? Many things, huh? So Aristotle talks about that, right, on the sense of sight there and the excellence of it, huh? You know, the sun, the moon, and the stars, none of that would be known without the eyes, right? Well, it extends to many things, huh? So we tend to carry it over to other senses, right? And therefore, its name is transferred to all the other senses, and also to all the, what? Interior apprehensions, right? So Hamlet says, I can see my father now. Look around, you know. Well, it's not with the eye, but he's using the word see, but he's using it for the interior what? Senses, huh? As Augustine says in the book on the, what? Yeah. On the words of the Lord, right? To the fourth, it should be said that the flight from evil is caused from the desire of good, as has been said, right? And therefore are laid down only the passions inclined to the good, as being the causes of those things which make one, what? Yeah, disorderly. See, the bad, yeah. Okay. Okay. Okay. three is enough to the sixth one proceeds thus it seems that sin is not what lessened i guess made lighter make light of something you say alleviated on account of what passion right for an increase of the cause increases the effect for if the hot dissolves the more hot more dissolves right but passion is a cause of sin this has been said therefore the more intense the passion the more is greater is the sin therefore passion does not diminish or lessen sin make it less but increases it more just as a good passion is to merit so a bad passion is to sin but a good passion what as someone has seen more to what merit who from a greater what mercy yeah therefore also a bad passion more aggravates sin than like that more the more intensely the the will that someone does a sin the more brave does he seem to yeah but passion impelling the will makes it be born more vehemently in the act of sin therefore passion aggravates the sin if you strike somebody you get angry and you strike them even harder but against this the passion itself of concubiscence is called a tempting of the what flesh but the more someone is what thrown down i guess by great temptation so much more less does he sin as is clear through augustine therefore passion diminishes the what sin now i answer it should be said that sin essentially consists in the act of free what judgment which is a faculty of the will and the what reason and the what reason my text says refers to the magistrum and who's that i'm broad yeah in the second book of the sentences aristotle says something similar too passion over is the emotion of the sense desiring power but now thomas looks before and after right the sense appetite or since desire rather is able to have itself to the bermitrium both antecedent there before or consequently right antecedently according as the passion of the sense appetite draws or inclines the reason in the will as has been said above on consequently according as the motion of the higher powers if they are what vehement flow over into the what lower powers for the what will cannot be intensely moved in something without exciting some passion in the sense appetite so he sees that distinction then right if therefore one takes the passion according as it precedes the act of sin thus necessarily is it that it diminishes the sin for an act is to that extent a sin insofar as it is both voluntary and existing in us but it's enough something is said to be by reason and what will once the more reason will act from themselves and not from the impulse of passion the more is something voluntary and existing in us and according to this passion lessens the sin insofar as it what diminishes the voluntary yeah but a passion followed upon does not diminish the sin but more what or more or maybe more so is a sign of its magnitude right insofar as it shows or demonstrates or points out the intensity of the will to the act of what sin unless it is true that when someone with greater libido right or concupiscence sins so the more to see sin right do you see thomas's distinction yeah so you know shakespeare is very important for your life of your mind huh you've got to look before and after right thomas if you don't look before and after you could not have answered the question correctly right then you're even worse well that's that's what that's what people do i want to go to a party to get drunk so i can do something after that that's pretty crazy that's pretty crazy remove your inhibitions to the first effort should be said that passion is the cause of sin on the part of what conversion right but the gravity of sin is more to be observed on the side of aversion which follows parachidans from what conversion right that is outside the intention of the one sinning but causes that are what parachidans augmented right do not augment the effect only causes parasite can make any sense of that so the gravity of the sin yeah yeah you're talking about the passion there that is before the act of the will right is that the cause per se of the sin was the cause of the sin per se in the will itself and the reason right so the passion before is stronger it's what yeah but if he's talking about the passion there before the act of the will right that's not the cause as such of the sin right So the increase of that, right, doesn't make it more a sin. It actually lessens it, right? Because it diminishes the per se cause of the sin, which is the voluntary act. But the other one, it's an effect in the sense of cause of the sin if it's fouling it, right? And that might increase it, as he said, right? It more approaches the per se, right? So that's a very important distinction between the per se and the parachidans. It comes up all the time. Yeah, so why does he say that the aversion comes from the conversion, per se and the parachidans, right? In this reply to the objection here, right? He says, the gravity of the sin is more to be observed on the part of the aversion, which follows per se and the parachidans in the conversion. Yeah, yeah, yeah. It's not part of their intention, right? Although they should have taken into account, right? That this is against the law of God and so on, right? Yeah. Even, you know, if a person, in terms of reason even, if he drinks, because the pleasure of drinking, right? Is he drinking to lose his reason? Or that kind of... That's often how you use it as a reason to discourage people from drinking too much. Yeah. Because you... It's like telling God, I don't want to be your image. Yeah. Okay. To the second, it should be said that a good passion following upon the judgment of reason increases the merit, right? If, however, it precedes that a man more from passion than from the judgment of reason is moved to acting well, then the passion diminishes, what? Yeah. It makes it less voluntary, right? To the third, it should be said that although the motion of the will is more intense than the passion incited, right, is not, however, so proper to the will as if, by reason alone, one is moved to what? To sin, right? That's the passion of total excuse from sin, because that's what we're interested in, right? Mm-hmm. to seventh one precedes us it seems that passion wholly excuses from sin because whatever causes the involuntary excuses what totally from sin but the concupiscence of the flesh which is a certain passion causes the involuntary as i said according to that of galatians 5 that the flesh what desires against the spirit that not whatever one wills does he do that right therefore the passion hold the excuses from the sin i blacked out made me so angry i blocked out i didn't know what i was doing this is probably on the way of my fist or my or my hammer or whatever it was i had more of a passion causes a certain ignorance in the what singular particular but ignorance of the particular holy excuses from sin this has been had therefore passion holy excuses from sin more infirmity of the soul is more grave than infirmity of the what body but the infirmity of the body holding excuses from sin as is clear in the mad huh that word comes originally from the greek that frenetici sound is originally greek word therefore much more passion which is an infirmity of the what so but against this is what the apostle says in romans 7 he calls the passions of sin not except because they what cause sins right which would not be if from sin it wholly what excused one right therefore the passions do not wholly excuse from passion the answer should be said that according to this only some act which is in his genus bad right totally what excuse from sin that renders it totally what yeah once if a such a passion which what right involuntary the act following it would wholly excuse from sin right otherwise not totally but about this two things should be it seems to be considered first that something is able to be what it is i couldn't say as when the will directly is carried towards it right or according to its cause when the will is carried to the cause and not to the what effect as is clear in the one who what voluntarily comes drunk from this as it were voluntary it's imputed to him what he commits through ebriety right who is it got drunk there that that is excused there in the gospel in the old testament was it no no yeah and they covered him up you know because he was yeah yeah but he didn't know the power of the wine right that's he's not thinking what yeah he didn't know the power of it yeah so even though what the man being drunk there didn't seem to be acting voluntarily right he chose voluntarily to be drunk yeah so he's responsible yeah yeah secondly it should be considered that something is said to be voluntary directly directly or indirectly directly when that in which what the will is carried right indirectly when the will is able to what pivot but does not yeah yeah able to do something but does not do so and according to this it ought to be what distinguished because passion sometimes is so great that it wholly takes away the use of what just as clear in those who on account of love or anger in sunnyota what about roman julietta coriolanus there and then is such a passion was from its beginning what voluntary then the act is imputed to what sin because it is voluntary because it is voluntary in its cause just as about drunkenness this has been said right if however the cause was not what voluntary but natural as in someone from what sickness or some cause of this sort falls into such a passion that totally takes away what use of reason the act is altogether rendered what involuntary and consequently totally excuses from sin just in the causes what natural rather than than voluntary right but sometimes the passion is not so great that it totally uh intercepts the use of reason right and then reason is able to what exclude the passion by diverting to other what thoughts or to impede it lest it what get its effect right because the members are not applied to work except to the consent of reason when such a passion does not hold the excuse from what because you still the use of reason right though diminished now what about this text from saint paul right to the first therefore it should be said that that which is said there in the text that not whatever you will that do you do right it should not be referred to those things which come about to an exterior act but to the inward motion of what concupiscence for a man wills never to what desire the bad just as also is expounded that which is said in romans 7 15 that the evil that i hate that i do referring to the emotion okay or it can refer to a will preceding the passion as is clear in the continent who against their what their will you might say act and encounter their what their concupiscence yeah there's two ways to expound in that text then right the second should be said that particular ignorance which total excuses is the ignorance of a circumstance which is someone what that someone is not able to know right despite what suitable diligence but passion causes ignorance of the law in particular when it impedes the application of the common knowledge to the particular act which passion reason reason is able to what repel you has been said it was talked about earlier right we got the two what adultery is bad adultery is pleasant and you assume one to the other it's not excusing you the third should be said that the infirmity of the body is involuntary it would be similar if it were what voluntary as has been said about but he really taught that which is a bodily infirmity you eat cardicle here what i'm right sure Question 77. To the eighth one precedes us. It seems that the sin which is from passion cannot be, what, mortal. We'll talk to David about that, I guess. For venial sin is divided against mortal. But a sin which is from infirmity is venial because it has in itself the cause of its what? Yeah. Is that what the word venial sin means? A forgivable sin. Yeah, well, it's encouraging. Yeah. Since, therefore, the sin which is from passion is from infirmity, it seems that it is not able to be, what, mortal. Moreover, a cause cannot be more potent than its effect. But the passion is not able to be a, what, mortal sin. For there is no mortal sin in sensuality, as was added above. Therefore, the sin which is from passion cannot be mortal. Moreover, passion, what, takes away from, I guess, a reason. But it's of, what, reason to be turned towards God or to be turned away from Him. In what consists of the ratio of mortal sin. Therefore, the sin which is from passion is not able to be, what, mortal. How is this going to trickle down? You know, I was talking about trickle down economics. It's a big argument. But I mean, trickle down moral theology, right? It's such a thing, you know. How does it always get down to the common man or common woman, you know? Therefore, the sin which is from passion is not able to be mortal. But against this is no less an authority than the apostle himself. Is anybody else called an apostle by autonomously besides St. Paul? Really? Where? Oh, I'm sorry. He's naming the quote afterwards. I'm sorry. Yeah, no, I don't think, I think only Paul and Peter, you know. That's what caught my eye, but they... Yeah. That's kind of striking, though, you know. See, among the... I mean, don't the apostles come after Mary, you know? Is having a high position, right? And these guys are called, you know. How is Mary, I think, in the Feast of Peter and Paul, you know? So, good credentials there. Against this is what the apostle says in Romans 7, 5. That the passions of what? Operate in our members. With the fruit of what? Fruit of death, huh? But this is proper to mortal sin. That it, what? Fr, fr, fr, kind of funny to say. To death. To death. Therefore, the sin, which is compassion, is able to be, what? Mortal. Yes, Paul's the apostle. They were Gentiles, and Peter's kind of the apostles of the Jews, isn't he? The circumcised. I guess he claims he was a person in Cornelius. Now, I am sure it should be said that mortal sin, as has been said above, consists in turning away from the last end, which is God. Which aversion pertains to reason, deliberating, huh? Of whom also it is to order in, what? Yeah. Ordinary, infinim, right? That's the effective definition of reason. In this way only can it happen that the inclination of the soul in something that is contrary to the last end is not immortal sin. Because reason, deliberating, cannot, what? Occur in this case, huh? Which happens in, what? Sudden motions, huh? But when from passion someone proceeds to the act of sin, or to a deliberate consent, this does not come about suddenly, huh? What, did David see Bathsheba taking a bath, wasn't it? That's what happened? And then he said, what, he sent somebody down to bring her up to the castle? Yeah, yeah, so he had time to deliberate, huh? When someone proceeds from passion to the act of sin, or to what? Deliberate consent, this does not come about, what? Suddenly, right? Yeah, for sure, when he planned to get rid of the husband, right? Whence reason, deliberating, huh? He's able here to, what? To meet it, or something. Yeah, to occur. Run into it. Yeah. He's able to exclude, or at least to, what? Impede passion, huh? Whence, if it does not run in there, it is a mortal sin, huh? Just as we see that many homicides, and that's some in the paper every day, I think. And adulteries, huh? Are committed through, what? Yeah. He realized, say, he had a problem with alcohol, and he realized, he said, I have to make a choice. If I'm in this part of town, and I have to go in that part of town, and the bar is in between, I can't go there, because I'll go right in it, but I go by it. I see it, I'll be in it. So I have to go over here, over here, to get it. That's the reason deliberating, at a time. Yeah. To the first, therefore, it should be said, that vigno is said in three ways. That's the news to me, huh? In one way, from its cause, huh? Because it has some cause for forgiveness, right? Which diminishes sin. And that's the sin from infirmity, and from what? Ignorance, huh? Those two kind. It's said to be, what? Vigno, because there's some reason to get forgiveness, huh? So what does St. Paul say? You know, he persecuted the church out of, what? Ignorance, yeah. That doesn't mean it wasn't something sinful about his persevere in the church, right? But it had some reason for being pardoned, right? Another way, from the event. As every sin, through penance, becomes, what? Vigno. Well, that's good to know. That is, it achieves, what? In a third way, it is said to be vigno from its genus, or kind, as an idle word. I can see somebody trying to explain that in a sermon, right? What an idle word is. What is an idle word? Because I've been trying to be polite. Great, dear. Is that an idle word? and this venial only right the third one i guess is opposed to the what yeah but the objection however precedes of the what first to second it should be said that passion is a cause of sin on the part of what conversion but that it be mortal is on the part of the aversion which parachidens follows from the conversion whence the argument does not what follow what is the argument yeah we don't weigh weigh the seriousness of the sin by what the seriousness of the cause because it follows prudence but the per se one has to be stronger the stove heats the water it must be hotter per se right but if i burn my house and it gets cold is the fire colder than the cold air what's the first distinction of being that aristotle gives in the fifth book of wisdom yeah even before he distinguishes between being according to the figures of predication right substance quantity quality and so on and being according to act and ability that's the first distinction he gives of being yeah yeah so what kind of being is a philosophical grandfather because to be a grandfather and to be a philosopher happens to the same man therefore you have a philosophical grandfather and i'm a white logician what kind of logician is that i suppose there's some black logician around somewhere two kinds of magicians right oran murray tells me if both my parents had been irish i would have made a bad philosopher or if both my parents had been swedish i would have made a bad philosopher right the dangers from my being irish my irish mother are offset by my father's swedishness and the defects they have from being swedish are offset by my irish mother yeah maybe something to that i think a swedish irish philosopher is still prudence combination so that's a rather fundamental distinction right to the third should be said that reason is not always in its act wholly impeded by passion whence there remains what free judgment huh that is able to turn away from or to be converted to what to god if however it totally took away the use of reason already there would not be what sin neither mortal nor what venial right so can anger be so great that the man loses his reason you get into a berserker which is very uh helpful in battle although it left the bulk in her defense but it was the best off so losing reason certainly you mentioned swedish before you mentioned you mentioned anger before but love also right no true medieval man i think that love drives some people mad would coronis be a tragic character if his anger had really taken away his reason entirely for a while then he tries to listen to reason right and they get him going again you know mccarthy when he gets to the point you know about the time you know when truman removed him right of course it wasn't too long in front of that when truman written that terrible letter you know to the guy who had said some bad words about his his daughter's musical performance you know maybe he lost his temper you know he used a lot of you know bad words you know you know how he's gonna put it in writing it's not contemporary okay we've got time to go on for one more here