Prima Secundae
Lecture 200: Passion, Reason, and the Causes of Sin

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To the second one goes forward thus, it seems that reason is not able to be overcome by a passion against its own, what, knowledge. That's kind of the way Socrates spoke, right? That might have been true about him, but for most of us, I'm afraid not. For the stronger is not conquered by the, what, weaker. But knowledge, on account of its certitude, right, is the strongest of those things which are in us. Therefore, it cannot be overcome by a passion which is weak and quickly, what, passing. Moreover, the will is not accepted as something good or an apparent good, but since passion draws a will in that which is truly good, but when it does that, it does not incline reason against, what, its knowledge, right? But when it draws it in that which is an apparent good and not existing a real good, it draws it in that direction that seems to reason. But this is in the knowledge of reason that it seems so to it. Therefore, passion never inclines reason against its, what, knowledge. If it be said that it draws reason knowing something in universal, that it judge the contrary in the particular, against this, the universal in particular proposition, if they are opposed, are opposed according to contradiction, right? As every man and not every man, right? But two opinions which are contradictories are contraries, as is said in the second book of the peri-hermeneus, that's the second book in logic that's come down from the father of logic, right? It's a book about statements. If there is someone knowing something universal, judges the opposite in the singular, it would follow that he has, at the same time, contrary opinions, which is, what, impossible. It's like being sick and healthy at the same time, right? Moreover, whoever knows universal knows also the particular that he knows to be contained under the universal. Just as whoever knows the mule to be sterile knows this animal to be sterile, so long as he knows it to be a, what? Mule. As is clear through that which is said in the first book of the Posterior Analytics, another book of logic, of demonstration, right? But the one who knows that something universal, as, for example, no fornication should be done, right? He knows this particular under the universal to be contained, that this act is, what? Fornication. Therefore, he sees also, therefore it seems that he also, what, knows in particular that this is wrong. So what about David there, right? He must have known that adultery is wrong, right? This is adultery, therefore. Moreover, those things which are in voice, in the vocal speech, are signs of the understanding of the soul. According to the philosopher. But a man existing in, what? Passion. Frequently confesses that that, what? That he chooses is bad, even in the, what? Particular, right? Therefore, also in the particular, he has, what? Knowledge. Thus, therefore, it seems that the passions are not able to draw a reason against its universal, what? Knowledge. Because it cannot be that he has, what? Knowledge. Knowledge, and estimates the opposite in particular. Against all this is what the apostle says, and that's by Antiochia, David, St. Paul. Romans 7, verse 23. I see another law in my, what? Members, huh? Repugnant to the law of my mind. And what? Only me capture, right? Into the law of sin, huh? Like Slomites is called. We'll get to the chapters here on the law eventually. It's kind of interesting to use the word law there, right? But the law, however, which is in the members he's talking about there is concubiscence, right? About which one is spoken above. Since, therefore, concubiscence is a certain passion, it seems that passion does draw a reason even against that which it, what? Knows, huh? What an invisible creature we are. I'm conflicted. And I said, join the club. That's the next quarter of his best, St. Paul. St. Paul was conflicted. Hmm. Answer, it should be said that the opinion of Socrates was, as the philosopher says in the Seventh Ethics, the Comagian Ethics, that is, that science can never be overcome by passion. That's what Socrates said, huh? Whence he laid down that all the virtues are, what? Sciences, huh? And all sins are, what? Ignorances, huh? In which matter, he in some way, what? Rightly judged, yeah. Tasted, yeah. Because since the will is of the good, or the apparent good, right, never would the will be moved to something bad unless that which was, what? Not good, in some way appeared to reason good. And an account of this, the will never, what? Attends to evil, except with some, what? Ignorance or error of reason. Whence it is said in Proverbs 14, errant y operantum malum. They ur, they are mistaken. Who, what? Do something bad, right? But since, by experience, that's where we started in ethics, right? It is clear that many act against those things of which they have knowledge, right? And this also, experience is confirmed by divine, what? Authority. According to that of Luke 12, the servant who knows the will of his Lord and doesn't do it will be, what? Beaten with many. And be. Yeah. And in Jacob, James, chapter 4, verse 17, to the one knowing to, what? How to do the good and not doing. It is a sin to him, right? But, what? Socrates does not simply dare verindicts it, in some way he does, right? But it's necessary to, what? Distinguish. Aha. That should be memorized. Yeah. Tweets in the seventh book of the ethics, huh? So Aristotle's going to be the philosopher, not Socrates. You know, Socrates is very often the model for the philosopher in some way, right? People are very attached to Socrates. Since, for rightly acting, man is directed by a two-fold, what? Knowledge, huh? That is of the universal and the particular, right? By universal knowledge and by a particular knowledge, I guess it's in the habit. Okay. But the defect of what? Yeah. Suffices for this that there be impeded the rightness of the, what? Work and of the will. As has been said above, right, huh? Or it can happen that someone who has a knowledge in the universal has that no fornication should be, what? Committed. Done. And nevertheless does not know in particular that this act, which is fornication, should not be, what? Done. And this suffices that the will does not follow the universal, what? Knowledge of reason. Huh? And this is fornication. And this is fornication. And this is fornication. And this is fornication. And this is fornication. Also, it should be considered that nothing prevents something that is known in habit that is not considered in what? Act. You see that in the students all the time. You probably give me a solution sometime, I think it's correct, you know, and then, oh yeah, but I know habitually this form is what? You can't draw any conclusions from the first figure from a universal affirmative and a universal negative, which is the minor premise, right? The reverse you can. I wasn't applying it to this argument, right? So you deceive me, right? So they say, you know, probably most people, you say to them, you know, they say, I know from a mean examiner, you know, I put this on an exam, you know, and say, is this good, you know, every mother is a woman, no man is a mother, no man is a woman, they'll say that's good, right? You guys, some of you thought too, I think, didn't you? So you can catch somebody, right, who might even have studied logic, right? Because he doesn't recall what he knows habitually, right? In this one here. So it should be considered that nothing prevents also someone, what? To know something and habit that an act he doesn't consider, right? So that's what we pray there, huh? Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, did that pray, did we say? To the angel, right? Strengthen the light of our mind, order them to our images, or rouse us to consider more correctly, right? You know, it could happen that someone also has right knowledge in the singular, and not only the universal, right? But nevertheless, an act he does not, what? Consider it. And therefore, it is not difficult that apart from that in which he does not consider an act, the man acts, huh? That he acts apart from that what he does not consider an act, huh? Now, that a man does not consider in particular that which he habitually knows, sometimes, what? Happens from the sole defect of intention, as when a man knowing geometry does not intend to the consideration of, what? Conclusions of geometry, which at once impromptu he has to, what? Consider, huh? Sometimes, sometimes a man does not consider that which he has in habit on account of some impediment, yeah, either on account of some exterior occupation, or on account of some, what? Bodily weakness. And in this way, the one who is constituted in some passion does not consider in particular that which he knows in, what? In the rift. So, in so far as a passion impedes such a, what? Consideration, huh? That impedes in three ways, huh? First, by a certain distraction, as has been expounded above, right? Secondly, through contrariety, because often the passion inclines to the contrary of that which universal science, what? Has, huh? And third, through a certain, what? Bodily change, from which reason is in a way, what? Bound. So that it's not freely, what, going to act. As sleep, or what? Yeah. By a certain, what? Body transmission made. Binds the use of reason, huh? No one's often deceived in dreams, huh? And this happens in passions. It's clear from this that sometimes, when the passions are much, what, intensified, huh? Man loses totally the use of, what? Reason, huh? Like Coriolanus there, when he's under the influence of anger, right? For many, an account of the abundance of love and anger, right? Conferred into insanity, huh? And in this way, passion draws reason to judging in particular against the knowledge which one has in the universal. So Socrates is kind of ignoring the experience, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said that universal knowledge, which is most certain, right, does not have, what, principality, huh? Chiefness. In operation. But more, what? In that operations are about the, what, singular, right? Once you don't commit adultery with married women in general, both Bathsheba in particular, right, huh? You know? And so that the senses and the sense appetite have great force because action is in the, what, singular. See, that wouldn't be the same problem in geometry, right? Your conclusion would be something universal, too, you know? Whence nones miram, huh? It's not wonderful. If in things to be done, right, passion acts against, what? Yeah. Being absent in consideration in the, what, particular, right? To the second should be said that this seems, what, to reason a particular something good that is not good, right? To be some good that is not a good. It happens from some, what, passion, right, huh? To make an exception with, with Bathsheba, right, huh? You know? He's worthy of an exception, right? And nevertheless, this particular judgment is against universal knowledge of what? Reason, huh? You know, people, you know, they buy a sack of candy and eat the whole thing, you know, because it's really good, you know? So down in Williamsburg there, you know, they're all talking about the family, you know, my son was talking about the, the, uh, uh, cherry sours, they're called, right? And so, cherry sours, they're called, and they kind of melt in your mouth, oh, they really are good. Paul says, this is the best I've ever had, you know, because I've had a little package of it, and each grandchild, you know, I couldn't stuff myself completely, because, I mean, you would just tend to go right through the whole thing, you know? It's really good, really good, you know? And you've got to finish it off, you know? Don't share it. It's less for me. I bought two packages, and the second I used to want to branch them, each one, can I have one, can I have one, can I have one, can I have one, can I have one, can I have one, can I have one, can I have one, can I have one? By the time you get eight or nine of them, boy, you get what's left. But they were very good, they were very good, I mean, it was the best I tasted, I mean. So they had to, you know, I think you could have a good contest for that to be first, you know? Oh, man, no. Yeah, yeah. So we went to the Oktoberfest, right, you know, they had, you know, in our package, you know, you had a dinner, right? And they bring out like a whole chicken, you know, for you, you know, we'd eat nice and soft. And then you have two things for these big muggies, you know, the liter. Of course, once you have a liter of beer, I don't want any more than that, you know? And so all of us at the table, you know, we all had a liter of beer, and, you know, going to get the ticket and get another liter of beer? No. So we had these young guys behind us, you know, so we all passed forward to these guys. I don't know. The thirsty. Yeah. The drinks and the thirsty. Yeah, yeah. Of course, the first. I don't know, more than a liter, because one guy had gotten two liters, and he couldn't finish the second one, so he said, give me some of that. And the other guy, so. Now, what about the, we'll get right to the third objection now, right? To the third should be said that it cannot, what, happen. That someone has together, right, ama, simul, together, enact knowledge or opinion which is true about the universe affirmative and opinion false about the particular, what, negative or the reverse, right? That's the famous square of opposition, right? But bene potest, and it can well happen that someone have, what, a true knowledge, most habitually, of the universe affirmative and a false opinion and act about the particular, what, negative. For act is not directly contrary to habit, but to act. I see that distinction between knowing something habitually and knowing it, yeah, yeah. Now, to the fourth it should be said that the one who has knowledge universal, an account of passion is impeded, lest he place under that universal, right, and arrive at the, what, conclusion. But he assumes under another universal which the inclination of passion, what, suggests. And he concludes under that. Now, he gives the example there, right, from what the Aristotle teaches in the example. Once the philosopher says in the seventh book of the Ethics that the syllogism of the incontinent man, right, the incontinent man is a man who knows in universal what is good, right, but he has four propositions in his mind. Two universal, of which one is a reason that no fornication should be, what, committed. Another is of the passion, or suggested by the passion, right, that pleasure should be, what, should be followed, right, huh? Passion, therefore, what, huh? Binds reason, lest it assume, right, and conclude under the first, right? Whence it remaining, he assumes and concludes under the second, right? Pleasure should be, what, pursued, this is pleasant, therefore. Simple enough, right? Socialisms can be dangerous, right, huh? Okay. Now, to the fifth, then, what about the man who knows these things, you know? What was the correct numeral I was saying years ago? I think I said, everything I like is either, what, sinful or fattening. To the fifth, it should be said that just as a drunk sometimes, what, puts forth words signifying profound, what, positions, right, or opinions, which, nevertheless, he cannot, what, judge by his mind, drunkenness, verbatim, this, so also the man existing in passion, right, although by mouth he puts forth this, should not be done, nevertheless, inwardly, in his soul, right, he senses that it should be done, as is said in the seventh book of the Ethics, right? So that's a very profound book of Aristotle's, pretty book of Aristotle's profound, right? Okay, so I have to stop there, huh? Question 77, huh? In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, Amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. Thank you, guardian angels. God, enlightenment. Guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, Lord, illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor. Pray for us. Help us to understand what you've written. You know my favorite thing there about what sense of before? Does one sense of before come before another sense of before? Why are we doing the thing on time, you know, huh? Aristotle's putting out how the before and after on the road, right, is the cause of before and after of the motion over the road, right? And then the before and after in time is because of the before and after in motion, right? So you have three before and afters there, right? But what's the order of one of those three, right? What sense of before does one of these senses of before come before another sense of before, right? It's like another tongue twister, right, huh? What sense is it, would you say? Does the before and after in the road come before the before and after in the motion over the road, and that before the before and after in the motion, the time it takes to? No, because one being, you know, honestly, one being could be without the other. In what sense does the before and after in motion in the road come before the before and after in the motion down the road, and that before the before and after in the time it takes to go down the road? Yeah, yeah, yeah. What kind of cause is it, right? It seems to be what? It comes like extrinsic form, right, huh? Yeah. Now, it's an interesting thing, too. In how we speak of what is the best thing after God, huh? No, it's the cosmos as a whole, right? No, it's the cosmos as a whole, yeah, yeah. Well, the end is outside the cosmos, right, because the end is God, right? So what's the best thing in the cosmos, right? It's a whole, yeah. It's the order, huh, in the cosmos, right? You see this better in the Greek word cosmos, right, because it has the idea of a beautifully ordered whole, right? It used to explain to the girls, you know, the cosmetics, right? You're arranging your face, you know, to be more beautiful, right, huh? Okay, so the beauty of the cosmos is in the order, right, huh? The order, of course, means before and after, right, huh? Now, among the five senses of before there in the 12th chapter, the categories, right? What sense of before is involved in the order of the universe, huh? That's the order in the knowledge of reason, right? Yeah, that's nice. That's not the order in the universe. Yeah, but then reason would not be the order that's in reason, like that's if you have the logic you're studying. It is, you know, but Thomas says there's two senses of order, right? One is the way in which the universe is, what, in a diverse creature, one of which is better than another, right? You know, so the plants are better than the stones and the animals are better than the plants and man is better than the, you know, all the way up, you know, and the angels are equal, right? They're all unequal, right? So that's the order in the fourth sense, right? That one is before the other in the sense of being better and more perfect, and the other is a sense in which one part moves another part, right? And that's kind of the fifth sense in the, not the fifth order, but the fifth sense he takes up in the categories, huh? See, and those two orders, right, huh? Kind of interesting, huh? Not the order of time, it's not the order of being, or even the, and not the order of reason, right? The reason, it's thinking, it's interesting, two of the five senses are in the world. So Thomas is above me, right, huh? What's Indiana used to say about Cajetan, right, that Cajetan made a mistake trying to comment sometimes directly upon Aristotle. He should have commented on Thomas's commentary on Aristotle, right? You need, you know, Aristotle's up here and Thomas would be down here. So if you read Thomas's commentary there on Dionysius, I mean, he speaks of, you know, Dionysius' way above him, you know, and he's bringing him down kind of to, proportioning him to us, right, huh? You know? Then you need, you know, De Connick and Dion and, you know, T.J. Cosperry to kind of proportion, you know, even Thomas to us, right, huh? That's Cajetan's mistake, right, when he tried to comment directly on the book of Aristotle, right, he got in trouble, right? The Bible says, we need fathers to explain the scriptures. Yeah. But since we can't understand the fathers too well because they're so far above us, we need theologians to explain the fathers the same. Yeah, yeah. And because we're not really ready for theology, we need philosophers to teach us about theology, get the parents of theology, get the parents of theology, get the fathers, get the parents of theology, get the parents of the fathers, get the parents of the scriptures. Those are the whole thing. There's many objections here, you know, you see, taken from Augustine, you know, and Thomas explained what Augustine's really saying. And so, as I always say, Aristotle means what Thomas says he means, right? And Augustine means what Thomas says he means. Some people try to say, Thomas is trying to excuse Augustine here, you know. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So we're up to Article 3 here, right? The third one goes forward thus. It seems that the sin which is from passion, or from the emotions, right, ought not to be said to be from, what, infirmity, huh? For the passion is a certain vehement motion of the sense-desiring power, as has been said. But the vehemence of emotion more attest to the, what, fortitude than it's infirmity, right? Therefore, the sin that is from passion ought not to be said to be from, what, infirmity, right, huh? But then you're piped and smoking, huh? Okay? Now, tomorrow I'll give you the answer. I remember, I said, yeah, I was saying, I was going to use a text here. I forgot the text in the sentences. And of course, I said, boy, there was a text, you know. And I remember when the class went through, those texts came out, but I didn't know. We're dying. You know, this forgotten text. Moreover, the infirmity of man is more to be noted according to that which is in him more, what, fragile. But this is flesh, huh? Whence is said in Psalm 77, remember that you are, what? Yeah. Therefore, that ought to be more called sin from infirmity, that is, from some defect of the body, right, than something that is from a, what, passion of the soul, right? As Falstead said, I have more flesh than the other man, so I should be excused. More to those things, a man does not seem to be infirm, which are subject to his. what will but to do or not do those things to which passion inclines is under the will of man right according to that of genesis chapter 4 under you will be your what appetite and you will dominate it therefore the sin which is from passion is not from what yeah but against this is what tullian sounds cicero in the fourth book of the tuscan questions passions of the soul are called what sicknesses but sicknesses by another name are called what infirmity but they call the place to keep the sick people yeah therefore sin is not from passion every sin which is from passion ought to be what called from infirmity well i answer thomas says huh it should be said that the cause of sin the proper cause of sin is on the side of the what soul in which chiefly is what sin now they're going to be spoken of an infirmity in the soul to the likeness of the infirmity of the what body now the body of man is said to be infirm when it is what weakened or impeded in the carrying out of its own operation on account to some disorder of the parts of the body thus to wit that the humors and what memories of man are not subject to the cruelling power and motive power of the body once the member is said to be infirm when it is not able to complete them the operation of a healthy what member just as an eye when it does not see clearly as the philosopher says in the 10th book on the history of animals history means what greek means like investigation right okay story animal you sir says trying to kind of investigate what the facts are you know and then he's going to try to understand why they are like they are so thomas says uh actually aristotle calls the books on the soul there too his story right because he's not determining what everything can be said about the soul right and he says the nature of history to be incomplete and and that's why it's good to uh know that we call history right you know it's always incomplete and uh he talked to the man who really was there and it wasn't that way at all you know and uh we're talking earlier there about uh lydell hart's book you know and all these things you know you think that the germans had more tanks than the french no the french had better tanks and more of them they didn't know how to use them you know and then he gets into the battle britain describing you know the difference you know between the airplanes that the germans had and we had and uh how the the british airplanes in some way better right more maneuverable right and how uh they had better you know communication between the crown and so on so whence the infirmity of the soul is said when the soul is impeded right in its own operation on account of a disorder of its sweat parts now just as the parts the body are said to be disordered when they do not follow the order of nature so the parts of the soul are said to be disordered when they are not subject to the order of reason for reason is the power that rules the parts of the soul right thus when outside on the order of reason when the gibbs will power or the irascible power is affected by some passion outside the order of reason and by this is impeded right is bestowed yeah in the forced way yeah the true action of man there's said to be a sin from what infirmity whence the philosopher right beautiful comparison the first of ethics compares the incontinent to the paralytic whose parts move in the contrary of that which he himself what disposes it's kind of a warfare going on shakespeare says right has a little war going on inside himself right one part is impeding the others now what about the first objection from the vehemence of the passion to the first therefore it should be said that when the motion is stronger in the body apart from the what order of nature there is a greater what infirmity right so in the motion of what is stronger of passion outside the order of reason then there's more infirmity of the what so right to the second it should be said that sin chiefly consists in the act of the will which is not impeded by the infirmity of the body for it's possible that the one who is infirm in body has a prompt will to doing something but it is impeded by passion as has been said before once when it's said that sin is from infirmity it should more be referred to the infirmity of the soul than to the infirmity of the body nevertheless that infirmity of the soul is said to be what infirmity of the flesh insofar as when the condition of the flesh passions and the soul arise in us right in that the sense desiring power is a power using a bodily what organ now even latin they'll speak the emotions as the passion is anime right which doesn't mean they're not in the what body that they're in the soul like like uh understanding and willing are right but they're what more on the side of the soul than in the body right and they kind of arise because you have a soul the third it should be said that in the power of the will it is to assent or not assent to those things in which passion inclines us and to that extent our appetite is said to be under us but nevertheless the very assent or dissent of the will is impeded by passion in the ways i was pointing out before this order stronger to those which are your body is Fred Fredette a friend of ours last year he had some kind of seizure and what happened he said the last thing he remembers was he was going to the kitchen table with two priests sitting there next thing you know he was on the floor they said he like almost flipped backwards he had the seizures i mean that's pretty strong but then you know there's something seriously wrong with him he has some serious disorder inside because of the violence Now, whether the love of oneself is the beginning of every sin, right? To the fourth one goes forward thus. It seems the love of oneself is not the beginning of every what? Sin. For that which is in itself good and suitable is not the proper cause of sin. But the love of oneself is what? Itself as such, right? As you can say, good and debitum. Whence a man is commanded that he love his neighbor as himself. Well, that wouldn't be commanded if it wasn't good to love yourself, right? As is said in Leviticus chapter 19. Therefore, a love of oneself is not the proper cause of sin. Aristola talks about the love of self there, right? And he sees a distinction there, right? But usually, you know, if we say something that he loves himself, it's taken in the, what, bad sense, right? And, but there must be a sense of loving oneself that is good if you are commanded by God, the second commandment, right, to love your neighbor as yourself, right? You have to see that distinction, right? But it's kind of striking, you know, that love of oneself usually has a kind of bad connotation, right? He loves himself. He's selfish and so on, you know? As if it's a easy disorder to love of oneself, right, huh? More of the Apostles says in Romans chapter 7, that occasion being taken, the sin by the command worked in me all, what, concubiscence. Once the glass says that the law is, what, good, which while it prohibited concubiscence, prohibited all evil. Which is said in account of this, because concubiscence is a cause of all sin. The next article will be about concubiscencia of carnies and so on, right? But concubiscencia, which is a form of desire, right, is a different passage or passion from love, as it had above. Therefore, a love of oneself is not the cause of every sin, huh? Moreover, Augustine says upon that Psalm 79, that the fire being, what, kindled and tempered, or what, or suffocated, isn't it? The fire being dug down. Dug down, okay, that's better. Fosa. That every sin is from love, bad inflating, or from fear, badly, what, humiliating, huh? I mean, therefore, not only is love of oneself a cause of sin, but also this fear, right, okay? So the coward, right, I mean, it's fear, isn't it, right? Yeah. Of course, he fears because he loves himself. Like Richard. Richard loves Richard. Yeah. I love that. Yeah. Moreover, as a man sometimes sins on account of a disordered love of himself, so sometimes he sins on account of a disordered love of his neighbor. Therefore, love of oneself is not the cause of every sin. But against this is what Augustine says in the 14th book of the City of God, that the amor sui, the love of oneself, usquia, all the way to the contempt of God, makes the city of Babylon. Why, the amor, what, de, usquia, and contemptum sui, makes the city of God, yeah. That's what it's called. But through every sin, or any sin, man pertains to the city of Babylon, right? Therefore, the love of oneself is a cause of every sin, huh? So are you a Babylonian, or what are you? Sometimes. Try not. How did Babylon get such a terrible reputation that it becomes the symbol of the, or the name of the city of, question 77, article 4? The answer should be said, and as has been said above, the proper, in per se, cause of sin ought to be taken on the part of a turning towards, right? The changeable what? Good. From which part, every act of sin proceeds from some, what, disordered desire of some temporal good, huh? Times of Meshavik. Motion, right? But that someone desires disorderly some temporal good proceeds from this, that one disorderly loves himself. That follows in what it says here. For this it is, to love someone is to wish, what? Good for him, right? So disorderly the good that I, what, am willing for myself, it's proceeding from a disorder in my love of myself, huh? Once it is manifest that a disordered love of oneself is the cause of every, what, sin, huh? Okay, now in the first objection there, he's, what, seeing, right, pointing out the distinction, right? But Aristotle points it out in the 10th book of the Nicomachean Ethics, too. To the first, therefore, it should be said that the ordered love of oneself is, what, suitable and natural, right, huh? Thus also to wish for oneself the good that is fitting, huh? But the disordered love of oneself, which leads to a contempt for God, is laid down to be the cause of sin, according to Augustine. That's what Augustine means. Disordered love of oneself. Well, finally, philosopher, a lover of wisdom, right? Does that proceed from a disordered love of myself? I remember it used to be this thing then, I was in college, you know, you get talking sometimes with other students and people do, and so on. And some people don't know what they want to study or what they, you know. Well, obviously you want the best knowledge, right? No. So, if you hear, what? He started out as a salesman. And, of course, you hear that wisdom is the best knowledge, and hear some kind of a reason before wisdom is the best knowledge, then you want to be a philosopher, right? The trouble was, this is convincing some people to be philosophers who aren't really cut out to be philosophers, right? So, you shouldn't convince this guy to be a philosopher, you know, because how is he going to support himself? He's not going to succeed as a philosopher, right? So, in loving wisdom, could this proceed from a disordered love of oneself? I want the best for myself? For the best part of it. Yeah. The best of the best. Yeah, so, if he was a philosopher, who would do the farming, right? Exactly. It would be just terrible what would happen to the country, right? Yes. Of course, they don't have this danger too much. Most men don't love themselves. Yeah, yeah. They used to argue that the love of literature is kind of, you know, a substitute for the love of wisdom, right? Can't quite go all the way. So, the students of literature, I don't know if they appreciated this, you know. But the fact that, you know, love of oneself usually has a bad connotation, right? It's a sign, probably, that it's hard to have an ordered love of yourself, right? To love yourself the way you should, right? You've got the commandment of love, right? To love your neighbor as yourself. But you've got to be stringing yourself out before you can love your neighbor as you should, too. Now, what about concubisence, huh? Well, concubisence, by which someone wishes for himself a good, is reduced to love of self as to its what? Cause. So Thomas looks before and sees that love is the cause of what? Desire. If I didn't love wisdom, I wouldn't desire wisdom, right? If I didn't love candy, I wouldn't desire candy. If I didn't love wine, I wouldn't desire wine. If I didn't love Mozart, I wouldn't desire to hear Mozart, right? If I didn't love Shakespeare. So love is a cause of passions. To the third should be said, that someone is said to love both that good which he wishes for himself and himself, right? You've met this distinction before, huh? They call it the love of what? Wanting or concubisence and the love of what? Yeah. Love of friendship sometimes. The love, therefore, according as it is said to be, what? Of that which is wished, right? That someone, what? Is said to love wine or money. He wants to, what? Receive that good, right? And for a, what? Oh, I did that. I'm going to do a little trick. I'm a little confused here. He receives as a cause fear which pertains to the flight from, what? Evil, huh? But every sin comes either from the disordered desire of some good or from the disordered flight from something, what? Bad. But both of these are reduced to love of oneself. On account of this, a man either, what, desires good for himself or he flees evils because he loves himself, huh? So the coward, huh? He loves his own life, right? So that's why he's running away, right? So it proceeds from a love of himself. It may be a sort of love of himself, right? He shouldn't put himself over his country, right? What? Or defend. Yeah, yeah. So if you're always going behind you with a gun and saying, you know, he wants to be a dead hero as a dead coward. You keep going, right? That's a fairly common thing, you know. I guess I don't know. What about disordered love of your, what, friend? In the fourth, it should be said that a friend is, as it were, another, what, self, huh? And, of course, the footnote here refers to Aristotle's ninth book of the ethics, right? Which is one of the two books on friendship, right? And I took a course in Greek in college. They had a nice little textbook, you know, and they had a lot of little quotes in Greek, you know, right, in each lesson, right? And, like, they had the beginning of St. John's Gospel, which is very simple Greek. In the beginning was the word, the word was of God, or it was God, and so on. But another one, they'd have this one, Ophilos, esten, alas, autos, right? A friend, Ophilos, is another, what, self, huh? So disordered love of your neighbor comes from disordered love of your friend, from your disordered love of yourself, huh? So watch this love of self, huh? To the fifth end, one goes forward thus. It seems that unsuitably are laid down as the causes of sin. They can keep a sense of the flesh. They can keep a sense of the eyes and the pride of life. Can you read John, St. John of the Cross? He likes to talk about this text a lot. Well, because according to the apostle, that's St. Paul, right? The root of all evils is what? Cupidity. But the pride of life is not contained under cupidity. Therefore, it ought not to be laid down among the causes of sin. Practicing the word there. Cupidity covers. Moreover, the cubistence of the flesh is most of all excited from the vision of what? Eyes. According to that of Daniel 13. Beauty to siege. Is that the old men there? The appropriate ten. Therefore, it ought not to divide concupiscence of the eyes against the concupiscence of the what? Flesh? Just as I heard about it on the radio there, that some good-looking woman walked down the streets there in New York, right? And she had a man going in front of her with a back case with a camera, right, huh? And they'd see all the remarks of where she's on the way, you know. And they recorded, right? So we walked about ten hours, you know, at the end of the day, right? And they made a film of us now, you know, showing how aggressive men are, right? Well, it sounds like this is concupiscence of the eyes, right? Just walking down. This is an example there from Daniel, right? I guess they're the old men, right? So the speech is, huh? It's got the idea of beauty, huh? Somewhere in one of the wisdom books in the essay, the Latin was gratia, gratia meaning beauty or something to see. Moreover, concupiscence is a, what? Desire of the pleasant, right? Delightful. But pleasures happen not only according to sight, but also according to the other, what? Senses, huh? Therefore, when ought to lay down, what? Concupiscence, therefore, when ought to lay down, concupiscence of what? Hearing and concupiscence of taste and concupiscence of smell and so on, you know, the other senses, huh? Moreover, just as a man is induced to sinning from a disordered desire of good, so also from a disordered fleeing from what? Evil. But nothing here is enumerated pertaining to the flight from what? Evil. Therefore, insufficiently, are the causes of sin, what? I hope Tom's going to defend this text now, because it is into three, right? And three is all, right, huh? So I hope that he will save me the embarrassment of admitting a fourth thing into the causes of sin, right? But against this is what is said in the first, what, epistle of John, huh? That everything that's in the world, taking world now in the bad sense, the worldly, is either the concupiscence of the flesh, or the concupiscence of the eyes, or the pride of life. But something is said to be in the world on account of, what, sin. If a woman decides she's going to be a merry-go-go-win rather than a virgin or something like that, she'd say she's going to the world, right? That was the old phrase that you see in the older books. One says, as it's said there, the whole world is, what, you, yeah. Therefore, the four, said three, are the causes of sin, huh? I think I've got a pretty good witness there, John, right? I'll see if Thomas can defend John, you know, against all these things. I answer, it should be said, as has been said, a disordered love of oneself is a cause of every sin, huh? But in the love of oneself is included the disordered desire of the good, huh? For each one, right, desires that good to which he, what? No, excuse me, each one desires good to the one whom he loves, right? Sometimes we say that to love someone is to wish good for them, right, huh? To want good for them, right? So if the parents love their children, they want good things for their children, right? Whence it is manifest that the disordered desire of the good is the cause of every, what, sin, huh? But good is in two ways the object of the sense-desiring power, huh? In which are the, what, passions or emotions of the soul. Mostly they call them the passion is anime, right? That was the way it's speaking. But I mean, it's very clear that they're not simply in the soul, right? They have a bodily connection. Aristotle talks about that at the beginning of the, of the, uh, in the premium to the three books on the soul, right? That the emotions are involved in the body, right? And you don't know what the emotions are fully if you just know their form and don't know their, what, bodily change that accompanies them, huh? That's true, especially in violent emotions like anger, right? You realize the body change going on in your own. In one way, absolutely, according as it is the, what, object of the concubiscible. In another way, under the ratio of something, what, difficult, which is the object of the, what, the erasome. It's going back to that distinction between the epithumia, as they called it in Greek, and thumos in Greek, right? Now you get two, now you get the three, right? Now there is a two-fold, what, concupiscence, huh? The nature of the body has been had above. One, which we call natural, because it is of those things by which the nature of the body is, what, sustained. Whether with respect to the conservation of the individual, as food and, what, drink, and others of this sort, or as regards the conservation of the, what, species. Just as in sexual matters, in the era. And the disordered desire of these things is called the concupiscence of the flesh, right? So it's food, drink, and sex, shall we say, huh? The other is a concupiscence that is more of the soul, right? Animalis, huh? We get the word that. Of those things which do not bring, right, to the sense of the flesh, sustaining or delection, right? But they're delectable according to the apprehension of, what? Imagination, huh? Or some taking of this kind, huh? As money, huh? Well, money's not pleasant in the way food and drink are pleasant, right? See? It's imagination, right, huh? Then knock down my barns and build bigger barns, right? I'm made for life, right, huh? We have a little account for the others, the miser. The ledger is coming to the miser on his deathbed, and the miser's got all his money under the bed. He says, ha, ha, you can't do it. You, like, not set out all my money. He's mocking you. He can't pursue his pleasure, but he's got his. It was cartoon years ago, you know, they're sitting in the largest office.