Prima Secundae
Lecture 197: Sin as Cause of Sin: The Four Causes

Transcript
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To the third one proceeds thus, it seems that sin does not have an outside cause. For sin is a voluntary act, but voluntary things are of those which are in our power, right, in us. And thus they do not have a, what, exterior cause. Therefore sin does not have an exterior cause. Moreover, as nature is a beginning within, when they're established, I'll define nature as a beginning and cause of motion and rest, in that which it is, right? First as such, and not by accident. But, so also is the will. But sin in natural things, no, sin is used there for natural things, huh? So if the baby is born without an arm or a leg, that's the sin of nature, right? Right, but that's in the broadness of the Latin word there, right? Catum. It never happens except from some, what, interior cause. It has monstrous parts, right? Defective babies and so on. Births. Come to bout from the corruption of some interior, what, principle. Therefore neither in morals can there be a sin except from an interior cause. Therefore it does not have an exterior, therefore sin does not have an exterior cause. Moreover, the cause multiplied, the effects multiplied. But the more and the greater are the exterior things inducing to sin, the less is that someone, what, privileged and distributed to him is to sin, right? Right, therefore nothing exterior is the cause of sin, right? So he's kind of saying they can diminish the kind of responsibility for sin, but not. The Greek word for cause, I guess, there's got the sense of responsible, right? You're responsible for this. That means you're the cause of this, right? It's your negligence, right? But against this is what is said in the book of Numbers in the Old Testament there, chapter 31. Are these not those who deceive, the sons of Israel, and make us, what, go astray in the Lord over the sin of Phogar, whatever that was? Therefore, something outside can be a cause, making us to sin, huh? Now, that's the way Thomas proceeds here in the reply. A nice three-fold reply here. I answer, it should be said, that as has been said above, the inward cause of sin is both the will as what? As perfecting, completing the act of sin, and reason as regards the lack of the suitable rule, and the sense desire as inclining, right? Well, there's three. Wow. No more, no less. Thus, therefore, something outside, tripliciter, is able to be a cause of sin, huh? Well, you knew that would move me to enthusiasm, right, huh? You know, when Thomas is commenting on the premium of Aristotle to the Dianima, and Thomas says, you know, the premium has three parts. This is kind of, you know, this text is kind of, you know, bumped into our heads a lot by our professors, you know. So, every time you're writing a thesis or papers like that, you've got to have a premium with these three parts, you know. So, this is nice, though. Now, so you're going to have to move one of these three things, right? The will, however, as has been said above, cannot be moved inwardly, right, except by what? God, who cannot be the, what, cause of sin, as will be shown later on, but that will be taken up, you know. I guess in the cause of sin in particular, it's God a cause of sin, huh? Whence it remains that nothing outside is able to be a cause of sin, except insofar as it moves reason, right? As a man or a demon persuading sin, right? Or as moving, right? The sense desire, just as exterior sensible things move sense desire, right? The woman or the bottle or something, you know. I asked my friend Jim, I said, which is better, a woman or a bottle? And he says, a bottle, he said. Doesn't talk. One afternoon, Jim and I were visiting used bookshops, right? And so we'd go to a used bookshop, and then we'd go to a tavern, have a beer or something, and then go to another used bookshop, and then, you know. Finally, I said to Jim, we've run out of bookshops. He says, we haven't run out of taverns yet. They go good together, you know. One to the other, back again. But neither exterior persuasion in things to be done, right, of necessity moves what? Reason, huh? This happens in politics, right? You can't convince these people. Nor also does things outwardly proposed a necessity move sense desire, right, huh? So one doesn't always go for the candy or whatever it is that's out there. Unless perhaps, huh? One is in some way disposed, right, huh? Okay. And nevertheless, also, the sense desire does not a necessity move reason and the, what? Will, right? When something outward is able to be a cause, moving one to sin, right, but not sufficiently, what, inducing or leading us into, what, sin. But the cause sufficiently, completing sin, is the will alone, right? Yeah, so it's possibly something I got found from a part of me, you know. You know, he says there's no sin except the two to her, you know. But you got probably to the will, right, huh? You know, it's, uh, yeah. Okay, the first objection was saying, well, the voluntary is in our power, right, huh? Thomas admits that, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said that from this, that the exterior or outward movers to sin do not sufficiently, right, induce and from necessity, right, it follows that it still remains in us to sin and what? Not to sin, huh? The second should be said that through this, that there's laid down an inward cause of sin does not exclude the exterior, right, huh? Because that which is outside, for that which is outside is a cause of sin. It's not. Yeah, a cause of sin, except by means. Of something interior. Yeah, okay. So the candy doesn't make me to excess or something like that, right? But even so, insofar as it moves the sense of desire, right, huh? But, uh, the will has to consent to stuff in myself. Um, to the third, it should be said that the exterior causes incline to sin being multiplied, the axis sin are multiplied, right, because many from these causes in many ways are inclined to the axis sin, huh? It's a good description of mankind, right? Plures exiles causis, et plurias, huh? Many from those causes, and in many ways, I guess, are inclined. Bye-bye. to the acts of sin right but nevertheless the ratio of guilt right his lesson right which consists in this that something is voluntary within our power right so what about david and besheba right he was moved by something exterior right now you know he was eventually forgiven right now but he went pretty far you know having never has been killed you know thomas you know it says that uh the psalms are attributed to david right or they come from him so that we don't lose hope right in our own sinfulness right it's kind of interesting you know it's not moses who composes the psalms but it's it's this david who's you know considered you know some very serious sins right because their connection between hope i guess and and the divine attribute of mercy it seemed to me right and i believe god it's because it was uh not because of his mercy but i believe god because of his truthfulness right but if i hope in god it's primarily because of his what mercy right yeah but his justice and that sort of things or instills fear in me right which is necessary right that's been kind of beautiful in the psalms there when thomas says you know that uh mercy without justice becomes what excuse me when you say mercy without justice there's not come mercy without justice can kind of kind of lead or something yeah yeah yeah yeah and and justice without mercy is another harm right and you need kind of a balance between the two right huh i used to take that and kind of you know generalize it and say you know that uh you need a balance of hope and fear right and uh you could apply it to other kinds of hope and fear but i used to apply sometimes to the philosopher right then the philosopher disparities of finding the truth as you might with these objections and so on that's all you'd heard uh that's going to ruin you as a foster right if you disparate find the truth you'll give up the pursuit right but if you don't have the fear of making a mistake right and say you know you know i know all the answers and so on and i can answer any questions uh then you become what you have to make mistakes right so you need a balance of hope and fear and the beautiful example given there is the one of socrates in the fatal yeah yeah yeah because in the fatal they get into discussion you know of the immortality of the soul which is a thing difficult to know right is the soul morto or not and socrates he makes a joke there right about you know they say we're always discussing irrelevant things you know you know things that are not uh apropos and it's in the day i'm going to die you know it might seem that this is not an irrelevant thing to be considering what they're thinking about and uh so um socrates you know begins by defending the immortality of the soul and uh it seems pretty good but he's uh said the arguments he gives everybody seems to be more or less convinced but there's a couple tougher guys there you know he said he says socrates says you guys uh you know still thinking about this or you got into something else you're talking about you know so we've been thinking about you said socrates and you know i get an objection and simius object you know and they give their objections right all of a sudden they fall into kind of a what despair right because the arguments of socrates seems so good and now they don't seem to be good at all and uh socrates the guys who's narrating this last day is socrates right you know he talks about that kind of you know that discouragement they had and if not despair and uh the guy's hearing about yeah what did socrates do you know he said i never admired socrates more than at this time sarki is a beautiful way of leading them out of this right and kind of restoring a little bit their their hope you know and then he he resolves the arguments right and the one of the guys aren't easy to handle the other guy and so he takes up the user ones first right and they're really getting confidence just a minute now you know you know the the other the other guy's gonna be harder to answer right so he's always kind of what washing them you know like my friend warren murray said about you know monsignor dian you know his his principal passion is fear right and uh and uh you know if you come up with some new thing and dangled idea you thought of you know his first impression you know is you know no and but it forces you you know to justify it you know and and make you more careful right so um but i remember what what kasurik my teacher said down to dian too he he mentioned you know this one story where he was in class you know and seeing dian had solved some problems what it was and kasurik you know came to speak to dian in his office after class right and he was much different in the office that he had been in the classroom you know and it's very good he's kind of wondering about it he says why would you like that in class oh he says it's a business of the teacher to encourage a student he says to think you know but then he had a guy that was you know pushing things he showed the difficulties you know so i mean a teacher like that or like socrates right he can see where his his students are right and sometimes they need what encouraging and sometimes they need to be discouraging what's that you know you know that's just a divine providence you know one thing i think thank god for is for kasurik and deconic and dian right now but if i had gotten dian first i would probably be afraid to think you know and kasurik was always encouraging me do you know go out and and read this and you know he kept on me you know followed the bed of my mind to some extent you know and i was interested in something and you know occasionally he'd say do you know read very carefully do i even say and uh so next time i read a text he directed me to you know he made sure i was really knowing it right and then deconic was much more careful right than work than sirik was right and then dian you have more fear of dian you know so you kind of move up you know but i got in the right order right you know i think it would have been it could have been if he had dian fresher would be a little bit you know it was yeah it uh it uh sure come with it was just his intensity you know huh yeah he'd see something you know huh that i'd think about for a week or something you know something he said you know what do you see you know he's so excited but it's interesting to see even deconics of great great humility in front of dian you know you know respect for him i i i rented a place you know i stayed right across the deconics house you know and sometimes i see dian coming up there to talk to dian you know so and dian stopped in front of the deconics house and we walked back and forth just thinking out something like that you know and realized i could just say hello and walk on right on in case of any conversation you know sometimes they kind of could ask dian to make a logical analysis of some little text you know so we're up to article 4 now is it What would it be like to have Thomas as a teacher? It would have been interesting, huh? Because apparently he was well-received in Paris, that's what they say, you know. He was regarded as the teacher of the teachers, right? I was reading Thomas an article the other day there where the one man understands better than another man. It's so funny to see Thomas. He's such a good example of one man understands better than another man, right? Yeah. I read that he responded something like that the great grace he received was that he never, he always understood what he read. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. I remember Deconic quoting some contemporary, you know, saying, UFO de passé, Saint-Thomas, you know. Deconic said, well, fine if he can do it, he said. There was supposed to be a time when Augustine appeared to Thomas, you know. I'd be interested to see those two guys go at it together. Was it Peter and Paul? Yeah, yeah. Paul did, you know. Paul and Thomas can actually never believe who it was. To the fourth one proceeds thus, it seems that sin is not a cause of sin, right? For there are four genera, four kinds of causes, huh? Where did we learn that? Of which none is, what? Able to fit that sin is a cause of sin, right? For the end has the notion of something good, as Aristotle himself, the man who distributes the four kinds of causes says, right? Which does not belong to sin, which of its very definition is bad. For the same reason, sin cannot be a, what? Cause, efficient cause. Because evil is not an efficient cause. But it's infirm and impotent, as Dionysus says, huh? Imagine if you don't understand that issue, you'll say, how naive can he be, you know, when he sees Hitler and Stalin and how many, you know, legions of the Pope have and so. And the material cause and the formal cause seem to have place only in natural bodies, right? Which are composed of matter and form, huh? Therefore, sin is not able to have a material cause and a formal cause, huh? So this is one way we sojize, the either-or sojism, I call it, huh? Disjunctive sojism is the technical word for it, but I call it the either-or sojism. So you go through all the four kinds of causes and one of them fits, so. Moreover, it belongs, right, to make or do something similar to oneself or a perfect thing, right? You can reproduce yourself, right? As is said in the fourth book of the Neurology, that's in Aristotle's book. But sin, of its very notion, is something, what? Imperfect, huh? Therefore, sin is not able to be a cause of sin, huh? I mentioned how my, one of my modern philosophy teachers here at Laval, he said they call Descartes the father of man's philosophy, but he doesn't really have any sons, because they all do their own thing, right? But it's like you're saying here, right? You don't have any sons, only the perfect can have a son, right? And it's only when plants or animals, you know, reach their perfect age, so to speak, right? That they can reproduce, right? So if sin is, by its very notion or definition, something imperfect, right, how can it reproduce itself, right? How can it be the father of another sin, right, huh? These are marvelous arguments, huh? I just wish I could cut off that part and just feed it to you, you know? Have to wait till tomorrow, you know, and see if you really thought about those objections, right? I told you I had that thing that I couldn't solve when I was an undergraduate. My teacher, Cassari, couldn't solve it. And then I was reading Thomas, and I was going to a lecture with Dionne. I put two and two together, and I had the answer. I said, but after 10 years, you know, I said, I better check with Dionne. So I came down and I said, I perceived a nice order, he started out, and Dionne said, I know where you're going. And I said, well, damn it, can I go there? He, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he He, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he He, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he, he The answer should be said that since sin has a cause on the side of what? Act, not only on the side of the disorder, right? But in this way, one sin can be the cause of another, just as one human act is able to be the cause of what? Another, right? Now it happens that one sin to be the cause of another according to the four general causes. I should be weeping at this son because this is a four now rather than a three, right? You know? So much for breakfast, right? His idae fixeis, huh? I should joke about that because with the first Greek natural philosophers, matter seems to be the only kind of cause, right? And you get the great Pythagoras and you get the cause called form, right? So that's two kinds of causes, right? And finally you get Empedocles, right? And now you get three kinds of what causes, huh? Because he has earth, air, fire, and water, and so on, the material cause, and then he has ratios, just like he takes from Pythagoras, right? And then he has love and hate, love that brings them together and hate that separates them. So he's got three kinds of causes, the matter, the form, and the mover, right? And I say, now, isn't that enough? And that's three. And I'll say, no, it's got to be a fourth kind of cause, right? Right, huh? So even Aristotle himself doesn't always stop at three, right? So much for breakfast, huh? His rule of two or three. We can dispense with him now. Yeah. Of course, when you divide the causes... You usually divide them into what? Yeah, sometimes they'll divide them into two. They'll say the inward causes, which are matter and form, and the outside causes, which are the mover and the in, right? And sometimes, you know, they'll divide them into not two and two, but one and three, right? Because they'll divide a form and mover and in against what? Because matter is based upon what? Potency or ability in the passive sense. But form is act, and agent acts insofar as it's an act, and act is the end of ability, right? So those three are based upon act, right? And that's the division we use when we talk about God and what way God is a cause, right? Because God being pure act can be a cause in the sense of end and mover or maker, and even form in the sense that he's still an exemplar, right? But in no way can he be the matter out of which things are made, right? So there you divide, but you divide it into two, right, to understand that, right? You divide them into two. But sometimes we divide them into two and two, right? So in that sense, we still follow the rule of two or three, right? And we try to understand these four. The same when you get to the four kinds of opposites, right? Thomas, when he divides, takes up the four kinds of opposites, like in the fifth book of wisdom, he'll divide relative opposites against the other three. And you can't have the first three in God at all, right? Because it involves some, what, none being, right? Especially, you know, contradiction and privation or lack involved, none being. But even one of the contraries is lacking in comparison to the other. So you can't distinguish the father and the son by any of those three kinds of opposites because then one would be having none being, right? And so you divide the one against the other three, right? But you do that even, you know, in terms of philosophy because one relative posits the other relative, right? I can't be a father without having a son, you know? I can't be a teacher without having a student. I can't be a friend without having a friend, you know? So I'm positing the one that I'm being distinguished from, right? So sometimes we divide four into two and two and sometimes into one and three and sometimes we do both, right? Sometimes they divide the causes too. They'll put matter with the mover against form in the end because form is like the end of generation, right? And the matter and the mover or maker are before in being, right? But the others are more perfect, you know? So there's a couple ways you divide them into two and two, right? So in order to really penetrate these things, you've got to eventually divide into two or three to understand the division into more than three, right? So I still hold on a little bit to my stubborn... So we won't dismiss you entirely. Yeah, yeah, yeah. And Thomas gives a supreme example of that when he distinguishes the ten categories, right? Because he divides them into three and then he subdivides some of them into two or three again until it gets down to all ten, right? But he doesn't try to understand the division to ten by one division, right? Aristarchus numerates to ten, you know? By ten, first thing it does. First thing it does. It's the standard way to divide two or two. You know, when I was in Austria there, you know, talking about the other system, you know? What's on our system, you know? How do you transcribe, you know, into ours, you know? What's the real temperature on? I was thinking about the word... Well, I may not go into this before I distract you, but you have the word point. Remind me of the word point, you know. That's the interesting thing about it. Okay, we just finished with the great Gregory, right? Now we go to responde, all right? It can happen that one sin to be the cause of another according to the four January clauses. Now he's going to do what? Explain it one by one, right? Okay. First, according to the mode of an efficient or mover clause, right? Both, what, per se and perachidens, huh? Perachidens as the removens, prohibens, huh? That's the way they describe them at the end. What removes the thing that prevents something, right, huh? It's said to move perachidens, right, huh? I'll just talk examples as the guy who pulled the... Pull her down and then... Yeah, yeah. So do you make the ceiling come down or did the gravity make it? Well, per se, it's the gravity or something, right? But in removing the prohibens, removing the pillar, it's the cause of the roof coming down, huh? So he's the cause of the roof coming down, huh? This is one of the external causes that Aristoteles distinguished, huh? They're removens, prohibens, and so. So for Aristoteles, you know, the reason why the stone goes down to the ground is because it has an inclination to go down, right? But if you have something holding it up, right, but if you have something holding it up, right, the one who removes that thing that holds it up is the cause of its going down, not per se, but parachidens, right, huh? But this is a very important cause, nevertheless, even though it's an accidental cause, huh? Removens, prohibens, huh? What happened? They took the Baltimore Catechism out of the instruction, you know? Ignorance, ignorance. Yeah, that's right. Since through one act of sin, a moral sin, right, a man loses what? Grace or charity, or shame, yeah, or whatever other there is, withdrawing one or holding one back from sin, right, huh? He falls from this into another what? Sin. And thus, the first sin is a cause of second, parachidens, right? Parachidens, parachidens, parachidens, parachidens, parachidens, parachidens, parachidens, parachidens, parachidens, parachidens, parachidens, parachidens, parachidens, parachidens, parachidens. Parachidens, parachidens, parachidens, parachidens, parachidens, parachidens. Kind of directly, parachidens, parachidens, parachidens, parachidens, parachidens, parachidens, parachidens, parachidens, parachidens, parachidens. You know, which often is about congregating wealth, right, or about wealth that have been brought together, okay? So I suppose I say eating too much is a cause of lust or something, too, right? Preparing the matter in the sense of it, yeah. That's removents, prohibents, right? That too, yeah. Yeah, yeah. I was rereading Basel's Life of Johnson, you know, they're talking about the effect of wine upon a man, the interesting conversations that they have. According to the genus of a final cause, one sin is to cause another, insofar as for the sake of the end of one sin, one commits another sin, right? That's great. Just as one commits, what, sinning on account of the end of, what, ambition. You want your family to be prominent, right? Or fornication on account of, what, theft. So you're committing one sin in order that you might commit another sin, right? So I might steal the jewels to impress the woman. I might give them to her so I can seduce her, right? Well, then my destruction of the woman is a cause of my stealing the jewels, right? Or I want to pick her up in a nice car so I steal a good, beautiful car. So I'm like stealing the car instead of, you know, so you can see the woman or something. And because the end gives the form in moral matters, as has been said above, right? From this it follows that one sin is the formal cause. Now that's kind of an extension there. I could speak of charity as being the form of the virtues, right? For in the act of fornication, which is, what, committed on account of theft. Fornication is material, but the theft is, what, formal, huh? What's the example there of Falstaff, right? Of course, the legend is that Queen Elizabeth, she liked, you know, the representation of Falstaff in the Henry plays, right? And so she said to Shakespeare she wanted to play, you know, a Falstaff in love, you know? So that's why he's supposed to have written, you know, the Mary Wives of Windsor, right? You know, the command, so to speak, of request of Queen Elizabeth, right? But if Falstaff is making these proposals, right, to the Mary Wives of Windsor, what is it to get their, what, money, right? So he's committing fornication for the sake of stealing from their monies that their husbands have accumulated, right? In that case, the sin is, what, materially fornication, but, yeah, yeah, but formally it's, yeah, see? But, you know, you could speak of that more as the end, right? So Thomas is, that's even, in a way, you can call that's the form, right, huh? And so in a sense, it's all four clauses, right? It gets none of these things, of course, because they play tricks a lot each time. That's why they're very wise of Windsor, right, huh? One of the good-natured comedies of Shakespeare, right? It's a great, great comedy. In a sense, you know, you can see what Shakespeare does, and what Mozart does in The Marriage of Figaro, right? For the lustful man is made, what, ridiculous, right? And this is kind of the way in which it's appropriate for the dramatists to inculcate virtue, right? In a sermon, you wouldn't do that, do you see? But, you know, a play should not really be a sermon, right? So it should move the emotions in a way so that you, by laughing at the lustful man, you are kind of being, what, inclined a bit towards virtue, right? So he says, you know, Thomas says, it belongs to the poet, to a pseudo-representation, you know, to lead men into something, what, virtuous, right? And in Mozart, in The Marriage of Figaro, the Count is trying to get the maidenhead, you may say, of Susanna, and Susanna, of course, is in the hoots with the wife of the Count to avoid this, right? And when there's an assignation to meet her in the garden, right? The Countess substitutes for, so he's holding the hand of his wife and raving about her smooth flesh and so on, you know, her youthfulness, you know. It's really his wife who's somewhat, you know, older now. And of course, you have to go down, you know, and ask forgiveness of the Countess, you know. So it's a beautiful, beautiful thing, you know. But I mean, this is the kind of way it's proper, you know, for the, you know, Mozart or Shakespeare, you know, to lead us into something virtuous in the way they do, right? Paul VI said, the artist, he said, you have a kind of advantage over the preacher, because the preacher is always like the brothers there, mourning and scolding and blaming, whereas the artist, he says, he can reduce people to desire what's good or not. Yeah, yeah, yeah. That's why, you know, it'll stress me, right, huh? You know, as my old teacher, the servant said, you know, you can tell a good teacher when he, what examples he gives, right? Well, in, the Pope there, this is before his Pope, you know, he lived very short on it, the 1st John, Paul I. But he said that after reading Edikosan, one is anything but enthusiastic about incest. It's a clear example, though, you know. I mean, you couldn't, you know, it's a horrible tragedy, right? I remember there's, when I was reading some of the Elizabethan plays, you know, there's one where you have a brother and a sister, right, who are engaged sexually, right, huh? And, you know, it just turns out just absolutely horrible at the end, you know, you know, the brother's got the sister's heart in his sword. It's just horrible, you know, so it's, it's not a pretty great play, but it's even not inclined to want to get involved with your sister, you know. I mean, it's just, you know, that's what it belongs, you know, to good dramatists to do this, right? I mean, certainly, you know, we were watching it at my brother's, my son's house there, the Merchant of Venice, right, you know, he spent the night before I left, and then up to about 10.30 or something, at least watching the thing, and, of course, you know, you can't, you're not really being inclined to sympathize with the Jew, right, huh? Because he's not being kind, right? And then, of course, the things are turned on him, you know, and Graziano's making fun of him now, right? You know, you'll get the law, you know, the law says, you know, you take only your flesh and no more nor less, you know, and no blood, you know, if you're not giving any, any, and so he's kind of outwitted, you know, things, and so on. That's an incredible subtlety that Shakespeare has. Okay, now, so what I would do, you see, is then, you know, if I'd up in each of those four things, right? But notice the order that Thomas gives there, right? He starts off with the efficient cause, right? And he goes to what? Material cause, and then to the end, and finally to the form. But there you're kind of thinking the efficient in the matter first, and then the end in the form, second, together. To the first, therefore, it should be said that sin, insofar as it is disordered, has the definition of something, what? Bad. But insofar as it is a certain act, it has something, what? Good, right? At least appearing for an end, right? And therefore, on the side of the, what, act, there can be a cause, both, what? Final and effect of another sin, although not on the side of the, what, disorder, right? Matter, however, the sin, however, has a matter, not from which, but about which, right? When we speak of the matter of the science, right? That is about which. The form it has from its end, right? And therefore, according to the four generative causes, there can be a cause of sin, as has been said. So what would you do if you didn't know the four kinds of causes of what Thomas did? You can see how philosophy is a, what, preambulum, right? Walks before theology, you know? What about this second objection here, right? The only perfect thing, right? To the second, it should be said that sin is imperfect by its moral imperfection, right? On the side of the, what, disorder. Disorder. But on the side of the act, it can have the perfection of nature. Fornication, right? You have the perfection of nature there, right? It can lead to another person, right? And according to this, it can be a cause of sin, right? That's beautiful. Applied in the objection, right? It's kind of interesting the way that Thomas teaches you because the objections make you think, you know, that's how you're going to solve them. But when the solution of the objection uses something that's been seen in the body of the article, right? It's like you're reinforced and seeing it from a little different angle and so on. It sticks in the mind more, huh? Now what about the third objection? That sin is a cause of sin and a sin is a sin? We said to the third it should be said that not every cause of sin is a sin. Once it's not necessary that one proceed ad infinitum, right? But one can arrive at some first sin, right? Whose cause is not a, what, another sin. So what's the sin of Adam and Eve, right? The sin of Eve, does that take a little break now? The sin of Eve, does that take a little break now? The sin of Eve, does that take a little break now? The sin of Eve, does that take a little break now? The sin of Eve, does that take a little break now? The sin of Eve, does that take a little break now? notice the way we speak sometimes right suppose somebody is you know uh that's negative thinking about the world right now and what does it mean if you say you know the world is pointless what does that mean yeah yeah yeah that's interesting right and we say you know um what's your point you know so we do use the word point for what end in the sense of purpose right so when aristotle gives the word in there in the fifth book of wisdom right the first meaning of end is the point is the end of the line right the line is the end of the surface the surface is the end of a body that's that's the first meaning of end right and then he he moves it you know to um the end of what motion right and um and then he moves it to the end of thinking which is the definition because definition comes the word into phinis and then finally to the end of intention which is the purpose right that's the fourth meaning right so when we say you know what's your point or the world is pointless uh um uh or is that pointless activity you know uh we move the word point from its first meaning in a line to what um to the last meaning of end which is so it shows how natural what aristotle has done is there right it's natural to move the word from one to the other right and um you know i often think of of the um beginning of the gospel of saint john right and in english it says in the beginning was the word right the word was towards god and so on and so the word logos which is the greek word there is translated by the word word right okay now you say um so you might say well the word logos in greek has many meanings right and is the meaning of the word logos their word or is the meaning of the word logos their thought well someone could say well the meaning is thought it's not it's not the word um so some might argue well then we've translated and corrected right you see but in translating it word you can say that we are forced in a sense in english to what go over again right the order in the greek word right so we have to move the word word to what the meaning thought right you see if you want to understand you know the word that is was in the beginning right um um so and in one sense it's good to be translated as word right because then we're forced to right see just like if i translated the word end by point well that's not the meaning point it's purpose you know uh that one context i mean you know you know the yeah i actually take the students i'd say you know uh happiness is the end of life the end of life is death therefore happiness is death what's wrong with the argument i'd say you know well you're confusing the that second sense of end that aristotle gives with the fourth sense right then so um you know but really you have to at some time the word right so when shakespeare says you know what i'm always quoting from fire lawrence right he votes from true birth stumbling on abuse what does true birth mean there right does it mean birth in the sense of the original no it means the fourth sense of the last sense of birth which is the nature thing right you revolt from your true nature stumbling on what abuse you know but shakespeare's moved it from his first to the last right i'm saying in common speech it seems to me that we've moved the word point you know uh when i say this is pointless you know you know or there are people you know think the world's point that has no purpose you know somebody's spirits like that they're using the word point to mean what the end they've since moved it to the last sense even okay time for their article