Prima Secundae
Lecture 195: Consent in Pleasure and the Morality of Sin

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Lower reason, huh? Deliberating through temporal reasons, right? Sometimes accepts this what? Pleasure, right? And then consent in pleasure pertains to what? Lower reasons, huh? If, however, considering eternal reasons, man perseveres in the same consent, right? Then such a consent pertains to what? Higher reason, right? It doesn't seem to be saying that it only takes place by consent to higher reason, right? That's really consent. And it should, you know, consult those things, but sometimes it does not. To the fourth, it should be said that the grasping of the imaginative power is sudden and without what? To liberation. And therefore, it can cause some act before higher or lower reason has the time of what? Yeah. But the judgment of lower reason is with some deliberation, huh? Which needs time. In which also, in which also, a higher reason is able to what? Deliberate. When Sif does not prevent from the act of sin to its deliberation, it is imputed to it, huh? Right. Thank you. Article 8. To the 8th, one goes forward thus. It seems that consent in pleasure is not a what? Mortal sin, right? For to consent in pleasure pertains to what? Yeah. Which is not to aim or pay attention to the eternal reasons or the divine law, and consequently neither to be what? Away from them. But every mortal sin is by turning away from the divine law, as is clear to the definition of Augustine, given of mortal sin. Therefore, consent in pleasure is not a what? Mortal sin, eh? For to consent in something is not bad, except because that is bad in what one consents, right? That's clear enough, huh? Sin. That's their favorite phrase. Yeah. And it kind of lets each thing and that more and that more, or at least not less. Therefore, that in which one consents, right, is able to be what? A lesser evil than the consent itself. But pleasure without the deed is not a mortal sin, but venia only. Therefore, neither consent in pleasure is what? A mortal what? Sin, huh? Moreover, pleasures differ in goodness and badness, according to the difference of what? Operations. As the philosopher says in the 10th book of the Ethics, right? Aristotle takes up pleasure before he takes up what? Happiness is final consideration. But other is the interior thinking, right? The apparition. And another, the exterior act, as an example of fornication. Therefore, also, the pleasure of falling upon the act of interior thinking, so much differs from the pleasure of fornication in goodness or badness, as interior thinking differs from the exterior act. And consequently, also, in the same way, it differs to consent in both. But the interior thinking is not a mortal sin. Therefore, neither is a consent in that what? Thinking. Therefore, consequently, neither consent in the what? Pleasure, right? Christ answers that one very directly. That one very directly answers. Moreover, the exterior act of fornication or adultery is not a mortal sin by reason of the pleasure, which is also found in the matrimonial act, but by reason of the disorder of the act itself. But the one who consents in the pleasure, not on account of this, consents in the disorder of the act. Therefore, it does not seem to be mortally sin. It would take somebody like St. Thomas to think of a reason. Moreover, the sin of homicide is more grave than that is simple fornication. But to consent in the pleasure which follows thinking about homicide is not a mortal sin. Oh, I couldn't put that in one. I think of these ISIS people all day and these heavy people all day. Therefore, much less is it to consent in the pleasure which follows the thought about fornication or a mortal sin. It's a really good confession. It's a good confession. Yeah, yeah. They do the seminaries and they give lessons on hearing confession, you know. One of the philosophers there in my brother Richard's department there said, going to a priest under 30 is just not worth it, you know. You've got to get an old guy, you know. He's been around for a while. Well, moreover, the Lord's prayer is said daily, right, for the omission of what? Sins, as Augustine says, huh? The gospel text this morning was the one on prayer there in Luke, right, huh? Which is not as complete, the prayer, as the one in the Sermon on the Mount, right, huh? I got thinking about it because it had held to be thy name, I think, and thy kingdom come, but not thy will be done, right? They went to, you know, to give us our daily bread, right? Let that one out. Anyway. But consent and pleasure, Augustine teaches, to be abolished by the Lord's prayer, right? To say it for these sins. For he says in the 12th book of the Trinity that this is what? Much less a sin, right? Than if it was what? Yeah. That you set it down, right? Yeah. Stated to be thought. And therefore about such thoughts, venia, forgiveness, should be asked, huh? And pectus quae, recudiendum, right? At quae dicendum dimite nobis divita nostra, right? Their consent and pleasure is a venial sin, huh? Ah, we're going to quote Augustine again, right? Augustine against Augustine. But against this is what Augustine says, after a little while, that the whole man is what? Yeah. Unless these things, which without the will of doing, right, nevertheless with the will of what? Yeah. To be sins of thought alone, right? To be, what? Remitted. Forgiven. For the grace of the beauty. But no one is damned except for mortal sin. Therefore consent in pleasure is a mortal sin, right? I think most people who are saved go to purgatory. I was at a funeral there a few years ago, you know, where the son got back to work, you know, and asked us to pray for his father, right? You know, because you don't know what, you know, this thing is. And, you know, people say, oh, I'm so glad he's, you know, out of his suffering, you know. Maybe he's suffering more. More than he did here. Yeah. Yeah. You know, the priest in the parish there said to my mother, you know, after my father died, never stop praying for him because we don't know when they get out, you know. There's too much of this, you know. Yeah. I don't know if my father died because he said, well, his suffering is over. I said, I said, I hope so. That's what, I heard this really, I think, irresponsible remark. There's a girl out in California, and I talked about this brain, brain death. Happened about a year ago. She had some surgery in the company. She's only 13 years old. And they declared her brain dead. All the other issues. She's a death certificate, the whole nightmare. But she's still on the ventilator for almost a year now. And mother refuses to pull the plug. And they've got videos now. She's moving. Mother tells her to move her hand. She's moving. Anyways, but some priest got on Fox News. He's sort of a talking head for the Catholic opinions on things. And he asked him about it. And he just, he said, well, the doctor said she's dead. Therefore, she's in heaven now. And I said, well, first of all, that's a presumption about the state of soul. But her body is alive. I mean, it's there. And the fact is, the surgery she had, she's healed from. Corpses don't... and, and, and, but it's just so, it's just so irresponsible, because the doctor said it, therefore, it's, it's, uh, impalable or something, yeah, the more I learn about this brain death thing, the more, if I'm brain dead, don't pull the plug, we have some interesting articles in the movie, brain, brain, brain, well, they used to be playing with brain death, it's just like Martin's daughter, that seems to be, that's pretty much, that's pretty much, it seems to be what Father Tad, what's his name, said, what's it, brain dead, according to what's commonly said, he's really brain injured, it's like they're handicapped, they're not really dead, because the body's doing things that if they were, if the brain was really dead, according to what John Paul said, they wouldn't be, they'd be just decomposing in a day, but it's just that Christian Martin, because the doctor said she's in, therefore, she's in heaven, that doesn't even make sense, that it makes sense. Answers should be said that about this, some have opined, diversely, for some, right, say, right, that consent in pleasure is not a mortal sin, but being your only, others say, that it is a mortal sin, and this opinion is more common, and more like the truth, right? It should, however, it should, however, be considered that since every pleasure follows some operation, as is said in the Tenth Book of the Ethics, and again, since every pleasure has some object, right, any pleasure can be compared to two things, right? 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Sometimes pleasure following one operation as, for example, somewhat thought has for an object another what? Operation as were a thing thought about, right? And then the such a pleasure proceeds from the inclination of the desiring power not in the thinking itself but in the operation thought about, huh? Thus, therefore, someone thinking about fornication can be pleased about two things, huh? In one way about the thinking itself in one way about the thinking itself in another way about the fornication being thought of. Now, the pleasure about the thinking itself follows the inclination of the affections, right? In the thinking itself. Now, the thinking itself by itself is not a mortal sin, right? In the thinking itself by itself is not a mortal sin, right? In the thinking itself by itself is not a mortal sin, right? In the thinking itself is not a mortal sin, right? In the thinking itself is not a mortal sin, right? In the thinking itself is not a mortal sin, right? 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And nevertheless, lower reason is able to be turned away from the eternal reasons, right? Because although it does not intend or aim at them, that it should be ruling according to them, right? Because that's proper to superior or higher reason, right? It intends nevertheless, right, that it be ruled according to them, right? And in this way, turning itself away from them, it can sin, what? Mortally. For the acts of the lower powers and even of the exterior members, right, can be mortal sins, according as they lack the order of higher reason, huh? Ruling them according to the eternal, what? Reason, huh? To the second, it should be said that consent in sin that is venial from its genus, right, is a, what? Venial sin, huh? And according to this, it can be concluded that consent in the pleasure, which is of the vain thought of fornication, is a venial sin. It's a little kind of strange what he's saying. But the pleasure which is in the very act itself of fornication, right? So that is about the vain thought of fornication, not the thing itself, right? But pleasure which is in the very act itself of fornication is of its, what? Genus, a mortal sin, right? But before consent, it is a venial sin only, right, huh? This is the only prejudice in account of the imperfection of the act, right? Which imperfection is taken away through the deliberate, what? Consent coming upon it. Whence from this it has led in to its own nature that it be a, what? Mortal sin, huh? Now the third objection. That argument proceeds from the pleasure which has thinking for its object, huh? To the fourth, it should be said that the pleasure which has the exterior act for its object cannot be without the, what? Agreement, you might say, huh? Of the exterior act according to itself, huh? Or by itself. Even if it not be established to be fulfilled on account of the prohibition of something higher. Whence the act becomes disordered and the, what? Consequently, the pleasure itself will be, what? Disordered, right, huh? You know, the question about pleasure, you know, is pleasure is such bad, right, huh? Well, if it's bad, let's say, to torture people, let's say. Then would pleasure in torturing people be something bad to follow, right, huh? Pleasure, in a sense, joins to the thing even more than desire for it does, huh? Because pleasure is in the presence of the thing, right? But taking pleasure in torture is even worse than wanting to torture. Because you're more joined to the bad act, huh? To the fifth, it should be said that also consent in the pleasure which proceeds from, what? Being pleased with the thought of his immortal sin, right, huh? But not the consent in the pleasure which proceeds from being pleased with the thought of what he was, right? To the sixth, it should be said that the Lord's Prayer should be said only against venial sins, but also against mortal sins, huh? A little break here now, let's see. Let's see. Let's see. goes forward thus. It seems that in higher reason, there cannot be a venial sin, according as it directs the lower what powers. That is, according as it consents in the act of what sin. For Augustine says in the 12th book of the Trinity, that higher reason adheres to what? The eternal reasons. But to sin mortally is by what? Eternal reasons. Therefore, it seems that in superior reason, there cannot be a what? Sin, except one that is what? Mortal. Moreover, higher reason has itself in the spiritual life as it were a what? Beginning. Just as the heart in the bodily life. But the infirmities of the heart are mortal. Therefore, the sin of higher reason are what? Mortal. Moreover, venial sin becomes mortal if it comes about from, by contempt. But this does not seem to be without contempt that someone from deliberation sins even what? Venially, huh? Since therefore the consent of higher reason always is with the deliberation of the divine law, it seems there cannot be, it cannot be without mortal sin on account of this contempt of the what? Divine law. So saying an outer word involves contempt of the divine. Maybe in a state of justice. Against this, huh? Consent in the act of sin pertains to higher reason. But consent to an act of venial sin is a what? Venial sin. And therefore, in higher reason, there can be venial sin. It should be said, I answer, that as Augustine says in the 12th book of the Trinity, higher reason adheres to the eternal reasons, to looking at them right and consulting them right. We mentioned the difference between those two right. One is looking at them for their own sake, so to speak. And the other is consulting them to direct and rule the Lord, right? Okay. And then Thomas explains it here. Well, you know. Just saw another text where he's doing the same thing. One, conspiciendis, huh? According as one looks at their what? Their truth, right? Consulting according as through the eternal reasons one judges about others and orders about others, right? To which it pertains that deliberating through the eternal reasons one consents in some act or one descents from it, huh? But it happens that the disorder of the act in which one consents is not contrary to the eternal reasons because it is not with turning away from the last end, as is what? Contrary the act of immortal sin, huh? But it is what? Apart from them as the act of a venial sin, right? Whence when higher reason consents to the act of a venial sin, not turning away from the eternal reasons. Whence is not sin mortally, but what? Venially. And through this is clear the answer to the first, right? To the second should be said that twofold is the infirmity of the heart. One which is in the very substance of the heart and changes the natural complexion of it. And such infirmity is mortal. Another is the infirmity of the heart in account of some disorder, either of its what? Motion or something of those things which stand around the heart. And such infirmity is not always mortal. And likewise, in superior reason, there always is a mortal sin. When it is taken away, right? The very order of superior reason to its own object, which is eternal reasons. But when there is a disorder about this, it is not a mortal sin, but what? Venial. The third should be said that a deliberate consent in sin does not always pertain to contempt of the divine law, but only when the sin is contrary to the, what? Divine law. So I can say an outer word then? Is it to say an outer word? You said Alphonsus is saying venial sins. They don't have to confess. But when they officially confess it, and they never approve, he says, don't give them absolution first because they don't need it. Or the venial sin you can get out of. But why confess if you're not doing anything about it? Why bother to confess if you don't have to confess, but you're not doing anything about it? You need to admit that you change your attitude. It's a subtle point, but it's not a point. To the intent one goes forward thus, it seems that in higher reason, There cannot be a venial sin according to itself, that is, according as it looks upon the what? Looks into the eternal reasons. For an act of a power cannot be found to be deficient, except through this that it has itself in a disordered way about its own object. But the object of the superior or higher reason are the eternal reasons, from which to be disordered is not without mortal sin. Therefore, in higher reason, there cannot be a venial sin according to itself, by itself. Moreover, since reason is a deliberative power, the act of reason is always with deliberation. But in every disordered motion in those things which are of God, if it be with deliberation, it's a mortal sin. Therefore, in higher reason, by itself, there never is, what, venial sin. Moreover, it happens sometimes that sin, from what? Suddenly, is a venial, what, sin. But a sin from deliberation is a mortal sin. Through this, that reason deliberating runs back to some greater good, right, against which the man acting gravely sins. Just as about a delectable act, a disordered delectable act, reason deliberates that it is against the law of God, he more gravely sins by consenting than if he only considered that it is against, what, more virtue. But superior reason cannot run back to something higher than its own object. Therefore, if it be moved suddenly, it is not a mortal sin, neither will the, what, the deliberation coming upon it make it to be a mortal sin, which is clearly to be false. Therefore, in higher reason, by itself, there can be, there cannot be a, what, a venial sin. But against this, the motion of sudden infidelity is a venial sin, but it pertains to superior reason, by itself. Therefore, in superior reason, there can be a venial sin, according to itself, right? Yeah, yeah, kind of a sudden thing, right? I answer it should be said that higher reason is a different way carried to its object, and otherwise in the, what, object of the lower powers, which are directed by it. In the objects of the lower powers, it is not carried except in so far as it consults about them, it consults the eternal reasons about them, right? Whence is not carried in them except by the motion of, what, by way of deliberation. Now, a deliberate consent in those things which are in their genus are mortal is a, what, mortal sin. And therefore, higher reason, always mortally sins, if the acts of the lower powers in which it consents are mortal sins. But about its own object, it has two acts, to wit, simple understanding or looking into, and, what, deliberation, according as even about its own object, it consults the, what, yeah. Now, according to some pletium intuitum, I like these words, intuition, so, looking into, according to some understanding, it can have some, what, about divine things, eh? As when it undergoes a subitum, a sudden motion of infidelity, eh? I think the devil likes to do that, you know, some of us talking about that, you know. I just think the rising issues, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Who's, you know, those, those guys who had some doubt about the real presence and so on, right, eh? It probably arises sometimes, eh? And although infidelity, according to its, what, genus is a mortal sin, right? Nevertheless, the sudden motion of infidelity is a, what? Because the mortal sin is not except, what, of God. But it can be that some thing of those things that pertain to faith, by a sudden reason, occur under some other, what, reason. Before one takes counsel about this, right? Or is able to consult the eternal reason as the law of God, right? As in someone considers suddenly that the resurrection of the dead is impossible according to, what, nature. And at the same time apprehending, he, what, checks this before he has time to pray that this is treated for us, or handed over to us, is to be believed according to the divine law. If however, act is to liberation, the motion of infidelity remains. It is a peccato mortale, right? It's kind of an obstinate, right? Disbelief, huh? And therefore, about its own object, although it is a mortal sin ex genera, nevertheless, higher reason can sin venially in sudden motions, right? Or it can also sin mortally, the way, what? Yeah. Okay. In those things, however, which pertain to the lower powers, it always sins mortally in those things which are mortal sins from their genus. Not, however, in those things which according to their genus are. To the first thereof, it should be said that a sin that is against the eternal reasons, although it is a mortal sin next genera, from its genus, it can be nevertheless a venial sin in account of the imperfection of the, what? Is that an act, huh? So saints undergo that too, didn't they? What do you think of? To the second it should be said that in operativi sedrationum, to which pertains deliberation, pertains the simple, what? Looking into of those things from which deliberation proceeds, as also in speculative things, to reason it pertains both to, what? Syllogize and to form propositions. And therefore also reason can have a, what? Yeah. What's he saying there? It's kind of a thing. One doesn't always deliberate, right? So there's a simple movement there. To the third it should be said that one and the same thing can be had according to, what? But one can have diverse considerations, of which one is higher than the other. Just as God is able to be considered, either insofar as he's knowable by human reason, or insofar as he's believed by written divine revelation, which is a higher consideration. And therefore, although the object of higher reason is something according to nature, or the thing most high, nevertheless it can be reduced in somewhat. And for this reason, what is in a sudden motion will not be immortal sin. But being reduced by deliberation to a higher consideration becomes a, what? Yeah. So you might be considering it according to. Well, that's your consideration, right? Kind of puzzled by it. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm.