Prima Secundae
Lecture 173: The Gifts of the Holy Spirit and Their Distinction from Virtues

Transcript
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I guess at the interior angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, right? Something imperfect in my big guess, right? But you can understand that theorem more and less, can't you? Well, love is like that, right? It's not by definition imperfect, right? And so your love can, what, grow, right? That's very interesting. Peradjudance, the habitants. You call it peradjudance because it's not the very definition of the thing, right? Now, to the second it should be said. This is the one saying, now, hey, don't you have to know in order to love, right? It's a different kind of knowledge, you've got a different kind of love. That seems to make sense, right? To the second it should be said that charity does not have for its object the knowledge itself. Because if that were so, it would not be the same on the road and in the, what, fatherland, right? But it has for its object the thing known, right? Which is the same with God, right? Yeah. So as the knowledge of God grows, the love could grow, right, huh? It would still be the same object, right? It's not the knowledge that is the object of the thing, but the thing known, right? So, you know, I know God a little bit from theology, right, huh? And I'm knowing the same thing that I'll know in heaven, right? And that's the first part of the definition. The first part of the definition of charity, I mean, of faith is what? The substance of things hoped for. I think it's upostasis, I think, in Greek, right? Which is etymologically like the word substance, right? So the translation of the substance is even etymologically closer than, you know, when you translate it as sia by substance, right? But substance and upostasis, they both have sub, or upo, under, and standing, yeah, yeah, yeah. So it's, why is it called the substance, right, of things hoped for, right, then? Yeah, yeah, yeah. Even though you're not knowing it as it is in itself, right? But you're knowing the same thing. But that's what he points out, right? Charity does not have for its object the same knowledge, the knowledge itself, rather. For if this were the case, then it would not be the same in the road and in, yeah, yeah. So I suppose the love of theology and the love of the Bittig Vision are not the same love exactly, right? Not loving the same knowledge, right? But the love of God would be the same, right? Because by theology, you're knowing the same thing you know in the Bittig Vision. Same God. Not the God of theology, God of the Bittig Vision, right? Two gods, huh? But it has for object the thing known itself, right? Which is the same, huh? To it, God, right? I think that's why you call it the substance of things hoped for, right, huh? It's already, in a sense, you have a foundation, right? You believe what you're going to see. So you believe the same thing you're going to see. To the third, it should be said that the charity of the road, huh, the VA, through growth, right, is not able to arrive at equality, right, of the charity of the fatherland, right? Why? On account of the difference, which is on the side of the, what? Cause. For vision is a cause of love, as is said in the Ninth Book of the Ethics, right? If you remember in the article on the question on the causes of love, right, the first cause was the good, right? Second cause was, what, knowledge? Third cause was, what, likeness, yeah, yeah. That's a beautiful, beautiful, good story there, right? So because the vision is a kind of knowledge, and it's so superior to the knowledge of, what, faith, right? Hence the cause of love. That's why the love is always greater in heaven, right? Than on the, what, road, huh? Okay. For God, the more perfectly he is known, the more perfectly he is, what? Loved, huh? So you'll never love God in this life as much as you'll love him when you, what, see him face to face, huh? It's very subtle to see that, huh? The knowledge is a cause of love, but yet it doesn't make it a different, what, charity, right, huh? But just a more, what, perfect charity, right, huh? A more perfect love of God, huh? And the saints talk tough to God sometimes, you know. I can't love you the way I should if you don't give me the vision. Give me the vision, huh? And I'll love you the way you should be allowed, you know. So let's go take a little break now, because starting a new question here on the gifts, whatever they are. They do this. Let's go take a little break. De Donis, huh? Question 68, huh? It's a little bit like in Aristotle, you know, when he gets through talking about the various virtues, the moral virtues and the virtues of reason. Then in the seventh book, right, he talks about things that are less and things that are more in human virtue. He invices them, you know, bestial vices, you know. And then he talks about heroic virtue, right, huh? It's interesting, you know. What is a hero in Greek fiction? Yeah, he's the one who has one parent who's immortal and one parent who's immortal. Sometimes the father is a god and sometimes it's the mother, you know. So for Achilles, it's his mother who's divine, right, huh? So heroic virtue, you know. And Thomas compares it just sometimes to heroic virtue, right, huh? It's something more than the human, what? The human virtue, right, huh? He takes up these things after the virtues, right? In the same way Aristotle takes up heroic virtue. Consequently, we're not to consider about the Donis, huh? And about this, eight things are asked, huh? Did you know that? Okay. And first is whether Dona, or gifts, right, differ from the virtues, right? Well, they do, and what is that difference though, right? Secondly, about the necessity of the gifts, right? Do you need the gifts in addition to the, what, virtues, huh? I'm afraid we do, huh? Third, whether the Dona are habitus, right? Because the virtues are habits, right? That's important, right? And finally, which and how many of them there are? I guess there are seven gifts, huh? Then the question that he asks about the virtues. Whether the gifts are, what, connected, right? Whether they remain in the patria, in the fatherland, huh? And about the comparison of them to each other, right? Some better, I suppose. And finally the comparison of them to the, what, virtues, huh? You can see how much man's perfection differs in perfection of God in terms of simplicity, right? Because you need all these different virtues, you know? And now you've got these gifts, too, you know? You say, oh my God, they've infused virtues and stuff. If I know these things, you know, just, you know, get around. And you need the angels, too, right? The angels, too, they do, yeah, yeah, yeah. I try to remind myself to call from that kind angel every time I drive in that car, I figure I'm getting too old to, you know, you know. The old men just, I think my friend Warren Murray, his first car, you know, they took away Grandpa's car because he came down to the intersection in the red light and he put on the gas pedal instead of the brake and shot through the thing. Unfortunately, he didn't hit anybody, but anybody ganged up on poor Grandfather. That was the end, you know, when he came up with the car, you know. He came up for independence, but. That was a brand new way. So Warren got his whole junky car, you know. The car wasn't in any too good condition either, which was the brakes. Boy, you put on the wrong, wrong thing, yeah. I know one of the relatives there, you know, the wife couldn't stay on the husband when he was driving since he got out of the car. Of course, he went off and smashed up the thing, you know, and. But not on purpose, but I mean, he just, you know, it goes into him, you know. So you never know. I'm going to take the car away from you, you know. They talk about, you know, I'm going to get more of a test, you know, to get your license, you know, renewed. You get to be old men like me, you know. So, so to the first one proceeds thus, huh? It seems that the gifts are not distinguished from the virtues, huh? For the great Gregory in the first book of the Moralia, expounding upon that of the book of Job, huh? There were born to him, what? Seven sons, huh? Seven are the sons born to us, right? When, through the, what, conception of good thought, right? The, what, seven virtues of the Holy Spirit arise in us, right? They call them virtues, right, huh? And he induces that which is had in Isaiah 11. There, what, rests upon him the spirit of understanding, and he goes through and enumerates the, what, seven gifts of the Holy Spirit, huh? Therefore, the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit are, what, virtues, huh? Gregory's a big guy, especially in Moralia, right? Thomas often goes through that, you know, the, the, the Mallow, right, huh? Capital vices and so on. Gregory really had a, really, really, understanding of moral theology, right? And other theology, too, but he really stands out, you know, as a, as a master there, right? And there comes another big name there, this guy Augustine, right? He's got to go to a lot, too. Moreover, Augustine says in the book on the questions of the Gospels, right? Expounding that which is had in Matthew chapter 12, verse 45. Then he went and took seven other spirits, right, huh? He says the seven vices, huh, are contrary to the seven, what, virtues of the Holy Spirit, right? That is the seven, what, gifts, huh? For there are seven vices contrary to the virtues commonly said. Therefore, the gifts are not distinguished from the virtues commonly said, right? Moreover, in those things of which the definition is the same, they also are, what, the same, huh? But the definition of virtue belongs to the gifts. For each gift is a, and this is the definition that he gave from Augustine of virtue earlier, right? Is a bona qualitas mentis, qua recti vivitor, which no one uses badly, right? Which God in us without us, right? That's the definition we had before. Likewise, the definition of gift belongs to the, what, infused virtues, right, huh? For a gift is a, what, a gift that is not to be returned, right, according to the philosopher. Therefore, the virtues and the gifts are not distinguished. What did Shakespeare teach us, right? He said looking before and after, he included, what, looking for distinctions, right? You know that from the axiom of before and after. Nothing is before or after itself, right? So there's always a distinction between what is before and what is after, right? So distinction is fundamental for a reason, right? This is a question about distinction, isn't it? I've got the name distinction and distinguished in the statement. Moreover, many of those that are enumerated among the gifts are virtues. For it's said above that wisdom and understanding and science are intellectual virtues, right? Counsel pertains to prudence, right? Piety is a species of what? Chess. Yeah. Chess the story is God. Fortitude is a moral virtue, right, huh? Therefore, it seems that virtues are not distinguished from what? Gifts. What did Aristotle say in the book on Cisic Refutations? The most common mistake in thinking is from mixing up the sense of the word, right? Maybe these words are, what? Equivocal when said of the moral virtues or the virtues of reason, when said of the, what? Yeah. Just like when Sophia said of a little lady I know, and wisdom, right? There's the equivocation there that just kind of caught me up, you know? Just delightful. Pleasing, yeah. Pleased you. Many times. But against this, now he's quoting Gregory against Gregory, right? But against this is what Gregory says in the first book of the Moralia. He distinguishes the seven gifts, which he says are signified through the seven what? Interesting, huh? He distinguishes them from the three theological virtues, right? Which he says ought to be signified through the three daughters of Job, huh? Okay. And in the second book of Moralia, he distinguishes the seven gifts from the four what? Cardinal virtues, which he says to be signified through the four what? Angles of the house, right? Yeah. What does the master say? The answer should be said that if we speak of the gift and virtue according to the ratio of the name, thus they have no opposition to each other, huh? It's strange, he says. Why? For the ratio of virtue is taken according as it perfects man for acting well, right? But the ratio of the doni, of the gift, is taken according to a comparison to the cause from which it is. So the gift is something that I give you, right? Expecting nothing in what? Return, right, huh? But the virtue is what makes its haver good and its activity good, right? So there's no opposition between those two, right? For nothing prevents that which is given by another, right, as a gift, right? To be perfective of something to operate well. That's what you have with the infused virtues, right? They're obviously given to us, right? It may be Dustin's definition of virtue there too, right? Especially when we say that the virtues, huh? That some virtues are infused in us from God, right? Right, huh? Whence, according to this, gift cannot be what? Yeah. As if the one perfects us into doing something and the other is a gift of God, they're not opposed. The same thing can be both of those things, right? So that doesn't really tell you what the difference is. If there is a difference, right? Which you don't know yet, huh? And therefore, quidam, right, huh? Lay down that gifts are not distinguished from the virtues, huh? But to these there remains a not, what? Lesser difficulty. That they assign the reason why some virtues are called gifts and not, what? All, right? And why some things are computed to be among the gifts, which are not, what? Counting among the virtues. Among the virtues, as is clear about fear, right? Okay. Whence others distinguish the gifts from the virtues, or whence others say that the gifts should be, ought to be, distinguished from the virtues, right? But they do not assign a suitable cause of the, what? Distinction, huh? Which thus is common to virtues that in no way is it common to the, what? Gifts. Or the reverse, huh? For some considering that among the seven gifts, four pertain to, what? Reason, huh? Wisdom, science. What do you call it? Knowledge in the translations we get usually? Knowledge, yeah. And intellectus would be understanding and counsel, right, huh? And three pertain to the appetitive power. Fortitude, piety, and what? Fear. They lay down that the gifts perfect free will according as is the faculty of reason, right? The virtues according as is the fact of the will. Because there are found only two virtues in reason or the understanding, to wit, faith, and prudence, huh? Others in the desiring power and effective power. But it would be necessary if this distinction were suitable, that all the virtues were in the desiring power and all the gifts in reason, right? Okay? Giving you quite a history here, right? Some considering that Gregory says in the second book of Moralia, that the gift of the Holy Spirit is in the mind, huh? Subject to it. Forms temperance, prudence, justice, and fortitude. Now those are the four, what? Correct. Convictures. The same mind it guards against, what? Singular temptations through the seven gifts. They say that the virtues are ordered to operating well, the gifts to existing temptations. That's kind of weird, right, huh? Like, the campus is to drink bodily, and the other gift is to avoid, to get excess. It's different with the same things that perfects you for both, right? But neither does this distinction suffice, huh? Because also the virtues, what? Resist temptations, right? That induce us to sin, right? Which are contrary to the virtues, right, huh? For each thing naturally resists, it's what? The contrary, which is especially clear about charity. About what you just said in Canicles chapter 8, many waters cannot extinguish charity. How are these things going to be distinguished, right, huh? You see the excellent times of his mind that he's going to see. Eventually, I'll bet he'll distinguish these, huh? Others, considering that these gifts are treated in Scripture, according as they were in, what? Christ. This is clear in Isaiah chapter 11. They say that the virtues are ordered simply to doing well, right? But the gifts are ordered to this, that by them we are conformed to Christ. Especially as regards those things which he suffered, right? Because in his passion, especially, these gifts are, what? Shaming. But this also does not seem to be sufficient. Because God himself, the Lord himself, especially induces us to, what? Conformity to him? According to humility and what? Learn from me because I am mild and humble heart. And according to charity, as his son in John 15. Love one another as I have loved you. And these virtues also especially shine forth in the passion of Christ, right? Greater love than this hath no man to lay down his life for his friends. And therefore, for distinguishing the gifts and the virtues, we have to follow the way of speaking of Scripture, in which there is tweeted for us, not under the name of gifts, right? But more under the name of what? Spirits. Yeah. Now, this might just be a whiskey bottle. Spirits. That's because you work on liquor store. You can get a dangerous material here. But notice the beautiful quote he has here. For that's what it is said in Isaiah's church. Chapter 11, there rested upon him the spirit of wisdom and understanding, etc., from which words manifestly is given to be understood that these seven are enumerated there, according as they are in us from divine inspiration, which is related to the word spirit, right? For inspiration signifies a certain motion from the outside. So if God inspires you to do something, right, it's coming from outside you, right, this inspiration. Now it should be considered that in man there is a two-fold moving beginning, right, mover beginning. One which is within him, right, which is reason. And another which is outside him, which is God, which has been said above, huh? And the philosopher also says this in the book on good fortune. It's amazing the way Aristotle, you know, says things that brings to our mind, huh? It's kind of amazing in the Edemian Ethics, you know, where Thomas goes to the text of Aristotle, Edemian Ethics, where he talks about how God actually moves our will and so on, huh? He has kind of an unmoved mover, you know, in the will as well as in the material world, huh? He's actually an incredible what Aristotle does all. He said, he said, he said, Aristotle is something, he's somebody. Now it is manifest that everything that is moved is necessarily proportioned to the, what, mover, huh? That's one of the corollaries Aristotle gives about causes, right? And this is the perfection of the mobile, the movable, insofar as it is mobile or movable, right? The disposition by which it is disposed for this, that it be moved well by its, what, mover, right? Now, the higher the mover, right, the more necessary is it that the mobile be, what, proportioned to it by a more perfect disposition. Just as we see that more perfectly is necessary for the student to be disposed for this, that he might grasp the higher teaching from the one who is the teacher, right? The one teaching. That's an interesting comparison, huh? That's why I was taught first by Kisurik, and then by De Kahnik, and finally by Dion, right? And I had them just in the right order, right? Because one was preparing the way for the next man, right? I was thinking of a material example, too, is just working with wood. If you have a master craftsman, he's got to have really good tools. Because he can't do as good a work as he's capable of doing it. He's supposed to kind of dull or follow it. Yeah. He won't be in a better disposal. Well, follow his motions, yeah. Something like something similar. Now, it's manifest that the human virtues, right, perfect man according as man is apt to be moved by reason, right? In those things which are within him, or he does outside, right? It's necessary, therefore, that there be in man higher perfections, according as he's disposed towards this, that he be moved, what? Divining. Divining, or by God. And these perfections are called, what? Gifts. Gifts, huh? Not only because they're infunded by God, like in the infused virtues, right, huh? But, because according to them, man is disposed that he might be promptly movable by divine, what? Inspiration. Inspiration, right? So John XXIII always insisted he was moved to call the Second Vatican Council, right? I was teaching an assumption to Cardinal Wright during one of the intermissions there from the Council, came through and he talked a bit about it, right? And he explained it in terms of, he said, John XXIII would say, you know, that the grain is under the soil, right? The what? The grain. The grain. It's under the soil, right? In the seed, right, huh? He was going to plant seeds in the Vatican II and they would eventually sprout, but not right away, you know? Sprouted right away was not the Vatican II. Some, it's the so-called spirit of Vatican II. To be distinguished from the spirit of the, which is a gift of the spirit. Which opposed to a letter of the Vatican II, yeah. Okay. So it's necessary, therefore, that to be within man higher perfections, according to which he is disposed to be moved by God, right, huh? And these perfections are called gifts, huh? Not only because they are poured in by God, but because by them, man is disposed, they might, what, be promptly movable by divine inspiration. As it is said in Isaiah 50, huh? The Lord, what, opened to me an ear, right? And I did not, what? Country to him. I did not go backwards, huh? And the philosopher also says, huh? This philosopher is quoting this. Somebody. Yeah. And the philosopher also says in the chapter on good fortune, that those who are moved by divine instinct, huh, is not expedient to them to take counsel according to human reason, but that they follow the, what? Serious instinct. Yeah, because they are moved by a better beginning than human reason. That's my entire style, you should see that, huh? And this is what some say, huh? This is among these in a footnote, some say, or Albert and Bonaventure, right? They can mention those, right? Okay. That the gifts perfect man for higher acts than are the acts of the, what? Virtues. Virtues, right? What about, there is some higher acts than charity? Maybe it makes a higher act than charity would normally have. We'll have to see if it gets into more details, right? Okay. Now, that's the first objection where you had a text from Gregory where he seems to call them, what? Virtues, right? This is the problem with the word, right? It's the first, and it should be said, that these gifts are sometimes, what? Called virtues, right? According to the common ratio of virtue, right? For they have, nevertheless, something, what? Rising above the common notion of virtue, insofar as they are, what? Divine virtues. Perfecting man, insofar as he is moved by, what? God, huh? Whence the philosopher, also in the seventh book of the ethics, above common virtue, lays down a certain, what? Heroic virtue, or divine one. According to which, some men are called divine men, right? Yeah. Yeah. We've meant that way of speaking before, you know, but sometimes the one that adds something noteworthy gets a new name, like these are called the donor, right? And then the other ones keep the name, what? Virtue. Virtue, in this case, right? So they could be called virtues, right? Just against all, man is an animal, right? Sometimes you don't want to call man an animal because there's something beyond what the other animals have, right? That makes it quite distinct from them, right? So it's like the biologist has said, you know, man is an ape, but an unusual one. I don't know when the tooth comes through, you know? He's an unusual one. You heard of a professor there at Harvard there who wants to give personhood to chimpanzees, right, huh? Yeah. And give them rights, he wants to free some ape that's, he thinks they're being imprisoned by some man, you know? Well, maybe the ape, since he has rights, maybe he also did injustices so he's being punished because he's a criminal. So, maybe that's why. Somebody says, if I could call it for jury duty, I hope they'll bring the champion. Yeah, if I commit a crime, I'm hoping there's a few chips on the jury. I'll bring bananas in there. Those academics are really going by that. Yeah. It proves evolution, because some of these people are descendants of the game. Yeah. Likeness is a very slippery thing. But notice how Aristotle's distinction between heroic virtue, you know, and ordinary virtue, you know. It's kind of a disposable one to see this distinction, you know. To second should be said, vices, insofar as they are against the good of reason, right, are contrary to the what? Virtues, huh? Especially human virtues, talking about. Insofar as they are against the divine instinct, they are contrary to the what? Yes, huh? Now, the same thing can be contrary to God and to reason, whose light is derived from God, right? It enlightens every man who comes into this world, huh? St. John tells us. Now, apply to the third objection, right, huh? It goes back to the, what, definition that we had from Augustine, right? The third should be said that that definition given of virtue, that definition is given of virtue according to the common mode of virtue, right, huh? Once, if we wish to, what, restrict the definition to virtues, insofar as they are distinguished from gifts, right, we should say that this, which is said in the definition, quarecti vivita, right, huh, should be understood about the rightness of life, which is taken according to the rule of, what, reason, right, huh? Likewise, the gift, insofar as it's distinguished from the infused virtue, right, huh? It can be said that that which is given by God in order to, what? His motion, huh? Because it makes man, what? To follow well the divine instincts, huh? Okay. Too many to understand, you know, the new pope, you know, but he may be, what, following the divine instinct, right, huh? The gifts of the Holy Spirit. He didn't quite respect what he's doing. Now, the fourth one is talking about the, what, the means that might be equivalent there, right? To the fourth it should be said, huh, that the wisdom is said to be a, what, intellectual virtue, according as it proceeds from the judgment of, what, reason, right, huh? It's said to be a gift according as it acts from, what, operates from divine instinct. And similarly, so, the word is equivocal, right? Did I stop now, I guess? Or what? Did I stop now? Did I stop now? Did I stop now? Did I stop now? Did I stop now? Did I stop now? Did I stop now?