Prima Secundae
Lecture 167: The Intensity and Equality of Virtues

Transcript
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Well, at least to the frame here. Probably at least to the frame here. Okay, look at the frame here. The first article. Then we're not to consider about the equality of what? Virtues. And about this, six things are asked. First, whether a virtue is able to be more or less. Secondly, whether all virtues existing together in the same are what? Equal, right? I'm more courageous than I am temperate, or more temperate than I am courageous. Or more just than I am. Third, about the comparison of moral virtues to the intellectual virtues. Fourth, about the comparison of moral virtues to each other. And fifth, about the comparison of intellectual virtues to each other. And then sixth, about the comparison of theological virtues to each other, right? So he makes things down, Thomas. And he sits down from every angle, right? To the first one proceeds thus. It seems that virtue is not able to be, what? More or less, huh? For it is said in the book of the Apocalypse, chapter 21, verse 16. That the sides of the city of Jerusalem are equal, huh? But to this are signified the virtues, as the gloss says, right? Therefore, all virtues are what? Equal, huh? There's not equal, therefore, to be one virtue greater than another, right? It's a square, right? And they're all equal sides, right? It's a virtuous mass, like a square, right? Solid in a cube, you know? It's not like a sphere that's not going to run away from you. Nice solid, huh? Moreover, everything whose definition consists in the most, right? Is not able to be more or less. But the notion of virtue consists in the maximum, huh? For virtue is the, what? Ultimate of power, huh? As the philosopher says in the first book of the universe. And Augustine says also, in the second book on free will, that the virtues are maxima bona, right? Most good, huh? Maxima bona. Which no one is able to use badly, right? Therefore, it seems that virtue is not able to be more nor less, right? Why does he always argue against what he thinks, huh? It's exercising our minds, huh? That's the positive one thing. However, the quantity of the effect is, what, weighed according to the power of the agent. But the perfect virtues, which are the infused virtues, are from God, right? Whose power is uniform and infinite, huh? Therefore, it seems that virtue is not able to be, what? Then another, right? But against this, huh? Wherever there is growth and superabundance, there can be inequality. But in the virtues, there is found, what? Superabundance and growth. For it is said in Matthew chapter 5, unless your justice abounds more than that of the scribes and the Pharisees, do not enter into the kingdom of heaven. And in Proverbs 15, it is said, in the, what? Abundant justice, there is, what? Grace virtue. Grace virtue. Grace virtue. Therefore, it seems that virtue can be more or less, huh? When they give the Medal of Honor for Courage, right? Isn't it because? More? Not less. But I thought they all grew into all of them. Let's see what Thomas says, huh? The answer should be said, that when it is asked whether one virtue is able to be more than another, this question can be understood in two ways, huh? In one way, in virtues that differ in, what? Species of kind. And thus is manifest that one virtue is greater than another, huh? For always, the cause is more potent than the effect, right? And in effects, something is that way more potent than that is, what? Nearer to the cause, right? Now, it is manifest from the thing said that the cause and the root, let's use the words easier, cause and root of human good is something called reason, right? That's what Shakespeare says there, right, in the exhortation to use reason. And therefore, prudence, or foresight, as we say in English, which perfects reason is preferred in goodness or is better in goodness than the other, what? More virtues. More virtues, huh? Because they are good because they are, what? Reasonable, right, huh? So is love good, as I ask the students, is love good? Well, it's a reasonable love, right? It seems that prudence, which is in reason there, right, huh? It's going to be greater than more virtues, right? In so far as they partake of reason, right? They are good. So what partakes is less so than what is essentially so. The more virtues, which are perfecting the desiring power, right? In so far as it partakes of reason, huh? And in these also, one is better than another, the more it, what? Cedes to reason, huh? Whence justice, which is in the will, is preferred to the other, what? More virtues, huh? That's interesting, you know, how when Aristotle takes up the virtues, huh? He takes up justice last, right? But in the, because the other ones are more known to us in some ways and so on. But in this secunda secunda, right? Thomas takes up, what? Foresight before justice. And justice before fortitude and fortitude before temperance, right? But in God, you have foresight and you have, what? Justice. You have fortitude, metaphorically speaking, but not properly speaking. And temperance you don't even have metaphorically, you know? Once justice, which is in the will, which is closer, right? It's in the rational part of the soul, is preferred to the other moral virtues. And fortitude, which is in the irascible, is preferred to, what? Temperance, which is in the concubiscible, which partakes of reasonless, right? One of my first insights in Mozart was the piano concertos that excels them, right? And that's dealing with, what? The irascible, to some extent, right, huh? This is clearly said in the book of the Ethics, huh? Another way, one can understand the question in virtue of the same, what? Species, right, huh? So if you and I are both courageous, can one of us be more courageous? Or one of us more temperate, right? One of us more just, we're both just. And thus, according to those things which have been said above, when we treated of the, what? Intensities of the habits, right? Virtue is able to be said in two ways, more and less, right? In one way, in itself, or by itself. In another way, on the side of the, what? Subject partaking in that, right? If, therefore, one considers it by itself, the magnitude or smallness of it is attended according to those things to which it extends, huh? You might have geometry more than I do, right? Because your geometrical knowledge extends to more, what? Yeah, more conclusions than mine does, right? Okay. What's his name there? Euclid, you know, extends to even more, maybe, than you'd hear it still, right? He's quite, quite there, yeah. Whoever, however, has some virtue, as an example, temperance, has it as far as all the things to which temperance extends, huh? So, am I temperate if I drink wine moderately, but I don't drink my beer moderately, or I don't drink my whiskey moderately? It's got to go through all of these, right? Or if I eat chicken in moderation, but not steak, or... That's understandable. Or I eat cake in moderation, but not candy, and... But this does not happen about, what? Science and art, huh? For not everyone who's a grammarian knows all the things which pertain to, what, grammar, right? And according to this, the stoic cell say, well, as Simplicius says in his commentary on the, what, predicamentor, right? That's the categories of Aristotle, right? They call that the, what, predicamenta, the... They call it genus, species, difference, property, and accident, the predicabilia, and they call it, you know, substance, quantity, quality, you know, predicamenta, right? Which is if I know it to other people. That virtue, meaning, I suppose, moral virtue here, does not receive more and less as science or art does, right? In that the ratio of virtue consists in the, what? Right. Maximo, right, huh? Okay? If, however, one considers virtue on the side of the subject partaking, thus it happens that virtue can be more or less, either according to diverse times in the same man or in, what? Diverse men, right, huh? Because to attain the mean, huh, of virtue, the middle virtue, which is according to right reason, one is better disposed than the other, right? Either on account of being accustomed to it more, right? Or by a better disposition of, what? Nature, right, huh? Or more, what? Clearly, clear judgment of reason, right? Or also on account of a greater gift of, what? Grace, huh? Because to each is given according to the measure of the giving of Christ. So Christ doesn't give the same to you and me and the apostles, right? Okay. Apostles, what he gave to Mary, right? And in this, the Stoics, what? Fall short, huh? Estimating that nothing should be called virtuous except what is in the highest disposed to, what? Virtue. Virtue, right, huh? For it's not necessary for the notion of virtue that it attains to right reason in the middle in something, what, indivisible, right? Like a point, as the Stoics thought, huh? They must have been thinking mathematically, right? But it suffices to be near the middle, right? As is said in the second book of the Ethics, huh? So how many bites is too much, huh? Very, very, very. How many sips is too much? For the same indivisible sign, one more near and one more promptly attains another, just as in what? Archers drawing to a certain what? Sign, right? There's a little leeway there on the bullseye there, right? Now to the first, therefore, it should be said that that equality, huh? This is the equality talking about in the first objection there, huh? The sides of the Jews on there, right? In the spiritual sense there. That equality is not according to absolute quantity, but it should be understood according to a, what? Proportion. Because the virtues proportionally increase in man as will be said, what? Below, huh? It would be illuminated that more. That would be the next article, I guess. Now, to the second objection about it being maximum, he says, that last thing that pertains to virtue can have the notion of more and less good according to the four said modes, since it is not something, what? Last that is indivisible, right, huh? Like the point that's the end of the line, right, huh? So one more sip, or half a sip, or a quarter of a sip. What about God, right, huh? He says, well, God, you know. To the third, it should be said that God does not act according to what? Necessity of nature, right? But according to the order of his wisdom. According to which, or by which, a diverse measure of virtue is given to men, right? So he's going to give more to the apostles because they have a somewhat more important role than you and I have in the church, right? And to Mary, right, huh? God eats it, quality. Yeah. But what do they say? By their fruit, you shall know them, right? Isn't that said? We see it in the prayer for the Hail Mary, you know? Hail Mary, full of grace, the Lord. What is it? Yeah, yeah. So what's the fruit of her womb? Yeah. You couldn't have a greater fruit than that, could you? So, obviously she's going to be given virtue in a greater degree, right, than even the, what, apostles, right? But the apostles more than the rest of us, huh? Because the church is founded in them, right? We're descended there. Our bishops are descended from the apostles, huh? Static succession. So, which one is given grace according to the measure of the giving of Christ, huh? Don't wonder about the religious orders, you know, whether the founding of the religious order has more, what? More grace. More grace, huh? It's the cause of the... That's what I mean, yeah, yeah. I mean, the Dominican have as much grace as St. Dominic. Or the Benedictine have as much grace as St. Benedict, yeah. He's the father of Europe, you know, these, all these things. Got a little booklet there, and you're at Monte Cassino there, you know, about Benedict and Scholastica and so on. And it has some of these things in there, Paul VI, you know, and he declared the patron of Europe and so on, and some from John Paul II and so on. So, I mean, would any Benedict have as much grace, you think, as Benedict? What would you say? What about St. Thomas? Well, as I say, would any Dominican have as much grace or as much virtue as Dominic, right? He's the founder of the order, right? I wouldn't try to say I'm altogether sure about these things, but it seems to be probable, right, that the founder of the order would have a student, but excellence, yeah. Had a little problem there with the legionaries, right? Yeah, yeah. Well, that's why they have to be re-founded. Yeah, yeah, yeah. It's kind of a strange thing, the defect there. I was getting a letter here from a friend that was stopped here, but I'll give you a little, reach out a little bit about this letter here. Thank you, God. Thank you, Guardian Angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. God, our Enlightenment, Guardian Angels, drink from the lights of our minds, order the luminary bridges, and allows us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas and John Doctor, help us to understand what you have written. Father, Son, Holy Spirit, Amen. So I guess we're up to question 66, article 2. To the second one goes forward thus, it seems that not all virtues in one and the same, meaning one and the same person, I guess, are equally, what, intense. For the Apostle says in the first epistle to the Corinthians, chapter 7, that each one has his own gift from God, right? One this, another that. But this would not be that one gift is more proper to one person than another if all the virtues infused by the gift of God was had equally by everybody, right? Therefore, it seems that not all the virtues are equal in one and the same. Moreover, if all the virtues were equally intense in one and the same, it would follow that whoever exceeds someone in one virtue exceeds them in all the other virtues. But this would seem to be false. Because diverse saints are especially praised about diverse, what? Virtues. Virtues. Virtues. Virtues. As Abraham about what? Faith. Faith, huh? What's that thing there, the way they explain the names here in the beginning of, Abraham begot Isaac, Isaac begot Jacob. The spiritual sense is faith begot hope, and hope begot, yeah. Moses of what? Mildness, huh? That's interesting he says about Moses, huh? Job, job about patience, huh? Quence about each confessor when sings in the church, there's not found anyone like him, right, who can serve the law of the Most High, in that each one has some prerogative of some virtue. Therefore, not all the virtues are equal in one and the same. That's, I would be convinced by that argument, huh? I'm surprised, you know, that Thomas... That's the way that that text of the commoner confessors is always interpreted. The more intense a habit is, the more a man acts according to it in a more delightful way, right? And in a more prompt way. But by experience, it is clear that one man does with more pleasure and more promptly the act of one virtue than the act of another. Therefore, not all the virtues are equal in one and the same, huh? But here he goes to his teacher there, who's what? Guston, right? He's somebody, this Guston, huh? Did he kind of get to say, you know, Aristotle, he's somebody, right? What do you think about Augustine, right? He is somebody, right, huh? But against this is what Augustine says in the sixth book on the Trinity. Whoever are equal in, what? Fortitude, courage, are equal in prudence and temperance. That's it. And that's about the rest, huh? But this would not be unless all the virtues of one man were equal. Therefore, all the virtues of one man are, what? Equal. This is going to follow from the fact that they're connected, right, with prudence and with, what? Charity, huh? Let's see what Thomas says in the body article, right? I answer it should be said that the quantity of virtues, as has been said before, or it's clear from what has been said before, can be noted in two ways, huh? In one way, according to the ratio, huh? The notion of the species. And thus, it is not doubtful that one virtue of one man is greater than another, right? Just as charity is greater, for example, than faith and hope, huh? In another way, it can be noted according to the partaking of it, of the subject, right? In so far as it is, what? Made more intense, or less so, in the subject, right? And according to this, all the virtues of one man are equal by a certain equality of, what? Proportion, huh? In so far as they equally, what? Grow. Grow in the man, huh? And thus, it's a charity mix. Just as the fingers of the hand, what a concrete way, huh? I lectured out there at TAC there, you know, they have a painting there. It's Thomas, I could see from the lectern grounds lecturing, you know. There were just five fingers. Yeah, yeah, yeah. And these, which I was trying to steal, you know, for the five senses of before, you know, but I mean, it stilled for this year, too. Yeah, yeah. Just as the fingers of the hand are unequal in their quantity, right? But they equal according to, what? Proportion. Since they grow proportionally, right, huh? Okay. That's what you said about your arms and legs, right, huh? The legs are, I suppose, longer than the arms, right? But they grow proportionally as the person gets older, huh? Mm-hmm. Okay. They seem to be longer when they're about 12. No, I'm just waiting. Really long, their body's not so big. All arms and legs. Now, the equality, huh? We have to take the reason in the same way for the equality of these things as their, what? Connection, right, huh? For equality is a certain connection of the virtues according to, what? What? Quantity, huh? Now, it has been said that the reason for the connection of the virtues is assigned in, what? Two ways, huh? In one way, according to the understanding of those things, of those who understand through these four virtues, four general conditions of virtues, right? Of which one is found, what? Together with the others in every matter, right? And thus, the virtue in every matter cannot be called equal unless it has all these, what? The conditions be equal. And this reason of equality of virtues is assigned by Augustine in the sixth book of the Trinity. That's the one quoted in the second, right? If one says that they are, what? Equal, these in fortitude, right? But that one, what? Stands out in prudence. It would follow that the fortitude of this one was less, what? Prudent. And through this, that neither are they equal, what? In fortitude, when the fortitude of one is more prudent than the, what? Other. And thus, it is about the other virtues you would find if you run through them all, right? By the same way of considering them, right? That's where you take these as being, what? Four qualities of every, what? Virtue, right, huh? If you have one of them less than the other, then they're not, what? Equal, right? So, in another way, one assigns the reason of the connection of the virtues according as we understand these virtues to have determined matters. That's where Establlo speaks, right? He speaks in the virtues. And according to this, the reason of the connection of the moral virtues is taken on the part of, what? Prudence, right? Because that, what? Takes counsel about what should be done and all these things. And on the part of charity as regards the, what? Infuse virtues. Infuse virtues, right? But not from the part of inclination, which is on the side of the, what? Subject, as has been said above. Thus, therefore, the reason of the equality of the virtues can be taken on the side of prudence as regards that which is formal in all the moral virtues, huh? For reason existing equally perfect in one and the same is necessary that proportionally that the middle constituted in each matter of the virtues is according to what? Right reason, huh? But as regards that which is material in the moral virtues, to wit, the inclination itself to the act of virtue. It can be that one man is more prompt to the act of one virtue than to the act of, what? Another. Either by nature or by custom or even from the gift of grace, huh? That's what you're going to say. That's what you're going to say. That's what you're going to say. That's what you're going to say. The third objection is there, right? He's not going to admit that one guy has what? This virtue better than another man, the other guy has another virtue better than him, right? But he's more prompt in the act. Now, to the first therefore it should be said that the word apostle can be understood about the gifts of gratia gratis dati. Now, I've talked about this way of speaking before, right? What are you doing here? And they distinguish gratia gratis dati and gratia gratum faciens, right? And what's that way of, what kind of piece of words is that? Because he calls one grace freely given, right? And another one making you what? Acceptable. Acceptable, okay? But even that grace that makes you acceptable is freely given too. So, what does he do? Stands out, yeah. That's something in addition, right? They're both freely given, right? Gratia gratis dati in Latin, right? But one has an addition that makes you what? Something notable. Yeah. Yeah, something notable that makes you what? God's favorite, you might say, right? And so that gets a new name. Gratia gratum faciens. The other one keeps the common name, right? Okay? The opposite of gratum faciens is persona non grava. Yeah, yeah. That's what I was... You had something like that in the class last night there, remember? The word chance is broader than, what? Luck, right? But luck is in human affairs, right? And it gets a special name, luck. And then the other one, chance in nature, just keeps the name chance, right? This is a common way of speaking, right? It's like when Aristotle distinguishes between habit and disposition, right? Well, habit is a disposition too. But a disposition is just a disposition. Habit is a firm disposition. So it gets a new name, habit, right? Because you must know if you try to overcome your bad habits. It's hard to get rid of them, right? My teacher, Kassari, you know, when he met the conic, you know, he went back to philosophy, right? But he had to get rid of all these bad ideas. It took a long time, you know. Get rid of all these bad, habitual ideas. Okay. So the word of the apostle could be understood about the gifts, gratia. Gratia, gratis date, right? Like miracles and so on. Which are not common to all people, right? Nor are all equal and one and the same, right? So St. Paul enumerates those different ones, huh? The gift of tongues, you know. You might have the gift of interpretation, but not the gift of tongues. And some else person might have the gift of healing and not something else, right? Or it can refer to the measure of gratia gratum, making, what? Acceptable. Yeah. Facientis, huh? According to which one abounds in all the virtues, right? More than, what? In other, right? On account either of a greater abundance of prudence, or also of, what? Charity. In which are connected all the infused virtues, huh? Now, in the second and third objection, he's going to do so in terms of what he said in the body of the article, right? According to a certain, what? Inclination, right? To the second should be said that one saint is praised especially about one virtue, another about another, and account of a more excellent proctitude to the act of one virtue than to the act of the other. But not that one has... This virtue doesn't have. This one has a better amount of that virtue, and another one has a greater amount of another virtue. No. The one person has a greater amount of all the virtues than the other person, right? But one person is more prompt of a particular act. What's an example of where I've heard texts about the guy who, you know, dad wants to do something? One guy says, no. Yeah, the other guy says, yeah. The other guy says, oh, yeah, I'll go. And he doesn't want it. Yeah, yeah. But the other guy is more prompt, but he's not... He doesn't do it. He's all talk. No. No. Now we get to Article 3 here. Whether the moral virtues are preeminent, come before the intellectual virtues. That's an interesting question now. To the third one goes forward thus, it seems that the moral virtues are preeminent to the intellectual virtues. For what is more necessary and permanent is better. But the moral virtues are more permanent than the what? Disciplines, the sciences. And this is a reference there to Aristotle, the ethics. He says that. Which are the intellectual virtues. And they are also more necessary for human life. Therefore, they ought to be preferred to the intellectual virtues. We'll have to see what Lady Wisdom has to say about that. She excels, of course, at both. But anyway. Moreover, it is of the notion of virtue that it makes good the one having it. But according to the moral virtues, a man is said to be good. Not, however, according to the intellectual virtues. Except perhaps according to only what? Prudence. So if I'm a good youngter, am I a good man? For that reason. If I'm a good carpenter, am I a good man? No. No. That's what Chesterton always says about him shooting his mother-in-law between the eyes at 50 paces. He's a good shot. He's not a really good man. Moreover, the end is more noble than those things which are for the sake of the end. Which are towards the end. But as is said in the sixth book of the Nicomachean Ethics, moral virtue makes for a right intention of the end. Like prudence makes for a right choice of those things which are toward the end. Therefore, moral virtue is more noble than prudence, which is a intellectual virtue about what? Yeah. Yeah. I'm convinced, aren't you? There you go. What do we pray there, you know? That was made to consider more correctly. But this is not a stupid position, this other opposition, no? No. It seems like, yeah, I'm pretty convincing. But again, it says that moral virtue is in the part of the soul that is reasonable by partaking of reason. But intellectual virtue is in the part that is reasonable essentially, as is said in the first book of the Ethics. But what is reasonable essentially is more noble than what is only reasonable by what? Partaking. Therefore, intellectual virtue is more noble than moral virtue. Oh my goodness, huh? It's like the character says here in Twelfth Night, you know? O time, I must untangle this, not I. For it is too hard a knot for me, tantai. It's interesting likeness there between a plot and philosophy, right? Because Aristotle says that the plot consists of tying the knot and then untying it, huh? And then the plot analysis, like in the new Hudson Shakespeare there, they speak of tying the knot, the knot is tied, then tying the knot, the knot is untied. And they kind of divide the plot up that way. And philosophy is like that, huh? You, what, argue and see what can be said on both sides with some probability. And then your mind is tied in a knot, as Aristotle says. Talking about dialectic there in the third book of wisdom, right? Then you have to untie this, right? And Aristotle says time is a good help, right? Sometimes it takes a long time before you see it, right, huh? I remember the one knot I couldn't untie, and I was sure you couldn't untie it, and it became relevant to my thesis in some way, a doctorate thesis. And I was reading something in Thomas, and it was following the lecture of Monsignor Dianne, and I said, ah, I got it, you know? And so I ran down to Monsignor Dianne to check it out after all these years, and I began a nice order when he said, I know where you're going, Dwayne, and he said, and I said, well, damn it, can I go there? Well, you can read, you know, huh? But time is a good help, right, huh? Oh, time, there must a dangle this, not I. It is too hard or not for me to untie, huh? You can read the twelfth plan and see what the knot is, huh? See how Shakespeare unties it, huh? You know, you read the critics there on the late play of Shakespeare, they're a symbol line, right, huh? You know, they try to do each other by saying, how many Nazi unties and one senior at the end? It's absolutely incredible what he does, you know? It's just, you know. Which was that? Symbol line. Oh, symbol line, yeah. I remember that. It's a marvelous thing, yeah. Great. Yeah. I was mentioning how I was reading the life of the poet laureate of England there, you know, Tennyson, right? He's on his deathbed there, right? He wants you to read the scene again, the symbol line, you know, where Imogen and posthumous are reconciled. It's a beautiful scene. I'll see. But here, you're tied in a knot, right? You have a beautiful example then in the dialogue, the title there, one of the introductions to logic, right? Where Socrates argues that virtue can be taught, and then he argues that virtue cannot be taught, right? Well, now the mind is tied into a knot, and then he's got to untie it, right? And then he comes back and he seems to find a weakness on one side, right? But anyway, that's another topic. So here we've got tied into a nice knot here, right? And there's probability on both sides, wouldn't you say? Yeah, I think it's a good example of dialectic, yeah. Now we've got to untie the knot, huh? As you said, the ability to look before and after has included the ability to look for distinctions, right? And eventually then, if you've got a good mind to see the distinctions, right? Well, here, Thomas starts out seeing a distinction here, right? Like, answer, therefore, it should be said, that something could be said more or less in two ways, huh? In one way, simply, in another way, you say, couldn't have quit, right? And that's a kind of distinction that you meet over and over again in Aristotle and in Thomas, right? And it's important there in the, what? In the Mino of Socrates, huh? Because Mino, you say to Socrates, you can't investigate what you don't know. How can you direct your thinking to what you don't know? But as you couldn't have quit, you could know what you don't know. People are being paid to do research, you know, to find the cause of cancer or some other disease, right, huh? They must in some way know what they don't know. In some way, yeah. We hope. Yeah. But if you can't see that distinction, then you're kind of caught, right? And there's a kind of mistake there that Aristotle takes up in the book on Sister Reputations, which is tied up with some picheter and secundum quid, huh? It happens again and again. For nothing prevents something from being better, some picheter, as in Aristotle's example, to philosophize than to make money, which nevertheless is better secundum quid, huh? That is to one undergoing some kind of, what, necessity, right? Now, simpliciter, huh? Simply, each thing is considered, simply, when it's considered according to the very definition of its, what, species, huh? But a virtue has its species, huh, from its, what, object, huh? Species now is opposed to the, what, the genus, right? Whence, simply speaking, that virtue is more noble that has a more noble, what, object, right, huh? Now, it is manifest over that the object of reason is more noble than the object of the appetite, huh? But he should say this is impressive here. For reason, grasp something in general, right? See? Large discourse, as Shakespeare says, right, huh? Discourse about the, what, universal. But the appetite tends towards things which have some kind of particular, what, being, yeah. Whence, simply speaking, intellectual virtues, which perfect reason, are more noble than moral ones, which perfect the appetite, huh? Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm.