Prima Secundae
Lecture 164: Kinds of Opposition and the Mean in Theological Virtues

Transcript
================================================================================

privation or lack and having, and then relatives, right? Well, if you distinguish these four, of course the mind couldn't possibly understand the distinction of four, right? And when Tang sometimes, you know, comments on it, he'll distinguish relatives from the other, what, three, right? Because the other three, one opposite eliminates the other opposite, right? But in the case of relatives, double doesn't eliminate half. Yeah, yeah, so it's a different kind of thing, right? So set that aside, that kind of opposition. And that's the kind of formal distinction you have in the Trinity, right? The Father and the Son, right? But then how would the other three distinguish, right? Contradiction and contrariety and having and lack, right? I'm just going to take a guess. One is maybe kind of absolute, contradiction is, is not. Okay. Now, does being and non-being, or man and not-man, do they have anything in common? One just negates what the other one is saying, right? But now when you get to lack and, what, having, right, huh? Are they as opposed to, or do they have something in common? Something in common. Yeah. So, to be blind and to have sight, right, huh? This is an opposition of having and lacking, right? But they have something in common, right, huh? So, is this thing here blind, huh? This neither has sight, nor is it what? Blind, huh? Is this here, have sight, no? But is it blind? No. But if you take contradictories, you've got to be one or the other, right? Either you see or you don't see, right, huh? Okay. Is this thing ignorant? Well, ignorance is really the non-being of knowledge and something able to, what? To know, right, huh? Okay. So, lack and having are not, what, as opposed as contradictory, right? Now, in the case of concreurs, right, you have even more in common, right? Because they're both something, what? One is not simply the non-being of another in the same subject, right? But it's another species, right? And it's the one that's furthest apart, right? Okay. So, you take virtue and vice. Well, is vice just the non-being of virtue and something that could have virtue? Or is it a real habit? Yeah. It's a disordered habit, right? A bad habit, right? Why virtue is a good habit, right? So, in that sense, contraries are the least opposed, right? Those three, right? Okay. But nevertheless, if I have virtue, I can't have the opposite vice. Or if I have the opposite vice, I can't have the virtue, right? If I'm blind, I can't have sight. And I'm blind, right? Okay, so there's real opposition between these things, right? Well, if I say, you know, two is half of four, and two is not half of four, right? Well, those are opposed, aren't they, right? If I say two is half of four, and you say two is not half of four, we think differently, don't we? And so there's some opposition, right? Okay. But what opposition is it? Is this contradiction? Well, if you're talking about the statements, right? You know? The statement that two is half of four, that's a statement, right? And two is not half of four, that's a statement, too, right? So you have two positive things, right? Two statements, right? Okay. So they're more like, what? Contraries, right? Contraries. Contraries. Now, we call them contradictory, right? Because you're affirming one thing that I deny. But if you take the statement, then they're both, what? When Socrates asked the slave boy, right, how do you double a square? And the slave boy says you double the side, right, huh? Well, the slave boy, is he just ignorant, or is he what? Mistaken. Yeah. He really thinks something that is, what, false, right, huh? Okay. Well, if the slave boy said, I don't know, then he would simply have been, what, ignorant, right? Everybody who's ignorant is not, what, mistaken, right? Everybody who's mistaken is, what, ignorant, right? Right, huh? Okay. So to be mistaken is not simply, what, lacking, right? But it's having something that's in the same genus, right, huh? So they are contraries, right, huh? Even though we call those statements sometimes, what, contradictory, but you've got to realize what you're doing there, right? The opposition of being and non-being is contradiction, right, huh? But the statement whereby I say this is, and you say it is not, they are contrary, right? Because they're both in the genus of what? Yeah, yeah. Okay. Boom. So it's very subtle, right, you know? Yeah, I see it is a subtle distinction. Yeah. Yeah. But it's kind of interesting, Aristotle will distinguish these kinds of opposites, right? And, you know, when you're in the first book of the physics there, huh, and they're talking about contraries and so on, and Aristotle says, well, there's change always between contraries, right? And maybe it's sometimes just between, what, the lack and the having, right? Okay. So I used to always talk about, you know, is it easier to convince somebody who's ignorant or someone who's mistaken? Yeah. Somebody who's ignorant. Yeah. Because the man who's mistaken is going to, you know, oppose you in a way that the man who's who's, who's, yeah, yeah. So I say, you know, if you're trying to, you know, win votes for the, let's say, Republican candidate, right? And I go in and say, no, you're voting Republican or Democrat. And I say, I haven't made up my mind yet. And he said, I'm voting Democrat. Well, maybe I should work on this guy here. Because he's going to resist me less than the stake of Democrat, right? And it's going to, you know, waste time maybe in trying to convince him, right? I can maybe convince two or three of you guys, you know, if you're mine. Low-informed voters. They call them now low-informed. Yeah, yeah. Low-information. Low-information, yeah. And so this is what we learned in epistemology. I mean, the only thing worse than ignorance is birth. So notice, in the simple things like what? Virtue and vice, they are not, what, in the mind. The understanding of one is not, what, contrary to the other, right? When you have affirmation and negation, where one is affirming with the other one negating, right? Of the same thing, well, then you're going to have contradiction, right? So he says, although to be and not to be are not contraries, right? But contradictorily opposed, right? If one considers the thing signified insofar as they're in things, right? Because one is a being and the other is pure, what? None being, right? He says pure, right? Because there's nothing, no subject in common, right? Let alone no genus in common, right? But nevertheless, if they're referred to an act of the soul, affirming or denying, both lay down something, right? In both cases, I think something, right? I think the two is half a four, you think the two is not half a four, right? So we're both thinking something, right? We're both making a statement, right? That's very subtle, right? You know, when they talk about God, you know, and the substance of God, and one of the five things that are said of the substance of God is that he's what? Simple, he's what? Well, what's the order to go? He's simple, he's perfect, right? What is attached to that? And then the third is what? He's unlimited or infinite. And then the fourth is in the Summa Thiroje. Unchanging? Yeah. And then there's what? That's the word in the Summa Thiroje. It's a little different. Summa Kami Chantilas. I discuss that sometimes. But Thomas says, when you say God is unlimited, what kind of... Is that a what? Engagement of lack. Yeah, yeah. And of course it's going to be what? Engagement of lack. Yeah, see. Well, use the word unlimited. Like the preacher talking about bodies being unlimited, right? Then it was a what? Lack, right? So even if you had a line going on forever, that would be unlimited in the sense that it doesn't have what a line could have. Maybe it should have. At least it's harder to think about it. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Unlimited sin of God is a pure, what? Negation, right? Pure in the name of God. So you say, well, you're knowing God. I'm perfectly unknowing God, right? But better than nothing, huh? Okay. One guy knows, say, well, Professor, he don't know nothing, he says. Don't say nothing. That's what they say in Spanish, in Portuguese. Whence essay and non-essay are contradictorial, right? But the opinion by which we opine that the good is good, right? Is contrary to the opinion, right? By which we think that the good is not good, right? And in between these contraries is the middle of, what? Intellectual virtue, right? Okay. You can kind of see this, you know, in the two greatest mysteries of the faith, are the Trinity, right? And the, what, incarnation, right? So the Trinity, the truth is, what? That there are one nature and three, what? Persons. And then you have one heresy that says, because there are three persons, there are three natures, like the Arians were saying, right? And then what's the other heir? They're saying one nature and one person. Yeah, yeah. Well, the guy who says that there's, what, three natures and three persons, he's saying that what is not, those extra two natures, is, right? The man who says that there's one nature as there's, I mean, there's one person as there's one nature, he's saying that what is, is not, right? Those are two ways you can make an error, right? But the truth lies in the mean, saying that there's one nature and three persons, right? Now, in the Trinity, it's reversed, right? In the Trinity, there is one person, I mean, excuse me, incarnation, there's one person and human and the, yeah, yeah. I was thinking around communion time today, and I said, it'd be interesting to talk to a man who's God, right? He'd be extremely interested to talk to, I would think. You know? Yeah. He's here, you know? It'd even be better to listen to him. But there are those who said that there are two, what? Persons. As there are two, what? Natures. And so they're saying that what... Is not, is. Yeah, yeah. And then there are others, Eutychus or somebody, right? Who said that there's one person that's got to be one nature, called monophysites, huh? He's one, fuses, one nature, right? And he's saying that what is, the second nature, is not, right? So, truth lies in between those two, huh? So Thomas speaks of following the right, tramite there, truth, you know, in between two, but... St. Vincent of Laverand put that very succinctly in Latin, in divinitas, in divinitate, alius atque alius, not alius atque alius. In Salvatore, alius atque alius, not alius atque alius. It's very well expressed. For alius is the nature, right? Yeah, alius is the nature. Alius is the person. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Thomas gets into those discussions. Right, so... There's kind of this metaphor, you know, where Greta, you know, speaks of the wise men, you know, as part of them, you know, truth from falsehood, right, you know? And as he swims on, they just flow back together again. There's a statement that the problem of modern intellectuals is they tend to get, but they tend to prefer the mean between the extremes of right and wrong. As a father and Kimball heads up the new criteria of journal on arts and culture. Yeah. It's very, very fine. I think he may be Catholic and certainly very Catholic-friendly. There's all sorts of great statements like that in some of his books. That's what Robert Frost had said coming, you hear about the middle of the road. Robert Frost said, middle of the road, where they paint the line, worst place to drive. The opportunity. Yeah. Okay, to the fourth, I kind of anticipated the fourth here, right? To the fourth, one goes forward thus. It seems that a theological virtue consists in the middle, right? For the good of the other virtues consists in the middle, as we've seen for both the moral virtues and the virtues of reason. But the theological virtue exceeds in goodness the other virtues. Therefore, the theological virtue, much more, is in the, what? The middle, right? Moreover, the middle of virtue is taken. The moral, according as the appetite, is ruled by, what? Reason, right? The intellectual, according as our understanding, is measured by the thing, right? But theological virtue perfects the understanding and also the, what? Appetite. Therefore, theological virtue consists in the middle, right? There's some truth to this, it seems, right? But maybe some falsehood, too. Maybe you wouldn't have put it in there if there was no truth. And it gets even more concrete here. Moreover, hope, which is a theological virtue, is a middle between desperation and presumption. Likewise, faith, yeah, a middle between contrary heresies, as the great Boethius says in the book of the two natures, like we're talking about, right? I was talking to Warren on the phone there the other day, and they said, do you agree with me? I kind of say that Boethius is the greatest mind between Augustine and Thomas, you know? He's called out there, he'd say. I mean, he says he's a great mind, this Boethius, you see. What an understanding is of trinity, you know, and all kinds of things. So, the one who confesses in Christ one person and two nature is a middle between the heresy of Nestorius, right? Who says there are two persons and two, what? Natures. Natures, right? And the heresies of Eutychus, who says there's one person and one nature, right? Therefore, the theological virtue consists in the middle, right? Of course, you know, the man who says the truth consists, in this case, in there being one person and two natures, can explain why you have these other two false opinions, because they both have a part of the truth. Because there are, what? Two natures, but only one person. So, you could think that because there's two natures, there must be two persons, and because there's one person, there must be one nature. So that the two eras can't explain each other. There's really two natures and two persons, and why should anybody think there's one person and one nature? And if there's really one person and one nature, why do anybody think that there are two, right? Two of both. If there's one and two, well, then you can see that there's a part of the truth in both heresies, right, huh? So truth explains falsehood as well. But against this, in all things in which virtue consists in the middle, it happens that one can sin through excess, just as one can sin through defect. But about God, who is the object of the theological virtue, it does not happen that one sins by excess. That's where it says in Ecclesiasticus chapter 43, Blessing God, right, huh? Exalt him as much as you are, what? Evil. For he is greater than all praise. Therefore, theological virtue does not consist in the middle, right, huh? So, how much did you love God, right, huh? You know, nothing too much, as the Greeks say, right, huh? So, he shouldn't, he made an agon, nothing too much. He shouldn't love God too much, right? Don't want to be a fanatic. Yeah, don't give up all these things to love God, you know, that's too much, right? Well, again, can you hope in God or trust in God too much, huh? Believe God too much? But yet we saw with those examples there, the heresies, right, that there seems to be some truth in the other position, right, that's in the middle between two things, right? And then there's between, what, presumption and despair, right? And there's hope in between those two. And Thomas speaks, you know, in the commentary on the Psalms there, you know, where he speaks about both hope and, what, fear, right, huh? That hope without fear. Yeah. Why, fear without hope would lead to, what, despair, right, huh? Okay. If I just fear God's justice, you know, then I might despair of my salvation, considering my wicked ways, right, huh? But if I just think of God's grace, you know, like people say, well, he's in heaven now, you know, he's, you know, there are eerie. You know, I was at a funeral not so long ago, a couple years ago. And the son would have a sentence. You know, we don't know whether in heaven or not yet. And we, you know, we think, I'll use the disease, but we don't know. So he's imploring you to pray for him, right? You know? I know when my father died, the father, uh, uh, Steiner, if you're a priest, he says to my mother, you know, never stop praying for him, right? We just don't know. We don't know. So, um, my father died, you know. I said, well, he's, he's, he's through with his suffering. So I said, I said, I hope so. But I don't know. I don't know. I mean, he's, you know. He's cooking away in purgatory. And we've abandoned him. Yeah, he made something more than we, no, he made something more than he was when he, you know, whatever, he died, you know. And, uh, so, uh, it's, it's hard to, uh, to strike the proper, what, balance there, you know. But that's why, some of those psalms will mention hope and fear together, right, huh? Doesn't Mary say that in the, in the, uh. Mm-hmm. She has mercy to those who fear. Yeah, he said, well, why don't say those who hope in him, right? Because hope corresponds more to mercy as an object, right, huh? We open the divine mercy, right? We fear the divine justice, right? So why, say, you know, she's, she's simplifying the thing, right? Yeah. She's saying that you have to put them together. Mm-hmm. Let's see if Thomas can, let's see. Answer, it should be said, as has been said before, that the middle of virtue is taken by conformity to its, what? Rule or measure. Rule or measure, huh? According as it happens that one can go beyond that rule or measure, or one can fall short of it, right? Mm-hmm. But of a theological virtue, one can take a measure in two ways, huh? For one, according to the notion of the virtue itself. And thus, the measure and rule of a theological virtue is God himself, huh? For our faith is ruled according to the divine truth, right? The first truth, as Thomas then calls it, and it is on faith there, and it's a goodness, couldn't it? Charity according to his, what? Goodness. Goodness, huh? Hope according to the magnitude of his omnipotence and his, what? Piety, now, piety is taken in the sense of mercy, right? And this is a measure excelling every human capacity, right? Whence never, nunquam, I guess, huh? That's never, isn't it? Mm-hmm. Whence never is a man able so much to love God as he should be, what? Loved. Loved. But what does, in French de Sales say, you know, we're thankful that God loves himself as much as he is lovable, right? Because none of us love him as much as he should be loved, you know? I think Shakespeare should be admired more than most he should be admired. I was telling you, I was reading this little biography of Tennyson, the poet, right? He died there with the Shakespeare in his hands, right, huh? Reading Simple Eye. He would have been better to die with the Bible in his hands, but it was kind of appropriate that poet should die with Shakespeare in his hands, right, huh? It's like Washington Irving, you know, told his nephew there at the end of his life there, you know, it's ideal for me to, you know, to expect the credit, you know, or to be admired, he says, you know, Shakespeare and one or two others said it all. I mean, what, what, what? What more have I got to say? Yeah, what, what, why should I be? You know, that's just the way, that's probably the way Tennyson felt a bit too, you know, he wanted to read again the conclusion of Simple Eye. It was a marvelous play, beautiful, beautiful play. One of those plays I came upon by myself, you know, never had to record for me in class by some English professor. I said, what a, what a play. That's a play, too, right, where a man thinks his wife has been unfaithful, right, because he's been deceived by a villain, right? But there's forgiveness there, right? It's one of the mercy-forgiveness plays, you know, the beautiful plays. Shakespeare's writing was at the end of his life, huh? It's a mercy-forgiveness plays. So one measure, then, of theological virtues, and one way of saying the object of them is, what, God himself, right? Well, you can't love God too much, right, huh? You can't believe him too much. And this, he says, is a measure excelling every human faculty. Whence never can a man so much love God as he, what, ought to be loved, huh? So we have to ask, apologize to God, huh? For not loving him as much as he should be loved, huh? But she'll always try to love him more, huh? Nor so much to believe or hope in him as, what? As he ought to be. Ought to be, right, huh? Whence multominus. Much less, therefore, is it able for there to be their excess, right, huh? So someone says, you love God too much, and they say, well, you're there. We think that. You believe God too much, you know. I mean, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you. You, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you. You, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you You, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you, you. from our And that could be unfolded some more, right? A person grows in their spiritual life, don't they? They should go forward rather than backwards, at first. If you're not going forward, they say you go backwards, I guess. That's what happens, huh? And I don't know about my friend there, Solomon, you know. Our liturgy used to say, speaking to God, you taught your divine wisdom to Solomon. And he became as one who knew no wisdom. Let me get a little insight as to what the second thing means here in the implied objections, right? Now, the first objection was arguing, well, that the theological, I mean, the moral and intellectual virtues have a middle way than these, right? To the first effort, it should be said that the good of the intellectual virtues and the moral virtues consists in the middle by conformity to a rule or measure which one can, what, transcend, right, huh? You can say, what is not is, right? You can eat more than you should eat, right? You can drink more than you should, right, huh? Which is not in the theological virtues. Notice he says, per se lo quendo, right, huh? It's quite a distinction, this person, per accident, huh? This has been said, huh? Now, second objection. To the second it should be said that the moral virtues and the intellectual virtues perfect the understanding and the appetite, as do the theological virtues, right? But they perfect it in order to a measure and a rule that is, what? He's a great man. But the theological virtues, in order to a measure and a rule that is, what? Once there's not a similar reason, right? So where does Plato talk about that? Distinguished student down there. What does Plato say, huh? It's in the laws, isn't it? He quotes the opinion of, some people say, man is a measure of all things. He says, no, no, no, no. God is a measure of all things, right, huh? But most fully, you're in the theological virtues, right, huh? What's his name? Boethius, right, in the Constellation of Philosophy, he says that happiness is a perfect good, right, huh? Well, the only perfect goodness is God, therefore happiness is God, right? So any human happiness is more happiness, the more it is, what? God. Yeah, the more it is God-like, huh? Think of food. What nourishes and sustains life. This is my own reflection, but no matter how much food you put in your body, the body is going to die. So, well, that good that food does it. So, it's more like food for your mind. It's real food. And that's what it says in the Gospel about, blessed is he who eats bread in the kingdom of heaven. That's what his father is all interpreted. That's to see God. That's food for God. That's real food. Feast for reason. It's convivium, as Thomas calls it, huh? Sacrum convivium. Sacrum convivium. Now, the theory, one gets closer to that second thing that was said in the text. To the theory, it should be said that hope is a middle between presumption and despair, right? Ex parte nostra, right, huh? I was saying ex parte nostra, not in the part of God, right? As if, you know, it's between trusting God too much or not at all, or not enough, you know? You know? But ex parte nostra. Insofar as someone has said to, what? Resume from this that he hopes from God a good that exceeds his, what? Condition. Yeah. So, myself, I'm going to rank above the apostles and right next to Mary, right? Or even above her and next to Christ, right? You know? That's presumptuous. That's my part. One time, because there's discussions, you know, who's greater, Peter or John, you know, and the Vikings up here, but perhaps it's presumptuous that, but to put yourself up there, you know, if there's a possible one, that's, that's, that's, that's... Or he does not hope for what, according to his own condition, he's able to hope, right? And that's, I suppose, the more I can despair, right? But there is not able to be a superabundance, an excess of hope, on the side of God, whose goodness is, what? Infinite, huh? Likewise, faith is a middle between two contrary heresies, that's the element of truth, right? But not by comparison to the object which is God, huh? To which one is not able to believe too much, huh? But insofar as ipso, opinion, human, it's on the side of man, right, huh? That the human opinion itself is a middle between, what? Contrary opinions, huh? It's a very subtle thing, you know, but it's a beautiful, beautiful text. Let's take a little break down here, please. Let's take a little break down here, please. Let's take a little break down here, please. Then, we're up to 65 now. It's very interesting, this thing, the connection of the virtues. Then we'll have to consider about the connection of the virtues. Thomas is very thorough, you know. And about this, five things are asked. First, whether the moral virtues are connected to each other. Secondly, whether the moral virtues are able to be without charity. Third, whether charity is able to be without them. And then, among the theological virtues, whether faith and hope can be without charity. Well, I think in God, you're going to have charity, but you don't have moral virtues, right? And then the reverse, whether charity can be without them. Faith and hope. I'm dying to find out about these things. It's an interesting thing. To the first, then, one goes forward thus. It seems that the moral virtues are not connected of, what? Necessity, right, huh? For the moral virtues are sometimes caused from the practice of their acts, right? As is proved in the second book of Nicomachean Ethics. But man can be exercised in the acts of some virtue. Without this, that he'd be exercised in the acts of a, what? Another virtue. Another virtue. Therefore, one moral virtue can be had without another. That makes sense, doesn't it? Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Moreover, magnificence, huh? Does great things with money, right? And magnanimity, right? Are certain moral virtues, right? But someone can have the other moral virtues without this, that he'd have magnificence. And magnanimity, he can have, what, liberality, and he can have, Aristotle calls it philatemia, right? Small honors, right? As the philosopher says in the fourth book of the Ethics, huh? That the, what? The poor. The poor cannot be magnificous, right? I was able to have certain other virtues, huh? And he who is worthy of little things, huh, and is dignified by them, huh, is temperate. But he's not magnanimous, huh? The Jupiter symphony, in other words, right? Or the 36th symphony, huh? Therefore, the moral virtues are not connected, huh? Moreover, the moral virtues perfect the desiring part of the soul. So also the intellectual virtues perfect the understanding part. But the intellectual virtues are not connected, for one can have one science without having another one, huh? Therefore, also, neither are the moral virtues, what, connected them. Moreover, if the moral virtues are connected, this is not except because they are connected in foresight. Speaking of it. Thank you. But this does not suffice for the connection of the moral virtues. For it seems that someone can be prudent about the things that should be done that pertain to one virtue, without this that he be prudent in those things which pertain to another. Just as one is able to have an art about some things that are makeable, without this that he has art about others. Yeah. You might be able to build a house, but not bake bread. Mm-hmm. Yeah. Yeah. But foresight is the right reason about things to be done. Therefore, it's not necessary for the moral virtues to be connected, huh? But against this is what the great Ambrose says upon the Gospel of St. Luke, huh? Mm-hmm. For they are connected to each other, right, huh? And the virtues are chained together, I guess. Mm-hmm. So the one who has one would seem to have many, huh? Ambrose is one of the four or five greatest doctors of the Western Church, right? Mm-hmm. Fathers. And Augustine, another one, says in the sixth book about the Trinity, the virtues which are in the human soul, in no way are separated from each other, right? He says, strong. And Gregory, he's another one of the four or five greatest, huh? And Gregory says in the 22nd book of Moralia that one virtue without the others is either not at all, right? Mm-hmm. Or at least it's what? Imperfect. Imperfect. And now Cicero, truly, says in the second of the Discipline Questions, if one virtue one confesses you not to have, it's necessary for you to have none of them, right? Yeah. That's pretty strong, right? Totally, right? Mm-hmm. These guys, they're good men, so they must know. Well, Thomas says, I answer it should be said that moral virtue can be taken either perfect or what? Imperfect. Imperfect. So you see that distinction is having something to do with the determination of the question. Imperfect moral virtue, as temperance or foietude, is nothing other than a, what, some inclination in us existing towards some work of the genus of, what, good things, right? For doing, making, doing that. But such, whether such an inclination is in us from nature, right? Or from, what, becoming accustomed to it. And in this way, taking moral virtues and some in perfect state, they are not, what, connected, right? For we see that someone, either from the natural complexion of his body, or from some accustomed, to be prompt to the works of, what? Liberality. Liberality. Who nevertheless is not prompt to the works of, what? Chastity. Chastity, right? So can a man be brave, like, can he have courage, say, without being temperate, right? Go berserk there and take a town. Must have, we had some kind of, some kind of courage, right, to take the town, but then they don't show too much chastity, right? You hear what the great Euclid of Magara said, right, huh? You know, when the city had been sacked, you know? What did you lose? I lost my gold, I lost two of my daughters, and so on. And he came to him, what did you lose? And he says, I didn't see anybody carrying off wisdom. The medievalist, you know, confuses Euclid of Magara with Euclid of Alexandria. Now, perfect moral virtue is a habit, right? Inclining us into a good, right? Work, right? And to doing it, what? Doing it well. Well, and taking moral virtues in this sense, perfect, right? It should be said that they are, what? Connected, right? As by almost everybody, right? Is laid down, right, huh? You see those great authorities there, Ambrose, Augustine, Gregory, and even the pagan there. Totally. And Plato and Aristotle, I think. Of which reason, the reason of which is twofold assigned, right? According as, in diverse ways, some distinguish the cardinal virtues, huh? So recalls what we said before about the two ways they distinguish them. As has been said, some distinguish them according to certain general conditions of virtues, huh? As that discretion pertains to prudence, rightness to justice, moderation to temperance, and firmness of soul to, what? Fortitude, right? In whatever matter, these are, what? Considered, right, huh? And according to this, there manifestly appears a reason for their, what? Connection, right? For firmness does not have the praise of virtue if it be without, what? Moderation, right? Or rectitude or discretion. And the same reason can be given about the others, right? These are conditions, general conditions that are found in every virtue, right? Although one of them may be more in one than another, but in all of them, right? So you can say the courageous man is just, I mean strong, but so is the temperate man strong, right? Confusing, you know, to go to this den of iniquity with you and so on. And this reason of their connection is assigned by Gregory in the 22nd book of the Moralia, saying that the virtues, if they are, what? Disjointed from each other, right? Disconnected. Are not able to be perfect, right? That goes back to Thomas' time, that distinction, right? Is Gregory using it, huh? According to the ratio virtue, because neither is that true prudence, which is what? Just, temperate, or is not. Yeah. That is not true prudence, which is not just and temperate or strong. And the same thing he joins about the others, virtues. And a similar reason is assigned by Augustine, right? Studied under Ambrose in the 6th book of Trinity. Others distinguish the force and virtues according to their, what? What matters, huh? Where they name, what? Four different special virtues, right? And according to this, the connection of them, the reason for the connection of them is assigned by Aristotle in the 6th book of the Ethics. Because as has been said above, no moral virtue can be without foresight, can be had without foresight, in that it is, what? A property of moral virtue to make a right choice, since it is a habit with choice. But to a right choice, not only does it suffice an inclination to the proper end, to the suitable end, which is directly to the habit of moral virtue, but also that one directly choose those things which are towards the end, which comes about through foresight, which takes counsel and judges and commands those things which are towards the end. Likewise, prudence cannot be had without having the moral virtues, since prudence is right reason about things to be done, which, just as they proceed from the beginnings, from the ends of the things to be done, to which one has himself rightly only through the, what? Moral virtues. Yeah. Whence, just as speculative science cannot be had without the understanding of the beginnings, so neither can prudence be without the moral virtues. You have to know what the ends are, you've got to be stable in them by the moral virtues, right? Otherwise you're not going to take counsel well and judge these things well, let alone command them, right? And thus prudence cannot without the moral virtues, from which manifestly it follows that the moral virtues are what? Connected. Connected, huh? Those are the two ways that they must be connected for them to be, what? Perfect, right, huh? Two ways of understanding the cardinal virtues, huh? Now what about the first objection here, right? It says, can't you be exercised in one of these things, right? So we get this, what does Plato have there in the city there, you know, you're using the gymnastic exercises to produce what? Courage, right, huh? My son's at West Point there, you know, you're jumping off this high bridge, you know, you've got the, you know, all this arm in you and stuff, you know. Well, it gives you a little bit of courage, right? This sort of stuff. That'll kill you. Yeah, yeah, yeah. But are you being, you know, you know, trained in temperance at this point? I don't know. To the first effort should be said that of moral virtues, some perfect man according to the common status, right, huh? That is, as regards to those things which are commonly occur to be done in the whole life of what? Or in every life of man, right? Once it's necessary that man at the same time be exercised about the matters of all the moral virtues, right? That's why Plato had music as well as gymnastic, right? Because they're both courage and temperance, huh? And if one is exercised about all of them operating well, he acquires the habit of all the moral virtues. If one is exercised by acting well about one matter, not about another one, right? If, for example, he has himself, well, about angers, not about concubicenses, right, huh? He acquires a habit to refrain, what? Angers, which does not have the notion of virtue on account of the defect of what? Foresight, right? Right. Which is corrupted about what? Desirees, concubicenses. Just as natural inclination does not have the perfect notion of virtue if prudence is what? Right. Yeah. If you don't have all the virtues there, you have some vices in place of some of the virtues, then your what? Foresight is corrupted, right? Can't judge right, can't take the council well, right? Yeah, healthy. Now, these diminishes. Some moral virtues there are which perfect man according to some eminent status, right, huh? Not just what are common in every life, huh? As magnificence and what? Magnificent. Magnificent. And because the exercise about the matters of these virtues does not occur to each one commonly, right, huh? one is able to have the other moral virtues without this that he has, what, has the habit of these virtues enact, speaking about the virtues that are, what, acquired, right, huh? But nevertheless, having acquired the other virtues, he has these virtues in ability that is near, right? So that if I suddenly get a lot of money then I can, I am a generous man, right? I can easily get, what, magnificence, right, huh? So when someone through exercise is adept at having the reality about, what? Little donations. Little donations and expenditures. If it comes to him an abundance of monies, right, huh? By a mariko a jichitzi, all right? He acquires the habit of, what, magnificence, right, huh? Just as a geometer by a little bit of study acquires the knowledge of some conclusion which he'd never, what, considered, right? Would you agree to that there, my geometer friend? Yeah, you should cover that, huh? Okay. That, however, which we have that in, what, quickness is that we might have, okay? So we said to have that, right, which we can put to get, right, okay? According to that of the philosopher in the second book of the physics. What differs little as where seems to be what? Nothing, right, huh? Okay. And to this, he says, is clear the response to the, what? Second one. Second one, right, huh? Because that was based upon magnificence and magnanimity, right, huh? So you might not have these in act, but you're not too far away from them, right? Okay. Now, with regard to that first paragraph, if a man, you know, has meekness, he can control his anger, but he doesn't have temperance, wouldn't he be a good judge in meekness? In that area, wouldn't he be a good judge? What's the right property? Yeah, but it's really one, foresight is really one virtue, right, huh? And so, foresight is corrupted by... You say it's concupiscence or whatever. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Then, how can he judge well, right, huh? He honestly wouldn't be a good judge in that area. Yeah, yeah. But he would be a good judge. So, I see, so he wouldn't have the virtue... The virtue is weakened, yeah, the virtue of foresight, But he would be a good... Yeah.