Prima Secundae
Lecture 162: Infused Virtues and the Mean in Moral Virtue

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So you want to divide the four into three and one, then I see, no? Right. You want to divide the four into three and one, then, huh? Rather than two and two. Yes. You read my mind. The third one goes forward thus. It seems that apart from the theological virtues, right, there are not other virtues poured into us or infused into us from what? God, right, huh? I don't hear much about these in sermons to you, infused virtues, more virtues. You hear about faith, hope, and charity sometimes, right? But I don't much about infused virtues, huh? So to the third one proceeds thus. It seems that apart from the theological virtues, there are not other virtues poured into us by God. For those things which are able to come to be from second causes, right, do not come immediately from God, right? Like the apple, right, huh? It comes from the apple tree immediately, right? God is the remote cause. Except perhaps sometimes miraculously, right, huh? Because, as Dionysius says, the law of the divine nature is that the last thing should be brought to the vital, the middle ones, right? That's the only way of proceeding. But the intellectual virtues, the moral ones, are able to be caused in us through our own acts, as has been said in the previous article. Not therefore suitably are caused in us through infusion, right, huh? Sounds pretty good, huh? So far, so good. Who could disagree with that, huh? Moreover, in the works of God, much less is there something superfluous than in the works of, what? Nature. Nature does nothing excess, right, huh? So why doesn't nature, you know, like in the fairy tale, mix them with three eyes? Why does nature have just two eyes, huh? You know, you need two eyes, though, right, to have that sense of distance, right, huh? But you don't need that third eye out, you don't need a third leg out, which is sufficient, right? What? Actually, a fourth arm would come in. You got to turn up to the door and turn it around. Didn't get along with two arms. Well, see, then you could drive and text. I'd get two brains, though. Well, it depends on the driver. But to ordering us to the supernatural good, the theological virtues, what, suffice, right? Therefore, there are not other, what, supernatural virtues, which, what? Ought to be in us, ought to be caused in us, I think. Yeah. Which are necessary to be caused in us by God, huh? Moreover, nature doesn't do to two what it can do to one. And much less in God. But God inserts in our soul the seeds of the virtues. As said in the gloss in Hebrew 1. Therefore, it's not necessary that other virtues in us be caused by infusion, right, huh? Multiplying virtues without the cessation, that's what this is projecting to, right? But against this is what is said in the Book of Wisdom, Chapter 8. He teaches sobriety and justice, prudence and virtue, huh? Where did Thomas get this principle? He begins the body of the article with. The answer should be said is necessary for effects to be, what, proportioned to their causes and beginnings, huh? Where did that come up, Joshua? Where did it come up last night? Because it's one of the corollaries from the four kinds of causes, or the corollaries of the ways of being caused. Which is it? The singular causes. Yeah, yeah. And this is stating in general here, what he's saying, right, huh? The cause and effect have got to be, what, proportional, right, huh? I see an objection in this De Veritate today, where Thomas' objection says that this objection is God's foresight, right, his providence, extending down to corruptible things, right? They don't seem to be proportioned to God in corruptible things, because God makes nothing defective, right? And corruption is a defect, right? So how can that be something that's an effect of God, right? Well, it's based on this principle here, right, huh? That's the third corollary, I think, isn't it? The third corollary. First corollary, from the ways of cause, right? And the first corollary is the causes and act and effects and act are together, right? The second one was the one of, what, go to the highest cause, right? And the third one, the two proportion. But anyway, that's a famous principle that Thomas learned from pagan Greek, yeah? But all virtues, both intellectual and moral, which are acquired by our acts, proceed from certain, what, natural beginnings pre-existing in us, but in the place of these natural beginnings, there is conferred upon us by God, right, theological virtues, by which we are ordered to a, what? Yeah. So why do you need those theological virtues, huh? Yeah. Yeah, yeah. Because an actual virtue would not be proportioned to an end that is above nature, right, huh? Okay. When is it necessary that to these, what? Theological virtues. Yeah. Theological virtues. Proportionally, they respond, other habits divinely caused in us, huh? Which thus have themselves to theological virtues, as the moral, intellectual virtues have themselves to the, what, natural beginnings of the virtues, huh? That's a mouthful, right, huh? It's based upon that one principle that Aristotle had brought out, right, huh? The cause and effects must be, what? Proportionally, yeah. Now, to the first objection there, right, huh? To the first therefore it should be said that some moral virtues, intellectual virtues, can be caused in us from our own, what? Acts. Acts, huh? Nevertheless, these are not proportioned to the, what? The logical virtues. And therefore it's necessary for others, proportioned to them, to be immediately caused by, what? God, huh? Now, what about the distinction? Because it was actually the theological virtues doing that, right? Don't the theological virtues suffice to order us to the supernatural? To the second should be said that the theological virtues sufficiently, what? Well, order us to the supernatural end according to a certain, what? Beginning, right? Strange to say that, right? As regards God himself immediately, right? But it's necessary that to other infused virtues the soul be perfected about, what? Other things. Other things. In order nevertheless to, what? God. God, huh? So it's other things in God, right, that orders us in a way disproportioned to the, what? Theological virtues, huh? It's difficult to see, right, huh? She didn't bring this out until here, right? Before we talked about theological virtues, right? We talked about intellectual moral virtues, right? And here we didn't talk about what's in between, okay? It's all deducing from the principle where Aristotle gave him, right? That causes and effects must be proportional, right? So there's Dominic bringing the wine over the hills there to the nuns in his convent, right? So there's Dominic bringing the wine over the hills there to the nuns in his convent, right? So there's Dominic bringing the wine over the hills there to the nuns in his convent. So there's Dominic bringing the wine over the hills there to the nuns in his convent. and abstaining himself from white. Well, that's obviously huge virtue, right, huh? Now, the third objection, huh? There are the seeds of these virtues, huh? And that's what those are, the natural seeds, right? So he says, the power of those beginnings naturally in us does not extend beyond the proportion of what? Nature. And therefore, in order to a supernatural end, man needs to be perfected through what? Other beginnings added above that, huh? Seems to be this cast the light upon the need for purgatory, too, right? A little break here now. Go on to Article 4 here. In the fourth, then, one goes forward thus. It seems that the infused virtues are not of a different species from the, what, acquired virtues. It was acquired by repeated acts. Interesting that Thomas should see the necessity of this, huh? Even though it seemed pretty clear from what's gone before that they're not the same, right? For the acquired virtue and the infused virtue, according to the things foresaid, do not seem to differ except according to the last, what, end. But habits and human acts do not receive their species from the last end, but from the, what, approximate. Therefore, moral virtues or intellectual virtues that are infused do not differ from those that are, what, acquired virtues. Right? So if I use my hands to drink and live it up, use my hands to pray, right, then it's still the same hand, isn't it? Right? Even being sort of a different ultimate end, but the same hand, exactly. Use my eyes to look at pornography or something. Use my eyes to look at pornography. Yeah. Why isn't it the same way here? Moreover, habits are known by their acts, right? But the same is the act of infused temperance, for example, right, and acquired, namely to moderate the desires of touch, right? And therefore, they don't differ in, what, in species. Moreover, acquired, virtue, and infused differ according to this, that the one is immediately made by God. Yeah, I suppose the other by the, what? But the same in species is man whom God formed and whom nature generated, right? So the first man was made from clay, right, by God, right, then? And the young men are made by their parents, right? Right. And the eye whom the, he gives a blind man born, right? And that which is formed in generation, right, the formative power causes. Therefore, it seems that there is the same, what, the same in species is acquired virtue and infused virtue. You're all convinced, huh? Okay. But against this, is it any difference placed in a definition, any difference, diversifies the, what, species, huh? I used to say sometimes, in trying to emphasize that to students in a way of proportion to them, right? I said, it's like spelling, right, huh? If you leave out one letter, or you change the order of letters, you don't have the same, what, word, huh? The definition is that important, right, huh? I was reading about the poet Tennyson, right, huh? And he had this famous poem, it's called Maud, M-A-U-D, and it got a lot of bad reviews, right? Although Browning and others, you know, thought, it's American, you know? And some of those saying, you know, there seems to be one, too many letters in there. It shouldn't be M-A-D. And that's the way the definition is, right? So you've got one part, or you've got to change one, right? Definitions are like what numbers, as you were saying earlier, right? But in the definition of infused virtue is laid down, among the differences, right? What God in us, without us, works. This has been said above, huh? Therefore, acquired virtue, to which this does not belong, is not of the same species with the infused one, huh? I answer, it should be said, that in two ways, habits are distinguished in what? In one way, as has been said before, according to what? Special and formal reasons of their what? Objects, right, huh? Now, the object of any virtue is the good considered in its own what? Matter, right? Just as the object, temperance, is the good of what? Things that are pleasant in the desires of the what? Sense of touch, huh? He talks about that, he's talking about temperance there, you know, the glutton, he wanted a longer throat, you know, so he had no food going down, so, like a giraffe, or like a, kind of a way of sizing, you know, the emphasis on touch there, you know? Which formal reason, of which object, the formal reason is what? From reason, right? Which institutes the mode or the measure in these, what? Desires, right? But that is material, which is on the side of the, what? Desires themselves, huh? But it is manifest that of another reason is the mode or the measure, right, huh? Thomas, you know, quote that quote of Augustine there, where mode is what measure fixes, right, huh? But it manifests that there is another reason, the mode or the measure, which is placed upon these, what? Desires, according to the rule of human reason, and according to the divine rule, right, huh? For example, in the taking of food, right, huh? The measure established by human reason is that it not harm the, what? Health. Yeah, well-being of the body, nor that it impede the use of reason, like too much venom, right? But according to the rule of divine law, it requires that man, what? Casting it to his body. Casting it to his body. Yeah, his body. Bring it to servitude. And bring it into servitude, and that's a quote from 1 Corinthians, huh? To the absence of food and drink and others of this sort, right, huh? I was reading the lights there of Benedict a little bit in Scholastica, right? You know, the famous thing at the end of her life, Scholastica, was like three days away from her dying. But anyway, she wanted, she would meet Benedict like once a year, and she wanted him to stay. He said, no, no. The rule says, you know, that if you're near the monastery, you can't stop off some other place, but you've got to go to the monastery, right? So she prayed to God, and this horrible storm erode, you know, and you couldn't go back to the monastery, right? So they stayed there and awake and prayed and so on, yeah. And then a few days later, she died, and we said to her, we saw the storm, right? I said, what have you done? Sister, right? You know, and she said, well, you wouldn't listen to me, so I prayed to God, right? No, but you can go home now if you want to, she says. It's a horrible, horrible storm. You used to do it, right? So then you've got to stay with her, you know, and pray and so on. Well, if you judge the point of human things, it was mean of him not to stay, right? Then, you know, God saw otherwise, right? And it's the matter, right? But he's going to go according to the rule of the law, I mean, the human law. Yeah, I mean, of the monster, right? It's a little more to the line law, right? Once it's manifest that infused temperance, right, and they acquire different species, and the same reason about the other virtues, right? So they differ in their what? Their measure, yeah. Yeah. One is measured by a different thing than the other, right? One is measured by a different species, right? One is measured by a different species, right? One is measured by a different species, right? One is measured by a different species, right? One is measured by a different species, right? One is measured by a different species, right? One is measured by a different species, right? In another way, habits are distinguished in species according to those things to which they are what? Ordered. Ordered, right? For there is not the same in species the health of a man and of a horse on account of the diverse natures to which they are what? Ordered. Ordered, right? And in the same way, the philosopher says, who's this guy? In the third book of the politics, right? That diverse are the virtues of citizens according as they have themselves well to diverse types of what? Cities, right? So what makes one a good citizen of a different kind of city, right? A monarchy or a democracy, right? Won't be the same. And in this way, the what? Different species, the moral virtues that are infused through which men have themselves well in order to this, that they are citizens of what? The saints. Yeah, the domestic house of God, huh? And the other acquired virtues according to which man has himself well in order to what? Human things. Yeah. In other words, by the virtues that Aristotle talks about in the Comarcan ethics, one is disposed well to live in the city, right, huh? Get along with one's neighbors and so on, right, huh? But by these infused moral virtues, one is ordered well to be a member of the heavenly community, right, huh? Again, a good reason why it's going to be a purgatory, huh? This is very demanding, though, right, huh? Because the acquired moral virtues, you know, are pretty important, right? And people can feel pretty satisfied with those, right, huh? If they have them, right? Most of them don't even have them. But I get these other ones in addition. Now, to the first objection, he says, it should be said that infused virtue and acquired one that only differ according to their order to the last end, but also according to their order to their own, what? Objects, right, huh? To the second, it should be said. The second objection is saying, well, they're both trying to moderate the desires of the sense of touch. But for a different reason, the, what? The acquired temperance, right, moderates the desires of the delights of the sense of touch, right? And infused temperance has been said, huh? Once they do not have the same, what? Act. Act, huh? To the third, it should be said, huh? That the eye of a man, what? Born blind, huh? God makes for the same act in which he forms eyes according to, what? Nature, right? And that's why they are the same, what? Species, right? And the same, you know, there would be the same reason if God willed miraculously to cause in men the kind of virtues that are acquired by acts, right? But this is not what is being proposed, right? Because the ones he's made for different, what? End, right? Than the other. They're already cool, right? Oh. Question 64, what's the significance of the number 64? It's a cube of a cube. Yeah, it's the first number that is both a square and a cube, right? So it's a square of what? Eight. And it's a cube of what? Yeah. So if you take the square of what? Of two and the cube of that, or you take the cube of two and the square of that, you get the same number, 64. So that's the first number, it's both the square number and the cube number, right? Then we ought to consider about the properties of the virtues, right? And first about the middle of virtues, right? When Aristotle approaches that in the ethics there, how does he approach the idea that virtue lies in the middle? When does he take the kind of likeness there, if I remember correctly? Yeah, yeah. Most people admit that, right, huh? You can have the house too hot or the house too cold, right? It's too hot in here, you know? Or it's too cold in here, you know? And when you cook the meat, you can cook it too much, obviously. Cook it not enough, right, huh? This is raw! Yeah. It's burnt. This is burnt, right, huh? You put salt and pepper on something, you can put too little or too much, right? The golden ball too. Yeah, yeah. I still hurt, I still, you know, time to get to put too much pepper in the soup, you know? I just started running the house for some time. It's kind of died down now. Now that the kids are gone. But, you know, if you break the leg of the chair and you cut a board, you can cut it too long or too short. You've got to just think, huh? Measure it three times, cut it once. Yeah. If you drink wine, you make it too much or too little, right? Thomas says you should drink Adelaritate. Okay. Secondly, about the connection of the virtues, huh? That'll be the next question. 65. Third, about the, what? Equality of them, right? That'll be in question, what? 66, huh? And then about the duration, question, what? 67, right? So the first part of this premium is the next four, what? Questions. Questions, huh? Okay, but now coming back to the first one. About the first, four things are asked. First, whether moral virtues are in the middle. Secondly, whether the middle of moral virtue is the middle of the thing or of what? Reason, huh? Of course, you know what Aristotle says, right? It's the middle of reason, right? So we bring out the turkey on the thing. Shall I eat half the turkey? Well, that'd be the middle of the thing, right? Or you bring out a jug, you know, and should I drink half the bottle? No. Should I drink what is either too much for me or too little for me, right? Should I eat enough to maintain my strength, right? But not to get fat, right? So how does Aristotle define moral virtue? Habit with choice, existing in the middle towards us, right? Determined by right reason, right? It's not the middle of the thing, then, is it? You have to have, I mean, justice seems to be different than the other two moral virtues. It seems to be a different set. Now, the theory article. The intellectual virtues consist in the, what? Middle, right, huh? What does Kent say? All my reports go with the modest truth, nor mourn or clipped, but so, right? Or what does Falstaff say? They say, more or less than the truth. They are villains and the sons of darkness, huh? He wants them to lie across. We were talking about that before, you know. Often the truth is in between two extremes, right? Those who say that there are three persons in God and three natures, and those who say there's one person and one nature, the truth is in between those two extremes. Or in Christ, there's, what, two persons because there's two natures, or because one person is one nature. Well, one of those is correct. The other one is, what, entirely mistaken, right? You can't explain why anybody would think that, right? If there's really only one person and one nature, why do you think there's two persons and two natures, right? But if there's one person and two natures, then you see, well, you could explain the two errors, right? But that's the truth, and it's in between. There's two extremes, right? What about the theological virtues, right? Do they consist in the middle? And you love God too much as well as too little? We'll see what he says. It should be interesting. The first one proceeds thus. It seems that moral virtue does not consist in the middle. For the last is what? Repugnant to the idea of the middle. But it's of the notion of virtue, the what? The ultimate. For it is said in the first book of the universe, that virtue is the what? Yeah. Therefore, moral virtue does not consist in the middle. Virtue is the completion of the power, right? Moreover, that which is greatest, maximum, is not the middle. But some moral virtues tend to that which is the maximum. That's magnanimity, right? It's about the greatest honors, huh? The magnificence is about the greatest, what? Expenses and so on. As is said in the fourth book of the Ethics, right? As opposed to what? Philotemia, which is about lesser honors, right? And liberality, which is about little sums, right? Therefore, not every moral virtue is in the what? Middle, right? The unanimous man does great things in all the virtues, right? Like Caesar, right? Or Alexander, weeping no more worlds to conquer, right? Moreover, if it's of the notion of moral virtue, that it be in the middle. It is necessary that moral virtue not be perfected, but more be corrupted, tending towards the what? Extreme, right? But some moral virtues are perfected through this that they tend to the extreme as virginity, right? Which abstains from all venereal pleasure. And thus it holds the extreme and is the most perfect chastity, right? And to give all things to what? The poor is the most perfect mercy or liberality, huh? Therefore, it seems that it is not of the notion of moral virtue to be in the middle, right? How much is in the last part of this third book? How much is in the last part of this third book? How much is in the last part of this third book? How much is in the last part of this third book? How much is in the last part of this third book? How much is in the last part of this third book? How much is in the last part of this third book? How much is in the last book? One of these Summa Gargiantilas takes up the religious orders, right? And he takes up the three vows and so on, right? These are the kind of objections you get against these things, right? That they're going outside the mean, right? Okay. But here he's not attacking, this objection is not attacking those things, but holding them up is, they're good, right? But they obviously go off the mean, right? Therefore, right? Okay. And what does the character say in Shakespeare? Do you think there'll be no more cakes and ale because you're virtuous? But against this is what the philosopher says, huh? Not just any philosopher, he is the philosopher, right? Did the guy say Aristotle is somebody, he says? He sure is, huh? Or as the philosopher says in the second book of the Ethics, that moral virtue is a habit with choice, right? Existing in the, what? Middle. That's not the whole definition, but the middle is determined by right reason, right? As the wise men would do. The answer should be said, this is clear from the things foresaid, that the virtue of its very, what? Definition, notion, orders man to the good, right? But moral virtue properly is perfective of the desiring part of the soul, but about some determined, what? Matter, right? So moral virtue is the virtue of the part that is not rational essentially, but where it takes the reason, right? Now, the measure and the rule of the motion of the appetite about things that are desirable is reason itself, right? So does anger know how much you should be angry? So if you bump into me, should I get angry? Maybe not, if it's just a pure, what? Accident, right, huh? If you're one of these high school kids that goes down the thing, not everybody goes down, you should get a little bit angry, right, huh? So the only reason you can consider these circumstances of your collision, right, huh? You're being careless, right? You know, you do it on purpose, etc. You step on my toe. But the good of anything measured and ruled consists in this that it be conformed to its, what? Rural. Just as the good in, what? Artificial things that it follow the rule of art. For the bad is consequently, right, things of this sort, with this that something is, what? Not in accord with its, what? Rule or measure. Which happens from this that either it exceeds the measure or they fall short of it. Just as manifestly appears in all things that are ruled and, what? Measured, right? So when you make a cup of tea, how long should you leave the tea leaves in them, right? I get the thing from, sometimes from my tea importer there, you know, they say this should be, you know, three minutes and ten seconds. Four minutes and, you know. I always put it, fuck, four minutes. It means once I make that, I don't get that exact, you know, but some people, you know, they talk about that, you know. I think, well, I know some guy in some tea shop there in Quebec, you know, and don't do this more than, you know. But, you know, if you... Let me rule my life. Yeah, yeah. But if you say, you know, I don't know, it's around seven or eight, something like that, different chemicals start to be released from the tea leaves, right? So now it's going to get a bad taste. You get a bitter tea, you know? So there is excess there, right? And then you could not leave it in enough to really absorb the tea, right? And therefore it is clear that the good of moral virtue consists in its being, what? Equal to the, what? Measure of reason, right? It's manifest already that between excess and defect, equality or conformity is in middle. Once it is manifestly appears, then moral virtue is in, what? Middle. So, yeah. So Aristotle actually brings out the definition of this. He goes through briefly all the moral virtues and shows they're between two extremes. So courage is between what? And temperance, he says, is kind of hard to name the two because one is something rare. But in temperance, let's say in periodism or something like that. And then he goes on later on to say that it's not equidistant between the right, the middle, right? So courage is closer to full-heartiness than to courage. Temperance is closer to virginism than to intemperance, as we call it. Excess, yeah. To the first, therefore, it should be said that moral virtue has goodness from the rule of reason. For a matter, it has the passions or the operations, right? If, therefore, moral virtue is compared to reason, according as it is a reason, it has the reason of an extreme, which is conformity, right? But excess and defect have the reason of another extreme, which is what? Deformity. If, therefore, one considers moral virtue according to its matter, it has the notion of a middle, insofar as it reduces the passion to the rule of reason. whence the philosopher says in the second book of the Ethics that virtue by its substance is a middle, insofar as the rule of virtue is placed around the proper matter. But according to what? Optimum, best, and bene is an extreme to it according to the conformity of reason. So what does Shakespeare say, huh? They are as sick that serve it with too much as they that starve with nothing, right? Therefore, it's no mean happiness, he says, to be constituted in the mean. Well, there's two different senses there, right? It's no mean happiness, it's extreme happiness, right? To be constituted in the mean. So in one sense, virtue is an extreme, right? It's extremely good. It's extremely, what? Reasonable, right? But in terms of the matter, right? It's a middle between two extremes. Yeah. But a middle that is in conformity to reason, right? You know, one of the reasons of why virtue is rare, right? That Thomas gets apart from the fact that men are inclined to pursue their the sensible good which is more known to them, right? But that the virtue is like the target, like the center of the target, right? And there's only one way we need to hit the center of the target and there's many ways to miss, right? Yeah. Yeah. So in that sense, it's what? It couldn't be better than that, huh? You know, in the old contest here in England there with the thing was to shoot the arrow so far that guy's here, right? If he had the target, you know, but that's the culmination, you know. You know, the other guy hits the target right in the middle, you know, and nothing you do is to write in there, you know. You get to do that, huh? Now it's in the Sherwood Forest where, you know, you could, you know, take the thing and try. Yeah. So, is moral virtue a middle or an extreme? Yes. A distinction, right? Yeah. It's extremely good, right? It couldn't be better, right? But it's what? In terms of the matter, it's not an extreme but a middle, right? The philosophy does it better. Shakespeare says it's better, right? There's no mean happiness, therefore, to be conscious what it didn't mean. He's a smart guy than Shakespeare. I don't know he got all his wisdom, but he's a pretty smart guy. He's a smart guy. He's a smart guy. He's a smart guy. He's a smart guy. He's a smart guy. He's a smart guy. He's a smart guy. He's a smart guy. He's a smart guy.