Prima Secundae
Lecture 157: Moral Virtues Distinguished by Objects of Passions

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It goes forward thus, it seems that the moral virtues are not distinguished according to the objects of the passions, right? For just as there are objects of the passions, so there are also objects of the operations. But the moral virtues, which are about operations, are not distinguished according to the objects of operations. For to the same virtue of justice pertains to buy and to sell a house and a horse. Therefore also neither do moral virtues, which are about the passions, are they diversified by the objects of these passions, right? Let's look at the reply to the objection. It's just, you know, an interesting point he makes here. To the first, therefore, it should be said that all objects of the same operation, according to species, have the same, what, relation to reason, right? But not all objects of the same passion, according to their, what, species, huh? Why? Because the operations are not repugnant to reason, as are the, what, passions, right? So sexual desire and the desire to drink are not opposed to reason in the same way. You know, you've got to see that from experience, right? That's what Stiles said, you've got to experience to understand ethics, right? Moreover, second objection, passions are certain acts or emotions of the sense-desiring power. But a greater diversity is required for the diversity of habits than for the diversity of acts. For diverse objects which do not diversify the species of passion, do not, what, species of moral virtue. Therefore, thus, that about all things delightful, there is one moral virtue, and similarly about what? Others. Moreover, more and less do not diversify species. But diverse delectables do not differ except according to more and less. Therefore, all things pleasant retain to one species of virtue. And for the same reason, all things terrible, and similarly to others. Therefore, not every moral virtue is not distinguished according to the objects of the passions. Look at the reply to those two objections for a second. To the second, it should be said that for a different reason, passions are diversified, and for a different one, virtues, right? We'll see that in the part of you. But to the third, it should be said that more and less do not diversify species except on account of diverse, what, relation to reason, right? That's the document of the body article. Moreover, virtue is operative of something good, so it also impede something bad. But concerning the desires of good things or diverse virtues, to wit, as temperance about what? The concupiscences of the pleasures of the sense of touch, right? Utrapalia, that's one concern with humor, right? The pleasures of play. About the pleasures of play, right? Therefore, also about what? The fears of bad things ought to be what? Diverse virtues. Let's look at the reply to that. The good, more strongly, is stronger to move us than what? The bad. Because the bad does not act except by virtue of the good. As Dionysius says in the fourth chapter, Divine Names. Whence the bad does not make for a difficulty to reason which requires a virtue, unless it be very excelling, right? Whence it seems to be one in one genus of passion. Whence about anger is there is not placed except one virtue, two with what? Yeah. And about audacity is one only to fortitude. But good enjures a what? Brings to bear a difficulty, but a virtue. Even if it not be excelling in the genus of such a passion. And therefore concerning concupiscences, there are laid down diverse moral virtues, as has been said, right? So, he says, against this is the chastity is about the pleasure in what? Venereal things, right? Mm-hmm. Abstinence, about the pleasures of what? Food. Nutrapoleia, about the pleasures of what? Yeah. I answer you, it should be said, that the perfection of virtue depends upon what? Reason. Reason, right? And the perfection of passion depends upon what? Desire. Yeah. Whence is necessary that virtues be diversified according to order to what? Reason, right? But passions according to the order to the desiring power. Now, the objects of the passions, according as they are diversely compared to the sense desiring power, cause passions differing in species, right? But according as they are compared to reason, they cause diverse species of what? Virtue. Now, there's not the same motion of reason and of the sense desiring power. Whence nothing prevents some difference of objects to cause a diversity of passions, which does not cause a diversity of virtues, as in one virtue is about many passions. And some also difference of objects can cause a diversity of passions, which does not cause a diversity of what? Diversity of virtues, which is a diversity of passions. Yeah. Since about one passion, to it, pleasure, diverse virtues are ordered, right? I think they said contrary, right? And because diverse passions pertain to diverse powers always pertain to diverse virtues, right? Therefore, a diversity of objects, which regards a diversity of powers, always diversifies species of virtue. As when something is good absolutely, and something good with a certain, what? Difficulty. Difficulty. And because, in a certain order, reason rules the lower parts of man, and also extends itself to exterior things, so also according as one object of passion is grasped by the sense or by imagination, or also by reason, and also according as it pertains to the soul, the body, or to exterior things. It has a diverse set. Relation to reason. And consequently, it is apt to diversify virtues. For the good of man, which is the object of love, and of concubiscence, and of pleasure, can be taken as either pertaining to the sense of the body, or to the interior, what? Grasping. Grasping of the soul. Grasping of the soul. And this, whether it is ordered to the good of man in himself, or in regard to the body, or in regard to the soul. Or whether it's ordered to the good of man, in order to what? Other things. And all such diversity, on account of its diverse order to reason, diversifies the virtue. This is a mouthful that he said, right? Thus, therefore, if we consider some good, if it is what? If we consider something good, if it is apprehended by the sense of what? Touch. And pertaining to the consistency of human life in the individual or in the species, there are the pleasurable things of food in venereal matters, right? It will be pertaining to the virtue of what? Temperance, huh? But the pleasures of the other senses, since they are not vehement, do not, what? Render some difficulty to what? Reason, right? And therefore, about them, there is not laid down some virtue. Which is about the, what, difficult, as Aristotle says, just as hard as about some difficulty, right? So is there a virtue that moderates the pleasure I take in the music of Mozart? No. Now, the good that is, what, grasped not by the sense, but by an interior power, right, pertaining to the man himself according to himself, is as, for example, money, right, pecunia, and honor, right? Of which the money is ordered of itself to the good of the body, but honor consists in the apprehension of the, what, soul. And these goods can be considered either absolutely, according as they pertain to the concupisable appetite, or with a certain, what, yeah, according as they pertain to the irascible. Which distinction does not have place in the goods which delight the sense of touch? Because these are some lowy things, right? Infima things. And they belong to man according as he comes together with the, what, roots. So I used to say they're a catch, you know, we're having steak tonight, huh? A cat that seemed to... She'd perk up. Yeah. Now, about the good of money, absolutely taken, according as it is the object of concupiscence, or of pleasure, or of love, there is the virtue of what? Liberality, right? And about the good of this sort, taken with what? Difficulty, according as it is the object of what? Hope. Is magnificence. Is magnificence, right? It's large sums, right? So Aristotle takes up those two virtues, liberality and magnificence, after, takes up courage and temperance, right? He takes up courage and temperance in the third book, right? And then, at the beginning of the fourth book, he starts to take up these virtues, like liberality and magnificence, and then, what, the ones concerned with honor, right? Philotemia, he says in Greek, right? And maybe, what, anonymity, right? So he distinguishes between liberality and magnificence, because there's a difference here in the difficulty, right? These are great things, right? About the good, which is honor, if it be taken absolutely, according as it is the object of love, this is a certain virtue, which is called... Alotimia. Yeah, that is the love of what? Ani. Dilo and Tamiya. But if it be taken or considered some difficulty, according as it is the object of hope, then you have what? Anonymity. So, perhaps the highest thing in imitation in music is what? To imitate what? Anonymity. So Mozart in the 36th of the lens, in the Jupiter, right? Represents anonymity. And both are in C major, of course. Whence liberality and philotemia seem to be in the concubisable, but magnificence and magnanimity in the what? The good of man in order to another does not seem to have difficulty, but is taken as absolutely taken, right? Insofar as it's the object of the passions that can give us all. Which good can be, what? In serious things, one shows oneself to another in two ways. In one way as, what? Pleasant, agreeable, by suitable words in, what? Deeds. Deeds. And this pertains to a certain virtue, which Aristotle calls, what? Friendliness. Friendliness. Yeah. It's more like friendliness, you know. Not the virtue of friendship, right? And it can be called affability, right? Another way he renders himself to another is manifest, through his words and deeds, right? And shows himself as he is, right? And this pertains to another virtue, which is called, what? Truth. Truth, right? So if I try to make you think I'm other than I am, that can be a vice, right, huh? Villain. Son of man. Like Iago, right, huh? Iago, you know, represents himself as, what, the friend of Othello, when he's considered the good of Othello, right? Now, manifestation more, what? Closely approaches to reason than pleasure. And the serious things and the, what? Jocular. Jocular things. Whence concerning, what? The pleasures of play. There's another virtue, which the philosopher names Utrapide, right? Which means easily, what, turning. Turning. Good turn. Yeah, yeah. Shakespeare speaks that way, right? One good turn deserves another. There's turning in my head. I always understand it is that when you're constantly given to serious things, you need a break, so you have a turn. There's a good turn. That's what I think was a good turn, to relieve you of the strain. Thus, therefore, it is clear that, according to Aristotle, there are ten moral virtues about the, what? Fashions. Fashions. To wit, fortitude or courage, temperance or moderation, liberality, right? Magnificence, huh? Magnanimity and philatemia. Mildness, friendliness, truthfulness, and etrapoleia. And they're distinguished according to diverse matters, or according to diverse passions, or according to diverse, what? Objects, right? If, therefore, one adds justice, which is about operations, there are, what? Eleven, right? So Aristotle didn't say there were ten highest-generate, because he had ten fingers, right? Because here he's got eleven, right? Are there ten commandments, because, you know, Moses had ten fingers or something? Easy to remember. And he couldn't, he couldn't, yeah. And he had to remember them, so. The threes that you've talked about before, is there anything involving ten? Since you have the ten commandments, you have, well, you have the metric system, which is a human. You see, there are two tablets, you know. And there's three on one tablet, and seven on the other, right? So the first division is into what? Two. Two, right? And then the, what? The three, we've got the division of three, right? Right. Okay. Well, then the seven, huh? You divide the, what, fourth commandment against the last six, right? But then they're divided according to what? The... Your neighbor. Yeah, they're doing something, and then the, what? words, and then desire, right? So that's into three, right? So you divide, right, two or three until you get ten, right? That's what St. Thomas does with the ten categories of Aristotle, right? He said they're distinguished by the way something can be said of what? Of individual substances, right? And he first gives a division into three, right? Something is said of individual substances like you and me for a reason of what we are, like you're a man. We're generally an animal, right? We're generally a living body. We're generally a body, most generally a substance, right? Other things are said of you and me, not for a reason of what we are, but for a reason of something existing in us, right? Either absolutely, which would be quantity and quality, right? Or towards another, like I'm a teacher or something, right? Or I'm a father, I'm a brother, right? So you divide the second group, there are things said of you and reason, but there's in you, right, into what? Two, and one of them is subdivided, right? So you're getting three there, right? And then you have the last, what, six, right, huh? And he divides those again into what? Two or three, right, huh? Yeah. We usually divide the man's category, right, against the other five. The man has something proper to himself, like being clothed, right, huh? Being armed, right? Being shod and so on, right? And then you have the five divided into the three according to extrinsing measures, place and time, and then cause and effect, right? Acting upon undergoing, right? So you divide the six into five and one, and then you divide the five into three and two. So that's the only way, you know, to follow the rule of two or three, right? Thomas divides the Gospel of Matthew, he divides it into, what, three parts, right? Because if the size of the humanity of Christ, whereby he came into the world, he proceeded to the world, lecturing and so on, and then he passed out of the spirit of his death. So then, you know, he's always dividing it into two or three or subdividing, you know. The way Augustine and Thomas divided the Psalms, right, you can't understand division in 150, it wouldn't make any, the mind would break down, right? So they divide the Psalms into three, right? And if you take the correct numbering, which you didn't have in your, you know, I'm very, very... You're not correct numbering of Psalms. Yeah, you had the parts of the numbering, right? You did. I got the text. I got the text from Brother Elias. He got it from the Chancery. We have to report this to the Holy See. But the 50th Psalm is the Psalm of Penance, the one that Teresa of Avila likes so much. And then the 100th Psalm is one of good deeds, right? And the 150th is one of resting in God. So this corresponds to the three stages of the Christian life, right? The beginnings, right? And then the progressing in those who are resting in God, right? And so you divide it into three, right, then? And then, you know, you keep on dividing it into two or three, right? That's interesting, right? But it corresponds to the division of the Our Father, right, then? The Our Father, you divide, of course, the Ascent to God, Our Father, who art in heaven. And then you have the seven petitions, right? And you could divide them into two, the four about the good and the three about the bad, right? But Thomas, like in the Sui Theologiae, he divides them into three, huh? Two that pertain to the end, hallowed be thy name, and thy kingdom come. Two to the means to the end, thy will be done, and give us this day our daily bread. And then three about the removal of the impediments to the end, your past sins and your future temptations and so on, right? And that corresponds to the division of the Psalms, right? But it's in the order of intention, while the Psalms are in the order of carrying it out. So it's really beautiful, you know, that way Augusta and Thomas seem to divide them. But it's kind of lost when you start screwing up the numbers. I think his air coordination is in balance. I think so, yeah. I think so. We're going to have to call the bishop up. It's a little coordination. Yeah, a little coordination. We remember these things. Forgive me, because I haven't gone to Soviet classes, but within nature itself, does this rule of two and threes reflect what we see in nature? You know, outside of human discovered things. How would you divide a plant? Well, you could say eight to three, the leaves and flower, the stalk and the roots. Yeah, you get the roots there, then you get the stem, then you get the branches, right? You know? So it makes some type of sense, doesn't it? Yeah, because there's an aesthetic sense of ripeness, of proportionality, I think, which is natural to men. When you're looking at something in nature, looking at the tree, there's a balance. And you can see this reflected in art as well, where that balance is, it satisfies a certain instinct for order, maybe an aesthetic sense that's connected to art. Yeah. We were giving a passage from John Danesina, just yesterday. It was last while ago, yeah. Yeah, it was just a day ago, I think we had the Feast of St. John Danesina. Yes, actually it was yesterday for you. Yeah, yeah, yeah. But I brought the text in there, you know, being saying, you know, most divisions are into two or three, right? Okay, rarely into four, right? Never more! And so, even if there are some exceptions to this, right? There's a famous division that Aristotle gives of the quality into four species, right? But you still have a rule that's good, but it's true for the most part, right? In other words, you better, you know, think twice before you accept the division into more than two or three, right? And I'm not saying, you know, in an absolute sense that there's not a thing. I divide Shakespeare's plays into, what, four kinds, right? But, you know, some might say, you know, you could divide them into the tragedies at one end, the comedies, and then the ones in the middle, and then subdivide the two kinds of romances you have in the middle. One that goes back to the Greek romance, and then it goes back to the medieval romance. But, you know, I just divide them into these four, you know? One interesting way of showing the four kinds is to take something that you find it all for one, where a man falsely thinks his wife, her wife-to-be, is false. Of course, in Athel, we have a real tragedy, right? But in the love and forgiveness romances, right, the pride, the wife doesn't die, right? But there's a long, you know, time before forgiveness comes. And then in the, what you do about nothing, right? It's not a long thing, you know, but there's a villain who's deceived him, you know, but it's discovered, right, by these clowns, you know, who were in the police that night. And then you get the merry ways of Lindsay, you know, where the husband thinks of his wife, you know, and he gets all his friends to come up there, you know, and they can fool himself, right? So he's, you know, oh, you know. You read the play, and it's funny, right? But it's the same thing, you know, a man is falsely, you know, and you can see kind of the four kinds of plays, right? You should go from comedy, and then, yeah, I told you I worked with this guy, you know, Charlie, and his wife was insanely jealous, right? And the boss had them out to the house one time, and the boss's sister was there, and she wanted to show Charlie something in her bedroom. She went into the bedroom, you've got to tell it that way. Oh, boy. And then the girls from the bank used to come over, you know, to get a Coke or something, you know, from the package store. And one time, you know, around summer, Charlie was talking, where are you going on vacation this year, you know? It seemed they were going to the same place to Charlie. His wife was going. He says, for heaven's sake, do you see me? Don't say hello. It's ridiculous, this woman, you know. I mean, it's laughable, you know. He's been trained. But, you know, there are times, at least, it's a tragedy, right? I don't know if there's, you know, ones in between, you know. I've been wondering about this just over the last few days, because with the Triune God, and thinking about it way back then. And thinking about it way back then. And thinking about it way back then. And thinking about it way back then. When I was a kid, I was apparently involved in amateur magician stuff, and one question that he would ask, it's part of the magician's repertoire, a very super basic level, if you ask somebody not to choose a number, chances are between one and ten you're going to choose three. For some reason, most people choose three. And so I was wondering if, because of our Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and the rule of twos and threes, especially threes, if there's a principle of this three in nature, in addition. I saw it gives a sign, you know, that three is the first number about which we say all, right? See, if you and I were going to the movies, we'd say we're both going, right? See? But if there was, you know... Oh, three of them. Three of them, you know. We're all going, right? Right. You wouldn't say for two of them, you'd say we're all going. All two of us. Except for the cylinder, it's nice. It's a word. We all. We all. But I mean, there's a kind of sign here, you know, to think of this going to three, you know, to divine comedy, right? It naturally falls into three, right? You know, trilogies are most common, you know, in fiction, you know, trilogies. It's like when you get to Mozart's music there, you know, you've got to have at least three movements to make a piece complete, right? So some of Mozart's symphonies, especially the ones, are just three movements, right? But even a late, you know, symphony like the Prague Symphony, right? It's writing for his favorite town, you know, the one that we've seen the most, it's three movements, right? You know? So even though most of the late symphonies and quartets are in four movements, the earlier quartets are in three movements, right? Of course, the concerto in Mozart is always in three movements, right? So three seems to be, what, enough, right? The only famous symphony that's in two movements is Schubert's unfinished symphony. Why is that? Yeah. But it seems you've got to have it at three, right? And Aristotle says, you know, Socrates introduced the third actor at the stage, right? And that's enough to make the greatest plays that the Greeks had, right? But you have to have that third one, you know? I don't know if it's in a story, too. What? I can't quite remember, but there's the sort of, the game of that. Yeah, and like where you have the... There's a plot you have, yeah, yeah, yeah. But even something that's distorted as history, you know, when divided into ancient, medieval and modern, something like that, or in this, you know, where the story in there, McNeil there, it's divided into three differently than that, but it's divided into three, right? It seems, the mind seems to be able to grasp that. A complete meal in Quebec. Hmm? A complete meal. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Yeah, we say, in Quebec, we say, repas complet. What does that mean? It means you're going to have an appetizer. Maybe it's just to be a gentleman or something, but at a main course, it's some kind of a little dessert, right? And that's called repas complet, you know? But even, you know, the sonata movement, you know, to be formed into three parts, and exposition, and development, and recapitulation, and so on. So. So, let me stop here, you know, because this is an elf winner, right? So, let me stop here, you know, because this is an elf winner, right? So, let me stop here, you know, because this is an elf winner, right? So, let me stop here, you know, because this is an elf winner, right? Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. So, let me stop here, you know, because this is an elf winner, right? So, let me stop here, you know, because this is an elf winner, right? In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit. Amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, Guardian Angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. God, you are enlightened. Guardian Angels, strengthen the lights of our minds. Orden, illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more quickly. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor. Great, Laura. And help us to understand what you have written. In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit. Amen. So, question 61. De virtutibus cardinalibus. Let me just read you this little quote they have from De virtutibus, right? Because it kind of explains the name a bit. It says, cardinalis is said from cardina, right? In quo, ostium, that's the door, vertitor, right? According to that of Proverbs 26, 40, right? As the, what? Ostium, the door turns in its, what? Inge and cardinalis so, so the pija, the lazy, laut, and lectulo suo, right, eh? Whence the cardinal virtues are said to be those in which human life is, what? Founded, eh? Through which one enters in, right? In the door, right? For human life is one which is proportioned to man. Now, in this man, however, there is found first a sensitive nature, sensing nature, in which he comes together with the brutes, huh? Then there is practical reason, which is proper to man according to his grade. And then finally, the intellectus speculativus, right? Speculativus is the same as the word looking there in Shakespeare's definition, right? Neuristal uses the word looking too. Which is not perfectly found in man as it's found in the, what? Angels, right? But according to a certain partaking of the soul. And therefore, the contemplative life is not propria humana, right? Not properly, man. But super humana. I say it very often, Thomas. The vita autum voluptuosa, huh? Life of pleasure, which adheres to sensible goods, is not human either, but is bestial, right? And therefore, the life which is properly human is the vita activa, the active life, which consists in the exercise of the, what? Moral virtues, right? And therefore, those are properly called the cardinal virtues, in which, in a certain way, turns and is found in the moral life, huh? Just as in certain principles or beginnings of that life. On account of which, these virtues are also called, what? The principales, right? The chief virtues, right? SMD virtudibus, question 5, article 1. Okay. So. To the first end, one puts, okay. Let me explain them first. Then we ought to consider about the cardinal virtues, huh? Of course, these will be used in the distinction of the virtues in particular in the, what? Secundi secundi, right, huh? Because there he takes up faith, hope, charity, and then prudence, justice, fortitude, temperance, right? And then, with the four cardinal virtues, he takes up the virtues that resemble them, right? It has some similarity, right? So, like, with temperance, he takes up, what? Humility. Humility is one. Yeah, yeah. Humility, right? And one that, you know, modifies something, or mildness, you know, that modifies anger. Mildness, yeah. Yeah, yeah. I think I mentioned how Shakespeare there, in As You Like It, there, when this man and woman have fallen in love very quickly, and they're talking about it, they're in the very wrath of love. Well, that's a metaphor, right, huh? But it's a metaphor from one species to another species because there's a likeness there, right, huh? So, you have a strong emotion here that needs to be, what, moderated, huh? And so, he'll take up mildness and humility, as you say, with, what, temperance, right, huh? And so, it's kind of important to understand the cardinal virtues, among other reasons, huh? Because of the fact that they will be used for the consideration of the virtues in particular in the secunda secunde, right? But, I mentioned how Plato there, in the Protagoras, he has something like the cardinal virtues. He has the four cardinal virtues plus piety, huh? He's more pious than we are. But, it's not as if this is altogether original with the Christians, huh? And, of course, he's asking, Protagoras, are these five names of the same thing, you know, synonyms? Are they names of different things, like the nose, and the ear, and the eye, and so on? Different things. And, Protagoras says that they're, what, names of different things, right? And then, Socrates says, well, you have to argue, right? And, he's going to try to show that, what, temperance and wisdom, I mean, kind of practical wisdom, are the same, what, thing. And, so, he develops a statement that a thing is just one opposite, right? And then, the opposite of wisdom is folly, right? And, of course, the opposite of temperance is, what? Folly, yeah? Yeah. So, the man who's making a fool of himself over the woman, right? That's the original meaning of the word fawn, right? I mean, I'm fond of a girl, and I'm making a fool of myself over the woman. And, if I drink too much, you know, I'd make an ass of myself, you know? I'd do something stupid, right? You know, because I had too much to drink or something. And, so, it seems that the opposite of temperance is, what, some kind of foolishness, right? And, so, if there's only one opposite, and wisdom has this opposite foolishness, well, then wisdom must be the same thing as temperance, right? And, he's gradually trying to, you know, do that, but you've got to be careful about Socrates, right? But, it's kind of interesting what he does. So, five things are going to be asked about then, right? First, whether the moral virtues ought to be called cardinal or principal. Of course, he's saying they can be called both in this other text that we gave you from David to the books. Secondly, about the number of them, right? And then, what they are, right? And then, it may seem strange at first, whether they differ from each other, right? And, there's two ways of understanding the cardinal virtues, right? Sometimes, they take the four cardinal virtues as attributes of, what? Any virtue in some way, right? And then, they're kind of appropriated to this or that one in particular, because this is a special problem in that matter, but. And then, whether they are divided suitably into the political virtues, the purgatory ones, and what? That is, the purge soul, and the exemplars, right? I've seen that division before, though, when Thomas is talking about, what's it, the book of Proverbs, you know? It's the political virtues, and then, what? Vanity of vanity, knowledge of vanity, that's the purgatory ones, right? And then, you finally get to the virtues of the, what? Purge soul in the next book, right? And so on. And the exemplars of that. Okay. To the first, what? You said that Proverbs would fall under political, the disasters of their. Yeah. And then, I guess it was the, the song, the songs of the purge soul, if I remember right there, but. Okay. Okay, but don't know what to quote on that. That's right, I remember hearing Thomas talking about that, quoting somebody for this distinction. To the first, then, one goes forward thus. It seems that the more virtues ought not to be called cardinal, or, what? Principles, right? Oh, and that's, not whether it's between those two, but whether either one of those should be used, right? Okay. Because those things that are divided ex apposito are, what? Simul natura, as is said in the predicaments, huh? So, in Aristotle, it takes up the, after the categories, and he takes up opposites, right? The four kinds of opposites. Then he takes up before, and what you understand after. And then he takes up hama, or simul, right? Together, right? So, the genus is before the species, right? But when you divide a genus to the species, those species are all on the same level. So, they're simul, or hama, right? In division of reason, right? Of the Simo Natura, I can see they divide the virtues, right, into their species, right? Unless one is not before, what, another, right? But all virtues are divided ex suppositor, right? They divide the genus of virtue by what? Opposites, right? Therefore, none of them ought to be called principal or chief, right? Okay. Moreover, the end is more principal or chief than those things which are, what, towards the end. But the theological virtues are about the end, right? They're about God himself, right? But the moral virtues are about those things which are adthine, towards the end, right? Therefore, the moral virtues ought not to be called the principal ones or cardinals, but more the theological ones, right? Moreover, that is more principal that is so through, what, its essence or nature, than what is so through, what, participation or partaking, huh? It's an interesting word, partaking, right, huh? It implies that you're getting something out in its fullness, huh? Partial. Partial understanding, right? But the intellectual virtues pertain to what is rational, essentially, the moral virtues to what is rational only by, what? Partaking. Partaking, right? So, is love reasonable? It can be. It's modern, right, if it partakes of reason, right? There can be a reasonable love, but there can also be a, what? Unreasonable love, right, huh? So, if you whine and a beer, and you take the beer, well, then, it's an unreasonable love, right? The same with anger, right? There can be a reasonable anger, like when Christ sometimes shows some reasonable anger, right? But many times, anger is unreasonable. So, they seem to partake, right, of what the intellectual virtues have, essentially. And therefore, the moral virtues are not principal or chief, but more the, what? Intellectual virtues, huh? But against this is what Ambrose says upon the Gospel of St. Luke. Expounding that, blessed are the poor in, what? Spirit, huh? For we know there to be, what? Four cardinal, what? Virtues, huh? Temperance, justice, prudence, and, what? For it to be not enumerated in particular order, but. In those four. But these are all, what? Moral virtues, huh? What I call prudence or foresight, a moral virtue, because it's about moral matter, right? But it's not in the, it's not in the design of the powers, huh? Okay. And therefore, the moral virtues are, what? Cardinal ones, right? I answer, Thomas says, it should be said that when we speak about virtue, simpliciter, right? We understood, we're understood to speak about, what? Human virtue. Human virtue, right, huh? Now, human virtue, as has been said above, is said according to the perfect notion of virtue, which requires the, what, rectitude of the, what? Desire and power. Yeah, of the appetite, yeah, the desire and power. For this kind of virtue not only gives one the ability of acting well, but also, what? Causes the use of a good, what? Doing, right? And you're inclined to do good, right? You're capable of doing it, you're inclined to do it. But according to the imperfect notion of virtue, right, huh? That is said to be a virtue which does, what? Not require rectitude of the appetite, huh? Because it only makes the ability of, what? Acting well, but it does not cause the, what? Use of it for good work, huh? Okay. So you say the medical art, right? You do that for abortion or something, right? In order to kill somebody, huh? But now it is clear that the perfect is more principle than the, what? Imperfect, right? And therefore the virtues which contain a rectitude of the desiring power, huh? A rectitude of desire, are said to be, what? Principle, right? And we saw this distinction before when we talked about what a virtue is, right? And these are the, what? Moral virtues. And among the intellectual virtues, only prudence, which is kodamodo, moralist, right? It's moral insofar as it's about moral matters, right? Okay. It's a kundumatirium, it says, right, huh? Yeah. When suitably among the moral virtues are placed those which are called, what? Chief or what? Cardinals, you can call me the one, right? Now he's got to reply to these nasty little objections, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said that when a genus that is, what? Univocal, right? What does univocal mean? Yeah. It's said with one meaning of many things, different in kind, right? Like quadrilateral is sort of square and rhombus and rhomboid, right? A number is said from odd number, an even number, right? Okay. So when a genus, that is a genus in the strict sense, univocal, is divided into its species, right, huh? Then the parts of the division, let's use the word parts there, right? They call them subject parts sometimes, right? As opposed to composing parts. Then the parts of the division, ex equo, equally, right, have themselves according to the notion of the genus. So if you divide animal into dog and cat, is the dog more an animal than the cat? Or is the cat more an animal than the dog? No. Now he says they have themselves ex equo according to the notion of the genus, right? Okay. Although according to the nature of the thing, one species might be, what? More principle and perfect than, what? Another, right, huh? Just as man, by reason of his difference now, right? Is better than the, what? More perfect than the other animals, right? When Aristotle, in the sixth book of the metaphysics, he divides looking philosophy into, what? Natural philosophy, and mathematics, and what? Wisdom, right? It's kind of like dividing a genus into its species, right? Yet wisdom is superior to natural philosophy. And natural philosophy is superior to mathematical philosophy. So Aristotle calls wisdom there usually first philosophy, right? And he calls natural philosophy second philosophy. But when there is a division of something that is, what? Analogous, right? What is said of many, secundum prius, et what? Posteriors, right? Before and after, yeah. As long as they speak of the analogous as being equivocal by reason, right? Well, by reason means before and after. That's what reason is characterized by. Then nothing prevents one to be more principled than another, even according to the common, what? Notion, right? Just as when you divide being into substance and accident, right? But it said chiefly of what? Substance, right? Then accident, huh? And so when I came in here today, did I come to be? In some way. Yeah, qualified, right? I came to be in this room, right? But when I was conceived, then I came to be, right? Right. Okay. And such is a division of virtues into the diverse genre of virtues, in that the good of reason is not found according to the same order in all, but found more in one before another, right? Now, what about this terrible objection here from the theological virtues, right? To the second, it should be said that the theological virtues are what? Above man, right? That doesn't mean that man doesn't have them, right? But they're what? Above the human status, right? Once they're not properly said to be human virtues, but superhumanity, right? Or you can call them divine, right? Kind of find the way we name them, theological virtues, because they're studied, I suppose, in theology, right? I mean, you better call them even superhuman. So somebody believes that he's got superhuman virtue, divine virtue, right? Now, what about the third objection here, right? About these ones that are essentially reasonable and so on. To the third, it should be said that the other intellectual virtues, apart from prudence, although they are more what? Principle than the moral as regards their subject, because reason itself, right? They are not, however, more principle as regards the notion of virtue, which regards the good, which is the object of the, what, appetite, right? So Aristotle was saying, or Thomas was saying before, that you could speak of foresight or prudence as being more a virtue than the other virtues of reason, right? Because it presupposes the rectitude of what? Yeah, yeah. So unless I want to eat and drink moderately, right, I can't really have foresight as to how much, and my own experience with people drink a little too much, right? They don't really deny the principle that you shouldn't drink too much, but what they deny is that they've had too much. That's what a boy said. That was a couple of lousy beers. Okay, so that does a subtle distinction then, right? I always think of the one song that I say sometimes. Sing joyfully to the Lord all you land. Serve the Lord with gladness, right? Come before me a joyful song. O, the Lord is God. He made us as we are. His people, the flock, the tins. Well, the second thing he says, that's me, that's me and Summa Concentilus, right? The three parts, you know. But in the psalm, you have to first, you know, you've got to serve the Lord with gladness, right? Which is more in the, rectitude of the appetite, right? And he said, I could be studying, you know, the Summa Concentilus with a bad appetite, right? But it's very enjoyable and very interesting. And so, it's kind of interesting the order of those two things, I think, right? You know, and Thomas is commonly in Aristotle's Nicomarckian Ethics, huh? And Aristotle considers the moral virtues before the virtues of reason, huh? Virtues of reason he takes up in book six, right? And the moral virtues in books two through five, huh? And Thomas gives two reasons why he takes up the moral virtues before the virtues of what? Reason, right? And one is, he says, that they're more known to us, huh? And that's a good reason. But then the reason he gives is that by them we are disposed for the virtues of what? Reason, right? So Thomas talks a lot about how temperance is a help to the life of the mind, right? And so when Thomas chased the woman out with the poker, whatever it was, and fire, you know, this disposes the mind for what? Thinking about these higher things, right? So to some extent that psalm seems to fall in that order there, right? See the Lord with gladness, right? Now whether there are four, what, cardinal virtues, huh? Distinction of four, right? Right. And see, if someone says to me, well, your favorite book, you say, is the Summa Cantu Gentiles, and that's divided into what? Four books. I say, yeah, yeah. But how does he get it into four books, right? Well, the first three books are divided against the fourth book, right? Because the first three books are about those things that natural reason as well as faith can know about, what? God, right? And then the fourth book is about those things that we know about God only through faith, like the Trinity, right, huh? And the Incarnation, right? And so that's really a division into, what, two, right? And then the first three books, he divides them according to God and himself. Then God is the Alpha, and then God is the Omega, right? Then the third book. He actually divides the fourth book into those three parts, too, but they throw on one book because not as lengthy treatment there. and those things, but... So, now in Aristotle, in the beginning of the categories there, when he divides what is into universal substance and particular substance, a universal accident, a particular accident, well, then he's crisscrossing two divisions into two, right? Universal and singular, and substance and accident, right? What exists in another and what does not exist in another, right? What is said of another and what is not said of another. Sometimes you do, you know, two twos, and sometimes you do one and three, right? But to some extent, I suppose you could say that the foresight could be divided against the other three because they're in the three desiring powers, right? foresight is directing all of them to some extent, but it's in reason, right? To the second, one proceeds thus, it seems that they're not for, what? Cardinal virtues. For foresight, which is the English word for prudence, if you look at Thomas' treatise on prudence, you know, he'll explain that the word prudence comes from the word foresight, so Churchill and myself will use the word foresight rather than the word prudence. So virtue is named from one of its chief parts, right? Forsythe. For foresight or prudence is directive of the other moral, what? Virtues, right? But that which is directive of others is more, what? Principle, right? Therefore foresight alone is the principle, what? Virtue, right? Now, whatever you think of this objection and significance, it does contrast that one with the other three, right? Moreover, the chief or principle virtues are in some way, right? Moral, right? But for moral operations, we are ordered through two things, huh? Practical reason and right, what? Desire. Therefore, only two virtues should be called, what? Cardinals, right? Right reason and right desire. Moreover, among other virtues, one is more, what? Principle than other. But in order that a virtue be called principle, it is not required that it be principle with respect to all, but only with respect to some. Therefore, it seems that there are many more principle, but virtues, huh? But against this is what Gregory says in the second book of the Moralia, in what? Four virtues, huh? That's the four cardinal virtues. Tota boni operis structure, the whole structure of good doing rises up, huh? Is that right? Translating con surge, it rises up. Anytime the surge there didn't warm, remember? It's con surge, it rises up. Now, Thomas says, I answer, that it should be said that the number of some things can be taken either according to the, what? Principia formalia. That's right. That's right. That's right.