Prima Secundae
Lecture 154: Virtue, Sadness, and the Passions

Transcript
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In the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, Guardian Angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. Dios, gracias. God, our enlightenment, Guardian Angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, or to illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more quickly. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor. Pray for us. And help us to understand what you have written. In the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, amen. Okay, we're up to Article 3, I guess, in Question 59. To the third one goes forward thus. It seems that virtue is not able to be with, what, sadness, right, huh? There's those Stoics getting in some trouble again, huh? For virtues are an effect of wisdom, right? According to the words of the Book of Wisdom, Chapter 8, huh? That wisdom, that is, divine wisdom, teaches sobriety and, what, justice, right? Prudence and virtue. And the acquaintance with wisdom has no, what, bitterness, huh? As Thomas quotes at the beginning of the Son of God Gentiles, right? Now he's more delightful than the pursuit of wisdom, he says. As we'll declare it, therefore, neither are the virtues able to be, what, with sadness, huh? You think about God with sadness, huh? Think about your sins with sadness. You think about God, huh? Moreover, sadness is an impediment to operation, huh? It is clear to the philosopher in the seventh and also in the tenth book of the Nicomachean Ethics. But what is an impediment of good operation is repugnant to virtue. Therefore, sadness is repugnant to what? Virtue. Moreover, sadness is a certain sickness of the soul, as Tulli himself calls it in the third book of the Tosculine Questions, huh? But the sickness of the soul is contrary to what? Virtue. Virtue. Which is a good disposition of the soul, right? I'm inclined to call it a lot of people nowadays, you're sick. You're in a moral position, you're in a moral position, you're in a moral position, you're in a moral position, you're in a moral position, you're in a moral position. Therefore, sadness is contrary to virtue, huh? Nor can it be together, what, with it, huh? But against all this nonsense is that Christ was perfect in, what? Virtue. Virtue. But in him there was, what? Sadness. Sadness, as is found in Matthew 26. My soul is sad, usquied mortem, right? He was sad there with his friend there, who died, huh? No, I was just, yeah. Yeah, yeah. He wept us in the count there. Shortest verse in the Gospels. See how he loved him, right? Therefore, sadness is able to be in virtue, right, huh? That's a pretty good quote. I answer, it should be said, as Augustine says in the 14th book of the City of God, The Stoics, what? Wish that for three disturbances in the soul, disturbances, in the soul of the wise men, there are three, what? Good. Undergoings, huh? Good. That is three good passions, right? For cupidity, to wit, will, right? It's going to get passion. For lititiae, I guess it's just kind of, yep, joy, right? Litit, Gaudium, huh? For what? Fear. Caution. Caution. Caution. For sadness, they denied that it could be in the soul of the, what? What? Wise men. That's what Shakespeare, you know, puns in that, right? There must be no stoic, no stocks, right? Stock, you could whack it back and just stays there and takes it. It's like the Greek stoic, you know, where the problem was that his son had died. He said, well, I always knew he was mortal. It seems kind of inhuman, right? And they had two reasons for saying you shouldn't be sad, right? For sadness is about something bad that has already, what? Happened, huh? But they thought that nothing bad could happen to the, what? Right. Yeah. For they believed that the only good of man is, what? Virtue. Yeah. That the bodily goods are no goods of man, right? Sounds like thinking he's just a soul, right? Or something. And therefore, only what is contrary to the good of the soul, in honestum, right? Dishonorable good is the evil of man, which could not be in the, what? Virtue. That's a friend of mine who made his little motto in high school, was death before dishonor. Was Christ dishonored in his passion? Well, it's not written so badly, death before dishonor, right? Yeah. Well, it depends on how you got away from it. I can say dishonor to save your, dishonorable to save your life, right? Yeah. Deny the faith or whatever. Yeah. Yeah. But he, I think he was certainly dishonored in his passion. Mm-hmm. But he didn't do anything dishonored. No, I didn't say that. Because maybe there's a dishonor in terms of what you do yourself and how I treat you. That's how I would understand it. You asked me a question there when I was a kid in a great school, you know, can a maiden jump off the building there to escape being raped, you know? So you'd say, yes, I don't know. If, well, I think some of the, some have suggested that if she's in danger of consenting, yes, she should. Yeah. But if she's not in danger of consenting, because it's better to, better, in that sense, yeah, death, the word is honor, right? If we're consenting to sin, better lose your life. But this is said unreasonably, Thomas says, right? So even the angelic doctor, right, finds this unreasonable. For since man is put together from soul and body, right, that which confers, I don't want to do my proper word there, that which cooperates, right, to conserving the life of the body is something good for man, right? It's not his greatest good, right? But not over, what? His greatest good, because the man can use it, what? Badly, right? When an evil opposed to this good, or an evil contrary to this good, right, is able to be in the, what? Wise man. And to bring about a, what? Moderate sadness. So when your father dies, your mother dies, or your brother dies, or your friend dies, right, then there should be some sadness, right? And not excessive, but, moreover, although the virtuous man is able to be without a, what? Great sin, right? Nevertheless, no one is found who is without, who leads a life without, what? Levibus peccati sin. Right sin. Yeah, yeah. For as it's said in the first epistle of John, if we say we have no, what? Sin. We seduce ourselves, huh? Put that in the pipe, smoke it. So there's something to be sad about, right? You know, even about your venial sins, huh? Before it's your, about the other ones, right? Third, because the richest man, although perhaps he does not have sin, perhaps he, what? 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Okay. There was a conversation between Augustine there and Thomas, you know. Augustine was supposed to appear to Thomas. I don't know if that's true or not, but Augustine was saying, yeah, but I left a good life there early, you know, so. And you were more chaste than I was and so on. So I don't know, but it was going to be higher than him. I mean, he will be Thomas. I don't know what the whole story is. I was reading about Padre Pio. We're going to go to Padre Pio's place, you know. But I guess when John Paul II made him, either he beatified him or Hannah, he might forget. He said, as a young priest, he'd gotten confession to Father. Yeah, yeah. Mastering sometimes even, you know, American soldiers tried to go to confession to him after the end of the war there, you know. So, interesting. Interesting, interesting. Very tasty. But he had, you know, physical pain and other things. Yeah. Some woman, probably a woman grabbed his arm, you know, kissed his hand or something, and yelled at her. And she kind of shied away. And he says, Madam, these aren't decorations. He didn't shake hands, you know. He didn't shake hands, you know. That was decoration. So if you have his past sin, about this one, audibly, right? Praiseworthily. Sorrows. According to that of St. Paul, 2 Corinthians. The sadness, which is according to God, works penance into a, what, stable salvation, right? And fourth, because one is also able to, what? Praiseworthily. Sorrow for the sin of another. Yeah. In the Syriac tradition, the monk is one who mourns. They don't name him by sorrow, sinfulness, or anything they've got to say. You know, our Lord, doesn't he, when he kind of weeps over Jerusalem, right? There he's weeping over the sinfulness of it, right? Because he even gets a little bit of anger one time there with the Pharisees. Not the Pharisees, but some people there. He was the Pharisees. You know, the heart is in their hearts, right? Yeah. Once, in that way in which moral virtue is compatible with, what, other passions moderated by reason, right, it is compatible also with, what, sadness. That's a reply to the first reason why the, what, Stoics, right? So this is nothing bad for us, right? Well, it's bad, but it's not the worst thing that can happen, right? You should love the soul more than the, what, body, right? If a man commits adultery or fornication with a woman, you'd say he loves her body more than her, what, soul, right? Which is disordered, to say the least. Secondly, they are moved from this, that's the Stoics now, I guess, that sadness is about a, what, present evil. Fear about a, what, future evil, right? Just as pleasure is about a present good, right? Desire is for a, what, future good, right, huh? Now, it can be, it can pertain to virtue that someone enjoys the good that he has, or the desires to have one that he does not have, right? Or even that he avoid a future evil, right? But the present evil, when the soul of man is, what? Yeah. It comes about to sadness. All together, it seems to be contrary to reason, right, huh? Can't do anything about it, right, huh? How he's doing is mortal, right? Yes. There's a, there's a Japanese thing. What was it that Thomas Morris was telling us? Many of the Japanese, like when the typhoon hit or whatever, or the tsunami or whatever, and they just kind of say, they have a word that we don't have, we don't have one word for English. They just kind of, they just kind of shrug their toes and say, like designing a new one. That's their attitude. I always think of the Japanese as being a little bit stoic, you know? But this also is said unreasonably, right, huh? For there is something bad that is able to be present to the, what? For just man as has been said, huh? Which evil reason, what? Detests. Detests, huh? When the sense desiring power in this follows the, what? Detesting a reason, right? They'd be sad about this evil, right, huh? But nevertheless, in a moderate way, right? According to the, what? Judgment of, what? Reason. Reason, right? So poor Romeo there, right, huh? Obviously sadly thinks Juliet has died, but it's too much, right? And then she thinks, well, she knows he's dead, right? It's too much, right? For this pertains to virtue that the sense desiring power be conformed to reason, huh? Whence it pertains to virtue that one be sad in a moderate way in those things that one ought to be, what? Sad. Yeah. Just as a philosopher says in the second book of the ethics, right, huh? Remember this, where is it? Is it here or back home? I forget, but a guy came into the hamburger place, you know, late at night, and he had his hand with a gun, and just a little lady was looking behind the counter at the last person working there at the place, and he said, put the money in the bag, you know? What the poor girl is to do, I mean, all by herself, and this guy's, you know, cut the thing. And so she puts the money in the bag, and then she starts to pass the bag, and he takes his hand down and she realizes, he doesn't have a gun, right? He doesn't have a gun. Yeah, yeah. He's the hand out of the pocket. Yeah, yeah. He's the hand out of the pocket to get the bag, huh? And she's got a better holding bank than he does, right? He's like this. He just runs out, right? And he's sad, right? Yeah, of course he did. Yeah, of course. It was a bad day. Unproductive day. Was that for a chance or not, that sadness? Yeah. Something which he was sad for. He should be sad that he was trying to rob the bank, right? But there was one here, a case in, she was in Appen-Wister, in one of the banks or things. A guy comes in, right? And he hands the woman the note, you know, put the money in the bag, right? And she kind of sized up like I was kind of nouous, you know? That's why he went out the message rather than, it's never good. So he says, oh, this is an unusual withdrawal notice. I'll have to go and check and see. He says, oh, this is an unusual withdrawal notice. So he runs out too, right? And then the police pick him up shortly after. He can kick himself, you know? Yeah. And then she's on the way to him, you know? Those are two examples where... Or like the guy that I heard this one recently was when, you know, people have the phone in their pocket and they accidentally dial. So a guy goes to rob a convenience store and he accidentally dialed 911 while he's robbing the store. So when he got out, he met the cops. They were there. I always take those examples from students to say, you know, how we really identify ourselves more with our reason than anything else, right? Because they're not concerned about the fact they're doing something immoral or robbing or something like that. But that they're so stupid, right? They kept his hand in his pocket and taken the money that was left and he would have gotten it off, you know? And he goes on to say, and this is also useful for what? Fleeing bad things, right? For just as goods on account of pleasure are more promptly what? Sought, right? So evils on account of sadness are more strongly what? Plain. Yeah. Okay. Thus, therefore, it should be said that sadness about those things which fit virtue, right, is not able to be together with virtue, right? Because virtue delights in its own what? Proper acts, right? But about those things which in any way are repugnant to virtue, virtue moderately is what? Sad. Sad, yeah. That's why it should be said about people committing abortion and so on, you know, and other things of the sort. To the first, therefore, it should be said that from that authority that was quoted in the book of Wisdom, right, it should be said that the wise man is not sad over what? Wisdom, right? Yeah. But he is sad about those things which impede wisdom. And therefore, in the blessed, in whom there is not able to be any impediment to wisdom, right, sadness has no what? Place. Place, huh? Now, to the second, what about sadness being impediment, huh? To the second, it should be said that sadness impedes the operation about which we are, what? Sad, huh? So, if the student doesn't like to study, he's sad when he studies, that's going to be his learning, right? But it aids one to promptly, what? Carry out. Those things by which sadness is, what? Fled. Fled, huh? Escaped from, huh? The third, he says that sadness that's immoderate, huh? Excessive, is a sickness of the soul, right, huh? Golly, right? Too much, huh? But moderate sadness, huh, pertains to the good, what? Disposition of the soul, according to the status of the present life, huh? Okay? So, of course, it's a good example of that, right? It's a kind. Now, the article... Article 4, whether every moral virtue is about the, what? Passions, right? About the emotions. To the fourth, then, one goes forward thus. It seems that every moral virtue is about the, what? Passions, right? For the philosopher says in the second book of the Ethics, that moral virtue is about pleasures and, what? Sadnesses, right? But pleasure and sadness are two of the, what? Eleven passions, right? It has been said above. Therefore, every moral virtue is about the passions, right? I mean, they must understand a bit in what way every moral virtue is about pleasures and sadnesses, right? Is it about its proper matter or is it something that follows upon its act, huh? Moreover, what is reasonable by participation is the subject of, what? Moral virtues, as is said in the first book of the Ethics, huh? Rastal divides the soul into that rational part and the part that is not rational, and that's part of that non-rational part, can partake of reason, right? Right? Okay. But of this sort is the part of the soul in which are the passions. Therefore, every moral virtue is about the passions, huh? So you distinguish the virtues into the virtues of reason itself, and then what can partake of reason, right? Well, that's the emotions, isn't it, huh? And I think I mentioned a bit, of course, you're not talking about the will here, right? What we're looking at, but even the great Plato, right, in the Republic there, right? He divides the soul into three parts, right? Corresponding to the three parts of the, what, city, right? Socrates does. And you have reason, right, which corresponds to the rulers, right? And then fortitude, which corresponds to the soldiers, right, and so on. And then temperance to the mob, right? The old ploy, right? And so he doesn't have, really, the will in there, right? And then the question is, where does justice belong? Well, justice is the order of these three together, right? But it doesn't have itself as a separate part. So even, you could say, Plato's a little bit responsible for this objection, right? And somebody might come to this objection, right? Aristotle, you know, in the Nicomachean Ethics, he, what, actually talks about the moral virtue in general there in the second book, right? And then about choice in the beginning of book three, right? The first two virtues he takes up are, what, fortitude and, what, temperance, right? Just like Plato is, right? Then he goes into the lesser ones in book four. And then in book five, he talks about, what, justice, right? But he does begin with courage and, what, temperance, right? It doesn't stop there, right? That's a good beginning, Plato, right? But there, being further away, you get this idea of what participation work needs to do with the will, right? And you see that a lot in music, right? Good music, right? So Mozart's music is kind of a witness that emotions can partake of reason, right? In good Baroque music, huh? Warren Murray's taught me something interesting. He's in a lecture on Johann Sebastian Bach, right? And I guess it's the B Minor Mass, I think, which some people think is his greatest work, right? Well, he wrote the B Minor Mass, I guess, when he was applying to his job at a Catholic church. And so Warren said he's following the Roman Mass rather than the Lutheran Mass, right? Most of his Mass says the Lutheran, right? So that's why. That's kind of interesting. He didn't get the job, though, so I don't know. But, you know, you've seen Handel, you know, talking about when he's writing the Messiah, you know, we thought the heavens opened up, he was seeing, you know, like a vision almost, he felt, you know, that inspired, you know, it's really, really, really, very good music, you know? Very good. Moreover, in every moral virtue, there is found some passion, right? Either, therefore, all are about the passions or none. But some are about the passions, as fortitude and temperance, as is said in the third book, like I was mentioning, right? Those are the first ones he takes up, huh? Therefore, all moral virtues are about, what? Passions, huh? Kind of interesting, huh? They kind of make, you know, fortitude is especially the virtue of the man, right? You know? You're a man or a mouse. And then, what? Temperance is especially the virtue of the woman, right? You know? So, those things kind of stand out, you know, huh? But it's justice, you know, to identify as one. But against this is the justice, which is a moral virtue, is not about the, what? Passions. As is said in the fifth book of the Ethics, right? That's the book devoted to, what? Justice, huh? I answer, it should be said, that moral virtue perfects the desiring part of the soul, right? Petitiva means our desiring, right? The desiring part of the soul. By ordering it to the, what? To the good of reason, right? Now, that is the good of reason that is moderated or ordered by, what? Reason, right, huh? Quince, about everything that it can happen to be ordered or moderated by reason, right? It can happen that there is a, what? Moral virtue, right? Now, reason orders not only the passions of the, what? Sense of power. But it also orders the operations of the understandable desiring power, right? Which is the will. Which is not the subject of, what? Passion. Okay. Because it's very difficult. I know, when I was teaching, you know, you try to distinguish the love that is the emotion from the love that is the actual will. It's very hard for people to get that, right? And to really separate the two, right? You know, you tell them the story of emotions in God. I mean, well, this is the love of God. He's just a stone. He doesn't feel for us at all. He doesn't feel our pain at all. Well, you know, you have that commonly, you know, people say, you know, we should be passionate for God. I don't know if that's the way to put it. I don't know if that's the right way to put it. Well, you know, they accuse sometimes really Greeks, you know, of not distinguishing between the reason and the senses, right? And later on, of course, you know, people don't distinguish between reason and the imagination, right? I think it's easier, nevertheless, to distinguish between reason and the senses than between the will and the, what? Emotions. Emotions, yeah. You should talk to them about marriage, and I'd say, now, what does the priest who's officiating there say, you know? Do you have wonderful feelings about this woman? Do you have wonderful feelings about this man? Are you making a, what? Are you witnessing the wonderful feelings you have about each other? See? Or are you asking them, you know, do you choose this woman as your wife, and do you choose this man as your husband, right? Are you witnessing, too, that you've made a choice, right? Are they having a hard time seeing it, you know? And, you know, they read these passages in St. Paul about love, you know, and how great a thing it is. But the thing, not the emotion, I'm sure, you know. My skin fights him, and he says, now, we don't mean, we quoted from Paul here. This is what he meant. He meant an act of the will. He didn't mean an emotion, right? And he says, love your neighbor as yourself. Feel as good about your neighbor as you feel about yourself. So, the first thought says, sometimes, you know, the will is in reason, right? And there is using reason for what? The rational part of the soul, right? It's something immaterial. So, we have emotions in common with the, what? Purry and kitten, right? Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. But we have Will in common with the angels, doing a little excursion there from the Summa Karajitila's there. I got through with the second book, reading the second book, so I said, I've got to read a little more about the angels, you know, so I went to the questions there, a couple of questions in the Ferritate, you know, you can give us that to Thomas, he's something. Those angels are really interesting, you know. It's really marvelous the way he does that. And therefore, not every war of virtue is about passions, but some are about passions and some are about, what, operations, yeah. You know, in Thomas' Latin, if you're looking at the Latin there, you know, he makes this distinction between an operation or an action like understanding or sensing, right, as opposed to kicking or heating or something, right? The one that has an exterior effect and the one that doesn't. You use the word axio for what? Both of them, right? But then for an act like understanding or even sensing, right, you use the word operatio, right? And then keep the word axio for the other ones, right? So it's a good example of that. Now, in English, what are the words to use? I'm not sure that even Martin, that's entirely at home that uses the words, but that's what he does, right? He uses the term operatio, right? I sometimes talk about the words doing and making, right? And there, you could divide doing into doing and making, right? And there, the operation or the doing that has an exterior product keeps the name doing. The one that has an exterior product gets a new name, which is what? Making, right? So it's not because it has something better, right, because it has an exterior thing, but it has something in addition to the doing itself, right? The new product, right? So that's why it gets the new name, making them. Yeah. So when I'm thinking about God or thinking about the soul there, I'm doing something. Making it. Not making it. Not making anything, right? I make something out of it. Self-made man. Yeah, he told us, too, he said, I'm living it up, you know? Thinking about God, thinking about the, yeah. I'm going to live it up this weekend. Oh, gee, what do you do? What do you do? Oh, I have to do it. I have to do it. Now, the first objection, though, from Aristotle, right, huh? He said that, what? More virtue is about pleasures and, what? Sadnesses, right? He says, to the first, therefore, it should be said, that not every moral virtue is about pleasures and sadnesses as about its own, what? Matter, right? But it's about something, what? Fouling upon its own act, right? For everyone who is virtuous delights in the act of virtue, right, huh? So I delight in paying my debts, huh? Okay? And he's sad about the, what? Contrary, right, huh? So I rejoice that I drink moderately. Or I'm sad that I drink too much, huh? Okay? Like, no, was it? Okay. Whence the philosopher, after the four said words, adds, if virtues are about, what? Acts and passions, right? There's a distinction between actions there. And to every passion and every action, there follows some, what? Pleasure or, what? Sadness, huh? An account of this, then, virtue will be about pleasures and sadnesses, right? To wit, about something, what? Fouling upon, right, huh? Okay? So you've got to be careful of that, right, huh? I was thinking, you know, about the word beautiful, right? And is beautiful more the object of the knowing powers or of the desiring powers, right? Yeah. I remember, I think that's true now, you know? I remember one time, you know, I kind of thought, you know, well, you know, you fall in love with a beautiful girl. This is more the object of the appetite, right? And then, I was taking a sign from the English word lovely, right? Which is kind of a synonym for beautiful, right? But lovely is directly from the word love. Wasn't it more the object of love than of knowing, right? But when you define the beautiful, right? The first definition of beautiful is the beautiful is that which pleases when seen. Oh, pleases, well, that's the appetite, right? That's not the knowing power, right? But if you look at that correctly, right, that pleasure is something that follows upon seeing, right? So it's primarily, what, an object of the seeing power, right? And the pleasure is a consequence, you know, of the excellence of what you're seeing, right? Thomas was talking, you know, in his Summa Concentrales, I guess it was, he's quoting Aristotle there. Aristotle says that perfect seeing, you know, this is the way Thomas quotes it, perfect seeing is the act of a well-disposed sight, right, towards the most beautiful of what? Objects, right? I was kind of struck by him saying, you know, the most beautiful of objects, right? Because he's talking now about perfection of the knowing power is what? Act, right? And you know how Justin there in the beginning of the Confessions, I think he says, Too late have I come to know thee, thou ancient beauty, right? And I think what really struck me most was when they were talking about the appropriation to the different members of the Trinity, right? And Thomas is explaining the appropriation of beauty to the Son, right, rather than to the Holy Spirit, right? Why, goodness is appropriated to the Holy Spirit, because that's the object of what? Of love, of the will, yeah. And he proceeds by way of love, right? So that's why we appropriate goodness to him, right? And, but, as soon as I say, part of the Father and wisdom to the Son and this, but beauty in this other way of it. Species. Yeah, species, yeah. Is appropriated to the Son who proceeds by way of mind, you know, so. Seems to me, primarily, right? That which seen, please, maybe it was that way, you put a consequence in its proper place, grammatically, right? I mean, so the grammatical order would not be so distinctive. You say it, that which pleases when seen, you're emphasizing the pleasure of it, right? And it seems to bring in the appetite more, right? But if you say, that which seen, pleases, right? Well, primarily, it's the object of seeing, right? And the pleasing is something that follows upon the seeing of this beautiful object, right? That's like St. Thomas says in the last verse of the Adorate, visus in the office, to it, I'll be blessed when I see your glory. I haven't seen your glory, I'll be blessed, I'll be happy. I was talking about that song there, I read a few a while back there. O God, you are my God, whom I seek, for you my flesh pines, and my soul thirsts, like the earth, parched, life is without water. That's why I gaze towards you in the sanctuary to see your power and your glory. Well, I was saying that power and glory, maybe he mentions those two, because there's something for the body, too. He said, my flesh pines, and my soul thirsts, right? The soul is going to be rewarded by the vision of the glory, eh? Like you say in the Adorate Devote. But when Christ is talking to the Sadducees, right? Who don't believe in the, what? Resurrection, right? Which is, getting your body back, right? And he says, you know the scriptures, you know the power of God, right? So he kind of, you know, if you wanted to, it's the same water, right? My flesh pines, and my soul thirsts. So your power and your glory, right? The power for your, getting back your body, and this. I was thinking there, you know, the saints there, you know, and these, we had All Souls Day and All Saints Day, you know. I call these the feasts of the communion of saints, right, huh? Feasts of the communion of saints. Feasts of the communion of saints.