Prima Secundae
Lecture 150: Prudence and Its Subordinate Virtues: Counsel, Judgment, and Command

Transcript
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They come from the Greeks, right? Article 6, huh? With the Eugulia, Sinesis, and Ganon, right? Our virtues, what? Joined to what? Foresight, huh? To the sixth one goes forward thus. It seems unsuitably are joined to foresight. Eugulia, which means good counsel, right? Eugulia is good, right? Eugulia, counsel. Sinesis, right? In Gnome, it's referred to kinds of what? Judgment, right? But one in more ordinary areas and one in special difficulties, right? For eugulia is a habit by which we take counsel well, right? As is said in the sixth book of the Epochs, right? But to counsel well pertains to foresight, as is said in the same book, right? Therefore, good counsel Eugulia is not a virtue joined to foresight, but more is prudence itself, right? More to the higher pertains to judge about the lower, right? But that virtue would seem to be supreme, whose act is judgment, huh? But sinesis is benedictiva, taking what? Judging well, right? Therefore, sinesis, judgment, is not a virtue joined to foresight, but more it is the what? Seems like it's a high thing, huh? In logic, you know, they would distinguish between unicative or logic, right? Which would be the prior impression of analytics, right? That's kind of the high point of logic, right? But of course, that's not about action, right? It's about perfection of knowledge, which is judgment, right? So what is a superior thing? It's not counsel, it's not even judgment, it's just something even higher than that, to foresight. Moreover, just as are diverse those things about which one ought to judge, so also are diverse those things about which one ought to take, what? Counsel. But about all things that one ought to take counsel, there is laid down one virtue, to wit, ebulia. Therefore, for judging well about things he's done, one ought not to lay down, apart from sinesis, another virtue called gnome. What the heck? Why do you have two here? Judgment, right, huh? And only one for consul, right? That's his thing. Moreover, Tullius, and that's Ciceroid, lays down in his, what? Rhetoric. Three other parts of foresight, to which, to wit, the memory of past things, right? The understanding of what's situation now, and the foresight of, what? Future things, huh? And Macrobius also lays down in his work on the dream of Sipio, right? The great general. So then other parts of prudence, to which, what? Caution, right, huh? That's about the impediments that might arise, huh? And docility, right, huh? Because you have to be docile, because no man is sufficient to see all the circumstances by himself, right? So do so, you know? Thomas will have, you know, these articles there in the integral parts of foresight and the secundi secundi, but I'm not in those details, yeah. Therefore, it does not seem that these virtues alone should be, what? Joined to foresight, huh? But against this is the authority of some guy called the philosopher in the sixth book of the Ethics, right, huh? Who, what? Lays down these three virtues to be joined to what? To foresight. Foresight. I answer, it should be said that in all powers that are ordered, that is the chiefest, which is ordered to the chiefest, what? The principal act, most principal. But about things to be done, human things to be done, three acts of reason are, what? Found. Of which the first is to take counsel, the second is to judge, and the third is to, what? Command, right, huh? I told you that about my brother Mark, right? His joke there about he and his two friends in Quebec there, right? One guy was good at, what? Thinking of all kinds of things to do. He was very imaginative. He proposed all kinds of things they could do, but he had no idea which one they should do. My brother Mark was a man of judgment, you know. This is the one to do, right? But he was kind of, you know, more sluggish fellow, you know. The other guy was, yeah, no, you know. So he said we had divided the three acts among the three of us. That's good, you'll see. Now he says the first two correspond to acts that you have even in the, what? Looking understanding, right? Which are to inquire, right? Which is like taking counsel, right? It's like dialectical, investigation. And then to judge, huh? For counsel is a certain, what? Inquiry. Inquiry, right? But the third act is proper to the, what? Practical understanding, huh? Insofar as it does something, right? It's operativos, right? For reason does not have to command those things which cannot come to be, what? By man. So we don't command the Pythagorean theorem, you know, we don't command the triangles and three angles equal to the right angles. Don't do any commandment there, right? We just try to find and judge. Now it is manifest in those things which come to be by man that the chief act is to command to which the others are, what? Ordered. Yeah. So this guy's always looking before and after this, Thomas, isn't he? We have to see the order of these three acts to understand why one is principle and so on. And therefore, to the virtue which is bene preceptiva, right? Well commanding to wit prudence as a word to the, what? Mor chief. Are joined as secondary, ebulia, which takes counsel well, and senesis and denon, which are the indicative parts, about whose distinction we all speak better. You apply it to one of the Egyptians, right? So it makes it clear, right? You look before and after there and you see it all. I imagine prudence is also used in a more general sense too, not only for this particular act, but for particular virtue which, in other words, don't mean common use prudence can include all this. Well, you could, yeah, but these elements are really kind of ordered to this principle act, right? There's something kind of different to these things, right? So he's saying that the principle act is really the act that, the highest virtue, which is foresight here, right? It's responsible for, right? But kind of a lesser virtue, responsible for judgment, and being these two, whatever their difference will be, as we'll see, and then for counsel, even lesser one, right? If you didn't have, you know, you can tell us well and judge well. If you didn't have those, you obviously wouldn't be a command well. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So you wouldn't be a prudent man, right? You can just... Take that thing we were talking before about Augustine, right, huh? He decided to give up a sinful life, maybe, right? And that was a good judgment, right? That was... But not today. You know? It's not prudent, yeah. You know? And, you know, when people talk about these things, they're not so profound, like, you've got to lose weight, right? You know? And so on. But even once they make that judgment, they're not there yet, right? You've got to really, what? Take the last step, right? Just command, right? That's true. The book, Prayer is on the Heart, and he talks about that in one of the chapters. He says three things you've got about prayer and so forth is to learn what God wants you and then figure out how he wants you to do it and do it. So that's... It seems to me that's what that works like. Yeah. I mean, sometimes, you know, a man who drinks too much and he smashes up the car or something, you know, he realizes he's got a problem, right? And he judges he should give it up, but I mean, that's a long way for him to be curing himself, right? He's got to go down and join double A or triple A or whatever it is. I just read an article, somebody was kind of lamenting, something I call analysis paralysis. People would never make up, they can analyze, they know all the options, they know them well, they know which one's best. Never stop, you know what? Make sure, make sure they go over and over and over. They should have done that, John, they really should have done it, but they didn't do it, you know? They didn't do it, they were going to get around it. They never commanded. You kind of see that in the higher kinds of foresight, like military foresight or political foresight, you know, where a man has his ability to, what, command others, right, and so on, right? Especially when, I know there's a particular, I think it's one of the parts of Putin or something, it calls for a judgment about commanding something quickly. Like you have to make a quick judgment about something and evaluate what you do. Because sometimes you, as they say, the window of opportunity to do something is very small, and you can miss a big chance or something. You see that in a man like Lincoln, you know, or a man like General Patton or somebody, or MacArthur or somebody, you know? You see that command is like, kind of, perfects them, right, huh? So, this first objection here is kind of maybe touching on what you said. To the first, therefore, it should be said that prudence is bene conciliativo, like you were saying. But not as if bene conciliari, to take counsel well, it's immediately an act of its, of, what, foresight. But because this act, it perfects this act by, is a medium, or by, by, you know, a virtue subject to it, which is eubilea, right? Yeah, so that eubilea, if it's not really foresight, it's subordinated to it, right, huh? That's as it belongs to it, right, huh? And MacArthur would call together his leading officers, you know, and discuss what they should do, you know, and what they have to say, right? Then he'd probably do the judgment and the command. Now, the second one is saying how judgment is the highest thing, right? Well, and the looking reason it is, right? Once he'd be on him, it's a marvelous judgment, right, huh? If you didn't think what you said was, or he's hesitant to say this correct, you thought twice about it, that's for sure. So he says judgment in things to be done is or to something, what, further, right, huh? For it could happen, as you were saying, for someone to judge well about doing something right and nevertheless not do what? Yeah, yeah. Checking out some of those leaves up, you know? But I can't commend myself, you know? Tomorrow, tomorrow. Well, they say, never do today what you're going to put off for tomorrow. But the ultimate compliment, right, huh, is when reason already, what, commands well about things to be done, right? See? A lot of understanding here of human nature, isn't it? You know, following human nature. That's actually, in that part, I think it's in that book on prayer, that's what Father Harden said. That's the big downfall of most people. They know what God wants, and they know how to do it. Yeah, yeah. Now, the third objective is about why are there two virtues about judgment and only one about counsel, right? Notice the rule of two or three is being observatory, right? You have these three acts, right? Now, one of them is going to be divided into two, right? You don't know if we're divided into four at first, do you? No. Divided into three, and then one of them is seen. And then, why is it so, huh? Well, you can see the reply to this is longer than the first two together, right? And this is why it is so. To the third, therefore, it should be said that judgment about each thing comes about through, and now how should you translate appropriate, you know? I don't think proper principles is the way to translate, right? It's own. It's own, huh? It's own private principles, right? Well, inquisition is not yet through, what, things' own principles, huh? So that's interesting, huh? Even looking reason, right, huh? There's many, what, forms of reasoned-out knowledge, because that's judgment, right? You have to judge what is its own beginnings, right? But there's one kind of dialectic that's used everywhere, right? And so you find Plato in the dialogues, exactly the dialogues, talking about just about anything, right? And doing so from probable opinions, right? But you get down to judging, and you've got to get down to what's, what, private to this subject, right, you know? It's its own beginnings, huh? My son-in-law is getting interested in making wine out there in California. It's got a place in the house. So, but you read about these winemakers, you know, and they get to know the different wood grapes, right? But what is good for one grape is not good for, what, another grape, right, huh? And what is good for one wine is not good for the making of another wine, right? And so that's why some places are more appropriate, right, for drinking, for making Charonet, right, I'd say, right? Another one is more suitable to make Carbonet Sauvignon, right? And they experiment around, they find this just the right terroir, you know, for this particular grape, you know, and the right temperature, and so on. And so you've got to know what is private to, right, this particular grape, right, you know? And in the soil, and in the climate, and in the way you... And the barrel. Yeah, yeah. The wood in the barrel, and how the wood is seasoned, you know? That's all part of it. Yeah, yeah. It's all chemicals. Yeah. So he says, inquiry or investigation is not yet to its own, what, beginnings, huh? Because these, when these are had, there's no need for further, what, inquisition. But the thing has already been, what, found, huh? And therefore there's only one virtue ordered to, what, taking counsel well. Well, but two virtues to judging, what, well. Because the distinction is not, what? In the general principles. Yeah. But the... It's not in the common principles, but in the, what, private ones, huh? Yeah. Okay. And that makes you feel a comparison to looking reason. When it's in looking matters and speculative matters, huh? One is dialectica inquisitiva de omnibus, huh? Dialectic, which is investigating about, what, all things. Right? But the demonstrative sciences, which are judging, right, are diverse about, what? Diverse things. Yeah. Yeah. So, you can see that if you read, you know, when Albert the Great, there are divides, and Thomas Follingham, when they divide the logic of reasoning, right, the third act, the logic of arguments, right, and they divide in two parts. The eudicativa part, which Aristotle treats them in the prior and posterior analytics, and then the, what, inquisitiva part, huh? Yes. Yeah. The, which Aristotle treats in the Book of Places, right? In the Book of Places, right, huh? And you can use the, what, the eight books of places in philosophy, right, huh? See? You can't use the postural analytics. They don't give you the private principles of each one, right? They tell you that you've got to go find the proper. Once you find those, then you can, you know, demonstrate, right, huh? That's a very subtle thing, right? So, there are many forms of reasoned out understanding, reasoned out knowledge, right? Or you judge. So, there are many forms of reasoned out knowledge, right? So, there are many forms of reasoned out knowledge, right? So, there are many forms of reasoned out knowledge, right? The necessity of these things, right? There's only one dialectic, right? That goes over them all. So it's kind of interesting, right? The same way dialectic, I mean, sophistic is like that too. It does not tie to any one thing. So, you know, the first kind of mistake that you take up in the book is the mistake of mixing up the senses of a word. Well, what sides is that tied to? You could do it in any one. Yeah, yeah, yeah. And so I could, you know, give you, you know, examples of this kind of mistake, right? From any science, right? It's kind of a common thing, right? And then dialectic, you have the second tool as the tool of distinguishing the senses of a word, right? Well, that's not really prior to some science, right? That's, you know, if you know a little bit of that, you can see kind of the comparison Thomas is making it right now. When she says in speculative matters, one is the dialectic, which is inquisitive about all things, right? That's why Aristotle, in the fourth book of Wisdom, says that dialectic is like wisdom. It's about everything. But wisdom is about all things in demonstrative way, in dialectic with, what, probability. And sophistic, he says, is also about all things, but in an apparent way. An mistaken way. It's apparent wisdom, right, huh? Makes you a wise guy, right? To make wise. Okay. But the demonstrative sciences that you're judging, right, are diverse about what? Diverse things, right? And therefore, we talked about the, what? The private road of each science, right? I was kidding the guy last night there, the one student who teaches. He teaches Euclid there at the, uh, up at the, uh... Tribune? Not Tribune, no, up at the college there, in the, uh, what's it up in? Oh, on Schmangelin? Yeah, I guess one of those colleges up there, you know? And, uh, so I talked to him a little bit about it, and he says, now, what is the philosophy of the continuous? Well, of course, when you divide quantity, you divide it into continuous quantity and discrete quantity, which involves number, right, huh? Mm-hmm. So, with Medici, it's about discrete quantity, numbers. And geometry is about continuous quantities like lines and angles and figures and so on. I said, so what is the philosophy of the continuous? You might be inclined to say it's geometry, right? Because it's about continuous quantity, right? But there's no consideration of the continuous in general in, what, Euclid? Where do you find a consideration of the continuous in general? And more likely than what you do in logic, right, where you distinguish continuous and discrete. Mm-hmm. It's in the sixth book of natural hearing, the sixth book of the physics, right? Mm-hmm. So I used to call it sometimes the philosophy of the continuous. Mm-hmm. And there are, as I was told, it shows, for example, that, um, the continuous is divisible forever. Mm-hmm. The continuous is such. And that nothing continuous is composed of, what, indivisibles, right? Mm-hmm. And this is true about any continuous, whether it be a line or the motion over the line or the time it takes to go down the line and so on, right? I said, now, why is there no, why is there no philosophy that continues there in geometry when you study? Continuous quantity at some, at some length, right, huh? Well, it goes back to the very order, right, of the sciences, huh? In geometry, you go from the simple to the, what, composed, right? Mm-hmm. So you go from plane geometry to solid geometry, from the circle to the, what, sphere, from the square to the cube, right? Okay. They're not related in general to particular, but it's a simple to the, what, composed, right? Mm-hmm. sides there, which are all squares and so on, right? You learn how to construct a cube there and solid geometry. Our natural philosophy goes from, what, the general to the particular, right? This is a striking example of it because the general consideration of the continuous is divisible forever, where you show that, and where you show there's not composed of indivisibles and so on, right? That general thing is in, what, the sixth book of natural hearing and not in geometry. That's an awful subtle thing, right? That you should find that distinction, right? It goes back to what's private to geometry in the way of proceeding and what's private to natural philosophy. So you can't get, you can't judge well if you don't know what road to follow in each science, huh? Each science has its own, what, road, right, and kind of the classical text there is the Gwethius and the De Trinitati of Gwethius, right? Where he distinguishes, you know, the road of natural philosophy and the road of, what, of geometry or mathematics and the road to wisdom, right? He has like a word, you know, to describe it, Thomas. It was an article, you know? But it absolutely, you know, you know, I remember Dion giving a course that first stop at the ball and he was talking about that, you know? Well, that kind of inspired me, you know, to go and eventually write my doctoral thesis, right, on the comparison of Descartes and Aristotle and the three roads, right, huh? Where Descartes was talking about the road, the natural road in the beginning of the physics there where Aristotle talks about it, right? And, you know, he reasons from the natural road to the road to follow natural philosophy. Now, how did he do that? See, well, it's what Brinkley says, right, when he says that natural philosophy precedes rationality, right? And Thomas, of course, explains different senses of rationality, but that most of all observes the common road of what? Of reason, right? Proceeding from the senses and so on, huh? That's why he can, Aristotle can do that, right, huh? But if you don't know the road to follow, you know, you're going to make mistakes in what? In judging, right, huh? You know, so I think the great way that says when you get in talking about divine things, you have to give up the imagination, right? You can't picture the trinity, right, huh? Making it, the painter can, you know, put a, you know, dove and so on, but you can't really picture the trinity. You've got to understand it, right, huh? Otherwise, you will, Shakespeare says, wander in illusions. What's his name there? What's his name like that? Heidegger, you know. Warren is saying to his Heideggerian there, well, that stuff's poetry. And of course, the Heideggerian says, yeah, but it's a beautiful poet. You know? What do you see, like, Mathematics, Mathematics, and other sciences? Everywhere, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. This is continued by Spinoza, right, huh? Because Spinoza says that the order in our thoughts and the order in things is the same. See? Now, what's unusual about geometry? It's kind of, it's kind of an exception to what characterizes our mind. Our mind naturally tends to know the effect before the, what, cause. And so every time we ask why, we know the effect but not the cause in some way. Why in geometry you go from, what, the cause to the effect, right? So, you know, you have, you know, straight lines intersecting these opposite angles are, what, equal, right? And you prove that through the fact that those lines are dissecting are, what, straight. Because you're dissecting they make, what, two right, make, you know, angles, right? But because the lines you're dissecting are, what, straight and not one band, that's why you're going to prove that those, what, opposite angles are equal, right? So in a way you're going from the cause to the, what, effect, right? And Spinoza, and Descartes starts it, you know, but Spinoza makes it a principle, right? The order in our, yeah. It's the cause, the effect. And basically the order in our thought and the order in things is just the reverse, right? Because the effect is before the cause in our knowledge for the most part, right? But in things the cause is before the, what, effect, right? Okay? So the, um, you can imagine the kind of mistakes he gets into, right? And then Hegel, right? Then Hegel, you know, He's influenced by, what, Spinoza, right, huh? And Hegel deduces the whole universe from the most, what, general thought we have. Being, which passes over into Nunby because it says nothing about what a thing is. And then you get to come and so on. So he's trying to generate the whole reality from, what, the most confused idea in our mind. Now the most confused idea in our mind is what comes first in our mind, because our mind knows things in a confused way, right? So he's saying the order in things is the order in our mind, right? So you go from Descartes to Spinoza to Hegel, you know? That's a very big mistake, isn't it? Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. But, you know, people are saying to Descartes, you know, that your natural science resembles pure math. That's a compliment, you know, to me, you know, he's saying, right? He wants it to resemble that, right? What was it in that second review, I think, with the Pope? That's kind of spurious now that they've questioned his authenticity. But a guy said something to him about Descartes. To the Pope? Yeah. And Descartes said, yeah, but he never lost his fate. Or something like that in the Pope. Sort of put that qualifier. Whatever else mistakes he made, he didn't lose his fate. Yeah, yeah. He wasn't faithful to his... Yeah, he took the pilgrimage there, you know, to win the shrines there, you know? I think it's kind of a sign that he... Unlike Immanuel Kant, who refused the ministration of his minister of death. He sent him away. Yeah. Yeah. Kind of what I would think of a shadow character. Well, whatever. So you can't judge in the same way, right? It used to distinguish, you know, the way of judging, for example, in the three sciences. Because natural philosophy and natural science, we judge it by going back to the, what, senses, right? So both Aristotle and Einstein say that natural philosophy begins with the senses and it ends with the senses, right? Everything we say about the natural world goes back to what we learn through our senses, and we judge it by going back to our senses, right? Like that? Okay? Now, is that the way you judge in geometry? You have to find a flat surface out here to construct these things that are on a flat surface? Because is this surface really as flat as the geometry needs, huh? No. No, no. But he separates, right, surface and things of this sort, from what? Sensible matter, right? And he makes them perfectly flat, right? Okay? He imagines them to be that way, right? So his judgment goes back to the, what, imagination, not to the senses, huh? But then you get into, say, a science like logic, right? As my teacher Albert de Graves says, you know, the first thing to be considered in logic is the universal, right? Well, where do you go to judge that? Understanding. Yeah. It goes back to the reason, right? So in one case, the judgments go back to the senses, the other one to the imagination, the other two to the reason, right? And I remember, you know, when you get these people who want to do these Venn diagrams. And so I would say that, you know, some men are, some women are beautiful, right? You've got the circle there, and you call it part of it, right? So then you're saying that some are and some are not, right? But you can't really say that, right? Some means some, and it doesn't say anything about the rest. And you can say some women are beautiful, even if all women are beautiful. Some women are beautiful, too. You know? Or you can say some are beautiful, some are and some are not, you know? And so they, but they try to replace the universal with the class, right? Well, the class is a multitude, right? That can be imagined, right? So I've got a class here, right? Okay? And it's a student, you know, the collection of you four guys. Yeah. See? Or a student is something that is said of each one of you, which is a true universal, right? So they're confusing the universal, which cannot be imagined, right? Universal whole, with the what? Integral. Integral whole, right? Which can imagine that, the multitude, you know, people, right? And so they're kind of trying to resolve to the imagination, and they misjudge things, right? Right. Randall, that you can't create. Yeah. But that way, logic, you can see, is closer to wisdom, right? Because in wisdom, you have to judge about the separated substances, like the angels, or even God himself, by going back to reason. You can't go back and try to imagine the way God is, right? And then you end up with what God said, a compacted Father, Son, Holy Spirit, just like three things rolled into one big ball. And you're going to judge this completely off, you know? So you can see why it's required a multiplicity of ways to judge it, right? And again, it's theology, right? And you have to, what? What does Daniel 13th say? He's first going to say, it's the soul. What's the soul of theology? It's the scripture, right? So you have to go back to the word of God, right? To Revelation. So you talk about the Trinity, right? Well, there are three persons in God. Well, you find this in scripture, you find this in the tradition of the church and the councils and so on. You know, God judges by imagination, your senses, right? What is, you know, the music of sense whom defect we, right? You know, the faith is the supply for the defect of the senses of the Eucharist, right? You don't judge what the Eucharist is by a chemical analysis of a host or something, right? That's not the way to judge those things, you know? So, there are many ways of judging, right? Many terms to which you've got to go back and judge. When dialectic, you see, you can proceed from probable opinions anywhere, right? I can pick up Einstein and say, hey, this guy had one year yet. But three hypotheses, all which are worth the Nobel Prize, right? They gave him one for the one they could understand first. It takes a long time. So, there's never been a fruitful guy. What does Einstein say? A scientific hypothesis is freely imagined. Well, that's probable if Einstein said so, right? You know? Or Mozart, if you listen to his operas, he's one of the most beautiful operas in the world. Mozart says in an opera, the words must be altogether the obedience served in music. That's highly probable if Einstein said so, right? Pythagoras said what? Pythagorean theorem, right? It's highly probable, right? It's highly probable, right? You know? If I say it because Pythagoras said so, right? I don't know who he thought of the theorem in geometry already. He's got a guy's name attached to it. Everybody's heard the term Pythagorean theorem, right? Yeah, yeah. What a guy he was. But I can use this, you know, it's a political matter anywhere, right? A judge, you know? Assert it to these things by probable opinion, you know? So, that's a beautiful comparison Thomas is making, right? Because he sees all these things. Now he's going to come down and say, so he shouldn't be shocked or scandalized or unexpected, right? That there could be a distinction, right? More in judging, right? Now, cynicism and gnome are what? According to what? Distinguished according to the diverse rules by which they, what? Judge, right? For cynicism is judging of things to be done according to a common, what? Law, right? But gnome according to, what? Natural reason. In those things in which the common law lacking. As will be more later on, right? So, there's times and you should, what? Yeah, you see? How many times when I should go over the speed limit, right? Get some of the hospital and so on, right? Watching this ambulance coming down, roaring with the slits on blinking and that roaring going on. And of course, we're all filled up there just as I was coming today, you know? And coming down there in Main Street through Shrewsbury there, I'm dying there. And I said, what are you going to do? He's going to go in the left turn aisle. I think that's when he could get by us. I thought the other people were going to stay up. I thought the other people were going to stay up. I think they stopped in time to be shot on him like that, but he was going on the speed limit, right? But there might be times when you should do something, right? There might be a bomb about to be thrown off. It's such a thing. One minute I should slow down. What about all these other little things that are touched upon? To the fourth, then, it should be said that memory, understanding of what? The present and foresight. Similarly, caution, facility, and others of this sort are not virtues diverse from prudence, but in a certain way are compared to it as, what? Integral parts. Insofar as all of them are required for the perfection of foresight. There are also certain, what? Subject parts to foresight. Or, another name for subject parts there are, what? Species of prudence, right? The household, right? That's the prudence of the father, let's say, or mother. Regnitiva, that of the king, right? And actually, later on, the summa, he distributes four species, right? One is the foresight of the individual man, right? So, I can take counsel well, and so on, and command for myself, right? Then I can, what? Command as a father, I can command. Yeah. And then there is the, what? Military foresight. And then the, what? Yeah, yeah. It's interesting, right? So, what you see in MacArthur there, you know, in Japan after the war was great, what? Political foresight, right? But during the war, you saw military foresight, right? But there, there's some proximity there, right? You see that in Washington, George Washington, right? You know, he has both military foresight and political foresight, right? You know, they're kind of, you know, close together than the household foresight, or the father's foresight, right? We'll take our old break now, it's 333, 333.