Prima Secundae
Lecture 147: Will as Subject of Virtue and the Three Speculative Intellectual Virtues

Transcript
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So, Article 6 here. Whether the will is able to be a subject of virtue, to the sixth one goes forward thus, it seems that the will is not a subject of any virtue, for that which belongs to a power from the very, what, notion of the power, that doesn't require any habit, right? But about, what, it is of the very notion, you might say, of the will, that it be in reason, the rational part of the soul, according to the philosopher in the third book about the soul. So it is that it tends into that which is good according to, what, reason, right? Just as the sense appetite tends into what is agreeable to the sense of, right? To which is ordered every, what? To which every virtue is ordered, right? Because each thing naturally desires its own, what, good. For virtue is a habit in the way of nature, in agreement with reason, as Tully says. Therefore, the will is not a subject of virtue. It's like something natural for it to be, right? This is the reasonable desiring power, right? Moreover, every virtue is either intellectual or moral, as is said in the first and second book of the Ethics. But intellectual virtue is in a subject in the understanding and reason, not over in the will. And the moral virtue is in the subject, as in a subject in the irascible and concubiscible, which are rational of every dissipation. Therefore, no virtue is in the will, as in a subject, right? Well, it reminds me of Plato, right? Because in the public, right? He has those three, what? Parts of the soul, right? And in reason, there's wisdom or something like that. And in irascible, there's courage. And in the epithumia, or the concubiscible, there's what? Temperance, yeah. There's no place for what? Prudence. For justice, right? Okay. You kind of got the cardinal virtues here, right? So, you know, wisdom is up here, courage is here, and down here is temperance. There's no place for that, right? And so, that's why you blow up the city, you see, right? And so, you've got wisdom in the rulers of the city, courage in the, what, soldiers, and then temperance in the hoi polloi, right? There's no place for the justice, right? So, you've got to consider justice to be a kind of, what? The ordering of these three together, right? But it's not like a separate part of the soul with a separate, what, virtue, right? So, you see, that kind of back of that tonic understanding of these things. So, you know, less of mine than Plato, right? You see, I mean, so. Moreover, all human acts, to which, what, virtues are, what? Ordered. Ordered. Are voluntary. If, therefore, with respect to some human acts, there is some virtue in the will, so, for like reason, with respect to all what human acts, there would be a virtue in the will. Either, therefore, in no other power would there be any virtue, or to the same act would be ordered two virtues, which seems something rejected before, right? Therefore, the will cannot be the subject of virtue. Against all this is that a greater perfection is required in the mover than in the moved. But the will moves the irascible and the concubiscible. Much more, therefore, are there to be virtue in the will than in the irascible and the concubiscible, right? I answer, it should be said that through a habit, the power is perfected to acting, right? Therefore, there is, what, a power needs a habit perfecting it for, what? Acting well. Which habit is a virtue, right? In those cases where there does not suffice the, what, proper motion of the power, right? Now, the proper ratio of every power is to be noted in order to its, what, object. When, since, as has been said, the object of the will is the good of, what, reason, proportion to the will. As regards this, the will does not need a virtue, what? Perfecting it, right? But if that good that is imminent for man to will, that exceeds the proportion of the one willing, either in regard to the whole, what, human species as the divine good, right? Which transcends the limits of human nature. Or, as regards the individual man, as the good of one's, what, neighbor. And then the will needs, what, virtue. And therefore, virtues of this sort, which order the affections of man, either towards God or towards his neighbor, are in the will as in a subject, as charity and justice. It's kind of interesting what he's saying there, right? It's like you kind of naturally will your own good, right? What you don't know is we're naturally will the good that is God, right? You have to be, what, perfected, right? By charity, I guess, right? You don't necessarily will the good of another, right? You see some little children, right? And they certainly want their own good, right? But they don't sometimes take into account the other person, right? And sometimes, you know, you see the kid come home and he's got a little toy there, right? It's not his own. I said, oh, whose toy is this, huh? Johnny. Did Johnny say he could take it? He had that look, yeah. Yeah, yeah. He kind of looked away, yeah. Well, don't you think you've got to return it, you know? So on. So, you kind of see that they have to be, what? Educated. Educated to be, what, just, right? Towards others, right? He used to play, you know, ball with the kid down the block there. He was kind of a spoiled brat, you know? And the game wasn't going the way he liked it, right? He'd take the ball and go in the house, right? Well, his mother said, well, none of that, you know? She'd take the ball, throw the balls to us, and make them come in the house, right? So now he's got to do the ball and the other game, right? But he'd get a little less than his mother was giving him, you know? In case he was a little bit selfish, to say the least. But a child is something like that, right, huh? Or if the child has candy, right, you kind of encourage them, you know, to share a piece of candy with their brother or sister, whatever it is, and maybe share a piece with daddy, you know? But just, you know, to them in that spirit of thinking of their own, right? You realize that right away, you know, as a parent, I think, you know, the child has to be, you know, as if, you know, how we have the commandment, too, of charity, you know, it's kind of explicit about loving God and your neighbor, right? But it's not explicit there about loving yourself, as if that's kind of, it's kind of natural to love yourself, you know? Which is Richard, right? That's what I was just thinking, too. That's not just education, but it's discipline, too. I mean, it's not just learning something, but it's education, I think. I want to put it, I think there's a moral dimension, it's not just like Nino was wondering if you could be taught virtue like mathematics or geometry or something. No, no, no. Yeah, no. Discipline or what you're teaching in a certain way. I remember this is one Greek Latin professor there, some, you know, talking about as a kid, you know, come from a big family, but you're coming home, you get some candy, but you got, you know, six or, you don't, won't be, you won't even taste it, you know? So then you're talking in your mouth before you go to the house, you know, it's all gone, I used to do that as a kid. My mother always used to pack my lunch in school, and unlike other kids whose mother would bring me, you know, carrot sticks and all kinds of things like that. My mother gave me Twinkies and all kinds of good stuff. And all my buddies are going, wow, I can't have some that. And I'd lick the whole thing and I'd say, you want something now? Is it still that way? Pretty much. That's one of the reasons why I'm in the monastery. So we've got a premium now, right? To the first derivative, it should be said that that reason has place of the virtue, about the virtue, which orders one to one's private good, right? That bonum proprium, right? Of the one willing, right? just as temperance and fortitude which are about the human passions and others of this sort right if it's kind of natural there now to the second it should be said and this is contrary to my friend there plato that the rational by participation is not only the irasible and accusable but omnino entirely right that is universally the appetitive powers right as is said in the first book of the ethics under the desiring power however is comprehended the what will the rational appetite as you call it and therefore if there is some virtue in the will it will be what a moral virtue accepted if it is a what theological virtue right then to the third it should be said that some virtues are ordered to the good of the what moderate passion which is proper to this or that man and in such it is not necessary that there be some virtue in the will since for this suffices the nature of the power but this is only necessary in those virtues which are ordered to some what sins a good like the god or like the neighbor right that's the end of that you want to distinction distinction on the brain so no class next week no class next week no class next week no class next week no class next week no class next week no class next week no class next week no class next week no class next week Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, Amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, Guardian Angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. Deo gracias. God, our Enlightenment, Guardian Angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, or to illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor. Amen, God. Help us to understand what you are writing. Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, Amen. So we're up to question 57 here. Let's look at the little premium here. Then we're not to consider about the distinction of the virtues. This is divided into, what, three, right? And first, as regards the intellectual virtues, or the virtues of what? Reason, right? I tend to want to avoid the word intellectual because it's a pejorative word in my vocabulary. You don't have to be intelligent to be intellectual. Second, as regards the, what, morals, right? Third, as regards the theological virtues, huh? So, now, that order strikes me as a little bit strange at first sight, right? Because we're in theology, right? And in theology, everything is referred to God, right? So why doesn't he begin with the theological virtues, right? It's third here, right? If you compare them with the secunda secundi, where he takes up the virtues in detail, he takes up the theological virtues first, and then the four cardinal virtues, and the virtues attached to each of them, right? Second, right, huh? So it's just the reverse order that you have here, right? And it seems like not proper to the theological order, right? I think you've got to understand that the theological order is not followed everywhere in a kind of simple way, right? Sometimes there seems to be a little variation, right? It's not the next Korean way of naming things, but a little bit like that, right? I'm struck by this, like, when you take the road in natural philosophy and the road in wisdom, which are to some extent, what? Contrary, right, huh? The road in natural philosophy is from the general to the particular, and it's towards matter, down into matter, right? So as you go from the eight books of natural hearing, right, to the book on the universe, and then the books of generation and corruption and the books on minerals and so on, you're going from the general down to the particular, but you're also going down deeper into what? Matter, right, huh? And then when you start with the dianima again, right, where you consider the soul in a kind of abstraction, from matter, but not a complete one, that has to be defined as the form or first act of an actual body equipped with tools, you, as you go from that to the intermediary works, you know, like the sense and sensible and the memory and reminiscence, and then down to the history of animals and the generation of animals and so on, parts of animals, you're going again, what, from the general in particular, but also down towards, what, matter, right, huh? Now, what do you do in wisdom, right? Well, you go towards the immaterial, as much as the dian said, right? And to some extent, you're going from the less universal to the more universal, as is especially clear in the ninth book of wisdom, which is the book on act and ability, right? Where he begins with the act of his motion and the ability for motion. And then the second part of book nine, he talks about act universally, in which case you find out other kinds of ability besides the ability for motion, the ability to move something or to be moved, right? The ability for form and so on. The ability to think and so on. And something like that with substance, right? You deal with material substance in book seven, eight, mainly, but you come to a kind of a general understanding of substance, and then later on you can talk about the immaterial substances. And even in the case of the one, which is the subject of wisdom, of being, you kind of have to ascend from the, what? One that is convertible with number, right? I mean, not convertible, one is the beginning of number, right? To the one that is convertible with being, right? And that's a hard thing to ascend from that, right? And when Thomas points out how both Plato and Avicenna, two of the greatest minds we've had, are both, yeah, quite distinguished there, right, huh? They turn to one what the other one has, huh? And, okay, I think that's a big contrast between wisdom and, what, natural philosophy, right? One's going down deep into matter, right, huh? Usqued elementa, as it says in the Latin, in the premium, and from the general to the particular. And here it's going just the reverse, right? But then when I read, let's say, the eight books of natural hearing, which is the most general part of natural philosophy, you go from motion, and what's tied with motion, like place and time, and the divisions of kinds of motion, and so on, you go from motion towards the, what? Mover, right? But first the moved mover, and then towards the unmoved mover, finding the eighth book. And the unmoved mover is shown to be not a body, right, huh? So in a way, you're going towards the immaterial, right? See? Does that contradict what you're doing, and natural philosophy as a whole? But it's very striking, right? And we always point to this as one thing you have to know to even realize there are things that are immaterial, right? Okay? Now, the other place where you realize there's something immaterial is when you talk about the immortality in the soul, right? But again, when Aristotle takes up the soul, he takes up first the living soul, which the plant has, right? And then he takes up the sensing soul, which the animal has, right? And lastly, he takes up the understanding soul. But as you move from the plant to the animal, which has no bit of immateriality in the sense that knowing involves a kind of immateriality, and you get to the understanding soul, which can exist, you know, even after the death of the body, right, you're in a way going towards the immaterial. And this is the second main place where you're going to see that there's something besides the material world, right? And so you say, well, you've got to be careful, right? So, even though you see it as a whole, what you're doing is going from the, what, general to the particular and towards matter, but it doesn't mean that every single thing you're doing, right? In Aristotle, even in the Dianna Bible, you know, he used to always note this passage there where he manifests something about the senses through the understanding. Generally, he does the reverse, right? You know, you first see that sensing is undergoing, and then later on, the reason is undergoing too, right? But sometimes, you know, it doesn't mean that in every little bit you do it, right? So you kind of see a reason why he does what he does, right? In my favorite book, the Summa Kahn Gentiles, right? Well, you're very, very much so you're considering everything that refers to God, right? God is to be, God in himself, and then God is the beginning of things, then God is the end, right? But he does that twice, huh? First, it regards what you can know about those three things by reason, a natural reason, as well as by faith, and then in the fourth book, what you can know about God in these three ways only by faith, right? The Trinity and the Incarnation and so on, the last things. So, well, likely you contain geometry, right? What does geometry do? Well, you look at geometry as a whole, it's a plain geometry followed by cell geometry. Was that general in particular? Not exactly. Because the circle is not a, what, particular kind of, the sphere is not a particular kind of circle, is it? And the cube is not a particular kind of square. But, you know, when Euclid begins the sphere, he says, imagine a circle, and the diameter of the circle, and rotating it around its diameter, and now you've got a sphere. And then you get to the, what, cube, you've got six, what, squares and so on, right? So, you see, as a whole, what is geometry doing? It's not going from the general to the particular, but from the simple to the, what, composed. You look at even the definitions in the first book. Definition of the point. Definition of the line. Definition of angle. Definition of figures, right? You're going from the simple to the composed, right? Okay. But yeah, if you look at, say, the first theorem in Euclid, where he's trying to cut a, or first couple of theorems, I should say, where he's trying to cut a, what, line equal to a given line, right? How does he do it? Well, he first of all talks about how you construct an equilateral triangle, right? By drawing these two circles. So in a way, you're drawing the line, which is simpler, right? To something more composed, right? So now that destroys what you say in general about it, but you've got to not be too fanatical about saying that, that there's no, what, except... to it or something like that right okay um okay now why does he take up uh the virtues of reason and the moral virtues before the theological virtues here right because as a whole he doesn't do that at all in the long part there in the secundi secundi right where he takes up the three theological virtues before the uh cardinal virtues you know which involve both of these right why i see you know maybe it's a little bit of what condescension to our need to go from what is more known to what is less known right so the virtues of reason and the moral virtues are more known to us than the theological virtues right so okay when he gets down to details he reverses the order right that's one thing it's saying right now setting aside that problem just look at the first two right it takes up the distinction of the intellectual virtues before the moral virtues right and uh what does aristotle do in the ethics right yeah the books uh three through what or actually two two through five are about the moral virtues and in book six is intellectual virtues so that's the second puzzling thing here right okay but there's something like all the virtues of reason in god but in a superior way but in terms of moral virtues is it something like liberality with money or like temperance right with food and drink in god no see so the virtues of reason right are more like god right what is it found in god right then are the what many of the moral virtues right not all right so maybe there's a little bit of theological order there right and you can see like he takes up the cardinal virtues in the secundi secundi he takes the prudence first right and then what justice right then which both of which are found in god but in a higher way right just distributive justice as we say no commutative justice and then he takes up what fortitude and temperance right where our style takes up fortitude and temperance in the third book of the nicomachean ethics and then they have justice until the fifth book and then prudence is taken up in the sixth book right but again uh prudence and justice are more divine than courage right and temperance right so we'll say you know that properly speaking there's foresight in god right now properly speaking there's justice in god right there's no fortitude in god properly speaking but there's metaphorically he said to be strong right by temperance right he's sober chaste and then uh then he's metaphorically doesn't seem to be you know instead of god right now you know we wouldn't call that chaste right you know you know or sober would you say you know doesn't get drunk it doesn't even seem to be appropriate right so you can see how he's following the order there right and so it's more appropriate here to start with the virtues of reason right in the science where you're talking about god right but maybe also the virtues of reason are a little not as numerous right and basically he's going to be talking here about what five of them right in the same five that her style distinguishes the beginning of the sixth book you know we'll let him get away with this i know it's like in in my favorite book the summa contra gentiles he takes up you know the human soul before he takes up the separated substances right which is opposite of the order in the what summa theologiae he takes up the angels before the soul right now but actually in the summa contra gentiles there's three sections there one is about the understanding substance right and we're coming to that right as well as the angels and then he takes up the more particularly it begins with the our understanding substance right and it goes to the angels right now but you had that general consideration before so that kind of gives him a little leeway to do that now but now about the first six things are asked about the virtues of reason itself first whether the intellectual habits of the speculative understanding are virtues right now what's this distinction between speculative reason and and practical reason right how do they differ the two different powers in us now by their end yeah yeah because the end of the speculative is just to what to know to know the truth right but the end of the practical is the making or doing something right okay and of course it's especially the speculative ones that seem to be like god right of course the famous thing there when he says to martha and mary says to martha you know mary has chosen the better part it shall not be taken away from her but she has chosen the speculative or contemplative life right martha has chosen the practical well the practical one will come to an end with this world right and the speculative will continue and be perfected the next so she has chosen the better part and it shall not be taken away from there because it's going to be continued in the next time okay so if you spent your life here making houses and chairs and tables you won't be doing that in the next world right okay but if you spend your time thinking about god well you're going to be even more so maybe you'll be absorbing him right it's funny how it gets all his attention you know in heaven you know when they're thinking they're seeing god face how do you get their attention you know he doesn't answer that but i mean there's a little problem there right now so that's kind of a general question about the speculative virtues right or habits right i had the virtues right we saw before how he spoke of a way which foresight is more a virtue than what the geometry is right remember that well i mean speaking of how a virtue in the fullest sense not only makes you capable of a good act but inclines you to use it well right well foresight presupposes this what rectitude of the appetite by the moral virtues right and without that you can't have foresight right and then he says the same thing about faith right faith is a virtue right now because it's moved by the the will which is always quoting a guess you know no one believes unless he wills to do so right so you can see why he has that question at first right and then whether they are three to wit wisdom science or reasoned out knowledge and understanding and actual understanding right but just like her style calls it noose right sometimes just goes intellectus right but you understand without having to what reason it out right third whether the intellectual habit which is art is a what virtue right maybe it's the same question there that we had about the speculative ones right because it doesn't require attitude of what appetite right so i can be a good cook and still be a glutton right or something okay and then whether prudence or foresight is a virtue distinct from art right it doesn't ask whether it's a what virtue but yeah because it is kind of rich in the full sense right when you speak of the cardinal virtues they're all virtues in this fullest sense of virtue right but he merely asked a different question whether it's a virtue distinct from art right well this is the old famous distinction between doing and what making right we've talked about that use of words before right so in a sense making something is doing something but not every doing is a making right and the reason why making gets a new name is because it's a product but in the doing the other activity doing there's no product right so it just keeps the name doing and then gets the new name making it's one way of understanding that and then with the foresight is a virtue necessary to man well hmm something is it's interesting that he asked that right he doesn't ask that about sapiensia science intellectus even though they're very high that's interesting that's interesting that's interesting that's interesting that's interesting that's interesting that's interesting that's interesting that's interesting that's interesting that's interesting that's interesting that's interesting that's interesting that's interesting that's interesting that's interesting that's interesting that's interesting that's interesting that's interesting that's interesting that's interesting that's interesting that's interesting that's interesting that's interesting that's interesting that's interesting that's interesting that's interesting that's interesting that's interesting But you've got to live, right? And you need foresight to direct you, right? You don't have to be a geometer, right, to be saved, but you need some kind of foresight. And the sixth, well, we'll let that passage get there, right? Where the eubulia, synestis, and gnome, sunt virtus adjuncti prudentia. But eubulia is a good counsel, right? And synestis and gnome are two kinds of, what, judgment, right? But the main thing in prudence is, what, command, right? My brother Mark, you know, when you hear about this, I think there are three things. You've got to take counsel, right, huh? And you've got to decide what to do, right? Judgment, and then finally you've got to end. He and his two friends here in Quebec, you know, one of the guys who's very imaginative, could think of all kinds of things to do, but he had no judgment as to which one he should do. So he had eubulia, right? And then my brother Mark, huh? He had judgment, which one he should do, right? But he's kind of lackadaisical and so on. And the other guy was like, go, go, guy, you know? So he was the command guy, right? So they divided the three parts of prudent among themselves, he said, yeah. So they had to be together to do the prudent thing. Yeah, yeah. That's beautiful, though, it does, because it makes you think of the three things, you know, that you have to have, right? But as Augustine said, you decide to become good, didn't you, or convert or something? Not quite yet, you know? See, he's got the good judgment, but he doesn't get up and, you know, throw away that, get rid of that woman anyway. Okay. To the first end, one goes forward thus. It seems that the intellectual habits that are speculative, speculative is a Latin word, the Greek word is what? Theoretical. So sometimes in text you'll see theoretical philosophy or theoretical reason, speculative reason or speculative philosophy, but the English word is what? Looking. Looking, yeah. That's what the word means. Okay. So I call, and I shock you by calling it looking philosophy, right? I mean, that's, speak English, right? In Latin you say speculative and Greek theoretical. That's why I like the word theorem, right, in Euclid, right? They kind of, you know, speak of, you know, 48 propositions in book one, right? But that's kind of a misleading thing because proposition is taken from the Greek word prothesis, right? Which he proposes what he's going to prove at the beginning of each one of these, right? But actually what you have here is something to look at. And that's like the word theorem, right? The theorem is something to look at. Interesting. Look at these things that he has. Okay. So the first end one goes forward thus. It seems that the speculative or looking intellectual habits are not what? Virtues, right? For virtue is a habitus operativus, a habit that does something, right? But the speculative habits do not do anything. For they are distinguished, the speculative distinction of the practical, that is from the one that is operative, right? Therefore intellectual habits, speculative habits are not what? Virtues, right? Lauders don't do anything. I had a colleague, you know, who was married, and if he's sitting in the living room there reading a book, you know, as long as he's reading the book, his wife realizes she shouldn't interrupt him, right? But when he stops and kind of leans back, then she can come in with her small talk. Because that's the time you're kind of trying to absorb what you read, right? You're thinking about it. This is the culmination of what you read, right? And she comes in, you know, he's not doing anything, you know. It's only if he's reading, you know. People are kind of funny the way they are. I did the same thing to me when I visited with her one time. And I was reading some, I don't know what I was reading. I thought she was napping. We were sitting in big arm chairs, and I was reading, and I did exactly that, and I'm looking up and I'm thinking to myself, and that's when she comes right in. What are you doing? What are you talking about? What are you thinking about? Yeah. Moreover, virtue is of those things through which a man becomes happy, right? Or blessed, right? Felix, by the way, comes in the Latin word for what? Fruitful, right? So a happy life is a fruitful life, huh? It's kind of interesting, huh? Another way of saying it's enjoyable? Yeah, yeah, yeah. But it's the fruit of your activity, right? What I like about the word fruit is, the fruit is a, the apple or whatever it may be, is a natural result of a, what? Activity, right? Of the plant and so on. And happiness is a natural result of fruituous activity, right? So flicitas is the reward of what? Virtue, right? So it's not that virtue is its own reward, but in a way it does be its own reward, right? So Thomas says virtue is the road to happiness and vice is the road to misery. You can see that latter statement in the newspaper every day, right? Someone who is, you know, not in the road, he's actually reached misery, right? Due to his particular vice. But intellectual habits do not consider human acts, but other human goods, huh? Through which man obtains, what? Beatitude, right? But more natural things and, what? Divine things, right? So Aristotle calls theology divine, right? But it's not divine in the way that our theology is, but it's still about God, right? In some way. So in the sixth book of the metaphysics, right, he calls it theology, right? But we have to show that our science has more right to the theology than this does. Therefore, habits of this sort cannot be called, what? Virtusa. It's not about human acts whereby we achieve our happiness, right? So, if happiness is the reward of virtue, how can this be? Moreover, sciencia is a speculative habit, right? Right, huh? But science and virtue are distinguished as diverse genera and not one under the other, right? As is clear through the philosopher himself in the fourth book of places, huh? It's a book on intelligible reasoning, huh? And therefore, the speculative habits are not, what? Virtues, huh? So you're convinced, huh? For the time being. But against this is that only speculative habits consider necessary things, huh? Which are unable to be, what? Other than they are, right? But the philosopher lays in the sixth book, lays down the sixth book of the ethics. Certain intellectual virtues in the part of the soul which considers necessary things which cannot be, what? Otherwise, huh? Supposed to foresight, right? Like we get, you know? Even necessarily soul, right? And even art there. We can do it a different way. Therefore, the intellectual speculative habits are, what? Virtues, huh? I answer it should be said that since every virtue is said in order to the, what? Good, right? As has been said above. For a two-fold reason, some habit is said to be a virtue as has also been said above, right? In one way, because it makes the ability for, what? Doing well, right? And another way, because with or in addition to the ability, it makes also one use that ability well, right? And this as has been said above pertains only to those habits which regard the, what? Desiring part of the soul, right? In that the desiring power of the soul is what makes us, what? Use all the powers and what habits that we have, right? So was it Voltaire supposed to have looked at the objections in the Summa, you know? So he could, you know, throw them against unsuspecting Catholics, you know? And things they couldn't answer, right? Well, he's, I might say, misusing, huh? Summa, huh? Since, therefore, the speculative intellectual habits do not perfect the desiring power, nor do they in some way, what? Regard it, but only the intellectual part. They're able to be called virtues insofar as they make for the, what? Ability of good operation, right? Which is the consideration of the true. For this, indeed, is the, what? Good work of the understanding, right? But, however, they are not said to be virtues in the second way, as making one use well, right? The... power or the what habit huh okay so i can use my my speculative knowledge to deceive my students right and actually convince them you know that the uh what that the whole is not always more than the part right and uh i told you about teaching hegel you know i the fun of it i you know in my lectures i was showing that the hegelian method is superior to aristotle syllogism right and i walked out and the student was kind of walking along with me and he says gee that was really a great lecture mr burquist and and someone finally found something better than the syllogism so i gotta go back and grab these yeah yeah i was not really as reverse as i may sound you know it was me trying to convince that the whole is not always greater than the part i wasn't that convincing but anyway for from this that someone has the habit of speculative science he is not inclined to what using it right but he becomes able to look at the true and those things which he has a what yeah but that he uses the knowledge had this is by the will moving right and therefore virtue which perfects the will as charity huh which is in the will or justice right which isn't the will that's why they say you can have justice properly speaking god because he has will right but courage and what temperance are properly in the irascible and the concisal appetite and god doesn't have those emotions right he's not an emotional guy right uh well habits like charity and justice they make one to use well these what speculative habits right and according to this also in the acts of these habits there can be merit if they come to be from what charity right now just as gregory says in the sixth book of moralities okay and also he said the contemplative is of greater merit than the active it's interesting to say that right because he's quite the man in moral philosophy right well theology okay so we saw it he met the distinction before when he spoke about that there could be virtues and reason remember that he made the same distinction there didn't he when he talked about how foresight or prudence could be a virtue in the full sense but not art or some other ones right or faith itself can be a virtue right in the full sense huh now to the first thing there about not being operative to the first therefore it be said that twofold is one's what work or doing exterior and interior right the practical therefore or the operative which is divided against the speculative is taken from the exterior work right to which the speculative habit has no what order right but nevertheless it has an order to the interior work of the understanding right which is to look at the what to consider the true right and according to this it is a what operative habit right okay so that's that's the right to see the answer to that first objection right to the second it should be said that virtue is of some things in two ways in one way as objects right and thus what speculative virtues of this sort are not of those things to which man becomes blessed right except perhaps according as through says the what cause or the object of complete beatitude which is god who is sum speculabile right how are you trying to assume speculabile huh he's to be looked at right most of all right that's interesting thing sum speculabile how do they translate that in english they assume speculabile supreme object of concentration yeah but this okay in another way virtue is said to be of some things as of acts right now and in this way the what of those things to which man becomes blessed both because the acts of these virtues are able to be meritorious right then then also because they are a certain what beginning of perfect beatitude which consists in the contemplation of the what true that's very strong what he says here can be both meritorious and they can be what a beginning you prove to be better too yeah you see don't you spend your time contemplating god when i have a question now st thomas i covered it in religious life the brothers oh the life of perfection time of perfect love of god that's what it's on the love of god whereas it's on the perfection of chariot and the quotes from origin one of the times of course from the favorite because he's saying that well once you profess the way of the state of perfectionism it's not that you become perfect all at once but he says you begin and he speaks of it until you begin this contemplation in which you actually begin and that's what leads to it yeah you've seen the motto of the of the dominicans there what is it contemplata alis to adere right i think meritorious about that too you know but it's also a beginning of what beatitude right and those four things thomas says there about it in some kind of gentiles huh it's the most perfect activity because it's the beginning of beatitude which is the perfection of man now the third one that should be said that science is divided against virtue said in the second way which pertains to the desiring power right okay so virtue could be divided into virtue and science right and we've talked about that way of speaking before right but sometimes the genus the name of the genus so to speak uh is kept by one of them because it has most perfectly right but the genus such right but the genus such right and the other one gets a what new name right we met that way of speaking quite often now article two to a second one goes forward thus it seems that unsuitably are distinguished three speculative virtues right to wit wisdom science and what understanding huh it's interesting you know if you compare thomas and aristotle here aristotle at the beginning of the uh sixth book there he distinguishes five virtues of reason right and three of them are being named here and art and foresight are the other two right and then in the way he proceeds he takes up first science and art and foresight right and then he takes up wisdom and understanding later on and distinction between the three and the two is that three of them are about what is from the beginnings and the last two are about the beginnings one the beginnings in our knowledge intellectus and the other the beginnings of all things ultimately god the beginning of all things right now that's a very interesting but way of dividing it you know we've talked before about how you can't understand the distinction of five right now and aristotle divides them into three and two but the base of the distinction is three are about what is from the beginning and two of them are about the beginnings huh it's a very subtle thing right and i think he does that because the ones that are about beginnings are kind of uh obscure to us right now one because it's at the very beginning of our knowledge so it passes over without even noticing that we have it and yet it's at the very end of our knowledge so it's it's least known right and everybody knows there are things like geometry they know there's the art of the carpenter you know and the art of the cook and so on and they know that uh some men had foresight you know and some had political foresight and some had military foresight they know this right but what's what's wisdom i don't know i think the sized idea right i just don't worry to them right so in sense he takes the three that are more known and the then the two that are less known right that's beautiful right why thomas seems to take them into the what the three in the two the three that are speculative and the two that are what practical right cherish all this sometimes too you know there's kind of two ways to divide the five into two that is into three and two right but three of them two so the rule of two and three is not being divided uh avoided right it's being done in more than one way it's very subtle what these two guys were amazing minds now the same problem we have about naming here these species is not up not to be divided against the genus like there are dogs in the world and there are animals in the world no no no no there are dogs and cats and animals right no no no you don't have to have a genus against it you know they're human beings and they're a woman and so on you get in trouble with that you know but sapientia is equidam scientia right as is said in the sixth book of the ethics right but wisdom therefore wisdom ought not to be divided against science in the number of the intellectual virtues so in greek you have sophia for wisdom right and episteme for science right and there's how distinguishes between sophia and episteme but then in the book on sophia he calls sophia and episteme hopelessly mixed up the guy right and uh but the same problem we had before right about virtue right so that's a very common kind of name equivocal by reason right but this is going to be a different one because here wisdom gets the new name because it adds something what noteworthy right because science in general is knowing things by their causes right but wisdom has something special it's a knowledge of the very first cause of all right the cause of the causes right so it's got something special in the way of knowing causes so it gets a special name sophia granddaughter right sophia wisdom she says it's the knowledge of god my wife said you taught me that didn't you see why in the other case huh virtue keeps the name virtue right because it has what the common meaning more fully right more in the distinction of powers habits and acts which is made according to objects right and there is to be noted chiefly the distinction which is according to the what formal notion of objects this has been said before right and what is what the heck does that mean let's say you know you're you're seeing all kinds of things around this room right now so am i seeing all these books you got here what's the formal object of the eye is it books you know it's called right now i'm kind of figuring out that they're books right you go to the stores you know these you got all these boxes open up you know they look like a book you know you've seen those ones you know they make them look like a book on the outside and you put in your bouquets and you keep your drinks in there or you keep your money in there or something you know it's something really beautiful you know i say you know i always want to buy one of them you know because it looks like a big deal press a fucking volume you know but i see a lot of those in the you know places it a reflex to visit so i can know the shape of what this table by my eye and i can know the shape of this with my hand and not quite as quick you know but formally i know it one through color another through hardness or something right therefore diverse habits ought not to be distinguished according to the material object but according to the what formal notion of the object okay so i mean you talk about the senses right and you distinguish the sense of of uh sight and the sense of touch you don't do so by what knowing tables or knowing books right yeah you put a book in my hand i'll probably figure out this a book without opening my eyes right now but uh you can't distinguish them by that material object can you what's the senses that knows the book right you know it's going to be by color and hardness or something like that yeah i might recognize you by your my sight right but you know it's amazing how you kind of recognize somebody's you know voice right now you know since you know you don't even try to away i mean you know you hear somebody saying something or you answer the phone and you recognize somebody's voice right away you know who it is right yeah but nevertheless a person is not the formal object of hearing it's sound right okay and sight is something else but the principle of demonstration is the what reason for knowing the what conclusions right therefore the understanding of beginnings ought not to be laid down to another habit or another virtue from the knowledge of what conclusions because conclusions because conclusions are known by the what principles right just like you're known to color by my eye or by sound through my ear right okay moreover the understanding power is said to be that which is what rational essentially right as opposed to what the will and the emotions right which are rational only by partaking but reason even speculative reason also reasons by syllogizing what yeah or just as it reasons by syllogizing demonstrably so it also reasons by syllogizing what therefore just as science which is caused from the demonstrative syllogism is laid down to be a speculative intellectual virtue so also opinion which is gotten by syllogizing syllogizing theoretically right not to be that right now okay But against all this is what the philosopher says in the Sixth Book of Ethics. He's got a heck of a lot of confidence in this guy called the philosopher, right? Whoever he is. He lays down only, what? Three intellectual virtues, speculative, to wit, wisdom, reasoned out knowledge, if he's stating it, reasoned out understanding, and natural understanding, or loose intellect. Okay, what does Thomas say? I answer it should be said, that just as has been said, the speculative intellectual virtue is that to which the, what? Speculative intellect, the looking understanding, is perfected in considering the true, right? For this is the good work of it, right? But the true is in two ways able to be considered. In one way is known, what? To itself, right? And another way is known to, what? Another, huh? Now, what is known to itself, has itself as a, what? Beginning. And is perceived at once by the understanding, like the whole is more than one of its parts. And therefore, the habit perfecting the understanding, for the consideration of this kind of truth, or true, is called, what? Understanding, right? Which is the habit of, what? Beginnings, right? Principles. But the true that is known to another is not at once perceived by the understanding, but through the investigation of, what? Reason. And this has itself in the notion of a, what? Term or limit, huh? In the Greek way, episteme means coming to a halt or stop, right? That can reach your goal. Which can be of two kinds. In one way, that it be the last in some, what? Particular genus. In another way, that it be what is last with respect to the, what? Whole of human knowledge, right? And because those things which are, what? Afterwards, known by us, are before and more known by nature, as Aristotle says in the first reading of the physics, right? The premium. Therefore, that which is last with respect to all of human knowledge is that which is first and most knowable according to nature. So, in some sense, God is most knowable. But not to us, huh? And about this is wisdom, which considers the highest causes, as is said in the first book of the metaphysics, right? Now, incidentally, notice that term, altissimus causas, right? So, the Greeks imagined the cause to be above the, what? Effect, right? So that the, what? Effect is, or is hanging from the cause. It depends upon, right? A woman they call pendant, right? It gets something hanging from the ear, I guess. But in English, we use the word, what? The native word is ground for cause, right? And so we speak of the underlying cause, right? Which sometimes a lot of us fall into, too, right? And therefore, the word understanding, right? To understand the effect means, you know, it stands under it. Shakespeare and to the gentleman of Verona, right? There's a exchange between the two, what? Servants of the two gentlemen of Verona, right? And one of them is, what? Say, I don't understand you. He says, what's the matter with you? Even my staff understands me. And so I'm thinking of that pun, you know, it's kind of, kind of a lousy pun in a sense. But it makes you stop and think, you know, right? To understand, you stand under it is all the same thing, right? And it's because we imagine the cause to be underlying the, what? The effect, right? So it's kind of interesting to see that difference, yeah. Because that's kind of the way you name the thing, the way the word arose, right? But that's when they say altissimus causus, right? Whence, suitably, wisdom, judges and orders about, what? All things, right? Why? Because perfect judgment and universal judgment cannot be had except by resolution to the, what? First causes, right? But to that which is last in this or in that genus of, what? Knowables. Science perfects the, what? Understanding, right, huh? And therefore, according to diverse genera, but noble things, there are diverse habits of science, huh? When wisdom is not except, what? One, right? So notice, when you divide these speculative virtues into understanding, science and wisdom, right, huh? Two of those three are lowest, what? Species. And one of them is, what? No. It's a genus. You see? So there's only one natural understanding. There's only one wisdom, right? But there are many, what, forms of reasoned-out knowledge. Geometry is one. Maybe arithmetic is another one. Natural philosophy is another one, right? You see? And that's not impossible that in one division, right, you have some species that are lowest species and one that is not, right? Like, take some example from geometry, you know. Euclid divides triangle into equilateral isosceles and scalene, right, huh? Well, all equilateral triangles have the same, what? Yeah. But in the case of isosceles, you know, you could have many different kinds of angles, right, and so on, right? And you could have the, you know, the equal sides be twice as big as the remaining one, or they could be three times as big or something, you know. And so it's kind of different shapes of what? Triangle that are, what, isosceles, right? Or maybe, you know, but not different ones that are, what, you could have them. They're all the same, you know. The same way square, you know, all squares have the same shape, right? But do all oblongs have the same? No. So one might be, you know, one might be, you know, so on, right? And so you have one that is a lowest species and one that is, what, not, huh? Yeah. So here you have an example of that, too, right? Well, if you divide, you know, animal into beast and man, well, we all read the same species, you know, whether they're white or black or yellow or something. But not all beasts are the same species, right? It's not to be doubted, right? That it can be possible, right? Now, the first objection, of course, is based upon that, what, word problem there, right? But you know, I often ask people, you know, can you think without words? I don't even know what to say exactly, right? But you can't really say to somebody else what you think. You can totally use words, right? But can you even, you know, know yourself what you think? If you can't say it in words, you know, what do I think, you know? I don't know what I think. I don't know what to think. And, you know, the fact that the most common mistake in thinking is from the equivocation of words, right? And this objection, and the first objection here and the third objection in the previous article, right, are both based upon an equivocation in the word, right? But it does get people hung up, right? Because they don't understand words equivocal by what reason, huh? To the first, therefore, it should be said that wisdom is a certain, what, scientia, right? Insofar as it has that which is common to all sciences, that demonstrates conclusions from what? From beginnings, right? But because it has something its own, right? It's appropriate means that, right? Something its own. Above all other sciences. Insofar as it judges about all things, right, huh? That's another way of putting out its, what, certain excellence, right? It has something worthwhile, don't it? And not only as regards conclusion, but also as regards the first, what, beginnings, right? Aristotle defends the principle of contradiction, right? As well as other ones, right? Now, see, with purpose, you know, and purpose is taking the poor students and saying, you know, there's a whole always more than its parts, right? And I told you how I did that, huh? And I told you how I did that, huh?