Prima Secundae
Lecture 142: Habits, Accidents, and the Corruption of Virtues

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You might say that the wise are those who have wisdom. The haver there is before the wisdom. On account of which, in the definition of this sort of accident, the subject is laid down, which is the first part of the definition. For we say that the snub is a curved nose, right? We say the wise man is a man who knows God. Let's say, right? Thus, therefore, that which belongs to accidents on the side of the subject, but not from the definition of the accident, is not attributed to the accident in the abstract, but in the what? Concrete. And this, what? And of this sort is the intensity and the emission in certain accidents. Whence whiteness is not said to be more or less, right? But white is said to be more or less, right? And wisdom is not more or less, but the wise are more or less wise, right? And the same reason is in habits and other qualities, except that some habits are increased or diminished, though we said in addition, right? I add theorems to theorem a day, right? Something like that. Now, whether habits are corrupted, I add theorems to theorem a day, right? I add theorems to theorem a day, right? I add theorems to theorem a day, right? I add theorems to theorem a day, right? I add theorems to theorem a day, right? I add theorems to theorem a day, right? I add theorems to theorem a day, right? To the diminution, or diminished, by only seizing from operation, right? To the third, this is, and I've got to be careful here, right? To the third one goes forward thus. It seems that habits are not corrupted or diminished through only cessation from work, right? Well, habits are more permanent than what? Undergoing qualities, as it appears. But undergoing qualities are not corrupted or diminished through the cessation from act. For whiteness is not diminished if it does not, what, change the sight, right? Nor heat if it does not, what, heat something, right? Therefore, neither habits are diminished or corrupted through cessation from act. Moreover, corruption and diminution are certain changes, right? But nothing is changed without some cause moving it. Since, therefore, cessation from act does not imply any moving cause, it does not seem that through cessation from act there can be a diminution or corruption of the habit. Moreover, the habit of science and virtue are in the understanding soul, which is above time. But those things which are above time are not corrupted or diminished through length of time. Therefore, neither are those habits corrupted or diminished through the length of time, if someone remains without exercise. Well, I know what they said by languages, either use it or lose it. Yeah, yeah. My French is worse now than when I was in Quebec, you know. We talked for a long time. But against this is what the philosopher himself says in the book on the length and brevity of life. He says that the corruption of science is not only through deception or by deception, but also oblivion, right? Forgetfulness, huh? And in the eighth book of the Ethics, he says that many friendships, huh, are dissolved by one not calling upon the other, right? I guess it's an epilopsy, you know. That's an interesting word. Yeah. It reminds me of a country and western song my mom told me about when the guy's lamenting. He says, if my phone still ain't ringing, I suppose it still ain't you. I think that's a good definition in Al Palazzo. Yeah. Yeah, people say we've tried a partisan like that, they'll say, you know. He has four men, though. Yeah, it's good. It's just their stuff. Oh, did you? Yeah. It's a good, it's a good, he calls it the worst thing. The worst thing in the world, the friends, because of this, they just drift apart. Yeah, yeah. That's the best thing about it. At least in the circumstances where they were. The answer should be said, as is said in the eighth book of the Physics. Something is able to be a mover in two ways, right? In one way, as such, what moves things according to what? The definition of its own form, right? As fire, what? Heats. In another way, by accident, is that which removes what prohibits, right? As far as we move the pillar, right? Until the tree will fall down, right? And in this way, cessation from act causes corruption or diminution of what? Habits. In so far as the acts are removed, which prevent the causes corrupting or diminishing the habit. For it has been said above that habits are per se corrupted or diminished from their contrary, what? Agent. When so, whatever habits, contrary is what? Increase through the passage of time, I guess, which are able to, what? Be subtracted through act by the, what? Proceeding from the habit. These habits are diminished or even taken away entirely through a long cessation from act. As is clear both in science and in what? Virtue, right then? For it manifests that the habit of moral virtue makes a man prompt to choosing the middle, both in doings and in passions, emotions. But when someone does not use the habit of virtue to moderate the passions or his own operations, it is necessary that there come about many passions and operations apart from the mode of virtue, right? The mean of virtue. From the inclination of the sense appetite and of other things which move one in an exterior way, right? Whence the virtue is corrupted or diminished through the cessation from act. Likewise, also on the side of the intellectual habits. According as a man is prompt to judging rightly about the things imagined. When, therefore, a man ceases from the use of the intellectual habit, there rise up extraneous imaginations, right? And sometimes one's leading to the, what? Contrary. Such that, except through a frequent use of the intellectual habit, these are in a way, what? Cut off, huh? Or compressed, right? And a man is rendered less apt to judging, what? Correctly. And sometimes he's totally disposed to the contrary, huh? Those lazy monks, you know, you've got to watch them, you know? And thus, through cessation from act, they are diminished, or even, what? Corrupted intellectual habit, right? So to the first objection, it should be said that heat, through cessation from heating, is corrupted, if through this is increased, what? The cold. The cold, which is the parasitic corruption of, what? The hot, huh? To the second, it should be said that cessation from the act is moving one to corruption and diminution as a, what? Removance, prohibance, right? That's an accidental cause, right? So what do you do? Press the, pull us out, and the wolf came telling them down, huh? Accidental cause, removance, prohibance, huh? That's how it talks about that. So you have to understand this distinction between the parasitic parochidens and the cause of removance, prohibance, is one kind of what? So, if I move the pillar, am I the cause of your death? It's an accident, though, right? No. It's special kindness. I mean, you didn't foresee the consequences. It's going to be there. You planned it that way. I think you'd be... If I had one of the big rock up over your head there, you know, and I'd leave my hand, the rock descends and hits you on the head, finishes you off. You didn't touch it. I didn't touch it, Your Honor. I didn't know how to do it. Punish the rock. Yeah, put the rock in jail. The understanding part of the soul, as such, is above time. But the sensing part is subject to time. And therefore, through the... Curse of time. Curse of time, right? Curse of time. When in the course of time, right? As it says in the felony documents. There is a change as regards to passions and sensitive part. And also as regards to the grasping parts, the sense of grasping parts, right? Whence the philosopher says in the fourth book of physics that time is the cause of what? Oblivion, right, huh? Okay. We're going to say, did you kind that we were talking about that in the fourth book there, you know? Kind of an argument against, you know, the idea that, of course, time is going to be evolution, right, huh? Because time is more the cause of corruption than it is of what? Generation. Yeah, yeah. So if you leave the house there, you know, and don't try to knock it down, don't try to improve it, of course, the time is going to go apart. Yeah. I used to say, you know, if you don't clean off your desk once in a while and so on, of course, time gets to be a mess, right? Not to make a mess in your desk, but you're not going to order it either, right? But they get your papers out of order and everything, huh? And I think you might see the passage of time, huh? The Spirit talks about that a lot in the sonnets, right, huh? Time is more the cause of corruption, perfection. So I just sit here for a while, and I'm going to get dimmer. Not wisely. I'm not going to be thinking. Sometimes I'm laying there, and I'm either laying there, I can't sleep at night, you know? And of course, try to even call something, you know? Call those eight arguments that Thomas had in that chapter or something, you know? We're out there, is doing all the arguments about God being good there, you know? But I'm going to say, I can give all now an order. Take a little break here now. Sure. Thanks. You've heard me talk about distinction, division, definition. Distinction is kind of the basic thing for the mind, right? I was just reading, you know, where Thomas was talking about God as being the cause of what? The distinction of things, right? He's distinct from all the things and the cause of their distinction, right? And then he refers to Anxagos, right? The Anxagos had introduced the mind, right, for the distinction of material things. The mind begins to distinguish things, separate them. So a nice thing there for him, you know. But it follows Shakespeare's definition, right? Looking before and after presupposes what? The ability to see distinction, huh? Okay. Then we're not to consider about the distinction of habits. And about this four things are asked. First, whether many habits are able to be in one power? It's a very interesting question. Theological virtues you have. Faith is in reason. There's two theological virtues in the will, right? Of course, it were the natural habits. I mean, the philosophical ones that are discussed. You have many. Mr. Austin, there's at least five in reason, right? Because some of them can be subdivided, so. There's many. Art of carpentry, art of cooking. Second, whether habits are distinguished according to their, what? Objects, huh? Third, whether habits are distinguished according to good and bad. A very strange one. Whether one habit can be considered for many habits. That sounds crazy. Why does he even ask that? To the first, then, one goes forward thus. It seems that there are not able to be many habits in one, what? Power. Power, huh? For those things which are distinguished by the same, when one is multiplied, the other is what? Multiplied, right? But according to the very same thing, powers and habits are distinguished according to acts and, what? Objects. Likewise, therefore, they are, what? Multiplied, right? Therefore, there cannot be many habits in one power. Are you convinced temporarily by that argument? I am. It doesn't take much. I'm pushing over it. Moreover, a power is a simple power. Critics is used for power, yeah. But in one simple subject, there cannot be diversity of accidents. Because the subject is the cause of the accident, then. From one simple thing, there does not seem to proceed except one thing, right? Therefore, in one power or ability, there cannot be many, what? Habits. Moreover, just as a body is formed by figures, this is the easy one to see, so a power is formed by its, what? Habit. But one body cannot be, at the same time, formed by diverse figures. Therefore, neither one power is able to be formed at the same time, not a single, by diverse habits. Therefore, there cannot be many habits in one power. But against this is that the understanding is one power, in which there are, however, habits of diverse sciences. I said you don't have this computer habit, whatever it is. It's important. Hence, it should be said, and it has been said above, habits are certain dispositions of something existing in, what? Potency to something. Either to nature, or to operation, or the end of the nature. And about those habits, which are dispositions for the nature, it is manifest that there are able to be many in one subject. In that of one subject, there can be, what? Taken, in diverse ways, the parts, according to which, according to the decision of which the habits are set. Just as we take the parts of the human body, the, what? Humanism. Insofar as they are disposed according to human nature, there is a habit or a disposition of, what? Health. If one takes it according to similar parts as the nerves and the bones, the flesh, there is a disposition or to nature, there is, what? Strength. Or, I guess you could guess. If one takes the members as the hand and the foot and of this sort, the super disposition of them is, what? Beauty. Beauty. And thus, there are many habits or dispositions in the same. So, you're talking about health, strength, and what? Beauty. Beauty, right? Men wonder more whether they're strong, more whether they're beautiful or what. Friend Jim, the golden glove boxer, you know, I'm strong, he said. I'm not healthy. So, I was more healthy than Jim, but he said I was strong. I said I'd not be flattened. How are you thinking about it? I used to think if I had wealth, I'd hire Jim as my bodyguard. Chauffeur and bodyguard. I worked in the package store there, you know, basically on those, you know, holidays, you had a lot of money coming into the store. You wanted to go over to the bank around the corner and deposit it, but he'd always ask, you know, this ex-football player, you know, to work for us, to accompany him, you know, because, protect him, right? that was more healthy than that football player, but he was, he was much stronger than me, you know. You always ask him, and then you ask me, coming into the bank. It's kind of funny to see them walk out the two of them. If, however, we speak of habits, which are dispositions for works, which properly pertain to powers, right? Because of the ability to do something, right? Thus, also, it happens that of one power, there can be many habits, right? The reason for this is, because the subject of habit is a power that in some way is undergoing, right? Passive. For an active power only is not the subject of somewhat habit, as has been made clear before. Now, a passive power is compared to a determined act of one species as matter to what form? In that, just as matter is determined to one form, to one agent, so also the undergoing power by what? Reason of one active object is determined to one act in speciesism. Whence just as many objects are able to move one passive power, so also one passive power can be the subject of diverse acts or perfections in species. Habits are certain qualities or forms inhering existing in powers, right? By which a power is inclined to determine acts in species. Determine acts according to some species. Which means one power can be the subject of the species. Which means one power can be the subject of the species. Which means one power can be the subject of the species. Which means one power can be the subject of the species. Which means one power can be the subject of the species. can have what? Once to one power, they are able to retain many habits. Just as many acts differing in what? The species. Because you can have many different acts from the same power. That is clear as it could be. To the first, therefore, it should be said, just as in natural things, a diversity of species is according to what? Form, right? A diversity of genera is according to matter, as is said in the fifth book of physics. For those things are diverse in genera, of which the matter is diverse, right? So also the diversity of objects in genus makes for a distinction of what? What? Always. Once the philosopher says in the sixth book of the ethics that to those things which are other in genus, right, there are also what? Different particular what? Animals, huh? But the diversity of objects in species makes for a diversity of acts in species and consequently of what? Abits, huh? Whatever things are diverse in genus are also diverse in species. But the reverse in this is not so. And therefore, diverse powers, there are diverse acts and species and diverse habits. But however, it's not necessary that there be diverse habits, that diverse habits be of diverse powers, but there can be many of one power. And just as there are genera and genera, so there are species and species. And thus it happens that there are diverse species and habits and powers, huh? Why is it saying that there's a difference between a distinction according to genus and a distinction according to what? Species, yeah. To the second, it should be said that a power, although it be simple in its essence, is multiple in its, what, potency or power, right? According as it extends itself to many acts differing in what? Species. And therefore, nothing prevents in one power there being many habits differing in what? Species, huh? To the third, it should be said that a body is formed by a figure as to its proper termination. But habit is not the termination of a power, but it's a disposition to an act as to its ultimate turn. And therefore, there cannot be of one power at the same time many acts, except that perhaps this one is comprehended under the other. Just as neither of one body can there be many figures, except according as one is in, what, another, as the triangle is in the, what, quadrilateral, right? Notice the Latin, the trigona, huh? The quadraton, the quadrangle. It's interesting that he's using the Greek words there. Yeah. For the intellect is not able to understand at the same time many things, right? But is able at the same time to know many things habitually, right? God knows all things actually, huh? Amazing. Amazing. Whether habits are distinguished according to objects. To the second one proceeds thus. It seems that habits are not distinguished according to objects. For contraries are differing in what? Species. But the same habit of science is the contraries. As medicine of health and what? Sickness. They're different objects, right? Therefore, they are not differing in species according to object. And therefore, habits are not distinguished according to objects differing in species. That's a better translation than habit. Aristotle is one book in the politics of the preservation of governments and the corruption of governments. Same knowledge. Plato and Aristotle, both of them, emphasize it as the same knowledge, the opposites, right? You know what ugliness is. You know what beauty is. You know what ignorance is or error is. You don't know what knowledge is. Moreover, diverse sciences are diverse habits. But the same, what? Knowable pertains to diverse sciences. As the earth to be round is demonstrated both by the naturalist and by the, what, astronomer, right? And therefore, habits are not distinguished according to their, what? See, astrologers are not in a negative sense, right? That's to say, you know, can philosophy and theology know the same thing? But it's like, you know, when you compare it to the senses, right? Can the sense of sight, right, know the shape of this, which is retained, get it right? And the sense of touch, know the shape of it too? They don't know it in the same way, right? The one knows it by how far the color extends, right? The other one knows it by how far the color extends, right? But they can know the same thing, but not in the same way, it seems. If they know the same thing in the same way, I don't know if they have different powers, the sense of touch and the sense of what? Sight, you know? If I recognize your voice, right, by my ear, right? That's what they say, I just learned that recently, that people who are blind and they want to know who you are, they can feel your face. That's kind of curious, I mean, besides your voice or something, but they want to know your face, they feel the features of your face. They have a sensitivity to those kinds of senses that we don't, or I'm kind of dull to those things, but they're much more focused in the senses that they have. However, on the same act, there's the same object, but the same act can pertain to diverse habits or virtues, if they're referred to diverse ends, right? For to give money to someone, if it be an account of God, pertains to charity, but if it is an account of solving a, what, a tax kind of debt, pertains to justice, right? Therefore, also the same object can pertain to diverse habits. And therefore, there is not a diversity of habits according to a diversity of what? Objects, eh? But against us, it is that acts differ in species according to a diversity of objects, eh? But habits are dispositions, so dispositions to acts. Therefore, also habits are distinguished according to diverse objects. You see, in the language, as Aristotle would say, right, he's going to talk about the powers of the soul, right, the abilities of the soul, and then he says that the abilities are going to be distinguished by their, what, acts, right, and the acts by their, what, object, yeah. So, the ability, sight, the sense of sight, and the sense of hearing are distinguished by seeing and hearing, right? But they're both forms of sensing, but the one is sensing color, that is sensing sound, so they're ultimately distinguished by their, what, object, right? Well, that carry over into habits, right, huh? Except it's a more, what, particular distinction, right, huh? So, seeing red and seeing green is not the same thing, but red and green are more particular differences than color and sound, right? The answer should be said that habit is both a, what? A form. Yeah. And is a habit, right, huh? Curious that you should say that, huh? Now, a distinction of habits in species can be noted either according to the common way in which forms are distinguished in species, or according to the way that is, what, property to habits, right? So, form is something more general than habit, right, huh? In a soul, it's a form, too, right? So, it's more general, right? Now, forms are distinguished from each other according to diverse, what, active principles in that every agent makes something like itself in species. But habits imply an order to something, huh? Now, all things which are said according to an order to something are distinguished according to the distinction of those things to which they are said, right? Now, habit is a, what? Habit is a disposition which is ordered to, what, two things, as I said before, to it, to nature, and to the operation following upon the nature, right? Thus, therefore, according to three things, habits are distinguished in species, in one way according to the active causes of such dispositions, in another way according to nature. nature, in a third way, right? According to objects differing in species, as will be unfolded in the things that what will follow. To the first, therefore, it should be said, huh? That in the distinction of powers, or also habits, one not to consider the object materially, right, but the ratio of the object differing in species, or also in genus. Now, although contrary species, huh, differ by diversity of things, right? Nevertheless, there is the same way of knowing each, right? Because one is known through, what? The other. And therefore, insofar as they come together for one reason of being knowable, they pertain to one knowing habit, huh? That's a very subtle thing in the sense that you stop and think about it, right? That's one way they distinguish between reason and the body, right? And the reason is not the body, because in the body, one contrary excludes the other contrary, right? So health excludes sickness, and sickness excludes health, right? But in my mind, the knowledge of one, it isn't the other, right? So normal blood pressure, high blood pressure, you know, has normal blood pressure in this understanding, right? You can't really know that blood pressure is high unless you know what normal blood pressure should be, right? Mm-hmm. this is a famous example because Thomas often talks about it to the second should be said that the earth to be round through one middle term the natural philosopher demonstrates, right? and through another the astronomer who has a mathematical science of nature, right? as to the, what, shapes of eclipses or something of this sort, right? okay so when the earth comes between the sun and the moon it casts a circular shadow upon the thing that's kind of a mathematical middle term, right? but the natural one demonstrates this through a natural medium as to the motion of everything is to the middle or through something of this sort, right? now the whole power of a demonstration, which is a syllogism, making us to know depends upon the, what? middle term, right? and therefore diverse middle terms are as diverse, what? yeah according to which the habits of the sciences are, what, diversified, right? which is something like the senses, right? where they have what they call the common sensible, right? so that more than one sense knows it, right? but it knows it to its own, what? proper sensible, right? so I know the shape of this here is being rectangular through the color I don't know what it is red, kind of and I can also know through, what? hardness, right? mm-hmm so the touch is knowing in a different way than sight is, right? mm-hmm and the eyes are going to be distinguished by color rather than by, what? shape, right? mm-hmm but it's knowing shape in a different way mm-hmm natural hearing yeah, physics and the seventh book of the ethics an end has itself in doings as the beginning or principle or premise in, what? and therefore the diversity of ends diversifies virtues just as the diversity of active principles the different premises for showing something okay for the ends are the objects of the acts of the interior acts which interior acts most of all pertain to what virtues, right? so that's interesting that's a very important portion there, right? so just as we reason from the premises to conclusions so we reason from the end to the means that are suitable to it, right? so the end is like the active principle whereby you know a conclusion, right? so you say why is this conclusion so? go back to the premises, right? why are you doing this? well, for this end, huh? that's essentially reasonable you might call it you might use the word reasonable in case, right? the reason why I did that, right? and then you get the end, right? the reason for thinking this theorem in Euclid is because of these what? premises, right? it's the reason he gave, right? mm-hmm mm-hmm mm-hmm you might use the word you might use the word you might use the word you might use the word you might use the word