Prima Secundae
Lecture 139: Growth in Habits and Spiritual Forms

Transcript
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The 37th is so funny, although I did the 36th and 38th, how did the 37th look, you know? But, what is Alexander the Great supposed to have wet, you know, because there's no more worlds to conquer, right? I guess there were, but he didn't know of the northern world to go out and conquer, right? I suppose he could have, you know, stabilized his kingdom more, right? Yeah, you know, Hitler kept on, what, seeking other things. I mean, he ran over Poland without much trouble, right? And then he, or France ran it quickly, right, huh? You know, something, right, huh? Things were really going pretty good, you know? He had taken over Czechoslovakia, you know, after he had taken over the sedation there. And then he made the mistake of going into Russia, and then started to turn around, you know? So, he should have maybe, you know, dug in more deeply in the things he had, right? Set aside Russia for the future time, right? When he developed the A-bomb and so on, right? But he didn't realize. I mean, it's kind of a difference between a man, you know, increasing the empire, right, and then stabilizing the, what, territory that he does have, right, huh? We can get more firmly under his, what, control, right, huh? Of course, he would have a paladizing, trying to create a synergy kind of Persian. Yeah, yeah, yeah. He had his men marrying Persian girls and so on, and trying to mix the races there, you know. I mean, there's a difference between stabilizing your, what, what you have, and making it more firm. And one time, we were driving across country with my brother Mark, and I said, I want to try to memorize Shakespeare's songs, right? I have the first 20 memorized. Now, I've kind of forgotten them, right? You know? But unless you kind of repeat these things, you kind of forget them, right, huh? But it's one thing to extend your memory to other sonnets, and then to understand something better, right, huh? I know I've memorized, you know, a few of the songs, you know, and I tend to use, see them, you know, and I tend to think about them, you know, and I come to understand those songs better, right, huh? And, but, so, my knowledge of the songs is growing in one way, right? When I penetrate the ones that I memorize more and understand them better, right, huh? But then, you know, they go on to other songs that I wish. You try to do all the songs that I've got through them in a superficial way, I guess, you know? There's two ways of, what, growing, right, huh? So, let's look at the reply to objections, huh? To the first it should be said, therefore, that just as the name of magnitudinous, right, is derived from bodily quantities to the understandable perfections of forms, so also, right, the name of growth, right, who's what? Is the great, right? Okay. Now, going back to, take Shakespeare's definition of this, or this thing. Large discourse, right, huh? Well, large and small, for that matter. Large, it belongs, first of all, to what? Quantity, right, huh? Okay. He's a large man, you know, okay? Or a large house, you know, I mean, you know? And you drive around Shrewsbury there, she'd come back, this one street there, come back to the church there, and I said, gee, look at the little houses, you know, boxes, you know? And then, there's a new area there, you know, what if there's a house, you know how much that house of costumes, he says, you know? So it's a large house, you know, I mean, you know? So, this is the first meaning of large and small, isn't it? When Shakespeare speaks of large discourse, he's carried the word large over from quantity to something else, right? But maybe, or closely, you might say, what is a large discourse, right? Well, sometimes I say, it's a discourse, one meaning of it is, a discourse that covers a large area, right? And there I'm kind of, already kind of, what? Staying close to the quantitative origin of the word, right? Okay, but then, more precisely, what I mean is that reason has a discourse about the universal. And the universal is said of many things, in fact, some universals are said of an infinity of things, right? So, a discourse about the universal is a large discourse. It covers many things, right? You know, but in one of the dialogues there, you know, with Socrates, is a young man, right? He's from Parmenides. He's trying to understand the universal, right? And it's like a big, a blanket you're placing over all these things, right? We're kind of stuck in that first meaning, you know, the quantitative one, right? And so, Socrates, you know, when you have a blanket, you know, if we lay it down, if there's one thing over us, only part of the land could be over you, another part would be over me, another part would be over you, right? But when this is said, when animals said of dog and cat and horse, the whole of animals said of dog, the whole of animals said of cat, you know? It's quite different from quantity, right? You have to assume the likeness there, isn't it, though, right? You know? So that's one example of a large, where a large is, what, very close to, yeah, yeah. But there's a difference between the way in which a blanket would cover, you know, furniture or something here, right? And the way that a universal covers many things, right? Okay? And then I say, you know, the discourse of the wise man is the largest of all in this sense, right? Because it's a discourse about being in one, and these are said of everything, right? So this is the largest discourse that there is, right? Okay? But then there's another meaning of large, which is more close to the one here in the text here, where large means what? Great, in a sense, means something perfect, right? Okay? And I contrast large discourse there with small talk, right? Where small talk means talking about, what, unimportant and significant things, right? See? Why, large discourse in this sense would be discourse about great things, right, huh? Even great here doesn't mean in a quantitative sense, right, huh? But discourse about, let's say, about the soul, right, huh? Discourse about human happiness. And the largest discourse of all, in this sense, would be a discourse about God himself, right, huh? But a discourse about the universe, right? You know, Einstein, after he, in 1905, he had a special theory of relativity, right? And then in 1915, he had the general theory of relativity, right? Which led to an explosion of, envelopment of cosmology, right? So Einstein said he primarily wanted to understand the cosmos as a whole, right? Well, the cosmos is the greatest thing there is, you know, in the world around us, because it includes everything in some way, right? So cosmology is a large discourse, right? The discourse of the cosmology is very large. But the cosmos is ordered to God, right? So the discourse about God is even greater. But nevertheless, cosmology is a large discourse, right? You can see why Einstein has moved to it, right? And Galileo gives us why he's doing this, too, right? So you can see, you know, in the use of the word large there, what Thomas is saying here, where you're taking words that name something, you know, in the imagination, something in quantity, and you're carrying them over, right? Okay? But I usually, when I talk about large discourse, I usually give us the first meaning is that it's a discourse about the, what, universal. That's closer to quantity, isn't it? than the discourse about great things, right? And so I kind of, you know, smoothed over that first transition and said, you know, we're going to cover a large area, right? And when you say, for example, that no odd number is an even number, right? How many numbers are you covering there? Yeah? Wow! And when you say no prime number is a composite number, right? And no perfect number is a prime number, right? Like, wow, you're covering, oh, my goodness, you know? You know? In a kind of qualitative sense, right, huh? You know? I was first studying astronomy, you know, and studying some of the stars and villages there in Orion, right? You could fit the whole solar system inside villages, right? Oh, my God. And I just learned, you know, the sun is 93 million miles away from the earth, right? And the size of the solar system, you know, with all this inside, you know? Peel-tooth, you know, these old stars expanding it all. So I was talking to my kids, you know, and I said, Daddy, can you count to 100? And I said, yes. And they're like, can you count to 1,000? Yes. After a while, they stopped to admire me. But why? Oh, Daddy, can you count to 1,000? Oh, Daddy. I mean, you know, it's great to be able to talk about God, you know, talk about the cosmos, you know? Second thing. To the second, it should be said, huh? Yeah. That's what I just talked about, right? Okay. Just as the name of magnitude is derived from corporeal quantities to understand what perfection is a form, so also the name of what growth, right? Whose term is the magnum, right? The second should be said that a habit is a certain, what, perfection. But not such a perfection that is, what, a terminus of its subject as giving its specific being, right? Nor in its ratio does it include, what, limit, as to the species of, what, number, right? Whence nothing prevents, but that it receives more or less, huh? So I can see, you know, when I come back over these theorems and Yuka once in a while, I say, yeah, I understand a little bit better, you know, I see it better now, you know? I see the way these things fit together, right? And I can see that I'm going to, what, I can understand it better and better, right, huh? In the same way, you know, sometimes I get through reading my favorite book, The Summa Kahn Gentiles, they say, well, I'm going to go read what he says about the same things in the summa, what he says about it in the sentences, right? And he approaches it a little bit differently in a little different context, and you start to see it a little bit better than you did before, right, huh? You know? It's like a professor will sometimes say the same thing and explain it a little bit differently, you know, and you see it a little bit better, right? You know, you've had that experience, you know? And so when I go from one summa to the other summa or to the disputed questions, you know, where it's discussed or the sentences, it's a little different, you know? You're starting to understand this even better now, you know? To the third objection, huh? It should be said that alteration is first found in the qualities of the third species, that's the sensible qualities, like hot and cold, right? White and black. But in the qualities of the first species, right, there can be an alteration per posterioris, right? For when there's an alteration according to hot and cold, the animal can be altered according to health and, what, sickness, right? So heat a man up too much or cool him down too much, you can affect his health, right? And likewise, an alteration made according to the passions of the sense-desiring power or according to the sensitive powers, there are a thousand alteration according to the sciences and the, what, virtues. And I imagine these things in Euclid more clearly, right? To understand how, when my passions cool down, you know, I get a little more friction in me, you know, and so on. But also, you know, the word alteration, if you talk about it as undergoing, you know, well, then the word undergoing is carried over too, right? Understanding is an undergoing. In fact, it's named from under, isn't it? We'll have to stop right now. So this is quite a particle there right now. Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, guardian angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. Deo gracias. God, our enlightenment. Guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds. Orden and illumine our images and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor. Amen. And help us to understand what you're written. Okay, let's look again at the question 52, which some of you saw last time. It's tied up with what's going to be in Article 2 again. Go at least to the body of the article. I don't want to do everything again, but it's really, really a very important article here. For many reasons in addition to a particular thing here about habits. So Thomas says in the body of the article, Question 52 there, Article 1. I answer that it should be said that augmentum, which I suppose you could translate as what? Growth, right? Just as other things pertaining to quantity are carried over, transferable, right? From bodily quantities to understandable spiritual what? Things. Okay. And why is that? On account of the connaturality, right? The coincidence of their nature, of our understanding to bodily things, which fall under the, what? Imagination. I've seen Thomas, you know, give that beginning there many times, you know. You know, say, all our kind of thoughts that we have, the words that we have, applied to these immaterial things, are taken from the continuous and time. And you stop and think about that. Take the words like beginning and end, right? What's the first meaning of beginning and end? Those two words. Yeah, the first meaning of beginning, it's the beginning of the magnitude, right? Okay. To which is similar to the beginning of the motion or the magnitude of the beginning of the magnitude and the time it takes. But the first meaning is what? You've got something continuous here, right? So, the point is the beginning of the line, right? That's a good, what? Example, right? Okay. You know, when we talk about God, you've heard me talk about God and sometimes I compare God to the point that is the center of the circle. And when Thomas is talking about how the eternal now is opposite every now and time, right? He compares the nows and time to the points on the, what? So it comes to the circle. So one point is before or after another one, right? But compared to the, what, center of the circle, they're right opposite, right? See, but you're kind of, you know, helping your thinking, right? But starting from the imagination, right? To talk about these things. The word end, the first meaning of end is, well, the end of the table, right? Okay. The end of the row, right? The point is also at the end of the line, right? That's the first meaning. And then you're gradually carried over, right? We saw that, you know, with Shakespeare there, right? When he talks about reason is the ability for a large, what, discourse, right? Well, discourse is taken from something continuous, which is running. And large is obviously taken from, what, quantity, right? And then you say, well, okay, it doesn't have exactly the same meaning, but you carry those words over. Now that is said in bodily quantities, something to be great, when it has arrived at the suitable, what? Perfection. Perfection of quantity, right, huh? Okay. So a midget has not, right, huh? Okay. Whence some quantity is regarded as great in man, but is not regarded as great in elephant, right? It doesn't sit in the size you want, huh? You know, Stahl talks about that in fiction there, right, huh? Why a play, say, is more beautiful than a sonic, right, huh? It doesn't have a certain magnitude, right, huh? Okay. And what's that in Midsummer Night's Dream? Then one girl is kind of short, you know, and the other girl thinks she's making fun of her because she's short, right? She doesn't have the full, you know, size, you know? I suppose a short man, you know, is kind of looked down upon by a woman, too, you know? Okay. Whence informs we call something great from this that it is, what? Perfect, huh? But no, there's other reasons there, right? When I was talking about large discourse and what it means, right? I said you can have a discourse about, what? The universal, right? And then going back to the imagination, kind of like universal covers a large, what? Area, so to speak, right, huh? That's said of, what? Many, right, huh? But it's not really covering them the way the blanket is, huh? Like Socrates thinks when he's a young man, right? He compares universal to a blanket, you know, spread over things and the parmenides, huh? He's running into contradictions like he gets other people into later on. And because the good has the, yeah, now notice, I see an interesting text in Thomas, the way he uses the word ratio. And we don't use the word reason in English exactly that way, right? But sometimes we speak of the reason why something is so. And is that reason more on the side of our mind or is it on the side of the thing itself? The reason why something is so. What's the reason why we had a civil war here, right? Does reason mean thought or does it mean more on the side of the thing itself? Yeah, yeah, yeah. So there we use the word ratio in the way Thomas sometimes uses in these texts, right? But, so I rarely speak in English, the reason why I say that, right? I don't usually say the reason what, okay? But maybe you could start to start this new custom, right? The reason of what something is, right? It'd be on the side of the thing, right? Because what a thing is, is more in the thing, obviously, than it is in our mind, right? Or in the definition, right? Okay? You've heard my sophisticated soldierism there, right, huh? A triangle is a, I mean a square is an equilateral and right-angled quadrilateral. But equal and right-angled quadrilateral is a definition. Therefore, a square is a definition. It sounds like the answer, right? Is it? It sounds like the answer. Yeah, yeah. Just like you explained, you want to just, that would be the example, right? Or maybe also, though, though, if I'll say, simply and not simply, right, huh? Because in a way, the definition is, what? It's a thing. Yeah, yeah. But in a way. But in the mind, right? Yeah, yeah. It's, the definition of square is square as understood. Yeah. So it's not square simply. Oh. But square is understood, right, huh? So is it both? Could be both involved, yeah, yeah. Oh. That's why sometimes you see the definition of truth as the adequatio intellectus et rei intellecta. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Not just the thing itself. Yeah. But the thing is understood. Yeah. That's what the truth is. Then he quotes a statement from Augustine, which you have to read in the Latin to get the alliteration, right, of Augustine, because you say rhetorician, you've got to realize he alliterates beautifully, right? Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. In hisque non mole, magna sunt, right? Aedem est esse meus quadmeleus. So he's got four M's there, right, huh? Mm-hmm. Okay. It all gets lost when you get into English there, right? I don't know how we even translate the word moldy exactly. It's a little pile. That's right. I think it's a pile. Yeah. Yeah. That's its first, I guess, first sentence. Yeah. Okay. Well, as the great Augustine says in the sixth book about the Trinity, right? Mm-hmm. Okay. Now he comes to a very important distinction, huh? The perfection, however, of a form can be considered in two ways, huh? And you could say there are two ways that a form can be what? Perfect, right, huh? In one way, according to the form itself. Now, let the seed, I don't know what that means exactly. In another way, according as the subject partakes of the, what? Form, huh? Now, later on, he's going to talk about, you know, I think in the next article, in fact, he takes the example of what? Geometry, right? Okay. And the more theorems I know in geometry, right, the more, what, perfect, you could say, is geometry, right? But there it's the form itself is being perfected, right, huh? Because it extends now to more theorems, right, more conclusions, right? Okay, but as I go over a theorem again and again, I start to understand that same theorem better, and that means that my reason, right, absorbs it better, it partakes of that theorem more, right, huh, okay? So I like to go back and read the same thing over again, right, and read it twice and read it thrice, you know? As Pedicly says, what is worth saying can be said more than once. And what is worth thinking about can be what? Yeah, yeah, yeah. I just got marvelous, this great mind of Boethius there, you know, and the definition of trinity and, I mean, of eternity, right? And Thomas' use of that, you know, and what Boethius says, he would be a great mind of Boethius, you know? Right, right, you know? But the teacher, you know, he'd like to teach us through Boethius, he'd like to teach us through Thomas, right? Because he wants to, what, us to share the dignity of, what, being a teacher, right? You know, Thomas says, why does God cause things, sometimes not immediately, right, but to other things, right? He wants them to share in the dignity of being a cause, right? And that's very generous of him, yeah. And so he teaches us through Thomas or to Euclid or somebody else, right, because he wants Thomas and Euclid to, what, share the dignity of being a, what, a teacher, in particular, right? So, he asked me to say a few words tomorrow or Saturday for the Trivium, you know, graduation, I'd like to stick something in here about very magnet and a teacher, right? And the ability of it, though, right, it's really kind of a marvelous thing, right? And my teacher, Kisra, he'd say, you can't be a teacher too much, he says. And he'd help himself, no, I can't, if I had some kids. What do you want to ask if he's to help himself? That's right. Heracles says that in the play, that's one of the lines I remember. Truth can never be confirmed enough, though doubts can never sleep. Even if you don't have any doubts, you can never confirm it enough. Yeah, yeah. Now, insofar, therefore, as the perfection of a form is according to the form itself, thus it is said to be, what, small or what? Great. Great or large, I guess, right, huh? Okay. Now, what did Samuel, not Samuel Johnson, did Ben Johnson say about Shakespeare, huh? I don't know. Is it small Latin and less Greek, something like that? Okay. But you might say, if a person doesn't know too many words, huh, he has a small vocabulary, right? Okay. Shakespeare, pretty much, had an extremely large vocabulary, right? You know, these people that do these word studies. But they, you know, they, Harvard and other places, they find that he's got a tremendous vocabulary, I mean. They hardly know anybody who's got such a vocabulary, I want that. Yeah. Mm-hmm. Yeah. Mm-hmm. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. But insofar as the perfection is to be noted according to the partaking of the form by the subject, right? It is said to be more and less, huh? So when I, you know, read the same text over another time, I start to understand it, what? More, right, huh? Mm-hmm. He said he still saw something new, everything went through it, right? Mm-hmm. Once he had to point something out to him, he said, how could I have this, that, God exists? After all these years of teaching it, right, how could I have this seeing that, you know? Now, this should not, this distinction should not be brought forward according to this, that the form has some being apart from the matter or the subject that exists out there in the world by itself, right? Mm-hmm. But because others' consideration of it according to the reason of what it is, the reason of its species, right? And the other according as it's partaken in the, what, subject, right? Okay? Now, I don't know if you can say that according to the reason of its, reason of what it is. But I don't see why you can't do it. You can speak of the reason why, right? Why can you speak of the reason what? Mm-hmm. But I'm just stretching a little bit the English language there, huh? When I asked Monsignor Dionne, was it good to speak of thinking out something, right? And he said, yeah, but you can't say that in French, huh? He and Boulet thought that French was inferior to English, right? Mm-hmm. Both for poetry and for philosophy, both of them. Just as Latin, they thought, was inferior to, what? Greek. Greek for both poetry and for, what? Philosophy, you know? Mm-hmm. That's why you talk about how, when the Church defined things, you know, and the clarity that came from Rome, right, huh? But it was in the Latin language, right? That shows the divine, what? The rabbi-le-dictum. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. I think it's so clear. The rabbi-le-dictum. And then, you know, the praiser Thomas that he could think so well in Latin, right? Yeah. And then I praised Dionne for thinking so well in French. LAUGHTER I'm sure he didn't accept it. He didn't get in mind, didn't he? He didn't get in mind, didn't he? He didn't get in mind, didn't he? He didn't get in mind, didn't he? He didn't get in mind, didn't he? He didn't get in mind, didn't he? Now, according to this, therefore, about the intensity, right, and the remission, right, of habits and of forms, right, huh? Habits like a form, right? There were four opinions among the philosophers. As Simplicius narrates, right? In his commentary on the, what? Categories and the predicaments. For Plotinus and other Platonists laid down that these qualities and habits we see more or less on account of this that they are, what? Material. And from this they have a certain indetermination, how much or how little there, on account of the infinity of, what? Of matter, right, huh? Others, huh? In contrary, lay down that these qualities and habits in themselves do not receive more and less, right? But qualia, which means that's the concrete thing, are said more and less according to a diverse, what? Partaking, right? So that's one way that there can be more, right? But they would deny that the thing itself could be more or less, right? As an example, that justice is not said more or less, right? But just is said more or less, right? And this opinion is touched upon by Aristotle in the predicaments, so in the categories, huh? Third was the opinion of the Stoics, huh? In the middle between these, huh? For they lay down that some habits receive in themselves more or less as the arts, right? But some not as the, what? Virtues. Virtues, right, huh? They see, yeah, some in themselves can, some not. A fourth opinion was of some saying that immaterial qualities and forms do not receive more or less. Material ones do receive, huh? What does the man say to Christ, you know, I believe, help my unbelief, right? It's as if there's, what? More or less. Yeah, yeah. And some people can love God more and some less, right? Now, what a mess, huh? Thus, therefore, that the truth of this thing may be made known, right? It should be considered that that by which something obtains its, what, species, its kind, is necessary to be something fixed and, what, standing, right? And, as it were, indivisible, right? Because whatever things attain to that are contained under that, what? Species. And whichever things recedes from it, either more or less, pertain to another species, either a more perfect one or a more imperfect one, huh? Whence the philosopher, and that means Aristotle, but he's by Antonia Messia, the philosophist, right, that Christ is a teacher by Antonia Messia, he says in the Eighth Book of the Metaphysics, and this kind is influenced by Plato, that the species of things are as, what, numbers, in which the addition or diminution varies the species, right, huh? Okay? Now, go back to Shakespeare's exhortation there, to his reason, huh? What is the man, if his chief good and market of his time be but to sleep and feed? At least no more. See, in this idea, no more, right? So, it's like saying that a body is one, and a living body is two, and an animal is three, and a man is, what, four, right, huh? So, you add life to a body, and you've got a plant. You add sense to a living body, and you've got an animal. And you add, what, reason, and you have a man, right, huh? Okay? Now, my mother didn't like me calling man an animal, right? I told you that. And I said, well, mama, he's not just an animal. He's an animal that has, what, reason. Something more. Yeah. That's a mention to be a man, right, huh? So that Christoph can say reason, more than anything else, is man ethics, huh? Just like you can say that, in a way, there's a two and three, right? But three is not just two, right? It's two plus one, right? And it's that third one, more than anything else, that makes it to be, what, three, right? So they're like the, what, numbers, right? And you add or subtract, and you have a different kind of thing. A plant, or an animal, or a man, right? Or just a stone or something, right? And of this sort are hot and what? White, huh? And other qualities of this sort, which are not said, and this is very important, in order to another, right? Because that's going to be important in talking about those qualities that do admit to what? More and what? Less, huh? And if these things don't admit to more or less, much more so substance, right? Which is being, per se, right? So substance cannot be more or less, right? So is one dog more a dog than another dog? Or is one cat more a cat than another, right? Or is one square more a square than another square? You're either a square, you're not a square, right? Now, those things which receive species from something to which they are ordered. That's not true now about whiteness or what? Heat. They are able, according to themselves, to be diversified in more and in less. And nevertheless, they are the same in species on account of the unity of that to which they are ordered, which they receive their species. So geometry is ordered to knowing what? Lines and angles and figures and so on, right? But you can know them more or what? Less, right? So geometry can be more or less, right? And not only understood more or less, but the science itself can be more or less, right? Just as motion by itself can be what? More intense or remiss. And nevertheless, it remains the same in species on account of the unity of the term from which it is what? Specified, huh? And the same can be considered in health. For the body arrives at the reason of what? Of health, according as it has a disposition suitable to the nature of the animal, to which diverse dispositions are, can be what? What? Suitable. Hence, the decision can be varied in more or less. And nevertheless, there remains always the reason of what? Health. Health, huh? Whence the philosophy says in the 10th book of the Ethics that health itself receives more and less, for there is not the same, what, measurement in all, nor in one and the same always. But even being remiss, there remains health up to some point, huh? I suppose that's kind of odd Hollywood, right, huh? Now these diverse dispositions or commensurations of health have themselves according to exceeding and exceeding. Whence if the name of health were imposed only to the most, what? Perfect. Perfect. Then health would not be said more or less. So are all beautiful women equally beautiful? But if one woman is more beautiful than another, right, then that one is not beautiful? No, no. I can say tonight. Which of my grandgirls is the most beautiful, you know? And I think they're all, many of them are, maybe they're all beautiful, you know? But some are more beautiful than others, right? Well, growing up, you know, you'd see sisters, you know, and one is clearly more beautiful than the other, right? And Valkenberg girls, when I was in grade school, they were twins, you know? And we'd get into a new grade, the teacher couldn't tell them a part. And they would switch seats, you know, and the teacher wouldn't know it, you know? But I could always tell them a part. But I thought, what's going to look at them? But still, you might call them both beautiful, right? And thus, therefore, it is clear in what way some quality or form can be, according to itself, what, increased or diminished, right? And what way not, huh? Now, the other way in which it can be more or less according to the participation of the subject. If, however, one considers the quality or form according to the partaking of it by the subject, thus also there are found some qualities and forms that can receive more or less than some not, right? So, unless you make a distinction, right? Some qualities or some forms can, in themselves, be more or less, right? And some cannot, right? Some can be, what? More or less, right? And some not, right? Now, a very interesting thing by some features of the Thomas is going to go beyond that. The cause of this diversity, some features assigns from this that substance by itself cannot receive more or less because it is being, what, per se, it's not received in the subject, right? And, therefore, every form which is substantially partaken of in a subject lacks intensity and, what, remission, huh? My soul is not more or less a soul, right? Whence in the genus of substance nothing is said according to more or less, huh? And because quantity is next to substance, and it's the second species in Aristotle that creates the things against quantity, second. And because quantity is next to substance, and figure follows upon quantity, right? That's the quality of figures, follows upon quantity. Hence, it is that neither in these is something said more or less, huh? Okay? Now, sometimes you speak kind of loosely and say this is more circular than that, right? Let's go ahead. But either you're really, what, circular, or you're not, right? You get that to the mall. Didn't Lucy say that in one of the Charlie Brown cartoons? Somebody drew a circle, and she says, I suppose it's a perfect circle. She says, every circle is a perfect circle. Something like that. But think about, you know, we're all created equal, but some are more equal than others, right? But equal is tied up with quantity, too, right? So, strictly speaking, you can't be more equal than others, right? Whence the philosopher says in the Seventh Book of Natural Hearing that when something takes its form and figure, it is not said to be, what, altered, but more to, what, come to be, right? So you don't, you know, come to be more a circle, but you come to be a circle. But other qualities which are more distant from substance and are joined to passions and actions receive more and less according to partaking of the subjects when you get to the sense qualities, right? Hot and white and so on. One thing can be hotter than another. One can be whiter than another, right? Or the black men, right? Some are blacker than others, right? Some are darker than some. Okay. Now, Thomas sees some truth in what Sabichis says, right? But one can also more unfold this, the reason for this diversity, right? For as has been said, that from which something has its species is necessary to remain fixed in what? Standing in something indivisible. Now, in two ways it can happen that a form does not partake enough according to more and less. In one way because the thing partaking of it has its species or the kind of thing it is by according to it itself, right? And hence it is that no substantial form is partaken according to more or what? Less. Less, huh? And on account of this, the philosophy says in the eighth book after the book is in actual. That just as number does not have more nor less, so neither does substance which is according to what? Species. That is according to the partaking of the specific form. But if with matter, that is according to material dispositions, it's found more and less in substance, huh? Another way this can happen from this that the indivisibility itself is of the reason of the form. Whence it is necessary that if something partakes of that form, there partakes of it according to the reason of what? Indivisibility. And thus it is that the species of number are not set according to more and less because each species in them is constituted by indivisible, what? Unity, right? So the one is even more, what? Indivisible than the point. Contrary to modern mathematicians, right? Who go around dividing one, right? Pretty scandalous. So it's not continuous, but it's great. And for the same reason, it is true about the species of continuous quantity, which are taken according to numbers as bicubitum and tricubitum, right? Indivisible. Individations like double and what? Triple, right? So is five more double of two than four? No. It's not really double at all, right? Only four is double of two. And about figures as triangle and what? Quadrilateral, right? There's no word there. Tetragona, right? I've often wondered about that because, you know, we call triangle, we name it from angles, right? Three angles. And then quadrilateral, four-sided, right? But sometimes you see in the books the term trilateral, right? Yeah. So why not call trilateral and quadrilateral? Why try triangle and quadrilateral? That's where the language grew up, right? Yeah. Here you've got trigonum and tetragonum and they've got the same. Why not say triangle and quadrangle? Quadrangle. Which we use some of the time. Quadrangle was, you know, in the triccine, that's the name. Yeah. In geometry we don't say quadrangle, we say quadrilateral. Quadrilateral, yeah. But, you know. We say pentagon. As my French teacher used to say, don't fight it, accept it. That's the way you say it in French. Yeah. Just don't fight it. I mean, you see a lot of, a lot of, a lot of, a lot of frustration. Yeah. We just accept that. Yeah. Just don't waste your time. And this reason, the, Aristotle lays down in the predicaments, the categories. We're assigning the reason wherefore figures do not receive more or less, right? What things receive, the ratio of what? Triangle or trigon. Circle. Circle, similarly, are what? Dragona and circunate. One is more or less, right? So one circle is not more circular than another. Because indivisibility is of their very, what? Reason. What they are. Whence whatever partake of the reason of them, yeah, I got that thing stopped already, now I'm getting used to speaking that way, is necessary that they partake of it in an undivided, what? Way. Thus, therefore, it is clear that since habits and dispositions are said by order to, now that's a clear phrase I was talking about, as is said in the sense of the physics, in two ways there can be intention and remission in habits and dispositions, in one way according as there is a greater or lesser, what? Health. Health. Or a greater or lesser science which extends to more or fewer things. So if you know the first book of Euclid, right, which you had to do to get into theology in the Middle Ages, right, you might not know as much as I know, right? Who knows the second book as well, the third book? In another way, according to the partaking of the subject, insofar as an equal science or health is more received in one than in the other, right? According to the diverse aptitude either from nature or from what? Custom, right, huh? For habit and disposition do not give the species to their subject, right? Not the substantial form, right? Nor again do they include indivisibility in their, what, reason, huh? To the last time, I used to have recorded the body at least to get through the objections again. As you demand, I do so. Okay. Truth can never be confirmed enough without some diversely. I have to punish those who played the last class. You can always do that. Okay, notice the first argument. Augmentum is about quantity, right? Growth, huh? It's about quantity. As I said in the fifth book of the physics. It's in the fifth book of the physics that Aristotle talks about the species of motion, right? And growth is one of them, right? He tries to find what genus they are, right? So alteration is in the genus of quality, right? In the third species. And growth is in the category of quantity, right? So, but habit is not in the genus of quantity, it's in the genus of what? Therefore, about these, there cannot be any, what, growth, right? But that's something dealing with the word there, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said that as the name of magnitude is, what, derived from bodily quantities to the understandable perfections of forms, so also the name of growth, right? Whose limit is the, what? The great, huh? So John Paul the Great, huh? Albert the Great, huh? Big man. Gertrude the Great. Yeah, yeah. It reaches to perfection, right? But it's, the word has been, what? Carried. over, right? Someone said the man objecting here cannot move the word, right? He's stuck on the, what, first meaning of the word, huh? There's all kinds of people who are stuck on the first meaning of the word. You can't carry the word over. It's too heavy by them to carry it over, huh? Hobbes there, you know, complains about these theologians talking about virtues poured in by God, huh? Infused virtue means poured in, right? How can a man be born again? Yeah, yeah. Same object, yeah. He's stuck on the first meaning of birth, right? Okay. Well, the time starts out with that because the first problem there is with the, in the word, right, huh? I was reading in the sentences there yesterday, I was trying to read about the will of God, right, huh? And the first objection is, well, the will is an appetitive power, right, huh? But Augustine says there's no appetitus in God because it's a something you lack. Point out how these, there's a problem there with the word, though, right, huh? Our mind, you know, is very much tied up with words, huh? It's thinking. The objection about God being perfect. Perfect is something that's completely innate, but God is a certain, right? Moreover, a habit is a certain, what? Perfection, right? As is said in the seventh book of Natural Hearing. But the perfection, since it implies an end and a, what, limit, does not seem to receive more or less. Therefore, habits are not able to, what? Grow, right, huh? The second should be said that habit, to be sure, is a perfection, right, huh? But not such a perfection that is the limit of its subject as giving to it, what, its specific being, right? Nor does it include in its reason, or in its definition, limit, right? Just as a species of numbers do, huh? Whence nothing prevents but that it receive more and what? Less, huh? Moreover, in those things which receive more and less, there can be, what, alteration. But that is said to be altered, which goes from less hot to more hot. But in habits there is no alteration, as is proved in the seventh book of the physics. Therefore, habits cannot be, what, increased, huh? To the third, it should be said that alteration is first in the qualities of the third, what? Species, right? Which are the sense qualities. But in qualities of the first species, which is habit or disposition, right? There can be alteration, what? Paraposterous, right, huh? For an alteration made according to hot and cold, it follows that the animal might be altered according to, what, health and, what, sickness, huh? So you hip a man too much or cool him down too much, you're going to affect his health, right? But it's first to change in, what, the third species of quality, right? That affects afterwards, huh? On the health. And likewise, there being an alteration according to the passions of the sense, what, desiring power, or according to the grasping sense powers, right? There follows an alteration according to the sciences and the, what, virtues, huh? It is said in the seventh book, huh? Okay, watch out for those passiones, peritus sensitiva, right? Especially young men.