Prima Secundae
Lecture 135: Habits in Angels and the Nature of Potency

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So, you know, you kind of see it in modern science, though, you know, because in modern science, we're accustomed to something called the equation, right? And the equation is used to calculate everything else, but the equation is a statement of equality, right? E equals mc squared, right? Force equals mass times acceleration, and so on, right? So, it's kind of marvelous to see that, right? So, the three looking sciences, natural philosophy, mathematics, and wisdom, they each have a different order of determination, right? But wisdom and natural philosophy seem to be almost contrary in some ways, right? But you can see the opposition there between geometry, where you do the simple, you know, plain geometry before solid geometry, but even in plain geometry, you do the triangle first, you know, the simplest of the figures, these sides, right? Before you do the more complicated ones, and even the fourth book when he's describing squares and circles and circles and squares, before he has pentagons in and out, right? Hexagons, right? It's always the simpler one first, right? But then you get to wisdom, right? And the simplest thing is the last thing, right? God, right? So, you don't start with the simplest, right? And so, it's just kind of the contrary, right? There's so much influence by math there, you know, in modern science, that when you pick up a book on life there, you know, they start with the cell, right? Where life is not really most known, you see? But that's the simplest thing, right? Because the cells make up the tissue, it doesn't make up the organs, it doesn't make up the whole animal, right? So, you're trying to imitate mathematics as in, you know, that's a mistake. As though a cell is a simple thing, too. Yeah. Well, I mean, we shouldn't start with a cell, we should start with a molecule. Well, no, yeah. Protons. But a cell starts with the soul, as known by inward experience, right? And life is more known by, what, inward experience than by exterior experience, by chemistry and so on, right? Yeah. I think a biology major, the first course of a biology major was a chemistry course, right? You're studying life, well, then you start with chemistry, right? You're kind of, it's kind of imitating if you're doing, like, in math, right? Take a little break here now? Sure. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. We didn't finish the last objection, I guess, in Article 4. We're just looking at the secundum, anyway. Can we look at the secundum? Yeah, I think we finished the second. Yeah, yeah. So to the third should be said that because the grasping powers inwardly prepare, what, for the possible intellect, its own object, right, huh? Because the Asian intellect separates out what's common, right? Therefore, from the good disposition of these powers to which, what, the good disposition of the body cooperates, man is rendered, what? A power, suited to understand it. Yeah, to understand it. And thus, an intellectual habit, secundaria, right, huh? He's not denying us out there, right? Can be in these, what, powers, right, huh? Chief, however, in the possible, what, understanding. I remember when I was doing the, years ago, the last books of Euclid there, to get into solid geometry, and I was having a hard time imagining these things, you know. So I think there's little things in cardboards, and had one hanging down from the dining table, you know, so I could look at the thing, you know. Now my son knows how to be, you know, some little things, the solid figures, the five-year-old figures, you know, each with, you know, in metal, right, each with nice little things, and one of his daughters, you know, one of my grandgirls, attached each one of them, you know. So, but if you can't imagine that, you know, solid figure, you know, very well, then you have a hard time, what, to follow in the argument, and step by step, you know, and so on. So, in some secondary way, at least, right, my knowledge of geometry is in my, what? Yeah, the lack thereof is, there's some lack therein, I think. But it's primarily in my reason, right? My knowledge of geometry, right? But in my powers of imagination, so it's some way there, right, huh? Mm-hmm. Article 5, whither in the will there is some habit, to the fifth then one proceeds thus, it seems that in the will there is no habit, there is not any habit, for the habit which is in the understanding are the understandable forms, right, of which it understands and act, but the will does not act through some, what, species, so species is one of the names applied to what, second person of the trinity, right, and of course beautiful is more applied to the second person of the trinity than to the third, right, species, speciosa, therefore the will is not the subject of any habit, right, that's going to be in some other way maybe though, moreover in the acting upon understanding, the agent understanding, there is not laid down any habit as in the undergoing, the possible understanding, because the agent intellect is an active power, right, but the will is most of all an active power, right, that's what the modernists like, the will more than reason, right, it's the mover, because it moves all the powers to their acts, right, therefore there is not in it any habit, moreover in the natural powers, there is not any habit, because by the very nature they are determined to something, but the will by its very nature is ordered to this, that it tends into the good is ordered by, what, reason, therefore in the will there is not any, what, habit, Thomas says the will naturally wills beatitude, right, and when you see God as he is, the reason cannot be deceived as to what the beatitude really is, therefore you can't change your will, it's all over, so if you want to enjoy, just feed me your will, you better, but against this, it is said that justice is a certain, what, habit, right, but justice is in the, what, will, will, Aristotle devotes the fifth book of Nicomagic and Ethics to justice, for justice is a habit according to which some people, what, will and do just things, as is said in the fifth book of the Ethics, that's the one about justice, therefore the will is the subject of some, what, habit, well, Thomas says, I answer, it should be said that every power which in diverse ways can be ordered to acting needs some habit by which it is well disposed to its act, but the will, since it is a rational power, is able to be ordered in diverse ways to acting, right, and therefore it's necessary that in the will to lay down that there is some habit by which it is well disposed to its, what, act, and from this very reason that habit appears, that it has a, what, principle order to the will, insofar as the habit is that which someone uses, right, when he wishes, huh, he's quoting the Averroes, right, the commentator, right, so he takes over some things from the Arabs, right, when you see the definition of moral virtue has got, what, choice in there, right, huh, and there's a reason for saying that, what, sometimes a moral virtue has more the character of, what, virtue than the virtues of a reason, right, huh, because they incline you to use your things well, right, but my knowledge of logic does not incline me to use it to deceive you, to teach you rather than deceive you, right, huh, depends upon my will, right, to the first therefore it should be said that just as in the understanding is some species, some form, which is a likeness of the object, right, huh, so is necessary in the will and in every, what, each desiring power to be something by which it is inclined to its object, right, but that's not a simulitude of the object, right, now to those things towards which it is sufficiently inclined to the nature of the power itself, it does not need some quality, what, inclining it, but because it's necessary for the end of human life, that this desiring power be inclined to something determinedly, right, to which it is not inclined for the nature of the power, which has itself to, what, many and diverse things as shown by the actions of men, right, and therefore it's necessary that in the will and in the other desiring powers that there be some qualities inclining which are said to be, what, habits, right, there can be a habit where the will or the emotions are inclined to follow, what, right reason, right, huh, and they're inclined to follow the right reason, huh. Grandchildren, they're inclined, DDD, the director of destruction, you know, Department of Direction of History, you know, but, no problem, yeah. He's a boy, so, yeah, he's a boy. Dennis, Dennis the Destroyer, David, David the Destroyer, they call him. That's my mother, my mother, when I was a kid, she always, when I would destroy something, I don't destroy your things, why do you destroy mine? Why? Why do you always take my stuff and wreck it? No, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no. To the second, it should be said that the acting upon intellect, the age intellect, is acting upon only and in no way, what, undergoing. But the will and any desiring power is a movin's motor, a moved mover. As is said in the third book about the soul, where the good is the unmoved mover, and therefore there is not the same reason about the age intellect and the will, right? For to be susceptible of a habit, to be the subject of a habit, belongs to that which is in some way in what? Potency. Now to the third it should be said, that the will from the nature of the power itself is inclined to the good as known by reason, right? But because this good is diversified in many ways, it is necessary that to some determined good of reason, the will be inclined to some what? Habit. In order that there might follow a more proud operation. Is it time to follow the angels or not? I don't think so. This is what's going on. Oh my goodness, well. Can we survive in a week for another week? Mr. Parliament, is next week Holy Thursday? Oh, next week. Ascension Thursday, next week. I mean Ascension Thursday. It's a Holy Day, right? We have a different schedule, yeah. So you can't have a class next Thursday? I mean Ascension Thursday. I mean Ascension Thursday. In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, amen. Thank you, God, and thank you, guardian angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas, Deo Grazius. God, our enlightenment, guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more quickly. St. Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor. Pray for us. Help us to understand what you have written. Father, Son, and of the Holy Spirit, amen. I'm just reading Thomas there about the four groups of names of God. When he's speaking of the groups of names of God, there are names that are said properly of God, right? You could add, you know, two of these four, the names that are said metaphorically of God, right? The Lord is my rock, and so on. What are the four groups of names that are said of God? I'm interested in the way he divides them, right? And he takes two of them kind of on the side of what? Naming God from creatures, huh? And one, of course, is naming God negatively, right? He's simple, meaning he's not composed, right? Or he's incorporeal, right, huh? And so on, huh? And then these relations, these names of God, whereby he's, what, related to, what, creatures as their Lord or their creator. And this is one of the most difficult things in theology, that these names of relating God to creatures are not real relations with God. But they're followed upon the way we have to understand, huh? See, he has those two groups of names, huh? And then he has names that are applied to God in himself, and some of them correspond to a real distinction of things in God. And that's the names of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. And the others don't correspond to a real, what, distinction of things in God, but they have their foundation in God, huh? And perfectly understood by us, huh? And so God is good, God is perfect, and so on, huh? Interesting, huh? Interesting. It's kind of beautiful the way Thomas began, he says that four questions, you know, whether God is nameable. Only Thomas would be so basic, you know, huh? Who's on? I said St. Augustine, speak of that somewhere, he said, maybe it's in De Trinitatis or something, he says about God being ineffable, but if we say that he's ineffable, we're saying something about it. So he says, we should just stop right now. Just don't go any further than that. Okay. Well, I guess we're down to the last article here in question 50, huh? But notice how in Articles 3 and 4 and 5, we're kind of setting the topic for the subject of the, what? Yeah, the virtues, right? And both the cardinal virtues and the, what? The theological virtues, huh? The theological virtues are the virtues whose objects are, what? Whose object is God himself, right? But Thomas sticks in the thing about the angels here, right? Well, I'm taking up with the angels here. I'm reading about the motion of the angels, you know, in the sentences there. Beautiful texts, Thomas. I'm trying to understand my guardian angel, but he's a hard guy to understand. He's very amused of me, I think. The angels must have a sense of humor, right? They must find us funny, huh? My old teacher, Kassarik, used to say, the angel watching you make a decision. It's like you watching an angle worm, you know, trying to decide where to go. He used to say, when your soul needs your body, and you see your guardian angel, he'll say, this is God! And the guardian angel says, no, no, no, no, no. You've got a much higher way to go. I'll take you to purgatory right now. And then you'll see God afterwards. You know, the catharsis there, right, huh? That's the catharsis of the, what? The will, the will. Socrates talks about a catharsis of what? Reason, right, huh? Aristotle talks about the catharsis of the emotions. The medical doctors talk about the catharsis of the body. When they're fighting cancer or something like that, they're trying to purge the body, right, of something that is harmful to the body, huh? And when you're mistaken, then you need to be purged another way, huh? But your emotions need to be purged, right, huh? Your will. Okay, to the sixth one goes forward thus. It seems that in the angels there are not habits, huh? For Maximus says, huh, and he's a commentator on Dionysius, huh? In the seventh book on the celestial arc, you know, it does not seem to be, what? Suitable, right? To think that, what? Intellectual virtues, that is, spiritual virtues, right? In the manner of, what? Accidents, right? As they are in us, are found in these divine, godlike understandings, huh? That in another, right, should be as in a subject, huh? For every accident there is, what, repulsed or is not to be found, huh? But every habit is an accident in the, what, category of quality, right? Which is one of the accidents, huh? Therefore, the angels, there are not, what, habits, huh? So you've got to understand, then, the nine, the genre of accidents, right? For the distinction of the ten, what, highest genre. Aristotle is famous for, what, giving us the distinction of the highest genre. Hence, the distinction of, what, ten highest genre. He doesn't explain how he got the ten, right? But Thomas, when he explains that, he explains it, he uses, what, eight distinctions in a two or three to explain the distinction of the ten, right? Breaks it down. Yeah. But he does it by distinctions of two or three, huh? How many distinctions do you need to distinguish the sacraments? Because the mind couldn't understand the distinction of seven, right? Which ultimately you do, right? No. How many do you need to do? What? I've seen them distinguished in different ways, so. You need basically five distinctions, right? Yeah. First, distinguish, what, five and two, right? You distinguish matrimony and holy orders against the other, what, five, right? Because matrimony and holy orders are ordered to the good of others, right? Okay, not to the good of the individual soul, seeing them, right? Okay. My sister now always tells about going to register them at the parish, right? And the priest kind of says, do you have any children? And she says, oh, yeah. He says, well, now you know what it's all about. He says. She just laughed. She says. But that's the purpose, technically, right, huh? Is to, what, generate more members of the church, right? And educate them in the faith. And the priest is, what, he's not ordained for his own good, right? He's ordered, he's ordained for the good of the church, huh? To sacrifice and to give us the sacraments, right? And so on. Just to be reading Hamlet there, you know, and of course, when he's talking to his father, the ghost, right, huh? And the father is complaining about the fact that he was sent off to the next world, right? Without having the last sacraments, huh? And of course, it was mentioned there of, you know, even of extreme unction, right? The last 20, huh? You've got to know the, you've got to have Kittredge's notes, right, huh? To know what he's saying here. But the word for oil there is in there and so on. So he sounds very Catholic there when Shakespeare speaks in all the. You've got to know what he's saying here. Being unhouseled, right? Not having received communion. And Dr. Perry, right? Didn't have the sacraments of confession and so on. So then you'd have to distinguish the five into what? Two, right? The three are kind of perfecting the soul, right? And Thomas compares them to the living soul, right? Where you have these three acts, right? Nourishing yourself, growing, and reproducing, right? So you have baptism and confirmation, which is like growth, and then Eucharist, which is like glory. Then you have the two. They're concerned with, what? Failure, right? Yeah. So you've got to divide the five into three and two, and then you divide the three into three, obviously, and the two. So you have all together, what? Five, five, yeah. So not as many. If you take porphyry, porphyry, you know, because he's going to talk about genus, difference, species, property, and accident, right? How many divisions you have to have to get the five, right? Well, he divides, you know, you can divide property and accident against the other three, because three are essential and three are outside. You subdivide the two, right? And then the three, you could take the three, or you could divide them into two, and then get one of them subdivided again. So, okay. So all that because he's talking about a habit is an accident, like there are accidents in the, what? Angels, huh? Moreover, as Dionysius says in the fourth chapter of the Celestial Hierarchy, you know, these two famous works of Dionysius, right? There are many of the works, but the one in Celestial Hierarchy, and the one on, what? Divine Names, right? And Thomas Aquinas wrote a commentary on the, it even needs no many books, right? And Albert the Great, his teacher did it on the Celestial Hierarchy, right? But Thomas uses Celestial Hierarchy, right? He talks about the angels, huh? You've seen those paintings of the great Fra Angelico? You know, where they, kind of, there's a stately dance. And you've got the men intertwined with the angels, right? So we're all together, you know, the angels. Beautiful way he represents those things, huh? Okay, more of as Dionysius says in the fourth chapter of the Celestial Hierarchy. The holy, what? Dispositions of the Celestial Essences, right? Above all, right? Partake, right? Yeah. But always what is per se is before and more potent than that is what is the one other. That's a very famous, what? Haxiom. Yeah, distinction between the per se and the parallel, right, huh? Therefore, the essences of the angels are perfected through themselves to conformity to God, huh? They're godlike creatures to begin with, huh? They don't need these accidents that we need to become godlike. Not, therefore, through some habits. And this seems to be the ratio of what? Maximus, the one who quoted there, right? Who there joins. For if this were right, they would not be, what? Would not remain in themselves their essence, right? Nor would they be godlike, huh? Be godlike per se. As much as is possible, would this be possible, huh? Now you've got to be careful of that axiom, right? Per se is before the parallel, huh? Now one of the most interesting examples of that, there's two very important ones. One is the Manichaeans, right, huh? And they said that, what? If something is bad to another, there must be before it something that is bad to itself. If there has to be something that is bad as itself. And this is kind of opposed to God as goodness itself, right? So it does not follow from the axiom, right? If you're not entirely bad, which I assume you're not entirely bad, you're a bad parallel, right, huh? Do another, right, huh? You partake of evil, huh? Bad. But there must be something therefore essential, right, to partake of, right? Must be something which is bad itself. And that is the evil that's opposed to God, right, huh? It's the Manichaean thing, right, huh? And, you know, Augustine was under the influence of the Manichaeans there for a certain part of his life, huh? I'm seeing it on there, you know, in terms of the importance of the liberal arts, right? You heard that story, I think, about before. He met the great, you know, teacher of the Manichaeans, huh? And, of course, he couldn't follow what he was saying, whether it was true or false. But he didn't seem to know the liberal arts. But there's something fishy about this guy who's talking about these things way above you, right? And doesn't know the things that he should start with, right? So he'd say, what if Augustine had been educated little bards, right? What would have happened to this great doctor, right? So, the other famous example is what? That of Plato, right, huh? Am I a man himself, or do I partake of human nature? What would you say? Partake of? Yeah, yeah. Well, before what is per Hollywood, right? There must be something per se. So, there must be a man himself through himself, right? And so, Plato talks about the man himself through himself, and the dog itself through itself. And that seems to follow from the axiom, right? They both seem to be following from an axiom. It might be easier to speak to the Manichaeans than the Platonists. You could argue about the existence of evil. It's not something that's all. But the other one is harder to deal with. But when you come to understand what the bad is, primarily, right? It's really the lack of something you're able to have and should have, right? So, there can't be something whose very essence or nature is to be a lack, you know? But you have to understand it. But you can see how a person who doesn't really understand what the bad is, right, you know? And thinks the bad is just like the good, right? There's good and bad things in this world, right? Kind of ex-equal, you know? They're both around you, right, huh? And if there is good and bad things in this world, there must be something that is good to itself and something that is bad to itself, right? But when you come to know the nature of a bad, speak of it as nature. It's using the word nature in a very, what, extended sense, right? But, you know, nature in a strict sense, what a thing is, can't be a lack. And, of course, there's all kinds of arguments against that, right? If it was bad itself, it couldn't have anything good in it at all. It's like God being good as itself, can't have anything, what, bad in itself, right, huh? When Thomas takes up the goodness of God, he shows that he's good first, then that he's good as itself, and then it can't have anything bad in it, right? Okay? Well, if there is a bad itself, a bad, something bad to itself, it wouldn't have anything good in it. And, therefore, it couldn't have any existence, because existence is something good. So it's impossible for it to be, right? But Aristotle, you know, in the, what, the seventh book of wisdom, right, kind of shows that Plato is mistaken there, right? It goes back to the nature of man, right? There couldn't be a man himself to himself, because it's the very nature of man to be, what, material, and, therefore, to be, what, individual, right? So you've got to be careful there, right? Even when using an axiom, huh, which you might, not understanding something else, right? Use the axiom to posit something rather strange, huh? The evil is. self. Moreover, habit is a what? Disposition, as is said in the fifth book of wisdom, fifth book after the books of natural philosophy. But disposition, as is said there, is the order of what has parts. Since therefore the angels are simple substances, it seems that there is not in them dispositions and consequently not habits, right? But again, this is what Dionysius himself says in the seventh chapter of the celestial harpy, that the angels of the first harpy are called, what? Califacientes, they're burning, they're with love, and the thrones, and the effusion of wisdom, and the manifestation, right? The what? The form of heaven. Yeah, see what the master says here. I'm glad he talked about the angels. I'll teach his concern. He said, any time you want to start studying the angels, you can. He says, well, yeah, great man. Actually, it should be said that some lay down that in the angels there are not habits, right? But that whatever are said of them are said what? Essentially. Now here, in a way, they're confusing the angels with God himself, right? When we say that God is wise or God is just, right, do we mean that he has wisdom as something other than his substance? When we say that God has, is just, he has justice, is justice some virtue that he's acquired or has had? He's partaking in it. No. Wisdom and justice in God are the very substance of God, huh? Strange as that may be, right, huh? But the angels seem to be like God compared to us, as my teacher Kassarik was saying. You're going to start to fall down. If you can fall down, you're so separated. This is God. I didn't realize, you know, how beautiful God is, you know. No, no. I'm just an angel. I'm just a great angel. I'm just here to conduct your way into purgatory. I'm going to wait for you before you really see God. Yeah, then you'll take care of it. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Purge you a bit, Mr. Berkwist. You have quite need to purge. Whence Maximus, huh? After the four said words, which we have, what, brought in, huh? Says, huh? The habitudines they are, right? It was their habits. Atque virtutes, and the virtues which are in them, right, are essentiales, right? They're essential, right? On account of their, what, immateriality, right? And this also, Simplicius, huh? Says, in his commentary on the categories of Aristotle, which in Latin they call their predicamentorum, right? Predicamenta. This is a quote now from Simplicius there in the Latin translation. The wisdom which is in the soul is a habit, huh? But that which is, what, in the understanding substance, intellectual, is a substance, right? For all things which are divine and, what, sufficient through themselves are existing in themselves, right? And not in another, right? Okay? What does Thomas say about this position, right? It's very interesting, that position, isn't it? It reminds me of a position there, you know, where Aristotle's talking about the man who has virtue and virtue lies in the middle between two extremes. And the courageous man seems to, the foolhardy man, to be a coward. And to the coward, he seems to be foolhardy, right? And Shakespeare deals with this in Coriolanus, right? And, well, it's something like this, right? The angels end between us and God, so, look at it from the point of view of God, the angels seem to be almost like men, right? But look at it from the point of view of men, they seem to be, what? Like God. Like God, huh? It's like those little plays in Shakespeare, right, on the kinds of romances, right? Some of them are, in the original edition, put with the tragedies, and some are put with the, what, comedies, huh? Because some of them are closer to the comedies, and some closer to the tragedies, and therefore, looking at it from the extreme, they seem to be tragedies or comedies. There really is something in between. Well, Thomas says, which position? Partem, huh? Partly has truth, huh? My goodness. And partly contains falsehood, right? For it is manifest from the foregoing that the subject of a habit is only what is a being in, what? Potency. Now, considering the foresaid commentators, that is, Maximus, right? And Simplicius, right, huh? We're very learned people, apparently. You know, Simplicius better than Maximus, but... The foresaid commentators, therefore, considering that angels are immaterial substances, and that in them there is not the potency of, what? Matter, huh? According to this, they exclude from them habit, and indeed, every accident, right? Because they don't have that, what? Yeah, they don't have the potency that is matter, right? Which is the potency we know best, huh? But does that mean that the angels are pure act like God, huh? No, because they receive their existence of God, right? So they're in potency, to their existence. And this, because although in the angels there is not the potency of matter, there is nevertheless in them some kind of, what? Potency. For to be pure act is proper to, what? God, huh? And of course, this idea that God is pure act is kind of something we can use to show all the attributes of the divine substance, that he's simple, that he's, what? Perfect, that he's, what? Infinite, that he's unchanging, eternal, and altogether one, right? And that's one reason why I think that the order in the Summa Kandjantilis is interesting, right? Because as he begins the consideration of substance, he naturally brings in that God is pure act, huh? Which he doesn't do in the Summa Theologiae. He has to kind of bring it in ad hoc there at the beginning of the consideration of simplicity of God, huh? That's kind of the middle term for showing all those things, not the only way of reasoning to them, but it's kind of a fundamental one, huh? And this goes back to the famous, what, ninth book of wisdom, huh? Where Estelle takes up, what, ability first, and then act, and distinguishes the various kinds of ability and various kinds of act, and then the third probably takes up the order, right, huh? Kind of following Shakespeare's definition, right, huh? You have to see the distinction, right, of things, and then you can see that it's on their, what, order. And that's what he brings out that in almost every way, act is before ability, huh? It's only the way in which a thing that goes from ability to act, but ability is before act. But it goes from ability to act because it's something already in act. So, simply, and not to couldn't quit, right, some pitchy tear, act is before ability, and therefore the first being must be, what, pure act. If it was an ability and it had been actualized, there'd be something before it. God is the first being, huh? The first being is pure act, huh? That's kind of a big mistake of the models there, right, huh? They kind of go back to the early Greeks, huh, and they make ability be, what, or potency be simply before, what, act, huh? So it's a fallacy of, what, simply, yeah, since he couldn't have quit, right? Because ability is before act in some way, right, huh? Therefore, simply, what came first is some kind of matter that, you know, evolved by some evolution, right, huh? Yeah. But these guys are kind of thinking of the ancient angels being kind of, what, pure act, because they don't have this ability that is matter, but they have another kind of ability. And therefore, insofar as there is found in them potency, or ability, to use the English word, to that extent, in them there can be found, what, habits. But because the potency of matter and the potency of an intellectual substance are not of one, what, ratio, one definition, right? This is a word that's equivocal by, what, reason, huh? Therefore, neither consequent is habit of one, what? Definition. Definition in both, right, huh? But it's equivocal by reason, huh? When Simplicius says in his commentary on the Predicator, also, that the habits, ah, he's admitted it's a habit now, right? The great Simplicius, God bless him, that the habits of the intellectual substance are not similar to those which are here, habits, right? But they are, what? More and more. Similar, yeah. But they are like the simple and immaterial species which they contain in themselves, huh? Mm-hmm. Okay? I think I have here, Simplicius, huh? He's a great guy. No, Tom's correct, Simplicius didn't mean the categories I don't know before. Now, about the habits of this sort. In one way, the angelic understanding has itself, and another, the, what? Human understanding, huh? Now, the human understanding, since it is infamous, huh? That's not infamous now, but lowest, lowest. Famous. It's always infamous. There's a famous passage of Aristotle in the second book of the Deiama, on the soul, you know, where he's complaining that the early Greeks, they tried to show the cause of knowledge in man and the other animals. They didn't show the cause of deception in error. And he says, well, if you're going to consider what's in man and the animals, it's more error than knowledge of the truth, right? So he should have explained why they are so often, what, deceived or mistaken, right? And I guess, you know, if you study camouflage in the animal kingdom, you realize how much deception goes on there. So, the human understanding, since it is lowest in the order of understandings, is in potency, right? With respect to all understandables, huh? And therefore, it's proportional in the order of, what, the understandable to, what, prime matter is in the order of sensible things, just as prime matter with respect to all sensible forms, huh? Okay? And therefore, it needs some habit for, what, understanding all things, huh? Okay? But, the angelic understanding does not have itself as pure potency in the genus of, what, understandable things, huh? But as a certain, what, act, huh? Knock over as a, what, pure act, huh? For this is only of God, huh? Okay? And notice, when you define God as pure act, um, pure is, what does it mean? Without passive ability, right, huh? Okay? So, um, pure is, uh, grammatically it's negative, but in meaning it's negative, right, huh? So, but like when you say that God is simple, right, huh? Well, when Thomas takes up to show that God is simple, he shows he's not composed of, uh, say, matter and form, right, huh? He's not composed, you know, of quantitative parts, right? He's not composed of substance and existence and so on. He goes through all these kinds of composition, right? And then he argues, finally, that he's not composed in any way, right? So, to say that God is simple, even though grammatically speaking, simple is not a negative word, right, huh? It really is, what, negative in meaning, in a sense, it means not, what, not composed, yeah. The same with the word pure, right? Is it? I want to take an example of that kind of fallacy, what do you think? Where pure, grammatically speaking, seems to be, what, affirmative, right? Figurification. Yeah, yeah. I wonder, it seems like it's, right? Yeah, I wonder, right? It seems like it's simple, right? See, what a word like, you know, to say that God is unchanging or incorporeal, grammatically, they, what? They're negative, right? But simple and pure seem to be like, uh, firmity, right? And watch out for language, you know? It's such a thing, dangerous thing, very dangerous thing, you know? But it's not, however, as pure act in the order of the understandable, for this is only of, what, God, huh? It's interesting, how, that Aristotle speaks of God as being the most knowable of all, right? But not to us. Yeah. But again, you have that famous distinction between the simply and, what, secundum quid, right? So even the beginning of the physics theorem, framing to the physics, he distinguishes between what is more known to us and what is more known simply, right? And the natural road is what is more known to us to what is more known simply. And it's beautiful, you know, in the ninth book of wisdom there, he takes up act and ability. And he shows that things are knowable to the extent they are an act, huh? So the thing that is most knowable is what is most an act. And that's the pure act, which is God, right, huh? But to us, what act is most known? Yeah. And, you know, Shakespeare says, things in motion sooner catch the eye than what not stirs. And our knowledge begins with our senses, so motion is the act that's, what, most known for us, known to us. And that's why Aristotle begins the ninth book of wisdom there in the first part there, where he talks about ability for emotion, right? And it's not until the second part that he starts to see act in a universal way, right? And so I always think, you know, of all the interests people have in football and all these other sports, you know, but it's all motion, right, huh? You know? And if you go see a movie nowadays, you know, it's all slam bang, you know, boom, car is smashing, fires, and explosions. But it's all motion, right, huh? And of course, the word movie, you know, it's all, it's kind of easy to watch a movie, you know. You know, you're brain dead. You've got to cut up with history and the philosophy of history. It's the movement that's real, you know, huh? Everything else is static and kind of unreal, you know, huh? And so people have a hard time understanding, you know, just, what I can only be doing is looking in God forever, you know? Man, when you get bored. Yeah. We ever get a big game to do something? It's a great big football. Oh! Most interesting game you've ever seen here. You know, when Shakespeare talks about fashion there, right, huh? He sees that. That's where he says that, you know, things in motion, as soon as it catches the eye, and what not stirs. So that motion, that change, right, huh? Yes, people are going, huh? But the angelic mind, although it's an act, it's with a...