Prima Secundae
Lecture 133: Bodily Dispositions, Habits, and the Soul's Powers

Transcript
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They're health and strength, right? And beauty, right? And to compare them to courage and what? Justice and to temperance, right? Which ones have a likeness to which? Well, courage is obviously strength, right? And beauty is what? Temperance, right? Temperance, yeah. In fact, when you study temperance, that's one of the integral parts of temperance, right? Well, that's that. Yeah. You can't name it until you chase stars, right? That's a nice metaphor there in Shakespeare. And then, what health is like what? Justice, huh? A little bit like that, huh? But they're not really so much for acts as for what? The form, right? My friend, Jim, used to say to me, and Burkwist, he says, I'm strong, but not healthy. It would be a different virtue, right? Jim could have, you know, not be flat. He had golden gloves, boxing, right? But he learned to health in some ways. I'm strong, but not healthy. Okay. So, in this way, huh? Is it compared to what? The soul is subject to its form. In this way, health and beauty and things of this sort are called habitual dispositions, right, huh? They do not, however, perfectly have the ratio of habits because the causes of them, from their very nature, are easily what? Changing your mind. Yeah. So, you know, what's the Phantom of the Opera or something, you know? They throw acid in your face and you've lost your beauty, right, huh? You know? Okay. Alexander, right? This is not Alexander the Great now, but another Alexander Aphrodisias, right? Ah, that's his hometown, not his character. Alexander, however, lays down in no way his habit or disposition of the first species in the body. He has some pletious notes in his commentary on the predicaments, right? But he says that the first species of quality pertains only to the what? Soul. And that Aristotle induces in the predicaments about health and sickness, he does not induce as if these pertain to the first species of quality, but by way of what? Exemplifying something. In the sense that just as sickness and health are able to be easily or difficultly changeable, so also the qualities of the first species, huh? Which I said are called habitations. But it's clear that this is against the intention of Aristotle. Both because in the same way of what's speaking, he uses exemplifying health and sickness and virtue and what? Science, huh? And then also because in the seventh book of the physics, he expressly lays down among the habits beauty and social species. I mean, Alexander's a little bit off there, huh? Alexander's got problems too, but it's still important, huh? To the first then, right, huh? It should be said that that objection, huh? Drawn from a very well statement there. Which seems from habit according as his disposition to operation, and about the acts of the body which are from nature, right, huh? But not over about those which are from the soul, whose source is what? The will, huh? To the second, it should be said that body dispositions are not simply difficult to be changed on account of the immutability of bodily causes, right, huh? But they're able to be, what, hard to move in comparison to what? Such a subject, huh? Because such a subject remaining, they're not able to be, what, moved. Or because they are hard to move in comparison to other dispositions, right? But the qualities of the soul are, what? Simpliciter! Difficile immobiles, right? That's the distinction between simpliciter and secundum quid, right? An account of the immobility of the subject, right? So, you know, some kids, you know, some kids are always getting a cold, they're always getting something wrong with them, you know? Rather than go through, you know, months or years without any, what, without seeing a doctor, as they say, right? You know? And so they seem to have, you know, in some way, right, something more stable, right? Maybe not simply stable, right? They could still be, go to the wrong place and get the wrong bug, you know? On account of the other one coming out of Asia, right? You know, all these. And therefore, it does not say that health is what? Certainly. Yeah. Difficile immobiles, habits. But it is as, ut habitus, right? As a habit, right? As is found in the Greek, right? Thomas does know a little bit of Greek, I guess. But the qualities of the soul are said to be, what? Simplicitare habitus, right? There's a good distinction there between simplicitare and simplicitare. Now, in the third objection, there's a long bite of that. All dispositions that are bodily are subject to alteration. But alteration is not accepted in the third species of quality, which is something Aristotle shows in the seventh book of physics, which is divided against habit, right? It's a different species. Okay, let's try to get a longer answer there. To the third it should be said that body dispositions, which are in the first species of quality, as some lay down, differ from the qualities of the third species in this, that the qualities of the third species are in coming to be and in, what? Motion, right? Whence they're called passions, which are like motion, right? Or undergoing qualities, right? When, however, they arrive at perfection as regards their species, then they're in the first species of quality. But this simplicitius disproves his commentary in the categories. Because according to this, califaxio, eating, right? Would be in the third species of quality, but heat in the first. But Aristotle places heat in the third, yeah. So, hurray for simplicitius, right? He's got one, right? He's got commentary in the physics too, if I remember, right? And it's important, yeah. I think it was, I remember the one they gave on Sr. Dionne one time, a copy of Latin translation of some pictures of commentary, right? And the thing he pressed it, and he said, well, there's nothing here that wasn't already in Thomas. That had already seen Thomas. The guy who really was a great commentator in Aristotle, one that speaks to it is this Ammonius Hermaeus writer. And Aristotle, I mean, Thomas says a commentary incomplete on the perihemoneus. I forgot to mention that earlier. And it breaks off on one of the Lactin translations of Ammonius Hermaeus. It breaks off, huh? It's if Thomas was not going to go further. So, people, you know, there's a pretty good guy in Ammonius Hermaeus. There's several Ammonius things. This was Ammonius Hermaeus. When Porphyry says, as the same Simplicius refers, that pasio, vel pasibidis qualitas, this is the way Aristotle speaks of the third species, and disposition habitus, which is the first species, differ in bodies according to intensity and emission, right? When something receives a heat according to being heated only, not that it is able to, what, heat other things, then it is a, what, undergoing, if it is easily passing away, or undergoing quality, if it is remaining. Whenever it is all brought to this part, or is lit. ...to this extent that it's able to heat another thing, right? Then it is disposition. If our further is confirmed that it's difficult to move, then it's a habit, right? That thus the disposition is a certain intention or perfection of passion or passable quality, habit of disposition. But this, the simplicious disproves, right? Because such an intensity in omission does not imply diversity on the part of the form itself, but from a diverse participation subject. And therefore, these are not diversified, and not to this are diversified species of what? You see the objection there, right? It's about how the subject is what? Receiving more or less perfectly some form. So it's not a distinction of form, right? But species is a distinction of form, right? So in English we sometimes use the word form for what? Species, right? Yeah, yeah, that's why you use it a lot, forms of government. Commonly speak that way, right? I like to speak of forms of fiction because they alliterate form and fiction, right? Forms of fiction, right? So epic and drama and novel and short story and so on are forms of fiction, right? And therefore, it has to be said another way. This hasn't been said above. The commensuration of these qualities, their undergoing qualities, right? According to their agreement to nature, have the notion of a what? Disposition, right? And therefore, when alteration has been made about these passable qualities, which are hot and cold, wet and dry, there comes about as a consequence an alteration according to what? It's in health. Yeah. Too hot or too cold, you heat them out, too much, cool them down, too much, you kill them, right? But first, in per se, there is not alteration according to what? Habits and dispositions of this sort. So, should we stop or go on from the moment? Hmm. It's short. It's short. Yeah. To the second one goes forward thus, it seems that habits are in the soul. more according to its essence than according to its powers. Like, he's going to be taking the opposite side then, right? He's arguing that side. Dispositions and habits are said in order to, what? Nature's has been said. But nature is more to be noted according to the essence of the soul than according to its powers. Because the soul, according to its essence, is the nature of such a body and its, what? Form. Form. Notice how he speaks there of the soul as being the nature of the body, right? Now, sometimes we divide the soul against nature. And in that ninth book of wisdom, Hirstaels speaks of the, what? The powers in the soul, right? As being kind of distinct from the powers of what nature, right? And in the diamond too, he talks about growth, right? How plant grows up and down, which are contrary directions, right? So already he's starting to rise a little bit above nature, which is determined to one. But you can also say that nature, that the soul is the nature of such a body, right? So you can divide soul against nature, as he does sometimes, right? And then sometimes he says soul is a nature, right? But it's not just a nature, right? But even the soul in some ways is determined to one, right? And in that respect, it is a, what? Nature, right, huh? It's not just determined to one. It has some openness to things, as you see. In reason and in the will, right? To good and bad, right, huh? Reason can be mistaken as well as no, right, huh? And the will can be good or bad, the willing, right? Here he calls it a nature, right? Therefore, habits are in the soul according to its essence and not according to its powers. Moreover, of an accident, there's not an accident. But habit is a certain accident, right? But the powers of the soul are of the genre of what? Accidents, as is said in the first book, right? It's in the second species of quality, right? Therefore, habit is not in the soul by reason of its powers. And you have an accident of an accident, huh? Of course, due to the ignorance of the fact that one accident belongs to a thing, would have an accident sometimes. So I'm taller than you through what? My quantity or size, right? I'm your teacher through my quality of my mind. That has any quality. Okay. Moreover, the subject is before that which is in the subject. But the habit, since they pertain to the first species of quality, quality is before power, which pertains to the second species. Therefore, the habit is not in the power of the soul-seek as in the subject, huh? And there you get some prius, huh? Some before and after to think about, huh? The againstness is what the philosopher in the first book of the Ethics lays down that there are diverse habits in diverse parts of the soul. So foresight is in reason and justice is in the will and courage is in the erasal appetite and temperance is in the concubal appetite and so on. Answer, it should be said, as has been said above, habit implies a certain disposition in order to nature or to the operation, right? If, therefore, one takes habit according as it has an order to nature, thus it is not able to be in the soul, if, however, we speak of what? Human nature, right? Because the soul itself is the form that completes what? Human nature, right? Whence, according to this, there is more able to be some habit or disposition in the body, right? In order to the soul than in the soul in order to the what? Body, right? But if we speak of some superior nature of which man is able to partake, according to the words of Peter, 2nd, this is of Peter, chapter 1, verse 4, that we might, what? Be consortes, right? Partakers, you might say, of the divine nature, right? But sometimes we say grace or sanctifying grace is, you know, to share in the divine nature, right? Thus nothing prevents in the soul, according to its essence, for them to be some habit to with grace, as infidicator. Ah, very same, right? Yeah, very bold, therefore. Yeah, yeah. But that's in respect not to another nature, right? That's very interesting, right? Because grace is not the substance of the soul, right? It's something in the soul, right? But by the grace, your soul is well disposed towards God, right? If however we take habit in order to operation, thus, maxime, most of all, right? Habit is found in the soul, right? Insofar as the soul is not determined to one operation, but has itself to many, which is required for habit, the thing that is a habit of, right? Has itself to many, right? And because the soul is a beginning of operations through its powers, right? Therefore, according to this, habits are in the soul according to its, what, powers, right? So for the most part, when you take up the virtues, right, they'll be in some power of the soul, right? So, fides or faith, it's in the reason, right? And there's a beautiful text of Augustine there. Fagoulai is, I think, one case. Someone's asking him, are reason and faith opposed, right? And Augustine says, they can't be opposed because we're capable of faith because we have reason. Interesting way it begins, right? So faith is in reason why hope and charity are in the will. But then foresight is also in reason, right? And episteme, reason of knowledge is also in reason, right? And wisdom is in reason, the highest perfection of reason, right? But justice is not in reason, it's in the will. And courage is in the ability for emotion, what they call the irascible, right? And then tempest is in the concupisal, right? Mildness, right? It's in the, what? Irascible, too, it seems. If it moderates anger, right? Which is, gives its name to the irascible. Appetite, right? Okay. So. So he says, to the first therefore it should be said that the essence of the soul pertains to human nature, not as a subject, right? To be disposed for something further, but as a form and a nature to which someone is, what? Disposed, huh? And also I use the word form there, like Wakefield does, for nature, right, huh? Of course when, who's the epistle of the Philippians, is it? Where he says he's in the form of God, right? And then he imputed himself, thinking on the form of man. Well, form there means what? Nature, right, huh? Okay. To the second about accident being an accident. To the second should be said that accident, per se, cannot be the subject of accident. It's going to be substance. But because also in the accidents there is a certain order. The subject, according as it is under one accident, accident is understood to be the subject of another. And thus it is said that one accident is the subject of another. As the surface of the body is the subject of color, right? And in this way, a power can be a subject of habit. To the theory it should be said that habit is sent before power according as it implies a disposition to nature. For power always implies a order to operation, which is posterior, since nature is the beginning of operation. But a habit whose power is what? The subject does not imply an order to nature, but to an operation. Whence it is what? Potency. Potency. Potency. Potency. Potency. Potency. Potency. Or it can be said that a habit is placed before potency as the complete before the incomplete. An act potency, for act is naturally before, right? Although potency is prior in the order of generation and time, as is said in the 7th book and also in the 9th book of metaphysics, right? So, potency is before, in the first sense of before, right? In time, right? But in terms, say, of goodness, perfection, in the fourth sense, then act is always before ability. Because act is the perfection of ability, right? Perfection, the thing, is it's good, right? So that, in what, it's perfection, this is before goodness. It's interesting about grace, though, isn't it, there, huh? You're always being struck down your first letter choice. I've been thinking about grace all my life. And now I find the same to find grace. His, what, habit of the soul itself, right? Or by its dispose towards a higher nature, the divine nature. After you asked the question, I was going through the different qualities. Yeah, yeah. You know, saying, I can't be that one, I can't be that one. He's going to talk more about it later on, you know, but I mean, it's kind of interesting. You know, it's interesting. You know, it's interesting. You know, it's interesting. You know, it's interesting. You know, it's interesting. Let's say our little prayer, in the name of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, Guardian Angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. God, our enlightenment, Guardian Angels, think in the lights of our minds, horde and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more quickly. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor, pray for us. Help us to understand what you have written. St. Athanasius pray for us. St. Athanasius pray for us, yeah. He'd suffer. He'd have to see. Oh, yeah. Now in college, I'm getting some religion chorus. I had to take some Church Father, you know, and write some little essay. I chose St. Athanasius, you know, and I've always been really attached to him ever since. I'm really impressed with the Athanasius, because he's solid, right? Yeah. I pointed to Dr. Carroll, he had red hair and blue eyes. He was described in some sort of red hair and blue eyes. He was Irish, didn't he? I think he was Irish. Irish. Ooh, Athanasius? Thank you. He was one of the forebears of St. Patrick. Yeah. Well, it was really Irish. And came to Victor, he married a girl from Paris, and we're all waiting just to meet her, you know, and she's Irish, you know. Yeah, I don't know. I don't know, I don't know, on the years of war or what, I don't know. Red hair, frickles, and so on. There you go. You know, there's a distinction between potencies or powers and, what, habits, right? It comes up when Thomas is in the fourth part of the Summa Cognigia Antilles, where he's talking about the sacraments, right? And he gets down to orders and so on. And there's one chapter dealing with the fact that a bad man can, what, nevertheless give you the sacrament, right? So a sinner can baptize you and you get all the benefit of baptism, right? And Thomas gives as many reasons why this is possible, right? But one reason is based on the distinction between power and what? Habit. Habit, yeah. So he gets the power to baptize, the power to consecrate and so on from Christ. And by his habits, he's either well or ill-disposed towards using this power, right? But even if he's ill-disposed by vice, right, then, he still has the power, right, then? So it's kind of interesting using that distinction between potency or power and virtue, right, then, to see where you can do it, right? But there's other reasons, too, you know, like if you were, had to be certainly the guy that submitted the sacrament in his holy, right? Yeah. You'd be putting your hope in man rather than in Christ, right? Another thing that strikes me, you know, Thomas speaks of the confession, I mean, the passion and death of Christ, right, as being the cause of the, what, sacraments, right? You can kind of see that, like, you know, in the two principal sacraments there, baptism and the Eucharist, you know, and the tap of the water and the wine. I mean, the blood, yeah, fluid. And you know how they always say, I guess the St. Paul said, you know, that you're buried with Christ when you are baptized, right? And obviously the Eucharist, right, you know, the separate consecration of bread and wine represents the death and the cross, right? So he ties it out very much with the death and the cross, right? But then he looks at Christ's resurrection as the cause of what? Our resurrection, right, huh? Even though I suppose it's sanctifying us, too, but it's kind of like a nice division there between the two, huh? Okay, we're up to Article 3 here in Question 50. Whether in the powers of the sensing part, right, there can be somewhat habit, right? On to the third one goes forward thus. It seems that in the potencies or powers, right, of the sensitive part, there cannot be somewhat habit, right? When he says the sensitive part, that includes, what, the emotions as well as the sense powers, right? Just like Aristotle says sometimes, you know, that the will is in reason, right? Or meaning in the rational part, but it doesn't mean it's in the reason, like being the same thing, you know? For just as the nutritive power is, what, irrational, right, without reason, so also the sensitive part, huh? But in the powers of the nourishing part, the feeding part, huh? There is not laid down any, what, habit, huh? Therefore, neither in the powers of the sensing part should some habit be laid down, right? Latin word orders, you see. You know how they capture these spies, you know, because they use some verbal thing, you know, that is not characteristic of the language, you know? You can always tell a guy who's been studying Thomas a lot, you know, a lot of this is he picks up and he speaks in a certain way, you know? See, giving himself away, you know? Moreover, the sensitive parts are common to us and to the, what, brutes. But in the brutes, there are not any, what, habits, huh? Because there is not in them will that is in the definition of habit, huh? So Aristotle puts in the definition of habit that is with choice, right, huh? Therefore, in the sensitive powers, there are not some, what, habits, huh? Moreover, the habits of the soul are the sciences and the, what, virtues. And just as science refers to the grasping power, right? Again, that's how Thomas doesn't say the knowing power, but the grasping power, right? So virtue also, right? Or, oh, so just as science refers to the grasping power, so virtue to the desiring power, right? But in the sensitive powers, there are not any, what, sciences. Since science is of the, what, universal, which the sense powers are not able to grasp, huh? They can grasp the singular. Therefore also, neither are there habits of the virtues in the, since the part cannot be placed in them, right? They're not able to be in them. But against this is what the philosopher says in the third book of Ethics, that some virtues, to wit, temperance and fortitude, and those are the two virtues he takes up in particular in the third book of Nicomachean Ethics, huh? They are, what, virtues of the irrational parts, right? The parts without reason, huh? Well, Thomas says, I answer it should be said that the sensing powers are in two ways able to be considered. In one way, according as they act or operate from the instinct of what? Nature. In another way, according as they act or operate from the command of what? Reason, right? According as they act or operate from the instinct of nature, in this way they are ordered to one thing, just as nature is ordered to one thing. And therefore, you don't have that, what, ambiguity, right? That requires a habit. And therefore, just as in natural powers there are not some habits, so also neither in the, what, sense powers, according as they act or operate from the instinct of what? Nature, huh? Nature not being able to be more than one thing, Shakespeare says. But according as they operate or act from the command of reason, then they are able to be ordered to what? Diverse things, right? And thus they are able to be in them some habits by which we are disposed well or badly towards something. So you're saying emotions can arise simply from the instinct of nature, right? Like I suppose they do in the newborn, what? Baby, right, huh? You know, hang on to the newborn baby. right and other emotions right and there's no what habit there right but they're acting from what instinct of nature right but as you get older right then what first the reason of your parents can act a bit upon your emotions and then if your emotions are habituated to listen to reason a bit then they make them to listen to your own reason right that's a long process right now what about the difference in the way that these are irrational and the nutritive powers are well to the first therefore it should be said that the nutritive parts or the powers of the nutritive part are not apt to obey the what command of reason and therefore there are not in them some habits right but the sensitive powers are apt to obey the what command of reason and therefore there can be in them some habits for according as to obey reason in some way they're called what rational right as is said in the first book of the ethics right but they're rational by what partaking of reason right without having reason in them right having reason itself in them but they can partake of reason until it kind of compares that you know to a man taming a horse or something like that right and uh washington early man came back you know from his 17 years in europe right second time he went off on a tour of the far west right it's beautiful descriptions of them taming these wild persons you know how quickly they can tamed them right but they're really wild horse in the beginning right and they tamed them to become docile they assume they're carrying loads and they're turning men around and so on and we know this difference just from our experience yeah i mean that was that our emotions do obey reason yeah yeah yeah i had a new car in the time to quebec you know and i thought i'd take a different route you know so i saw take the one up through maine you know and take the route the president kennedy is called right well it's supposed to be an honor i suppose the president kennedy had the route to president kennedy but the road was you know a lot of potholes and i was playing on the brakes all the time and i had this crazy frenchman behind me you know and he couldn't stand my you know going slowly because i was afraid to end up in a puddle so he zooms by and kicks up a stone and i could hear it hit the side of the car you know so the next day i looked down and he had definite definite remarks to this and i said but i'm a philosopher why am i going to get him to say that or i was driving around to the assumption one time you know and this is the old road there it used to be on the off route nine there and so on and i came down there was a okay in front of me so i was probably in the stop and i could see through the rear view this young lady coming down the car going too fast she hit my car and left into the car in front right you got two cars now and uh actually i was the only one thing that i could move you know and they're kind of right so i gave them you know i dropped on to the spelling station so i i'm a philosopher i didn't teach class i'm just wondering because um whether it might be possible for us to influence our human nutrient power in a way to um how do we know that we our minds don't you know our rational part doesn't have a certain power over these sub-rational um i suppose if you eat too fast to get indigestion right or gas or something you know you know but i'm talking about you know i'm thinking in terms of you know these hindus or whatever who concentrate on and they slow their heart you know yeah they concentrate on their heart either they concentrate on their digestion and they seem to be able to influence it you know and maybe if they did that repeatedly it would kind of cause that kind of so in other words how do we know that there's not habits in those lower maybe they're influenced by the sense powers too though in this case like the medium of the sense yeah yeah if you can locate some we'll give you another article stick one in here i can't teach my stomach you know to not digest poison right or something like that right or even the things that make me a fat or something right you can't say you know but just just don't don't absorb that you know let it go through it doesn't work it's like my brother when it was a teenager you didn't know ice cream and my mom said you're going to get fat to keep doing that it's just i don't get it it melts it goes right through it so somebody could kind of think that way it just melts go through it and they see you know in the essay by astrid right and he's talking about the superiority of the music of mozart and the baroque period and so on but he represents the emotions in a state what something to reason yeah yeah and uh mozart's music you know especially is is clear in its imitation right so you can mozart's music is probably the best example you know of how the emotions can partake of what reason reason yeah yeah it harmonizes with the reason now music sorry i heard the story of father boulay there didn't i tell you about that set the money up to to stop playing right more people would do stuff like that okay so they said to be rational what by what by taking right so aristotle makes that distinction there right now there's a part of the soul that has reason right other part doesn't but then he subdivides the part that doesn't have reason and one part is able to what listen to reason right now and partake of reason the second should be said that the sense powers in the brood animals do not operate from the command of reason right but if the boot if they are left to themselves right the brood animals operate from the what instinct of nature and thus in the brood animals there are not some habits ordered to operations there are however in them some dispositions in order to what nature as health and what beauty beauty right but because good animals are what disposed by the reason of man to a certain what custom custom to doing something right thus or in another way in this way in good animals habits can in some way what yeah so he's speaking of the dog training you know he's his dog a blind man so as augustine says in the book on 83 questions we see the what most fierce beast right from the greatest pleasures to be disturbed by the fear of what pain right which turns into them what a customer they're right and they're domesticated right yeah but there's lacking in the ratio of habit as far as the use of the will because they do not have the power of using or not using right which seems to pertain to the notion of what habit huh like a pharaoh said something you use and you want to right and therefore properly speaking in them habits cannot what be right but you mean that in some imperfect way right it's a creature of habit huh now to the third one here right to the third it should be said that the sense desiring power now here's your one in english they translate that as sense appetite right but it would have to take a bit of petitrust is being used to the power right it's not just it's apt to be moved by the rational what desiring power by the will But the rational powers, the apprehensive rational powers, right? Let's use the word vera's rationality to include the will there, right? And he subdivided the apprehensive ones, right? I have to receive from the sense powers, right? So in some ways they're contrary, right? So the reason receives from the senses, right? And the will kind of moves the sense appetite. And therefore it's more suitable, right? That there be habits in the desiring appetitive powers, right? Or sensitive powers, right? And then in the grasping sensitive powers, sensitive powers as used for both the senses and. Since in the desiring sensitive powers, there are not habits except according as the act from the command of what? Reason, right? Although also in the interior sense powers, grasping powers, there can be some habits according as a man comes to be many memorativos, right? A good memory or what? It's a cogitative power or the imaginative, right? It's also the philosopher says in the chapter on memory that custom does much for remembering well, okay? She gets her in the tricks, right? She says, I say, how old am I? I say, well, I know I was born in 36. 64 years in the last century, right? And 13 in here. But soon I use 64 plus 10 is 74, plus 3 is 77. I don't add 13 to 64, right? But I add 10 to 64 and then 3, yeah. It's much quicker, you know. Got all the tricks, you know. I was looking at the package store there, you know. I got over at three or four bottles, you know, and I had them up in my head, you know. He said, how'd you do that? He said, Well, you get some tricks, you know, you don't, if one is $3.15, you say $3.15, you say it's kind of, how do you do that? You know, tricks like that, huh? I was talking a little bit last night about the imagination there, and he always admired the Greeks, you know. They produced both Homer and Euclid, and the guys didn't have to do it, of course, like the Thaggers, right? But both of them are tied up with the imagination, huh? So Shakespeare says, you know, the poet, the lover, the lunatic, right? They're all compact of imagination. But geometry, what? Resolves to the imagination, huh? It doesn't go down to the senses, right? So the flat surface that you have in geometry, plain geometry is not the surface of a desk in the sense of a world. So this is really not flat enough, huh? And if you examine this under a microscope, you'd see it's not that. And if it's a beehive of abs and molecules, as some people think, you're never going to have a flat surface out there. So it's reduced to the, what? Imagination, right? Remember that Mark used to talk about how the posture is not about, what, parallel lines, because nobody can imagine parallel lines, because you have to imagine something infinite, right? They never meet. But he has lines where when a straight line falls across them and makes angles less than two right angles, they'll meet. But you can imagine two lines meeting, right? So you have to go back to something you can, what? Imagine, right? And then from that, you'll show something that would never meet, right? If they were equal to two right angles. So then geometry, I mean, the epics of Homer, right, are in the imagination too, right? They're quite different in a way. And it's closer to the madman in a sense. But I was reading this guidebook, which I picked up in the Fuseberry Library sale, of England and Wales and so on. There's a mountain in Wales, you know, and the legend is that if you sleep on the mountain at night, you'll wake up either mad or a poet, one of the two. Well, that's not far apart, right? I was talking to an actor who played Shiloh. He was a Catholic, you know, but he played Shiloh in the play and really hated the Christians when he was playing the role, right? So he's really out of his mind in a sense, right? You know, there's something like that. Marcia Devoncourt there, the novelist, says, quite simply, you are mad. When you're writing, you know, huh? They have this, from Charles Dickens, one of his little daughters, right? Described as a child, I guess. She was a little bit under the weather, you know. It's kind of a treat to let her kind of rest on a little couch in the room where he's working on one of his novels, right? Because he's so absorbent and doesn't pay attention to her, right? He'd jump up from the desk and go to the mirror. Now his whole face would turn, you know. And he's some character, right? And he'd go back and write. And she'd watch this thing, you know. I don't really, you know. But there's a little touch of madness there, right? Yeah. It's like the Hollywood actors and actresses, you know, they play lovers in the movie and before you know it, they're leaving their spouses, you know. Yeah. Getting married. You know, who they are or what. Yeah. That's what they call role-playing. You mentioned that the Greeks were the many things, remarkable things that they had done as they produced. Homer and Euclid. Yeah, in terms of, you know, two different uses of imagination, right? But both marvelous, right, in their own ways and necessary for the life of the mind and human life. Would you say that as Euclid sort of structured the imagination in one way that the poet also did so in another way? Yeah. Because there seems to be a structure in literature and the finest literature. Yeah. And whereas a lot of contemporary literature tries to abandon those structures and often fails the process. Yeah. I was remarking too, how you just have to look at these theorems again in the seventh book, right? I'm just delighted with this theorem, you know, that, you know, the first number is to the second as the third is to the fourth. The number produced by the first and the fourth will always be produced by the second and the third, right? And, you know, the fact that if the first is to the second as the third is to the fourth and the first will be to the third as the second is to the fourth, right? We kind of cut up with these proportions, right? But the most beautiful metaphors of Shakespeare's, as Aristoteles's in the Poetics are ones that are based upon a, like, this, of, what? Ratios, right? Analogies. And I always, you know, take the simile there and reserve the simile in Shakespeare there. The one where Julie is found dead, you know, apparently dead, right? On her wedding day, right? Well, this is supposed to be the happiest day in the world for a girl, right, no? I remember as an altar boy, you know, and I serve weddings, you know, and there used to be a little row of little girls in the neighborhood who came in just to watch the wedding. They sit in the last few hours of the church. It's like, it's kind of a cutest thing to see, you know, those little girls. And then they're all kind of, you know, dreaming. Yeah. Yeah. But, you know, the Father finally says, you know, death lies under like an untimely frost upon the sweetest flower of all the field. Well, I said, you can't improve upon that, right? But it's based on proportion, right? Death is to this young girl at this young age, right? Like the frost is to the, what, untimely frost is to the prettiest and sweetest flower in the field, right? It's just perfect, right? There's some similarity between that and what I was enjoying in Euclid, right? Because it's tied up with these, what, proportions, yeah. Did the Greeks come up with this? Or did they build upon advances by other cultures? Well, I mean, Western civilization begins at the Iliad, you know that. So it's a start of it, right? And, you know, there's a great, Albert the Great says, the poetry doc, Modem Admirandi says, poetry gives the way of admiring or wondering. I remember seeing a book there, I don't know if I have it to read anymore or not, but it was talking about the emotional effect of Shakespearean tragedy, right? And the title of the book was taken from the end of Hamlet. War or wonder, you know? Horatius is the end if you would see something of war or wonder, right? There's all these dead bodies up there, right? And Fortin Brock. and there's all these dead bodies up there, and so that wonder of the philomuthas is a what a stepping stone to the wonder of the philosopher right and the you see the wonder of the philosopher is a wonder about something what universal right or the wonder of the historian is about what something singular right but the wonder of fiction is more a wonder about the universal than it is about the singular right so you see rome and judy actually don't think of them being historical pair lovers in the 14th century or whatever it is but that's young lovers right and you know this terrible tragic thing happens you know in the play you know oh you men you know there's something about the human situation in general right so you're kind of wondering you know they say it's a universal singularized the singular universalized so it's a stepping stone to what the universality of the what philosopher right i know when i was teaching the love and friendship course right i had the the passage that's from shakespeare right now which i designed to go between your experience of love which is singular right and thomas's discussion of love which is very universal right and shakespeare's representation of love and its effects and so on causes is what right in the middle right it's a stepping stone right but it's kind of amazing that you can have the perfection in homer of the imagination in one way right and in euclid and when before you develop these geometry the perfection of the imagination and the science about things right that are imagined um it's just a really tremendous perfection right i bet you went out even to uh i bet you went out to mathematicians nowadays right i'm not sure if they could give you the reason why you know prove right off the bat you know why the first is the the second is the third is the fourth why the first and the fourth should be what equal to the product of the second the third right now so most people never know that you kind of think yourself you know see i was kind of it's kind of assumed that you know but i don't know but but did i really know it right now until i saw the the demonstration there and my teacher euclid there so it's it's actually amazing they can do both of these right and uh other ages you know might have a sonexon's in one or the other of these but not in what oh you know homer and you know there's only one rival shakespeare right the poet as her style says huh but the modern times as the federalist papers say the poet at shakespeare long farewell to all my greatness as the poet says you know you gotta know what the poet is uh where is i where's i reading there about the uh oh yeah i think i was thinking uh talking about the um development of um yellowstone there right and uh some of these pretty uh tough guys going in there you know living in log cabins right and eating bear made all the time and uh reading shakespeare kind of amazing right and uh it's like when uh lexington tockford came to the united states right and he he read the hymn in the fourth place first of all in a log cabin right all they had in log cabins was a few plays of shakespeare in the bible i'll say so they're much better ready than we are uh i guess lose the moms of slavery so that we can open up and we are a creativity in advancement then you see the modern physicists like you say in your natural hearing class uh going back to to the greeks and saying you know they were around to something and i wonder if there are any real advances uh that have come from the abandonment of these structures in literature and science and math and things like that has this freed us at all turning or is trying to go beyond what the greeks uh began and and established well it might be something but you know we've lost an awful lot there you know fundamental thinking so yes you've got a very profound literature yeah nothing back upon my geometry class in sophomore high school you know was nothing compared to euclid i didn't pick up euclid until i was out of college and i don't teach euclid because he says go get euclid i said why go get it he didn't write with me he just said you go get it yeah yeah yeah i should read yeah yeah it's delightful to read him even so did i just speak of shakespeare like you know it gets the mind keeps you kind of stable state of mind yeah and the music of old set too okay so we're down in the tertium was it i think so okay let's start again from the beginning to the third it should be said and that the sense desiring power is that removed by the rational desiring power as is said in the third book about the what so but the apprehensive uh the grasping rational powers are apt to receive uh to take from the sense powers and therefore magis more does it belong right is it convenient suitable that there are habits in the desiring sense powers then in the grasping sense powers unless i have to change the word order in english in english in some sense the latin is the the grammatical order is more the logical order right variables sensitives apprehensive you're contracting with each right sensitive contract variables but it could be applied to the knowing powers the apprehensive powers or to the design powers since in the sense in the desiring sense powers there are not habits except according as they act from the command of reason although in the grasping sense powers the interior ones that is to say right as opposed to the exterior ones seeing hearing smelling tasting touching there can be laid down in some habits right according to which a man becomes bene memoritivas i guess of good memory right or cogitativus that's the uh yeah compares individual intentions in the way that the universal reason universal intentions or the imagination right whence also the foster says in the book under me that custom does much for remembering well right i suppose that you know back in thomas's time and and so you know the the printing press on all this computer junk and so you had to memorize much more right has to have a joke assumption there you know you go down to that printing office you know that thing could not be i want to distribute to the students right and says i've got me a briefcase down there or something something down there you know and say it's wrecking my memory right this place right but you know you didn't have all these books running around and things you know remember a teacher say in high school you know what's important is to know where to find it you know so not here it's in some book in the cloud as you say that's that's what's uh i was i've encountered this more than once now people with their phone their cell phones and they got everybody's phone number and email and all that stuff on there they don't remember anybody's phone number anymore because they just look it up by name and they touch the screen and it calls them yeah they don't know any phone numbers anymore what are you gonna do i think thomas probably knew the the songs right by heart right and they knew them better than you