Prima Secundae
Lecture 131: The Four Species of Quality and the Priority of Habit

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In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, Guardian Angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. Deo gratias. God, our Enlightenment, Guardian Angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, or and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor. Amen. Help us to understand what you've written. Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, amen. It's kind of struck, you know, as we're reading Thomas' consideration there of the Eucharist, right? In the fourth book of the Summa Contra Gentiles. And he begins that consideration of the Eucharist, and he says, why is the Eucharist necessary, right? And I was kind of struck by the answer he gave, huh? He said, to preserve us in the virtues and to increase them. It kind of struck me, you know. If I've been thinking about the connection between the greatest virtues, faith, hope, and charity, right, and the Eucharist, right, huh? Like St. Thomas in the Adorote Devote, right, which is one of those prayers that the Church selected at the Vatican II to be a special mention in the tradition of the Church, right, and to be included in the new edition of the ingredient of indulgences. But the middle quatrain is about faith, hope, and charity, huh? And then, you know, Ador himself says there at the end of the words that they use in the consecration, you know, do this in memory of me, right? And so this prayer, you know, that they used to say after communion that I would learn as a boy, right, prayer before Jesus and the crucifix and so on. But there again you ask for faith, hope, and what? Charity, right? So I was kind of struck by his, you know, saying it's necessary to preserve the sacraments, I mean to preserve the virtues, and to what? Increase them. Of course, Thomas in his prayer after communion asks for the increase of all the virtues, right? But there's a special connection with faith, hope, and charity. And I was kind of struck by that. But every time I go through there, you know, you're kind of struck by something, you know, that didn't strike you so much before, you know, and say, gee whiz, what an interesting thing, you know? Like the conic used to say, you know, every time I go through the physics, right, he sees something new in them, huh? I've been teaching since the 30s, you know, and I had him in the late 50s, 50s, 60s there, you know? Oh, he sees something. So let's look again at the body of the article here that we use about halfway through there in Article 2, right, in Question 49. And the scandal here of there being four species of quality, right? I answer you, it should be said that the philosopher, huh? Meaning, no, more nor less than Aristotle himself, right? In the predicamentis, huh? That's the Latin word for in the book called the categories, huh? So, he lays down among four species of quality as the, what, first, right? Now, we'll see the reason why this is the first of the four species of quality, right? He doesn't, until the later part of the body, he's going to explain why it's the first one, right? But notice he already says, he lays it down first among the four species of quality. What does he lay down as first? First, disposition, and habit, huh? These are two words, huh? Okay, that's the beginning of the body, right? And the second part here takes up the famous commentator Simplicius, trying to understand this, right? Of which species Simplicius assigns thus the differences in his commento, predicamentorum, his commentary on the categories of Aristotle, saying that of qualities, some are, what, natural, which are in according to nature and always, and some are adventitious, right? They come to you, right? Because adventitious means come to, huh? They come to you, as it were being made from the outside, right, from the extrinsic. And they are also able to be, what, lost, huh? And these, which are adventitious, are habits and, what, dispositions, huh? Which differ according to easily and were difficultly able to be lost, right? So disposition sometimes names something easily lost, and the habit is something difficult to be lost, but it can be lost, right? Now, of natural qualities, some are according to that something is in potency, and this is the second species of quality. Some are according to something is in act, and this either in the depths, right? Or according to the surface, right? And thus in the depths, or profound depths, is the third species of quality, which is sometimes called sense qualities, huh? According to the surface, is the four species of quality, figure, and what? Form, huh? Which is the figure of the, form being the figure of the animated thing, right? But, Thomas says, this distinction of the species of quality seems unsuitable, right? I've had negative thinking all this time. For there are many figures and undergoing qualities that are not natural, but are what? Adventitious, right, huh? And many dispositions are not adventitious, but natural, as health and beauty, right? And things of this sort. And moreover, this is not suitable to the order of the species, right? The before and after in the enumeration of the species, huh? For simpler, always, that which is more natural is before, okay? Okay, he's hinting upon the basis of what habit and disposition are going to be later on, understood to be the first species of quality, huh? And then Thomas says, And therefore, in another way, we're not to take the distinction of dispositions and habits from the other, what? Qualities, huh? For properly, quality implies a certain, what? Mode of substance, huh? That's what they would spell in Latin, right, huh? Mm-hmm. Okay. Now, a mode, as Augustine says upon Genesis to the letter, is what measure prefixes, right? That's kind of, and usually he uses this, because you say, isn't this pleading to quantity, right? But it's in terms of something more general. Quince implies a certain determination according to some, what? Measure. And therefore, just as that by which the potency of matter is determined, according to substantial being, is called quality, which is a difference of, what? Substance. Substance, huh? So, that, according to which is determined the potency of the subject, according to accidental being, is called, what? Accidental quality, huh? Which is also a certain difference, huh? The first is marked with species making difference, right? Essential difference, huh? Now, notice, huh, when Plato, or say, you know, in Latin, they define difference, species making difference. They'll say it's qualiquid, it signifies qualiquid. You got the word for quality there, right? Quality, right? And Berkowitz translates it in this way, it says, difference is a name said with one meaning of many things other than kind, signifying how they are what they are, right? See? And so, you got the word how in there, which is the closest thing we have to poios in Greek or qualis in Latin, right? As if you were to call quality howness, right? Although we're not accustomed to do that. But you can see quality and qualis are related, right? Or poios, the adjective with poiotes, right? For the quality, right? And so, Aristotle talks about this, these two kinds of differences in the fifth book of wisdom, huh? Which is the book of, about the names equivocal by reason, right? That are used especially in wisdom, huh? And in the axioms, but to some extent, everywhere, right? Now, he says, the mode, however, or determination, right? Because mode simply would be more quantity, right? Or the determination of the subject according to accidental being, I'm in the categories now of accident, right? Can be taken... Either in order to the very nature itself of the subject, or according to acting upon and undergoing, which follow upon the principles of nature, which are matter and what? Form. Matter being the principle of what? Undergoing, right? In form of acting upon, right? Or according to quantity, right? Okay. Now, is Thomas following the rule of two or three? Yeah. Because here's a way to distinguish four following the rule of two or three, right? And let's pause on this stuff. Let's see this a bit. Sometimes you get four by dividing into what? Two twos, right? Or sometimes, as I say, by crisscrossing, right? Two divisions into two, right? And one famous example of that is in the Antipredicaments, right? Whereas Dallin distinguishes universal substance, particular substance, right? Or individual substance. Universal accident, right? And particular or individual accident, right? Okay. And he says, something can, what? Exist in something as in the subject, or not exist in something as in the subject. It can be said of another, right? Or not said of another, right? So you have two divisions into two, and you crisscross them, and you get four, right? So what exists in another, but is not said of another, is individual accident, right? What is said of another, but what? It doesn't exist in another, is universal substance. What exists in another, but is not said of a, but is what? Yeah. And then you have individual substance, which is either said of another, or exists in another, right? Okay. Now, kind of an aside to this, right? I mentioned how sometimes, you use a crisscross of two and two, right? To arrive not at four, but to arrive at what? Three, right? And you first arrive at four, but then you see one of the four is not a real, what? Possibility, right? And I gave two examples there, one from the book on the poetic art, where it's all, right? He divides the plot into three parts, beginning, middle, and end, right? He divides them by whether something is before something, or not before something, after something, or not after something, right? So if it's before something, but not after something, you have the beginning. If it's after something, but not before something, you have the end. If it's both before something, and after something, you have the, what, middle? Yeah. Now the fourth box, you might say, is what is needed before anything, nor after anything, right? So that may be a private block. No, no. So dividing, cross-crossing, two divisions of two, right? You end up with three rather than four, as big as that we see, right? Now it's kind of using Thomas' thing there, talking about the Trinity, right? Mm-hmm. Either a person in the Trinity proceeds from someone, or he does not proceed from someone. Either he has someone proceeding from him, or he does not have someone proceeding from him. So if he proceeds from someone, but no one proceeds from him, he's the Holy Spirit. If someone proceeds from him, but he doesn't proceed from anybody, he's the Father. If he both proceeds from someone, and someone proceeds from him, then he's the Son. Now if he neither proceeds from anyone, nor no one proceeds from him, then this couldn't be another person in the Trinity, because the Trinity, the members of the Trinity, are distinguished by relations of origin, right? Origins of procession, right? Okay? That's a kind of interesting thing, right? That sometimes you get, what? Only three by crisscrossing two, right? But here, in the case of individual substance, universal substance, individual accident, right? And universal accident, in the categories of anti-predicaments, you get four, but it's by dividing and crisscrossing two, what? Division, right? Okay? Now, what about this here? One in three, right? Well, now it's at Leval, right? And you have a professor in logic, right? And a professor in, what? Ethics, right? I don't know if you would have heard of it, sir. No. But they wanted to briefly distinguish their subject, right? From the other parts of, what? Philosophy, right? And so they used the same text, right? From the beginning of Thomas' exposition of the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, right? And Thomas says that, well, Aristotle says in metaphysics it belongs to the wise man to order things. And he does so because wisdom is the highest perfection of reason. And it's proper to reason to, what? Consider order, right? Or to look before an actor, as a godlike Shakespeare says, right? Okay? So then Thomas says, we're going to distinguish the knowledge of reason by the order that it considers, right? But it's a knowledge of reason you want to distinguish, right? So we have to distinguish the knowledge of reason by a distinction of order in comparison to reason, right? He says, now, this is fourfold, right? Oh, he's shocking right now. He says, and there is an order which reason does not make, but it considers. And this is the order of natural things, right? So natural philosophy is about order, but an order not made by reason, right? Then there's another part of philosophy which is about an order that reason makes in its own thoughts, in its own acts. And that's logic, right? Then there's a part of philosophy which is about the order that reason makes in the acts of the will, right? In the actions proceeding from the acts of the will. And that belongs to practical philosophy, ethics and domestic and political philosophy. And then there's the order which reason makes in exterior matter, right? Like in the wood, right? In the metal or plastic or the cloth and so on. Now, that's really a complete kind of division, right? And he divides a million to four, right? But if you examine it, you can see that one of the orders is about the order not made by reason. And the other three, the order made by reason. So you try to understand that, right? You see a distinction in the two, right? And then he divides the order made by reason starting with reason itself. In itself, and then the will which is right next door and then the exterior matter, right? It's perfectly ordered, right? It puts, of course, the natural order first, right? Prima. Prima. So notice, although he divides there, you know, seeking brevity, as Thomas says sometimes, right? Right away into four, right? Not to be so pedantic with purposes and so on. But you can see that to understand what he's doing, you have to see maybe he should divide it into two, right? And divide it into the order not made by reason against the order made by reason. Which is by opposites, right? And then the order made by reason can be divided into three, right? Now the third and last way can divide four into what? It was into three now instead of into what? Into two, right? And there you have to have at least one in each of these cases, right? But since there's four you've got to have two in one, right? And what is Thomas going to do now? He's dividing it into what? One, two, one, right? Okay. Now, if I can be so vain as to take an example of myself, right? If you look at Shakespeare's plays, right? There's about 37 plays attributed to Shakespeare, right? And if you set aside the 10 history plays that involve special problems of classification. You take the remaining 27 plays, I distinguish four kinds of plays, right? Okay. But, it's kind of natural to go back to Rastalic where you divide the plays into what? Tragedy and comedy. Back to Rastalic Back to Rastalic and comedy. Back to Rastalic Back to Rastalic But then in the later people, like even in Pautus, you know, Pautus makes a word out of tragedy and comedy, tragicomity. And in the writers on fiction there in the Renaissance, right, they said there seems to be some kind of a play that's sort of in between tragedy and comedy, right? They say basically tragedy and comedy were distinguished by happiness and misery, right? Because that's the most interesting thing, that's what life is all about, happiness and misery, trying to escape misery and get to happiness. So if the play goes from happiness to misery for the main characters, that's tragedy, right? If it goes from misery to happiness, it's, what, comedy, right, huh? But there seems to be plays that are, what, serious and not comic in the sense of being, like, just laughable, but nevertheless unhappy for their characters, right? So there seems to be a, what, something in between, these two. And so I might divide Shakespeare's plays into tragedies and comedies and then the plays in between, right? That's kind of understandable. But there seems to be two in between, right? And you could call them romances, right? In the technical sense of the word romance, right? And there's 12 plays, there's 10 tragedies on five comedies and 12 plays in the middle. The 12 plays in the middle fall into two groups of six. One is the love and friendship plays, which are closer to the comedies. And the other six are the mercy and forgiveness plays, right? And so I would divide, right, Shakespeare's, maybe four kinds of plays into three and then subdivide the middle, right? And Thomas is doing something like that here, right, huh? So to some extent, he's using this way of dividing into two or three to get four. There's a beautiful text there in the sentences, you know, I think it's in the Summa, but Thomas says, you can signify a person in the manner of something, what, absolute, or the absolute in the form of a relative, or relative in the way of a relative, or absolute in the way of a relative, absolute, right? He's got a division to four, right, by crisscrossing. Two twos, right? Okay. So notice in this text here now, he says, the modus or determination of the subject according to accidental being can be taken, and that gives a division to three, right? Either in order to the nature itself of the subject, right? He gives that first because the nature is what's first in the thing. Or according to what? Or acting upon and undergoing, which follow the principles of nature, which share matter and form. That's the middle, right? Or according to what? Quantity, right? If one takes the mode or determination of the subject according to quantity, thus it is the fourth species of quality that Aristotle gives. Just call it figure or form, right? And because quantity, according to its definition, is without motion, right? And without the notion of good and bad. Therefore, to the fourth species of quality, it does not pertain that something be well or bad or quick or slowly passing away, right? Now, that may seem strange, you know, because you talk about a girl's shape or something, right? But you'll explain why it isn't, right? And it's interesting, huh? You criticize the geometries. The geometries are pretty proud of their science, right? Because of the rigor of it, the solitude of it, right? And it excels all the human knowledge, all the sciences, in being certain, right? But you don't talk about the good or the bad. It's a good proposition. Oh, it's a bad proposition. Now, the mode or determination of the subject according to action and passion is attended in, what, the second and the third species of quality, huh? And therefore, in both of these is considered that something comes about, what, easily or with difficulty, or that is easily, right, or quickly passing or lasting, right, huh? Okay. Now, notice, the second species of quality is ability or inability, right, huh? Mm-hmm. And the third one is what sensible qualities are usually called, right? The undergoing qualities, the Aristotle calls them. But there is not considered in these something pertaining to the notion of good or bad, because motion and passions do not have the notion of a, what, end. But good and bad are said with respect to the, what, end, huh? But the mode and determination of the subject in order to the nature of the thing pertains to the first species of quality, which is habit and disposition. For the philosopher says in the seventh book of the physics, speaking about the habits both of the soul and of the, what, body, right, that they are dispositions of the perfect to the best, right? And because the form and the nature of the thing is the end, and that, for the sake of which is something, as is said in the second book of the physics, therefore, in the first species, it's considered both good and bad, right, huh? And also easily and difficultly, what, moveable, according as, what, some nature is the end of generation and of, what, motion. Whence in the fifth book of wisdom, huh, of the books after the physics books, huh, the philosophy defines habit, that is, the disposition according to which someone is disposed well or badly, huh? And in the second book of the ethics, talking about the moral virtues, right? And that they are habits by which we have ourselves to our passions well or badly, right, huh? So if I'm a coward, I'm disposed badly towards this emotion of fear, right, huh? But if I have, what, the virtue of courage, I'm disposed well towards this passion of what? If I have temperance, I'm disposed well to concupiscence, right, huh? If I have intemperance, I'm disposed badly towards that emotion, huh? For what is a mode suitable to the nature of a thing, when it is a mode suitable to the nature of a thing, then it has the notion of something good, right? When it is not suitable, then it has the notion of something bad, right? I remember what I was doing when I was quoting the poet. He says, Friar Lawrence, right, in Roman Juliet, huh? For not so vile that on the earth doth live, he says, but to the earth some special good doth give. Now, aught so good, but strained from that fair use, revolts from true birth, stumbling on abuse. That's what I said, right? That's what he's saying there, huh? Revolts from true birth. Now, that's the last meaning of nature, what a thing is. So, when you revolts from your true nature, right, then you stumble on, what, abuse, right? So, he sees that nature is the, what, measure of what is good or bad, huh? In essence, you can defend the words of Polonius, right, that this above all to thine own self be true, right? Let's say, be true to your, what? Nature. Nature, yeah. And then Thomas adds the thing that he started out reading with. And because nature is that which is first to be considered a thing, right? Therefore, Abbot is laid down as a free speech as a quality, huh? Whatever, whatever. You know, it took a Thomas to understand Aristotle, right? To really explain him, right? Unfortunately, we don't have a commentary of Thomas on the, what, categories, right? The only book of logic that Thomas comments on is, what, posterior analytics, yeah. So, you have to go to Albert or somebody else, right? But Thomas does say, you know, like, right here, you know, he does illuminate, right? Things, huh? That nobody else does, huh? I remember. I remember. I remember when I was at Laval there, I was reading my favorite book, Summa Cata Gentilis, and Thomas was showing in a chapter there in the first book that no name is said unificly of God and creatures, right? And he gives a whole number of reasons for it, right? But among the reasons he gives is an either-or syllogism, right? That every name said of two things unificly is either their genus, or their species, or their difference, or their property, or their accident. And then he goes and eliminates each one of those five, right? Worth God and creature, right? And then he concludes, right? Well, I got the right idea, right? Well, then the isogogia, right? Of the great porphyry, right? Which is, isogogia in Greek is the word for introduction, right? And this is an isogogia to what? The categories, right? If you go to the beginning of the work, right? A friend of porphyry, right, was having a hard time understanding the categories, right? And of course, these words that appear in their genus, species, difference, and so on. And so porphyry is going to what? Reply to his what? Yeah, yeah. And he says, what I'm going to say is useful not only for the categories, but for understanding also division and definition and demonstration, right? So this is really the beginning of the logical sense, right? Now, porphyry gets the definitions of genus and difference and so on from Aristotle. But it kind of brings them together, right? Which is something we can do, you know, without being too original. But we can do something for this, right? But porphyry doesn't say that this is a distinction of names said univocally of many things, right? But you get that from that argument that Thomas has. It was. So I runs off and said, Monsignor de Young. I said, Monsignor, shouldn't Porphyry have, you know, said that? He says, yes. So, you know, but you get little things like that. You pick up, you know, little gems, you know, that illuminate something, you know, in logic. And you have to kind of, you know, gather those together, you know, and they help you a lot, right? Because he doesn't have a commentary on any book in the logic of Aristotle except the Posture Analytics, just that. We're doing the sister refutations there, right? I wish I had Thomas there, you know, and he wouldn't be stumbling over the text all the time. But Thomas, you know, is always making use of those fallacies, huh? And pointing them out to that author that he's dealing with, right? So he knows this stuff, right? So this is the first, what, species, right? Of quality, you know? You see how it's distinguished from the other ones, huh? It's a one, two, one, right? Rather than a one and a three. Okay, two and a two, right? Okay, let's look at the reply to the objections here, huh? To the first, therefore, it should be said that disposition implies a certain, what, order, right? Once something is not said to be disposed by quality except in order to something. And if one adds bene velmali, right? Well or badly, right? It pertains to the notion of habit. It's necessary that one note in order to nature, which is the, what, end, huh? Whence according to figure, which is the, what, fourth species of quality, or according to hot or cold, right, huh? One is not said to be disposed well or badly except according to the, what, order to the nature of the thing, according as it is suitable or not suitable. Now notice the subtle thing he's going to say here. Whence those figures and those undergoing qualities, as Aristotle calls the sense qualities, according as they are considered as suitable or as not suitable as the nature of the thing, then they pertain to the first species, right? To habit or what? Dispositions, right? For figure, insofar as it fits the nature of the thing, and color pertain to beauty, huh? So beauty, where is the, this is the virtue of the body, right, huh? Okay? And health, which goes on to, is another virtue of the body, right, huh? Okay? And then he says, color, hot, heat, and cold, according as they belong or are suitable to the nature of the thing, they pertain to what? Health. So beauty and health will be put in the first species, right? Okay? Of disposition, right? Because they're easily lost, huh? Okay? And therefore, in that way, Aristotle puts hot and cold in the first species of quality, right? Insofar as you have a comparison to what? To nature, right, huh? Okay? Wentz has cleared the solution to the second one, although it's solved otherwise by some, as Simplicius says, huh? His commentary in the predicament song. So Thomas refers to Simplicius again, right? Kind of toning down a little bit is knocking him around too much, right? Simplicius is a pretty important one. Now, in the plight of the third one, he's going to bring out some other distinctions between the distinction of disposition and habit, right, huh? Apart from the fact that sometimes habit is called a disposition too, right? This difference, difficile mobile, huh? Does not diversify habit from the other species of quality, right? But from what? Disposition, right? Okay? But now you've got to be careful about the word disposition. Disposition, however, is taken in two ways. In one way, according as it is the genus of habit, right? For in the fifth book of wisdom, the fifth book after the book is the natural philosophy, disposition is laid down or placed in the definition of habit. In another way, it's taken according as it is something divided against habit, right? But now he gives another distinction about this dividing it against habit, right? Two ways, it's taken. And it is possible for disposition properly said to be understood is divided against habit in two ways. In one way, as the perfect and the imperfect in the same, what? Species. To which the disposition is said, retain the common name, when something imperfectly is in, right? So that it's still easily lost, right? So you just begin a new science, right? You don't have the habit. You have, in a very perfect way, something of the science, right? That might easily be lost, right? Like my average student, they're teaching in college, right? When he gets out of college, he's probably forgot what I said. In freshman, right? It's interesting, you know, in teaching college, you know, you have somebody in one class, and they may even get a very good grade, and then you want to use that thing that they learned in that other class, you know, and two or three years later, and it's not there anymore, right? So they didn't acquire the habitus, they acquired the, what? The disposition. They imperfectly had this, and they could lose it, right? So he says, this is one way you can divide it against habit, huh? As the perfect and the imperfect in the same species, right? That the disposition is called, but retains a common name, but it imperfectly is in something. So it could be easily, what? Lost, huh? Okay? Now that could be said, too, I suppose, about the moral virtues, right? Okay? You're trying to bring up your children, you know, to have this or that virtue, right? But maybe it's not too perfectly in them, right, huh? Okay? If it doesn't go too soon, maybe they're going to lose that, right, huh? Okay? They're disposed to be just, or disposed to be chaste, or disposed to be courageous, right? But a habit, when it is perfectly within something, is not easily, what? Lost, huh? And thus the disposition becomes a habit, as the boy becomes a man, huh? Okay? That's interesting, huh? Virtus. Forget the word from here, huh? In another way, they're able to be distinguished as diverse species of one, what? Subalternate genus, right? Those are called dispositions, qualities of the first species. to which it belongs, according to their proper definition, that they'd be something that can be easily lost, right? Because they have easily changeable causes, right? As sickness and what else? You can one day or, you know, suddenly get sick or something. Why, habits are those qualities which, according to their ratio, have that they cannot be easily changed, right? Because they have immobile causes, as sciences and what, virtues. And according to this, the disposition doesn't become habit. You see that? Two distinctions. And this seems to be, what, sound with the intention of Aristotle, right? Whence, for the proof of this distinction, he induces the common custom of saying, right? According as qualities which, according to their ratio, are easily movable. If from some, what, accident, right, they are rendered difficult to change, they are said to be, what, habits, right, huh? Okay? And a converse, so, about those qualities which, by their ratio, are difficult to be changed, huh? For if someone imperfectly has signs, that easily he might lose it, right, huh? He is more disposed to signs than to have signs, right? So I find that my knowledge of the French language is, what, passing away, right, huh? If I didn't be habit in a perfect way, right, huh? From this, it is clear that the name of habit signifies a certain, what? Indwelling, I mean, continuity. Persisting quality. Not, however, the name, what? Disposition, right? Now, some might say, well, but aren't these accidental differences? Well, Thomas says we often use accidents for the nature of the thing that's not too well known to us. Nor is it impeded that easily and difficultly to be changed are specific differences on account of the fact that these pertain to passion and motion and not to the genus of quality, right? For these differences, although paracidensa seem to have themselves to quality, they designate proper and paracid differences of qualities. Just as in the genus of substance, frequently we take, what, accidental differences in place of substantial ones, insofar as though they were designated essential principles, right? So I define the dog as a four-footed animal that barks and the cat is a four-footed animal that meows, right? Because I don't know the essential difference between the dog and the cat, right? But these are kind of what signs of their essential differences, huh? Now you've got a whole introduction toward the logic of the categories here, right? From this here. But Thomas is taking it up here as a preliminary to considering the virtues and the vices, right? And the habits, huh?