Prima Secundae
Lecture 128: Habit as Quality and the Category of Having

Transcript
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So let's look at the premium here at the beginning of question 49, right? Thomas says that a square number has the same symbolism as a number, which it is a square. So 49 is the square of what? Which is a symbol of wisdom, right? So he's beginning here now, question 49, right? So let's look at his premium, huh? It's very important to see this. And Sr. Dionne gave a course one time, what a premium is. A little course? Oh, yeah, wasn't it? It's a long course, but it's a very interesting little course. It's an importance to the premium, right? The longest part was a premium to the course. I noticed in the Second Vatican Council, right? My first copy of the documents of the Vatican Council was an English edition, right? And at the beginning of the day, it says introduction, right? When I got the Latin text, it said premium. You shouldn't confuse introduction with a premium, right? The isagogi means what? Introduction, right? Now, the isagogi has its own premium at the beginning. It's a marvelous premium, you know? Beautiful one for porphyry, right? But the premium shouldn't be confused with an introduction. When Thomas devised the texts of Aristotle, almost every one of them, it's into the, what, premium and the troctatus, right? The drawing out of it, right? With the premium, you know. It tells you what you're aiming at, right? That's an important thing. So, we can look at the premium here, huh? The King of Question 49, yeah. Post-actus et passionis, after the acts and passions, one should consider about the, what? Beginnings. Yeah, of human acts, right? And then, what's the first distinction he's going to make among these? And first, among the, about the intrinsic beginnings. Secondly, about the extrinsic beginnings, huh? Now, the intrinsic beginning is two-fold. The potency or the power, right? And the, what? Habits, right? Now, the powers he talked about back in the Prima Pars, right? He took up the soul, right? Okay. But because about the potencies or powers, one has spoken in the first part, it now remains here to consider about the, what? Habits, huh? Just like Aristotle distinguishes the powers, basically, in the Deaima, right? He talks about the habits in the, what? Nicomachean Ethics, yeah. And first, in general, right? Secondly, about the virtues and the vices and other habits of this sort, which are the principles of, what? Human acts, huh? Now, notice, huh? Is it question, what? 55, he begins to talk about the virtues and the vices, right? So, he's going to talk about the habits here for a number of questions, huh? As Paul VI said, right? This is the principle of all education, right? The general before the particular. I can't read Aristotle there in the beginning of the physics, right? Now, about the habits in general, four things should be, what? Considered, huh? Thomas, when he's explaining the premium in the Deaima there, he says, you know, part of the premium here is to give the order, right? The distinction, the order between us, right? So you can, what? Follow it, right, huh? So you can be teachable, right, huh? Krishna Zamanjaliyan says, there's two meanings that were teachable. One is teachable because of your will. The other is teachable inside the mind, right? This is teachable inside the mind, right? You see the order you're going to proceed in, right? This before that, and so on. But teachable in the will is more being willing to learn from another, right? Who knows things better, right? You've got to be willing to learn from Euclid, right? You see these things so much better about triangles and kinds of things, right? So first, that's in order, right? About the substance of the habits. Secondly, about their, what? Subjects. And that's in question, what? Fifty, if you have a footnote there. Third, about the cause of the generation, the growth, and the corruption of them, right? They'll start that in question, what? Fifty-one, right? Fifty-two, fifty-three, I guess. And then four, about what? Their distinction. Their distinction. Question fifty-four, right? It's not unlike St. Francis himself treated the love of God. He does. He seems to treat the love of God in that way, too. What is it? What's the subject? What's its generation, growth, and corruption? Interesting, the love of God, like the knowledge of God, is amphiboly, right? What? Amphiboly. So amphiboly is to speech what equivocation is to a word, right? So you could say that the knowledge of God, right, is a knowledge of God, right? You have two different senses. The knowledge of God can mean the knowledge which God has, right? Or a knowledge of God can mean a knowledge whereby God is known, right? Okay? So the knowledge of God is a knowledge, what? Of God. Because when you study God's knowledge, you find out that he knows all things by knowing himself, right? He knows primarily, first and most of all, himself, right? And in knowing himself perfectly, he knows all other things, right? So the knowledge which God has is a knowledge about God, right? So the knowledge of God in one sense is a knowledge of God in the other sense, right? The same thing could be said for the love of God, right? The love of God is a love of what? Primarily the love of God, right? So the love which God has, right, is a love of this object called God himself, right? So the love of God is a love of God, right? And Aristotle takes up wisdom there in the beginning of the metaphysics. And he says this knowledge, he says, is divine in both senses, right? He could have said wisdom is a, what, knowledge of God, right? In the sense that it's about God, right? Because it's about the first cause, he says. And it's a knowledge of God in the sense that God alone or God most of all would have such knowledge, right? So wisdom is a knowledge of God in both senses of the phrase or speech, right? Knowledge of God, right? Or like I say about Shakespeare's definition of reason, right? Shakespeare's definition of reason is a knowledge of reason in two senses. It's a knowledge which reason has about itself, right? So knowledge of reason can mean the knowledge which reason has or the knowledge which is about reason. By geometry, let's say, it's a knowledge of reason in one sense, right? But not in the other sense, right? Okay. So what is your definition again? Did you repeat, of amphiboli? Amphiboli is kind of a technical word from the Greek there, where you have more than one word or name, right? And the whole thing has more than one meaning, right? Okay. That's what I like about, you know, the... That's what I like about, you know, what I like about, what I like about, what I like about, what I like about, what I like about, what I like about, what I like about, what I like about, what I like about, what I like about, what I like about, what I like about, what I like about, what I like about, what I like about, what I like about, what I like about, what I like about, what I like about, what I like about, what I like about, what I like about, what I like about, what I like about, what I like about, what I like about, what I like about, what I like about, what I like about, what I like about, what I like about, what I like about, what I like about, what I like about, what I like about, what I like about, what I like about, what I like about, what I like about, what I like about, what I like about, what I like about, what Second Vatican Council, Verbum Dei, right? Word of God, right? You know, Word of God can mean the Bible, right? The Bible is the Word of God. But the Bible is chiefly about the Word of God made flesh, right? So the Word of God is about the Word of God, right? But the Word of God there has two meanings, right? In the one case, the Word of God means the Bible, right? But the Vatican Council teaches that the Bible is chiefly about the Word of God made flesh, right? In the other sense, right? So I kind of enjoy the union of those two, right? That arises from the two uses of a genitive, object, a genitive, and possessive genitive. So knowledge of God is a knowledge he has, he possesses it. But then knowledge of God as an object is the object. So that's built into a genitive, there's two ways to use it, either as an object or a possession. See, in the metaphysics, Aristotle is using the Word rather than the speech, right? So he's saying wisdom is what? Divine knowledge, right? And why do we call it divine? Because it's about the first cause, and the first cause is God, right? Therefore, it's about God. And then in the tradition of Greek philosophy, right? You know, the reason why Pythagoras, when they called him wise, they said, don't call me wise. Why not? Well, God alone is wise, right? Well, what shall we call you then? Call me a lover of wisdom, you know? So there's a humility there, right? In the origin of the word philosopher, and not just the idea of lover of wisdom, right? But the humility that man is not really wise in comparison to God, right? Okay? So when Aristotle says that wisdom is divine, he says it's in both senses divine, right? It's about God. And it's the kind of knowledge that either God alone would have, or only God would have, fully or perfectly, right? That's beautifully said, right, huh? But I could turn it into amphiboli and say, wisdom is the knowledge of God, right? In both senses, right? It's the knowledge that God has alone, or most of all. And it's the knowledge which is about God, right? Because it's about the first cause, huh? So, so about the first, four things are asked. First, where there habit is a, what? Quality, right? Well, in the book called The Categories, right, Aristotle has quality, and he divides it into four, what? Species, right? And we'll meet this division here, huh? And so Thomas is asking, first of all, whether habit is in that genus, right? It's quality. Just like you might say a number, you know. Is number a quantity, right, huh? The answer would be yes. Second, whether it is a determined species, right? A determined species of quality, right? So that'll take you back in those articles to what? The categories, right, of Aristotle. So Aristotle was a teacher of Thomas, huh? But by the, what? Written word, right? So we have teachers by written word, and teachers by the, what? Spoken word, right? St. Augustine is a teacher of Thomas, too. But by the, what? Written word, right, huh? Third, whether habit implies an order to, what? To enact, right? Well, does it have, what? Is it a source of habit in some way, right? And does it perfect act in some way, right? And you see, habit is going to have an order to act in a different way than the powers that he mentioned, right? So the habit is going to perfect the power, right, with respect to that, what? Act, right? So when I acquire the habit, I can do the act, what? Well and easily and perfectly and so on, right? Of course, an assistive habit touches upon something that's very important for a human being, right? And when Thomas takes up, you know, what grace is, right? Grace is in the way of habit. Special kind of habit, unusual kind of habit, right? But it's something that fits human nature, not respect, and we need that. What creatures have had? Yeah. Especially us. Yeah. That's critical. Absolutely. To the first, therefore, one who says thus, it seems that habit is not a quality, huh? My goodness, Thomas. You should make up his mind. And he quotes this guy, Augustine, right? He's quite a man. For Augustine says in the book of the 83 questions, that this name habit is said from this verb, which is to have. But to have not only pertains to quality, but to, what? Other genera. For we are said to have quantity, right? Even to have money, right? And others of this sort. Therefore, habit is not a, what? Quality, right? Now, what's the last chapter of the category is about? Do you remember? To have. To have, yeah. Is if Aristotle was aware of the fact that to have is a word that's equivocal by what? Reason, right, huh? And he distinguishes it among his senses, right? And he says, it's kind of a marvelous thing, you know? And, of course, nobody is fully explaining what they call the post-pregnance, right? Aristotle takes up opposites first, right? And then he takes up before and after, right? Chapter 12. Then he takes up together, right? Which is either before or after. Then he takes up, what? Alvotion. It fits into the categories. And then he has to have, right? So, what's interesting is because, you see, the substance is said to have accidents, right? Okay? That's one place where the word to have comes in, right? And then each of the categories, you've got a gena, ten genera, and each genus is said to have species. And then a species is said to have a genus. Confusion compounded. Okay? That reminds me, you know, when Aristotle is distinguishing the senses of in, in the fourth book of the physics, and he says that in the third sense of in, the genus is in the species, right? In the fourth sense, the species is in the genus. But they're obviously different senses, right? Okay? So, the genus is said to have species in the plural, right? And the species in the singular is said to have a, what? A genus, right? So, there you've got now, what? Substance has accidents, right? Genus has species. Species has a genus. You've got these three senses there, right? Then there's a category called echin. To have. To have, right? That's another sense, right? And then you have, in quality here, something called habit, right? Which seems to involve, you know? That's a fifth sense, right? And then a thing is said to have a name, right? That's another sense. And a name is said to have meanings, or to have a meaning, or to have meanings in some case, right? How many senses of to have is there there? You got all these? I'd be excused if my brain is cold. It's a horse-eyed person about this. I didn't hear it, though. So, it's interesting, I should have a chapter on to have, right? How many times does that use, and how many different ways does it use in there, right? No wonder so few people study this. Yeah. I'm not studying the word substance there in the categories, you know, and I found out about four senses of the word substance, right? And I found a text of Thomas Friedrich's image, there's all four of them, right? What a mind he had, you know? When he's showing, you know, that there's no member of the Trinity that's before or after another member of the Trinity, the Father is not before the Trinity. And the Son is not before the Holy Spirit, even though the Son is from the Father, and the Holy Spirit is from the Father and the Son. But Thomas will, you know, enumerate the senses of before in the 12th chapter, the categories, right? Is that important, right? Of course, have is very important, right? He says, you know, what's unusual about God is everything he has, he is. But what we have, we're not, right? I have some knowledge of geometry, but that's not what I am, you know? I have some health, but that's not what I am, you know? But what God has, he is, you know? Unusual sense of having, right, huh? That's kind of, you know, our way of speaking, right, huh? You say God has wisdom, right, huh? He is wisdom. He has life, but he said, I am the way, the truth, and the life, right, huh? I would not be so presumptuous to say, I am truth. So, God is very interesting, right? So, that's really quite a word, this word to have, right, huh? In natural philosophy, matter is said to have a, what? Oh, a form, yeah. And the word to have is always connected with the word. Yeah, yeah, Aristotle points that out in the physics, I think, of the word to have, there in the fifth book again, right? So, we have you now, right? I have you, right? You're in my power. I have you. You know? So, you can kind of, yeah. So, it's an extremely difficult word, this, to have, huh? Modern philosophers are too proud to stop and figure out what the words they're using mean. Strange, yeah? It's just, you don't want to be among the haves. Yeah. The has and the have-nots. Right. It's interesting, Lieutenant, you speak of the haves and the have-nots with respect to something exterior to you, right? Do I have more of my knowledge or my money? I have a car out there. Do I have that? Do I have? It's not in you. Yeah. It's not in you. But, you know, if you ask me, what do you have? You'd probably say, well, I've got some. It's a cash. You talk about things that are outside of him that he has, right? Rather than what's inside of him, right? Mm-hmm. You know? But you really have those things as much as you have, let's say, didn't you? I have a soul. Yeah. Yeah. I have a soul. You have a soul? Yeah. If somebody has knowledge, which is internal, and they have a car, which is external, but if they're sort of enslaved to their possessions, in a way, if they love their car more than everything in the whole universe, would that, that would be sort of a, so much having the car as the car having them. Yeah. Yeah. The difference between having possessions and being possessed. Right. Yeah. It's kind of a thing. You'd go on to, you know. What's the say about the cat, right? The cat has you, right? The cat kind of determines where you're going to live, you know? When you get up, when you go to bed, when you... Open the door, close the door. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. It's kind of interesting, we tend to use the word have and have nots, thinking of the exterior things, though, right? See if they're kind of more manifest to us in the use of the word, huh? He has it all. Yeah. It's really God who has it all, right? The problem with quality. He is all. He says to Moses, I'll show you every good, right? Right, Thomas says, that is myself. Moreover, habitus is laid down as one of the, what, predicamentum. And predicamentum is a Latin word they use for the categories, right? I mentioned how the word category comes from the, what, the law courts, right? And so, you know, the Gospels, you know, when they're accusing Christ of something, the word category comes up, right? Okay. So, I think the way the word was borrowed was that when you categorize somebody in the court, you accuse them of something, right? You are a thief. You are a murderer. You are an adulterer. Whatever it is. I'm, you know, I've got to say something of you. And so then he borrowed that, right? So, my friend Warren Murray says, he calls it ten categories, the ten supreme accusations, right? I think it's a good way of emphasizing the origin from the verdict of that word, you know. So, Habitus is laid, so they call it in Latin, though, they were the word from, to be said of, right? Predicare, right? Predicamentum, right? And they call the, the, uh, the, uh, Brook of Aesagoga, right? They call that the Predicabilia, right? Okay. So if you look at Albert's treatise on these, you know, uh, the De Predicabilibus, right? Which is about genus, species, difference, property, and accident, and then the, the Predicamentis, right, uh, I don't know where it is, and that's about the categories, right, huh? So, he says Unum Predicamentum, somebody might say, one of the categories, right, huh? Okay. It's one of the last six. But one predicament is not contained under another, right, huh? And therefore Habitus is not a, what, quality, right, huh? So, um, moreover, every Habitus is a disposition, as is said in the Predicamentis, uh, and that's capitalized, like, in the Seraphita's book, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? But in English, we call it the categories, taking over the Greek word, right? But disposition is the order of something having parts, as is said in the fifth book of Metaphysics. Well, that's, of course, one meaning of the word, but, okay. But this pertains to the predicament of, what, a situs on position, okay? I'm sitting now, right, and it's order of parts in place, right? Therefore Habitus is not a quality, right, huh? So, words are dangerous things, wouldn't you say? In the book, Consistency Orpitation, Aristotle considers 13 ways of being deceived, yeah. And the first six are all from what? Words. From words. But there are some things worth risking, some risks worth taking, yeah. Against all this is what the philosopher says, right, in the Predicamentis, in the categories. But Habitus is a qualitas de ficere, and not easily, right, changed, right, huh, okay? So you're going to find when Aristotle talks about habit and disposition, right, he'll sometimes say that habit is a disposition, as he does in his quote, other times he'll divide habit against, what, disposition, right, huh? And this is a way in which a word becomes equivocal by reason, right? Sometimes a word is said of two things, right, and it's kept by one of those two things later on as its own, and a new name is given to the other one. So disposition can be divided into a disposition that is easily lost, like, for example, mood, right, you know, and then a disposition that is difficult to remove or not easily lost, right? And because that disposition adds something noteworthy to this idea of some stability or permanence, it gets a new name, right, sometimes, habit, right, and these other ones that are easily movable keep the name at disposition, right, okay? And you've got to find that way of naming things over and over again, right, and the sooner you get used to it, the better, right? Because otherwise you're just going to be, you know, lost, right? Yeah, it gets lost. You know, they're always talking, we used to always joke about that, you know, the priests used to saying, you know, you've got to treat the girl as a person, not as a thing, you know, but if she's not a thing, then she's nothing, right? She's even worse, right? But obviously the word thing there is being kept for something, right, that a person is, right, in the broad sense, the word thing, right, and then the person gets a new name because it's a very, what, adds something noteworthy, right, okay? And you find this over and over again, right? In the sixth book of the Nicomagian Ethics, when Aristotle takes up the virtues of reason, he distinguishes between episteme, right, and sophia. In Latin, between scientia and sapientia, right? Okay, this reasoned out knowledge and wisdom, right? But then he takes up wisdom in the metaphysics, he calls it a, what, episteme, right? Well, episteme is a reasoned out knowledge of things by their causes and so on, right? And wisdom is one of those, right? But wisdom is something very special, right? Because it's not about just any causes, but the very first causes of all, right? So sometimes the other ones keep the name, scientia or episteme, and sapientia or wisdom gets a new name, namely what? Wisdom, right? You see that a little bit in English, you know? If we were to distinguish between knowledge and wisdom, right? Well, wisdom is a kind of knowledge, and there would be another sense of knowledge, right? But you might say that we keep knowledge for the lesser kinds of knowledge, and wisdom, which is a knowledge of divine things, right? It has its excellence, right? So it gets a new, what? Name, right? Now, you'll find that distinction over and over again, huh? You know? You've got to find that, right? Now, sometimes the one that gets a new name is the one that adds something, what? Noteworthy, like wisdom, huh? But sometimes it's because one of the two has only imperfectly what is meant by the common name. And then, in that case, the what? One that has fully keeps the name, and the other... Gets a name. Yeah, yeah. So we say, if you divide human beings into man and woman, right? That's the, I hope, exhausted division. Leaves to the privilege. Yeah, yeah. But then you might divide man into man and boy, right? Because man has fully what defines a man, right? And the boy has imperfectly. So he gets the new name because he has imperfectly, right? And woman is divided into woman sometimes and girl. And the woman has fully what is meant by woman, right, huh? But the girl is on the way there, right, huh? You see how it goes? Definitely on the way. So they get the new name, girl, right, huh? So you've got to find it over and over again, right? Sometimes, you know, we divide man against the animals, don't we? And sometimes we say man is an animal. So when we divide man against the animals, animals have kept the animal, but man, this animal, has been given a what? Yeah. So would you call man an ape? Well, you know, homo sapiens, a wise ape, you know? So you've got to find, those are two ways it takes place, right? But you find this over and over again, so sometimes they call this power of understanding, they call it what? Understanding, right, huh? Or intellect is in Latin, right? But then sometimes they keep for the angels or for God the word what? Understanding. And they give us a new name because we have a defective understanding. They call it in Latin, they're Isaac, they call it the intellectus abum gratus, the overshadowed understanding, right? Overshadowed images and all these other things. So we make a new name called what? Reason, right? Okay. That's why Shakespeare defines, you know, reason is reason as looking before and after rather than seeing the before and after, right? Because we have a hard time seeing that, right, huh? And so you might say reason is the ability to look for distinctions. Well, it's the ability to see distinctions too, but we have a hard time seeing distinctions, right, huh? And our mind breaks down, you know, with the word to have, even. You know, we have a hard time distinguishing the senses of the word to have, right, huh? Our mind breaks down. And so we get a new name, right, because the common meaning of understanding, the ability to understand, is having a very perfect, what, way, right? Okay? So you're going to find it over and over again, huh? So I just mention here, because it comes up here at the Omnis Habitus as Dispositio, right, huh? Of course, disposition has got other meanings too, even in the categories, right? You find this rule, I can't, huh? I answer it should be said that this name, Habitus, huh, is taken from having, right? From which the name of Habitus is derived in, what, two ways, huh? In one way, according as man or any other thing, is said to have something, right, huh? In another way, according as something in some way has itself in itself or towards another, right? That's a hard thing to say, huh? Kind of strange to have yourself, right, huh? Now, about the first, however, it should be considered that to have, according as it is said with respect to anything that is had, is common to, what, diverse genre, right, huh? Then, whence the philosopher, huh, among the post-Predicamenta, right? So when they divide up the Tweetis of Aristotle called the, what, categories, right, or in Latin the Predicamenta, right, they divide it into three parts, right? The ante Predicamenta, before Aristotle distinguishes the ten and takes them up, and then the, what, Predicamenta themselves, and then the things that are taken up after the Predicamenta, which are the opposites, before, you know, together, motion, right? And then to have, right, huh, okay? Whence the philosopher, among the post-Predicamenta, lays down Haberi, to have, right, huh? Which follow upon the diverse, what, genre of things, right? Just as opposita, right, huh? So that's where he takes up the distinction of the four kinds of opposites, contradictories, contraries, right? Right, having and, what, lack, right? And then relations, right? And then before and after, which he gives the Latin words here, of course, Prius and Posterius, right? At alia huyus modi, right, huh? So motion or change is found in, what, substance in some way, in quantity and growth, right? Quality, change of quality. It's found in ubi or where, right, huh? So our style, though, you can't put in just one category, right? But among those things which are had, such seems to be a distinction, right, huh? Thomas, again, is seeing a distinction, right, huh? That there are some in which there is nothing in the middle, right? Between the having, the one having, and that which is had. Just as between the subject and the quality or quantity, there is no middle, right, huh? But there are some in which there is something in the middle between both, but only a, what? Relation. As one is said to have a companion or a, what, friend, huh? There are some, however, among which there is some middle, not an action or a passion, but something in the manner of an action or a passion, insofar as one is, what, adorning, huh? Or covering, right? Another is adorned or covered, right, huh? Quince, a philosopher, says in the fifth book of Metaphysics that Habitus has said, as to were, a suit and action of the haver and the have. That's the way they explain that category of the have, right, huh? Just as in those things which we have about ours. And therefore, in these, there are constituted one special genus of things. which is called a predicamentum. It's a highest genus. It's a supreme accusation, right? And that's called echin in the Greek, right? About which the philosopher in the fifth book of metaphysics says that between the man having the gown, the clothing, and the clothing of self, which is had, there is a habit in the middle, right? That's the way of speaking, right? Okay, if however one takes to have insofar as a thing is said in some way to have itself in itself or towards another, then in this way of having, according to some, what, quality, right? In this way, habit is a, what, quality. So in some way you have yourself, what, to yourself or to another, right? About which the philosopher in the fifth book of metaphysics says that habit is a disposition according to which one is disposed, right? Either well or what? Badly, right, huh? Either according to oneself or to another, as health is a certain, what, habit, huh? A habit of the body. And thus we speak now about habit, once it should be said that habit is a, what, quality, right? If you look at the five objections, or is it terrible, okay? Because we're going to do this first article again next week, you know, but we'll just look at it here this time. To the first objection then, right? Taken there from Augustine, right? That objection proceeds from to have taken commonly, right? And thus it is common to many generations, not tied to one, right? To the second it should be said that that argument proceeds from habit according as is understood as something in the middle between the one having and that which is had, and that gives rise to that one predicament that's called to have, right? For thus it is a certain predicamentum, or categorism, let's say in English today. Now, to the third about disposition, this text from the metaphysics. To the third it should be said that disposition always implies the order of something having parts, right? But this happens in three ways, as the philosopher there immediately adds, right? Either according to place, or according to power, or according to species, in which, as Simplicia says in his commentary on the categories of Aristotle, he comprehends all dispositions, right? Bodly ones, in that he says, according to place. And this pertains to the predicament of, we usually translate it as position, right? Okay? Which is the order of parts in place, right? So when Aristotle is distinguished, or Thomas is distinguishing the categories, there's one called where, right? And one called when. And then in where, and there, I mean there's another one, where is tied up with place, right? When with time. But then there's another one called position, which is taken up with place too. And that is because there's a distinction for us, right? Between being in this room, and I'm in this room now, what? Sitting. When you say I'm in this room, you don't indicate that I'm sitting, or I'm laying down, or I'm standing, or something, right? See? Because to be in this room doesn't say anything about the order in which my parts are in, right? So when I'm standing, my parts are arranged in this order. I'm sitting down, and I'm like this. If I'm laying down, I'd be in another position, right? But there's no category corresponding to time that's analogous to what? Position. And that goes back to the definition of what? Time, right? That implied in the idea of time is already order, before and after. In fact, it's first sense of before and after. You see? So there's no two categories there tied up with time, just one. But there's two tied up with place, right? Where? And then the order of parts and place. Position, right? Okay? So, so we call it our position, right? Your position, right? But you can call it disposition too, right? And it's another category. It's crazy stuff, right? Okay. Those are said according to potency, right? Includes those dispositions, which are in preparation, and a suitability not yet perfectly, just as knowledge and virtue in coacta, right? And that which is said, secundum spatium, includes perfect dispositions, which are called habitus, as what? Science and... Virtue complete. Yeah. We'll come back to this first article next time again, right? But you get to the second article, it'll talk about, what, the whole category of, what, quality, right? And how it's divided up. And that falls upon seeing, though, that habit in some ways is a quality, right? Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you.