Prima Secundae
Lecture 126: The Causes and Effects of Anger

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Okay, Article 2. To the second one proceeds thus, it seems that not only Harvey Pencil, thinking little of, right, or despising is the motive of what? Anger, right? For Damascene says that undergoing an injury or estimating, they become angry, right? But a man can undergo injury even without, what, despising or, yeah. Therefore, not only is thinking small the motive of what? Anger, right? I was thinking that little boy, you know, came over to my friend's house there, right, and the plant was there, right, and he saw a guy, he saw the plant, and I just knocked him like that, and smashed it, you know, so he took one out. But you see, he broke the plant, right, huh? But there seemed to be a sin in what? Despising of him, right? What are you going to do, you know, huh? Yeah, yeah. A little kid like that, boy. It's of the same one to desire honor and to be, what? Saddened about people thinking little of you, right? But the brood animals do not desire honor, right? Therefore, they are not saddened by someone thinking little of them. But nevertheless, in them, anger is provoked on account of this that they are, what? Injured, yeah. As the philosopher says in the third book of the Ethics, right, huh? Isn't that the bull in Spain there? It gets angry, right, huh? You're trying to do a little kid that is anger by sticking with pins or something, I don't know. Okay. Moreover, the philosopher in the second book of the Ethics lays down many other causes of anger, right? As what? Forgetfulness, right? And this guy in high school, you know, and he'd introduce his friends to some girl, you know, he'd always say, and, and, and, pretending you remember their name, you know, like, it's kind of a joke, you know. He'd go, you'd go to, you'd go to the dances and he'd bring a little, you know, tin ring, you know, and take the girls up on the roof and propose to them. It was all a joke, you know, but, one thing, but. So, oblivion, forgetfulness, exultation in, what? Unfortunate things, right, huh? Denunciation of bad things, the impediment of, what? Foul to one's own, what? Will and so on. Well, therefore, not only little thinking of somebody, or thinking of them is provoking of anger, huh? But, against this is what the philosopher says in the second book of the Rhetoric, that anger is the desire with the sadness of, what? Punishment. An account of an apparent parvapensionum, right? Little thing, huh? Not suitably, what? Made, huh? The philosopher's really thought a lot about anger, hasn't he, huh? Maybe we should begin the study of Aristotle at the second book of Rhetoric, and he'll say, oh yeah, he's talking about things I understand, things that I experience every day, but they call them emotions. You know why they are, right? Now, what does the great Thomas say about this? I answer, Chinty said, and that all causes of anger are led back to, what? Thinking little. Thinking little, somebody, huh? For there are three species of, what? Thinking little. As is said in the second book of the Rhetoric, right? To wit, despising somebody, right? Blocking their will, right? Parasmus. That's probably from the Greek word, huh? That's how Thomas explains it, right? Impeding the fulfillment of their will, right? Oh, great. And contumulatio, huh? That's kind of like insulting, I guess, huh? Okay. And to these three, all things that move anger are reduced, right? Now, the reason for this can be taken twofold, right? First is that anger desires the, what? Harming of another, right? Insofar as it has the aspect of something just that is vindictive, right? And therefore, to that extent, he seeks, what? Insofar as he regards it to be just, huh? But that is a just revenge that has come about except an account of something unjustly, what? Done, right? And therefore, what is provocative to anger or produces anger is always something under the notion of something, what? Unjust, huh? I didn't deserve that. Once the philosopher says in the second book of the rhetoric, yeah, that if men think that those who, what? Injured? Who are injured? Something justly. Yeah. They do not, what? Get angry, right, huh? For one, for anger does not come about to, what is, what? Just. Just, huh? Okay. The interesting scene there in what Shakespeare's Judas Caesar there. For Cassius and Brutus get into kind of a conflict there. It's one of the most famous scenes in Shakespeare. And Brutus seems to be taking probably pensio, right, huh? For Cassius. Now, in three ways, harm can be inferred to someone. To wit, from ignorance, right? From passion, and from what? Choice. Choice, huh? So I can harm you out of ignorance, not knowing that I guess, right? I can harm you out of passion, I get angry with you. And angry would be the cause of anger. And choice, right, huh? Then someone, most of all, does something unjust, win from choice, or what? Effort. What? Effort, maybe, or industry. Yeah. Right. Or from certain evil, malice, right, huh? Infer is, yeah. Okay? And this is, what? Iago, right, huh? And choice, right, huh? And some of the funny videos I used at the end, they could tear apart. Iago, right, huh? Okay. And therefore, we most of all become angry against those we think that they, what? They labor, you might say, right? Yeah. To harm us, right, huh? Okay. For if we think that some, either through ignorance, right? Oh, I didn't mean to. Oh, that was your thing? Or from what? Passion to have inferred you to us, huh? Either we do not become angry against them, or much less, right, huh? Okay? You know, it's interesting, sometimes people put up with people who got a little bit of temper, you know, right? Because they used to, and they're, you know, you know, flowing up and going, like, I'm cold, you know? We already take it as, you know, they can't help it, right, huh? And Cassius is complaining to Brutus about that, right? That Cassius got kind of this temper that fires up. I think he inherited from his mother or something, or his father, and his mother, I guess, and he should take that into account, right? He's angry with it, you know. You do not become angry against them, or much, what? Less, right, huh? For to do something from ignorance or from passion diminishes the notion of, what? Injury, right, huh? And is, to some extent, huh, provoking of, what, mercy and, what, forgiveness, right, huh? For to do something from, what, mercy and, what, mercy and, what, mercy and, what, mercy and, what, mercy and, what, mercy and, what, mercy and, what, mercy and, what, mercy and, what, mercy and, what, mercy and, what, mercy and, what, mercy and, what, mercy and, what, mercy and, what, mercy and, what, mercy and, what, mercy and, what, mercy and, what, mercy and, what, mercy and, what, mercy and, what, mercy and, what, mercy and, what, mercy and, what, mercy and, what, mercy and, what, mercy and, what, mercy and, what, mercy and, what, mercy and, what, mercy and, what, mercy and, what, mercy and, what, mercy and, what, mercy and, what, mercy and, what, mercy and, what, mercy and, what, mercy and, what, mercy and, what, mercy and, what, mercy and, venial sin those who from industry or from study you might say infer harm seem to sin from contempt and therefore against them maxime most of all we become angry whence the philosopher says in the second book of the rhetoric that those who on account of anger do something right? Either we do not become angry with them or we are less angry with them for you not seem to have acted on account of thinking little of us the second reason is because part of pensio, thinking little is opposed to the excellence of what? for those men that we think in no way to be worthy right? we think little of them right? as is said in the second book of the rhetoric now from all of our goods we seek some what? excellence right? and therefore whatever harm is inflicted upon us insofar as it what? goes against our excellence seems to pertain to what? yeah to apply to the first objection there you can be injured by someone without you can be despised right? the first therefore it should be said that from whatever other cause someone suffers injury than from contempt that cause diminishes the notion of what? injury right? but contempt alone or thinking little of increases the notion of what? anger and therefore it is a per se cause of becoming angry right? it is interesting that Thomas the most reasonable man and the greatest thinker perhaps in the church right? you know he has a marvelous understanding of the emotions right? he wouldn't think that he would you know you see Thomas must have been a calm man to have thought all these things out you know and all these other parts of philosophy right? theology right? and yet that he should you know emotion so well right? modern psychology taking into account these very profound observations about human nature that he develops using Aristotle and other I doubt if they if they if they anybody go back and read them you know yeah probably they despise them it's I think maybe for any psychologist that knows what he's talking about you can't you can't you can't avoid this if you want if you're serious about the business you can't meaning the business of caring for souls at all in the capacity you can't you can't go to this I think who was I forget who the psychologist or psychiatrist whichever it was who said it may have been my mind the name Paul Vitt sticks out in my head but I I don't know if he's the one who said it but if you want to understand psychology you have to read St. Thomas I think Father Owen Bennett told us that years ago but I forget if it was or whatever he said they are Catholic and I suppose he's supposed to be good when he does and how can you ignore this you can't ignore this because we have to judge to be abnormal for what's normal he's in crisis what's normal and St. Thomas tells us about everything else in terms of Senator Moyni had a famous article refining budiency down back in the 90s I think it was in the 80s where you're saying that different civilizations or cultures might have a certain threshold of tolerance for behavior everything under the threshold is criminal unacceptable everything above the threshold is okay but we're looking at a phenomenon in our own society where we're redefining what inappropriate behavior is we're defining down what deviancy is so we're accepting a lot more inappropriate stuff that we didn't put up with before and yeah that probably goes with jettison in the talks in terms of you suggested i know i know and i hope you're not angry don't help no i just understand in that case i'm angry to the second it should be said that although the brute animal does not desire honor under the notion of honor he nevertheless naturally desires a certain what excellence right and he becomes angry against those who dare you remember that when the dog comes after you step on his turf his turf one of our cats she has her territory outside and the other one is a more ordinary kind of building but last year the other one ventured down there and kind of plopped down the middle of this courtyard where the other one right away she came right over because she was really mad she said my turf chafed her out and the other one submitted right away she wrote the up up up up the two cats at the house there and one was the daughter the other one but it was kind of a nice place I know where the cat had to go and rest so the little cat had gone there first and was laying there down and then the mother cat was down and she was going to she's the other cat there he goes pah you know this guy got to see her hate almost you know what are you doing in my soft spot cats do that to the dog sometimes he has little bed on the porch and sometimes cats ordinarily never go there but once in a while just plop right down the middle of it like we can claim this spot that's my interpretation the way watching Derving describes you know the animals of scottish novelist there so out to scott right you know and the cat kind of ruled the thing you know their paw and bodies the dogs that come by so really expecting her honor you know interesting to see this animals you know cats which aren't such social creatures compared to dogs which are pack animals by instinct so more similar to humans and so their whole notion of superiority and interaction is different as well although there are certain similarities too you've heard what Churchill said about the dog and the cat and the pig he says the dog fawns upon you like a slave you know and the cat you know looks down upon you you know and the pig looks you in the eye and treats you like an equal let's get all those animals around the house there so but you know they say the cat determines you know what how your schedule shall be you know you know it's got to adjust to his schedule or his schedule and he says all those ones that Aristotle gives in the rhetoric there right oblivion right exaltation and fortune and so on all those causes are reduced to a certain what thinking little right for forgetfulness is a what evidence sign of thinking little right why not I'm forgetting everybody's names now so back in his old age nothing different cause yeah for those that we estimate great we more what fix their memory right likewise from a certain what thinking little it is that someone does not fear to sadden someone right by denouncing to him some what sad things right and those who in the misfortunes of others show some signs of hilarity right seem to care a little about the good or evil of another right it's got a funny even among friends sometimes something ridiculous about what happens and their kind of noises your first reaction is to kind of you know you can help yourself sometimes yeah likewise someone who impede someone from the what the king of his what he proposes not on account of any utility arriving to them right does not seem to pertain much to his what friendship right doesn't seem to care about his friendship right and therefore all such things insofar as there are signs of contempt are provocative of what anger right so we get Time for the other article or not? Okay. To the third, then, one goes forward thus. It seems that the existence of someone is not a cause that he is more easily, what? Angry. For the philosopher says in the second book of the rhetoric that most of all, some are, what? Grow angry when they are saddened, right, huh? As the infirm and the needy and those who do not have that which they, what, desire, right, huh? But all of these pertain to, what? Defect. Defect, right? And therefore, more defect makes us prone to anger than, what, excellence, right, huh? So you go in the restaurant there to have dinner there and there's no wine list, huh? But Mark, of course, is a little bit chocked, a little bit, you know, angry about this. They said, well, we're a family restaurant. And I really thought of, you know, those excused matters. He doesn't use your master, doesn't he? He doesn't use your master. He doesn't use your master. He doesn't use your master. That's a defect now, right? Yeah. That doesn't mean you. Yeah. Yeah. Moreover, the philosopher says there, that then some are most of all angry when in them is despised that about which there can be, what, some suspicion, either that it is not in them or that it is in them, what, weakly, right, huh? But when they, what, themselves to be much excelled in those things which they despise, they do not, what, care. They don't care. But the fourth said suspicion arises from, what, defect, huh? Therefore, defect is more of the cause that someone is, what, than excellence, huh? What's the analogy of the word suspicious there? See it in mind? Mm-hmm. I'm going to guess, looking under something? I don't know. Yeah. I was seeing that in the Greek theory, the hypolombane, hypolipsis in Greek, you know? It can be translated sometimes as suspicion, right? Hypolipsis, it's a taking up, you know, huh? And it says, look up to or admire speech of. Yeah, yeah. Up to. But it's something like, like hypolombane in Greek, right, to take up, right? But it has a sense there, you know, I was talking in the sixth book, that opinion, and doxa, you know, and hypolipsis, right? Because they're sometimes correct and sometimes wrong, they can't be virtuous, right? But one pertains to dialectic, right, and the other to rhetoric, right? Suspicion and opinion. But I was wondering whether the etymology of suspicious is a little bit like that. Look up to, right? Mm-hmm. Yeah. You pull them out, take up from. Oh-ho. But they're not exactly the same. And moreover, those things which pertain to excellence, most of all, make men joyful and to be of good hope, right, huh? But the philosopher says in the second book of the rhetoric, that in play, in laughter, in festival, in prosperity, in the conservation of works, in pleasure that is not base, and in good hope, men are not what? Yeah. Therefore, excellence is not the cause of anger, right, huh? But again, this is what the philosopher in the same book says, that men are indignant on account of excellence, right, huh? So, my answer should be said that the cause of anger in the one who becomes anger can be taken in what? Two ways. Two ways, huh? In one way, according as its relation to what moves one to what anger. And thus, excellence is a cause that someone be easily, what? Angered. Angered, right, huh? For that is a motive of anger that is an unjust, what? Thinking little, right, huh? But it stands that one, the more he is, what? Excellent, right? More unjustly. The more unjustly he is, what? Yeah. In this, in which he, in fact, excels, right, huh? And therefore, those who are in some excellence are most of all angered if they are thought what? Little of, right, huh? If the rich are thought little of in their money, right, huh? And the rhetorician in his speaking, right? And sick, the alis, right, huh? I guess someone is teaching rhetoric, right? Another way, one can consider the cause of anger in the one who becomes angry, on the part of the disposition which is left in him from such a, what? Motive, huh? Not as manifest, and nothing moves to anger except the, what? The sadness. The sadness. And therefore, those things which pertain to defect are most of all, what? Saddening, huh? Because men undergoing, what? Are being subject to, what? Defects. Are more easily injured, right, huh? And this is the reason where, for men who are infirm or in other defects, are more easily, what? Anger, right, huh? Hmm. Because they are more easily, what? Saddened. Saddened, huh? And this is clearly the response to the first one, right, huh? Where I was talking about that, right? Yeah. He said, kick a man when he's down. Weak and something. Yeah, but he said, kick a man when he's down, it's easier, huh? Yeah. That's what a comedian said. When people are sick or something, they might be, what? Short-tempered, too, right? Yeah. Okay? But then there's coming from a defect in that. It's time, right? That's what St. Alphonsus advised the priest, pretending to die. He says, don't do anything to annoy them. Don't, you know, don't, I told you the story, somebody going on and on and on with these loud prayers and hymns and listening to somebody's dying. They're like, leave them alone. They're annoying to die. They're struggling with everything. And they thought, say, they want provocation to be so cheerful. To the second, it should be said, the one who's despised in that in which manifestly he excels much, right? Does not regard himself to have suffered some, what? So he boasts against them. Yeah. And therefore he's not saddened. And from this side he is less, what? Angered. Angered, huh? Angered. But from another side, insofar as he is, what? More loving. Yeah. He has more reason to be angry, right? Unless perhaps he regards himself as not to be, what? Envied. Envied. Or to be, what? Murmuring against? Yeah. An account of respect. An account of ignorance or something of this sort, huh? Now, all those things that Aristotle mentions there, where people don't get angry, they impede anger insofar as they impede, what? Sadness. Sadness, huh? But from another side, they're apt to provoke anger according as they make man to be unsuitably despised. So when the Pope comes to a country there and you get one of these crazy nuns, you know, coming out, the size of a crazy priest, you know? And they're kind of violent and they're protesting their ideas, right, huh? You know? I think they can agree, right, huh? Because they kind of treat him as of little concern, right, huh? Confused that situation. Was it Miami or whatever? Sister, whatever her name is, Sister. Sister Mary Anthrax came up and gave her a speech about whatever, what was the ordination of it. So he said, it's a long, long way, temporary. You can't confuse it with a joke, you know? Can't take that seriously. Probably made her really angry. Then he just despised her. Broke her. Couldn't take her seriously. You got to stop now here, or what? This isn't too long, maybe we can finish this one. Okay. To the fourth one proceeds thus, it seems that the defect of someone is not a cause that against him we are more easily what? Angry. Yeah. For the philosopher says in the second book of rhetoric that to those who confess and are penitent and are humble, we do not become angry, right? But we're more mild towards them, right? Whence the dogs do not bite those who sit down or something, I guess. But this pertains to smallness and defect, right? Therefore, the smallness of someone is a cause that we become less what? Yeah. Moreover, no greater defect is there than that of death, right? But anger what? Seizes, right? Towards the dead, right? Therefore, the defect of someone is not a cause that is provoking of anger against him, right? Moreover, no one regards someone as small from this that he is, what? His friend, right? But to friends, if they offend us or if they do not hate us, we are more, what? Offending. That's the thing there with Cassius and Brutus. You read that scene there. It's quite a scene. Whence it is said in Psalm 54, huh? If my enemy had, what? Cursed me. Cursed me. I could have sustained it, right? You, my friend. Yeah. That true brute. Therefore, the defect of someone is not a cause. Against him, we more easily come angry, right? But against this is what the philosopher says in the second book of the rhetoric, that the wealthy become angry against the, what? Poor. And if he despises him, right? And the prince against his, what? Subject, right? What if the rich despise the rich? Answer, it should be said, that as has been said above, the unworthy despising is most of all provocative of anger, right? Now, the defect or the smallness of the one against whom we are angry makes for the increase of anger insofar as it increases the unworthy despising, right? Just as when someone is greater, right, so much more so is he unworthily despised, right? And the more someone is less, the more, what? He despises, right? Unworthily, right? Yeah. Okay? And therefore, the nobles are angry if they are despised by the rustics, right? Yeah, yeah. Or the wise from the foolish, right? Or servants from the servants, right? The servants, right? If however, the smallness or defect diminishes the, what? Unworthiness of the despising, such a smallness does not increase but diminishes the angry. And in this way, those who are penitent of their injuries done and confess themselves to have done bad and humble themselves and ask forgiveness, they mitigate anger, right? According to that of Proverbs 15, a soft response, right? Breaks anger. Breaks anger. Insofar as such are seen not to despise, but more to regard greatly those before whom they humble themselves, right? So this, he says, is clear as the response to the first one, right? Mm-hmm. To the second about death, two-fold is the cause, wherefore, anger ceases towards the bad. I mean, to the dead, rather. And one, because they're not able to, what? Sorrow and to sense. Yeah. To the guilt and pain. Which the angry most of all seek in those who consume their angry. Another way, because they are now seen to have, what, arrived at the last of all evil things, right? Whence also to those gravely, what, injured, angry ceases, right? Mm-hmm. Insofar as their evil exceeds the measure of just friend distribution, right? The third, it should be said, that also despising, which comes from friends, seems to be more... Unworthy. Yeah. And therefore, from a similar cause, we are more angry against them if we're despised, either in, what, harming or not aiding, just as against, what, minors. It seems like a common thing to hear people say that all the disabled wives was angry that her deceased husband, whom she loved very much, but suddenly he has a heart attack and he's gone. Mm-hmm. So... Thank you, Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, Guardian Angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. Dios, gracias. God, our Enlightenment, Guardian Angels, drink from the lights of our minds, pour in a room in our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor. Pray for us. And help us to understand what you have written. Father, Son, and the Holy Spirit. So we're down now to the last question on anger here, and the last question on the emotions here. Question 48. And this is where Thomas has been looking before and after, in a kind of formal way, like he did with love, right? Where he looked at love in itself, and then he looked before at the causes of love, and then after at the effects of love, right? He's done the same thing with anger, right? Looked at anger in itself, and then the causes of anger and the remedy, and then now the effects of anger, right? Don't get angry, just get even, okay? It's like... Then we're not to consider... Question 48. Then we're not to consider about the effects of anger. And about this, four things are asked. Whether anger causes pleasure, huh? What a way to begin! Whether it most of all causes fervor, huh? In the heart, huh? Third, whether it most of all impedes the use of reason, huh? And fourth, whether it causes what? Yeah, it means like being kind of silent. I'm not talking, I guess, huh? To the first, then, one proceeds thus. Thus, it seems that anger does not cause pleasure. Why? Because sadness, justitia, excludes pleasure, right? The contraries are opposites. But anger is always with sadness, right? Because, as is said in the 7th Book of the Ethics, huh? Everyone who does something to anger does it being sad, huh? Being pained. Of course, it's been caused by some kind of sadness, right? You know, you cause me some kind of sadness or pain and I get angry, right, huh? Okay. Therefore, anger does not cause pleasure, right? So that seems to take care of the matter, right? Okay. Some guy wasn't used to this sort of thing, you know. They think that Thomas just likes to show how good he could be, you know, by attacking what he thinks and then having to, what? Answer. Yeah, yeah. Moreover, the philosopher says in the 4th Book of the Ethics, huh? That punishing quiets the, what? Impetus of anger, huh? Making pleasure for, what? Sadness, huh? From which it can be taken that pleasure comes to the irate or angry person from his, what? Punishing, right? But the punishing excludes the, what? Anger, right? Therefore, the pleasure coming about, anger is taken away. So you can't have an effect there without, the cause without the effect, right? If it was a cause, huh? You can have the effect without the cause. So the anger, the... When you have pleasure, the anger is stopped, right? Yeah. Therefore, it is not an effect joined to, what? Pleasure. Pleasure. Moreover, no effect impedes its cause. What a marvelous mind this guy had, you know? Since it is, what? Conformable. It's like its cause. Yeah. Right. But pleasures impede anger, as is said in the 2nd Book of the Rhetoric, huh? Therefore, pleasure is not an effect of anger, right? Maybe some pleasure. Against this is what the philosopher in the same book says, inducing the proverb, right? That anger, much sweeter than, what? Honey, right? Dropping honey. Yeah. Increases in the hearts of men, right? Sweetness of revenge, right? Carivro de mar. I answer, it should be said, that as the philosopher says in the 7th Book of the Ethics, pleasures, and especially sensible ones and bodily ones, are certain medicines against, what? Sadness, huh? And therefore, huh? The more through pleasure, right, against a greater sadness, or anxiety is a remedy against it, so much more is the pleasure, what? Perceived, right? Just as it is clear that when someone, what? Thirsts. It becomes, what? Water. More delightful to them, right? I was thinking of those three psalms, you know, that are the psalms of thirst, right? Where the soul is said to be thirsting for God, and so on. And we're talking about purgatory the other day, you know? Well, maybe the suffering of purgatory is like that of thirst, right? Kind of intensity, right? You ever been really thirsty, you know, and you've got to get some water or something, you know? Yeah. Or Brother Mark used to say, you know, you're out there in the desert there, you know, and you're thirsting, and you start thinking, you know, of an ice cream soda, you know, and maybe then at least, you know, a beer float or something, you know? And frankly, just want water. Just water. Something wet. But there's going to be a really severe thirst, maybe. Oh, you're really thirsty to see God, huh? You've got no one to distract you from that desire. That's why it's very focused. Yeah, yeah, yeah. You don't have a body to distract you from anything. Yeah, yeah, yeah. You've got no business, you've got nothing. There's no deadlines, nothing. It's just, that's what I want. It's like, you know, the word thirst, I suppose, it's a metaphor, you know, it's applied to the will, you know, but it gives you a little idea of what purgatory is like, you know? Like when Monsignor Dion didn't show up for class, you know? I was thirsting for, you know, for what he's going to say today, you know? The suffering is terrible. It's terrible, you know? Really, yeah. That's what the brother said to Father Robert. Yeah. Once, you know, or twice, not a class I was taking for credit, when Monsignor was sitting in on him. That comes down, I was late, you know? The class had already started, the door was closed. And I was too much respect to come in late, you know? So, oh, the thirst, I mean. It's just terrible. It's terrible. Okay? But the thirst in purgatory is going to be much more severe than the thirst from Monsignor Dion's lecture, you know? So, just as it's clear, he says, that when someone is thirsty, more delightful is the potisum. Now, it is manifest, are from the things that have been said before, that the motion of anger rises up from some, what, injury that is saddening or paining one, right? To which sadness, a remedy is adhered or may be applied through revenge, right? And therefore, at the presence of what? To the presence of revenge, pleasure follows, right? And the more so, the more. The more so. Yeah. It's opposites among each other. More clear. If therefore, the revenge was what? Present really, there would be what? Perfect pleasure, right? Which would wholly exclude, what? Sadness. And to this would quiet the emotion of what? Anger, right, huh? But before the revenge is present really, right? It is present to the one angry in two ways, right? And one way through hope, right? Because no one gets angry except hoping to get, what? Revenge, huh? As has been said. said above. Another way according to what? Continual thinking of it, right? For to each one desiring something it is pleasant to what? Dwell in the thought of those things which he desires, on account of which the imaginations of dreams are what? Pleasant. Thus have I had thee as a dream doth fodder and sleep a king, but waking no such matter. Shakespeare has one of the sonics there. And therefore he sends the man angry, but thinks much in his soul about revenge, from this he what? Delights, right? He's thinking of how this is going to be there. Nevertheless he says the pleasure is not perfect, right? Because it takes away sadness and consequently what? Anger. Yeah. But he's still angry, right? He has some joy, some pleasure, because he has the hope of revenge and he keeps on thinking about this. So is Iago, right? Pleased when he, even before he succeeds in rousing Othello to a pitch of jealousy that he kills his wife? To the first objection then, right, it should be said that it's not about the same thing that the angry man, what, is sad and rejoices, huh? But he's saddened about the injury that has been inflicted upon him, right? He delights over about the revenge thought about and hoped, yeah? Those two things he talked about in the body article. Kujitata thought about and Spirata hoped for, right? Thomas is always quoting that from St. Paul's. Beg adentes, right, huh? If you have hope of something good, right, then you have a suit and delight, right? Anticipation, right? When sadness has itself to anger as a principio, a beginning, huh? But pleasure as an effect or an end, huh? There he is looking before and after again, right? He just does the same thing over and over. There's no alternative to rationality, right? The constructionist, we're interested in, the alternative to rationality. I used to ask people, you know, can you give me a reason for not being reasonable? To the second, it should be said that that objection proceeds about the pleasure which is caused from the, what? Real presence of revenge, which then totally takes away anger, right, huh? But the other one is in the, what? What he called the hoping and thinking about it, right, huh? It's not yet present, right? To the third, it should be said, huh? The present, the pleasures preceding impede lest, what? Sadness follows, right? And consequently, they impede, what? Anger. But pleasure about what? Revenge follows upon the, what? Anger, right, huh? So, Thomas understands this, right, huh? So, don't get angry about the solution there, right? Okay, article two here now. So, don't get angry about the solution. So, don't get angry about the solution, right? So, don't get angry about the solution. So, don't get angry about the solution. So, don't get angry about the solution. So, don't get angry about the solution. So, don't get angry about the solution.