Prima Secundae
Lecture 124: Anger Compared to Concupiscence and Hate

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Okay. Whether anger is more natural than cupiscence? Now, this is really ridiculous now, isn't it? To the fifth one goes forward thus. It seems that anger is not more natural than cupiscence. For it is a property of man, it is said to be, that he is an animal that is mild by nature, right? Okay. But gentleness or mildness is opposed to what? Anger, right? As the philosopher says in the second book of the rhetoric, right? And Monsitutus gets also the name of the virtue that moderates anger, right? And we speak of something as a gentleman, right? That's kind of, you know, supposed to aspire to be a gentleman, right? Gentle is the opposite of what? Yeah. I guess my eternal grandfather was supposed to have been a very gentle man, right? We didn't even slap the mosquito, that's what they say. We didn't slap the mosquito, right? Very gentle man. Yeah, he kind of pressured him off like that, you know. He said, how can a man be that gentle? Therefore, anger is not more natural than cupiscence. But it seems altogether, right? On Nino, right? To be against the nature of man, right? Moreover, reason is divided against nature, right, huh? But those things which are done according to reason, we do not say to be done according to nature. But anger is with reason, huh? Concupiscence without reason. There's a quote there from somebody in the South Book of the Ethics, right? What would that be? Must be that guy who calls this the sophist, huh? Therefore, concupiscence is more natural than anger, right? Moreover, anger is a desire for revenge, huh? But concupiscence is most of all a desire for what is pleasing according to the sense of touch. To wit, food, and reproductive things, right? But these are more natural to man, right? Than revenge, right? That's what I was thinking, right? Yeah. And therefore, concupiscence is more natural than anger, right? Candy's always seen more natural to me than revenge. It goes right in. Now you have to think about it. Yeah. Okay. I guess this is what the philosopher says in the Seventh Book of the Ethics, that anger is natural, it's more natural. How could the philosopher have made such a mistake? In concupiscence, huh? How could he? Thank goodness. I answer, it should be said, Thomas says, that that is said to be natural that is caused by nature. As is clear in the Second Book of the Physics, that's where he defines nature, right? And says what natural is, right? Natural can mean has a nature, but can also mean by nature. When you don't have a nature. Whence whether some passion is more or less natural, is not able to be considered except from its cause, right? Now, the cause of the passion, as has been said above, can be taken in two ways. In one way, from the side of the object, right? Another way, from the side of the what? Subject. Subject, right, huh? So is my hatred of, of, yeah, is that on the side of the object or the side of the subject? I think it's more on the side of the subject. Although you may protest on the side of the object, but that's okay. If, therefore, one considers the cause of anger and of concubiscence on the side of the object, thus the concubiscence, and most of all that of what? Food. Food and reproduction, is more natural than anger. Well, thank God, at least he's seen that, huh? Yeah. In so far as these things are more natural than, what? Revenge. Oh, boy. So candy is more, you know, natural. Little boy here, huh? Mm-hmm. Stop that candy a little bit. The grown-up boy. Yeah. If, however, one considers the cause of anger on the side of the subject, then, in one way, anger is more natural, and in another way, concubiscence, right? Okay, now this is interesting. Okay, so even here he's not giving away entirely to anger, right? In this way. One explanation. Now, the nature of man can be considered either according to the nature of the genus, right? Or according to the nature of the species, or according to the makeup, complexion, that's property of the individual, right? If, therefore, one considers the nature of the genus, which is the nature of this man insofar as he's an animal, thus more natural is concubiscence and anger. Because from this common nature of man, man has a certain inclination to desiring those things which conserve, what? Life. Either according to species, that's reproduction, or according to the individual, that's food, right? If, however, we consider the nature of man on the part of the species, to wit, insofar as he is, what? Rational. Rational. Then anger is more natural to man than what? In concubiscence. In concubiscence, huh? Insofar as anger is, what? With reason more than concubiscence. Okay? So, though I'm listening to reason imperfectly, right? I'm listening to reason more when I get angry than when I'm pursuing the candy of the popcorn bowl. Insofar as reason is what is peculiar to man as a species, right? Here it go. Right? Okay. He's a marvelous man. I don't know how to think of this guy. Mm-hmm. How are you guys going to be so confused with such a topic and just completely unable to see these distinctions, right? Hi, this is a marvelous guy. It's Thomas, huh? Once the philosopher says in the fourth book of the Ethics that it's what? More human to punish. Yeah, which pertains to anger, right? That would be me. Yeah. Insofar as each one naturally rises up against the things that are contrary and harmful, right? Would you have me be false to myself? Says Coriolanus in the play. Say I play the man I am. That's marvelous, huh? Yeah. If however we consider the nature of this individual according to his private makeup, right? Affection. Thus, anger is what? More natural than cubisence because the what? Natural inclination is their disposition. Yeah, for anger, which is from one's makeup, right? Anger more easily follows, right? Than concubisence or some other passion, right? He's excusing Coriolanus a bit here, right? For a man who's disposed to anger according as he has a cholerae, what? Complexion. Complexion, yeah. Yeah, just like Coriolanus, yeah. Yeah, cholerae, right? That's the thing that's causing it apparently. Among the other humors, more quickly moves, right? And it's assimilated to what? Fire, right? That's Coriolanus, wow. And therefore, it's more prompt, right? The one who's disposed, right? According to a natural complexion of anger, becomes anger, right? Than the one who's disposed to what? Cubisence. That he has. Yeah. And in kind of this, the philosophy says in the Seventh Book of the Ethics, that anger is more of what? Carried over from the parents to the son than concubisence, right? Hmm. Okay. What's the example that Aristotle gives there, where he says, the son has knocked the father down, dragging him out? He did that to his father. And my son will do it to me, he says. He gets passed off from one to the other. He'll go back and read the great plays there of, uh, soccer plays, right, huh? You know. 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That in man one can consider the natural makeup on the side of the body, which is temperate, right? And what? The ratio of it. Now, on the side of the bodily complexion, naturally man, according to species, does not have, what? But a surpassing excellence, huh? Excessive. Neither anger nor some other passion, which the dog has, according to species, right? Okay. On account of the temperament of his complexion, that's why he's supposed to have the best sense of, what? Touch, right? More sensitive, this sense of touch, huh? Other animals, according as they recede from this quality of complexion to the disposition of some, what, extreme complexion, according to this, they are naturally exposed as a species, right? To the excess of that passion, as the lion to, what? Oldness, right? The dog to anger. That's what I said, right? A little mutt there barking at me. The hair, or the, I guess, is that the rabbit? Yeah. Yeah. To fear, right, huh? And likewise about other ones, right, huh? There's some excess, right? But on the side of reason, it's natural to man both, what? To be angry and to be, what? Yeah. Insofar as reason in some way causes anger, insofar as it announces the cause of anger, right, huh? And insofar as in some way it, what? Calms anger. Yeah. Insofar as the man, what? Does not totally listen to the command. Command with reason, as it said above, right? To the second should be said that reason itself pertains to the nature of man. Whence from this that anger is with reason in some way, right? It follows that in some way it is natural to man, right, huh? And to the third should be said that that reason proceeds about anger and cubisence on the part of the object, right, where he admits that the cubisence is more natural, right? So it's more natural for me to want to eat some candy now than to get angry and seek revenge. As far as the object, he says it's more natural, right, huh? That food is more natural than revenge, right? And in terms of my generic nature, right, that food is more so, right, huh? But in terms of what? My specific nature, right, anger involves reason more than what? Yeah, yeah. My desire for revenge involves hearing reason, although imperfectly, right? Why don't you hear reason at all to eat the candy? Do what you say, do what feels, that's what the old song used to say, don't think, feel. Or like Falstaff, you can harness reason in the service of concupisence. Yeah, yeah. He's an odd guy there. And Andrews. Will you touch it, stop now, I guess? Yes. You're not angry at we're stopping, are you? Not yet. You're not angry at we're not angry at we're not angry at we're not angry at we're not angry at we're not angry at we're not angry at we're not angry at we're not angry at we're not angry at we're not angry at we're not angry at we're not angry at we're not angry at we're not angry at we're not angry at we're not angry at we're not angry at we're not angry at we're not angry at we're not angry at we're not angry at we're not angry at we're not angry at we're not angry at we're not angry at we're not angry at we're not angry at we're not angry at we're not angry at we're not angry at we're not angry at we're not angry at we're not angry at we're not angry at we're not angry at we're not angry at we're not angry at we're not angry at we're not angry at we're not angry at we're not angry at we're not angry at we're not angry at we In the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, Guardian Angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. Deo gratias. God, our enlightenment, Guardian Angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, board and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor. Praise for us. Help us to understand what you have written. In the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, amen. So, I guess we're up to Article 6 here, huh? Question 46. We had that strange article about anger being in some way more natural than Qubisens. But Todd made a lot of distinctions there, too. Let's see what little bit of truth there is in that. To the 6th, one goes forward thus. It seems that anger is more grave than hate, huh? For it is said in the book of Proverbs, Chapter 27, the 4th verse, that anger does not have, what? Mercy. Mercy, huh? Nor the fjord that erupts, I guess, huh? But hate sometimes has mercy. I don't know. It's strange, huh? It's a piece of that. Therefore, anger is more grave than, what? Hating time. Thank you. It's interesting how that, in God, of course, they use the term mercy and anger, but anger for justice, right? Kind of a certain contrast there. Moreover, it is, what? More to under the bad than to be sorrowful about it. Excuse me. No, it is more to, what? Suffer evil and to, what? And to be sorrowful over it. Than simply to undergo, right? Yeah. But those who have someone in hate, it suffices that the one whom they hate suffers some kind of, what? Evil. Evil, yeah. But to the irate person does not suffice, but he seeks that, what? He should know, I guess, of his hatred and suffer from it. Yeah, as the philosopher says, he's done it to you. Therefore, anger is more grave than, what? Hate. Moreover, the more things that come together to the constitution of something, the more, what? It seems to be stable. It seems to be just the reverse of that. Just as a habit is more permanent, which is caused from, what? Many acts, huh? But anger is caused from the running together of many passions, as he saw before. Not over hate, no? More pure. Because it's more pure. It's going to be strong, wouldn't it? You would think, yeah. Therefore, anger is more stable and grave than hate, huh? You can't beat those arguments. The more a power is won, the more it's infinite. But again, this is what Augustine says in the rule where he compares hate to a, what? Beam, I guess. Beam, yeah. And anger to a speck. A speck, yeah. So, Augustine sees hate as being worse, right? Than anger, right, huh? It's better to get angry with your brother than to hate him, right? Yeah. Well, what does the master say here, huh? He says, answer, it should be said that the species of a passion, of an emotion, and its ratio is weighed from its, what, object, huh? Now, the object of anger and of hate is the same in, what, subject, huh? For just as the one hating desires evil to the one who he hates, right? So, the man who's angry is against the one who he's angry, but not for the same, what, reason, huh? Because the one hating desires evil for the enemy insofar as it is evil, okay? But the man angry desires the evil of the one against whom he is angry, not insofar as it is evil, but insofar as it has the notion of something good, insofar as he estimates it to be, what, just, huh? Yeah. Insofar as it is, what, indicative, right? Venge, huh? So, although sometimes, you know, metaphorically, we do say even hate of God, right, huh? At times Jesus says, minus amat, on those letters. But, I mean, it seems like anger would be more able to be applied metaphorically to God than hate good, huh? From this reason given here, right? Whence also is said above that hate is by the application of the bad to something bad. But anger, by the application or applying of something good to the bad, huh? Now, it is manifest that to desire something bad under the aspect of being just has less the notion of something bad than to wish the evil of someone simply, huh? For to wish the evil of someone under the notion of something just can even be according to the virtue of, what? Justice. Justice, huh? So, Christ is angry there with their stubbornness of their heart, right? Even there. There's a number of places in the Gospel where he says Christ is angry, right? Does it say anywhere that he hates? I don't know. I don't know. That's it. Yeah. I mean, in terms of hating some person, right? He's angry at these people who are so hard-hearted, right? So, it says, to wish the evil of someone under the notion of something just can be also according to the virtue of justice if it is, what? Measured, right? Tempered by the precept of, what? Reason, right? But anger, and this only fails, it does not obey the precept of reason in taking revenge, I guess. Whence it is manifest that hate is much worse and more grave than anger, right? So, Thomas and Augustine are quite in agreement, huh? Now, the first objection there, right? Anger does not have mercy. Well, Thomas is going to say a distinction here. To the first therefore it should be said that in anger and in hate, two things can be, what? Considered, right? To it, the very thing that is desired, and secondly, the intensity of the desire, right, huh? Now, as regards that which is desired, huh? Anger has more mercy than, what? Hate, huh? As far as that which is desired, right, huh? Because hate desires the evil of another as such, and is satisfied, since it does that, huh? Then it is not, what? Satisfied, huh? By any measure, a vivo, huh? Hell hath no fury like a woman's woman. No limit. For those things which are desired, secundum se, as such, are desired without measure, as the philosopher says in the first book of politics, right? Just as the avaricious man desires wealth without limit, right, huh? Sam Walton. That's what he said when they told him, you've made a bazillion of dollars, huh? What do you want to do now? I don't know what. Winston is said in the book of Ecclesiasticus that the enemy, if he, what, finds time, huh? Would not be satisfied, right, with blood, huh? But angry does not desire the bad, except under the aspect of indicative justice, right? Whence, when the evil, uh, stowed upon the person, exceeds the measure of justice, huh? According to the estimate of the one angry, then he takes what? That's right. That's right. That's right. So if you beat the kid too much, you know, you start to feel sorry for him, right? Of course, my father used to say, sit in that chair and don't move. I'd sit in that chair and not move. My mother was amazed at this. The power. Yeah. Once the philosopher says in the second book of the rhetoric, that the angry man, if many things come to be, right? He takes mercy, right? But the one hating, for none, right? So hate is much more opposed to mercy than what? Anger, right? As regards the intensity of the desire, that was the other half of the distinction, anger more excludes what? Mercy. Than hate, huh? Because the motion of anger is more, what? Impetuous, right? On account of the inflammation of the cholera. Whence immediately is subjoined, who is able, what? To bear, right? The impetus of the spirit that's been, what? Aroused, huh? So when Thomas takes up the virtue of what? Mildness that moderates anger, right? He takes it up with, what? Temperance, right? And so I spoke of Shakespeare's metaphor there, right? They are the very wrath of love, right? That's a metaphor from species to species, right? How can wrath be compared to love? This kind of, you know, man-woman love there. The intensity of it, right? So he says the act can be more intense, the anger in the man is, which fires up and so on, you know, and get out of his way, you know. It calms down, right? The hate is kind of a cruel thing, you know. What did Stalin say? You know, you've got to really hate your opponent in order to overcome him, right? Okay, now the second objection, huh? The angry man wants a person to know who's revenging him, right, huh? And so on. To second should be said, that as has been said, the angry man desires the bad of another insofar as it has the definition of something just indicating what has been done. But the vindicta, the vengeance, so to speak, comes about through the bestowal of pain, huh? Now, it is of the notion of pain, or punishment rather, that it be contrary to the will, and that it be what? Afflicted. And that it be inferred for some guilt, right? And therefore, the angry man desires this, that the one to whom he infers, what? Harm. Harm, perceives, and sorrows, and he knows that on account of the injury he's done, huh? This has happened to him, right? This has come about to him, right? But the man hitting cares nothing about this, right, huh? Because he desires the evil of the other as such. It, however, is not true that that about which someone, what, is sad, huh, is, what, worse, right? For injustice and, what, imprudence, since they are evils, right, huh? Because, nevertheless, since they are voluntary, they do not, what, sadden those to whom they are in, as the philosopher says in the second book of the rhetoric, right? So Thomas is always running to the second book of the rhetoric there, where Estelle takes up the passions, right? Of course, he says, in a well-regulated court, they would not have these emotional fields, but since they do, this is how to do it. The second part of the Lord of the Rings and the Trees, that are called the Ents, that come and they fight against Sauron and the Tower and all these orcs running down, or whatever those other creatures are. You've got these giant trees and there's one scene, this one guy, all these little orcs running around, he's just going, stomp, stomp, stomp. He's not interested in their knowing about it, but he just wants to wipe them out, he hates them. I have this joke, right, kid, the grandchildren, you know, my daughter's children, you know, that I talk to the trees, you know, at nighttime, 2 a.m. in the morning. So, I think my mouth's up, I went back at 2 a.m. to see if I'm out there talking to the tree. To the third, it should be said, that that which is caused from many causes, right, is then more stable when the causes are taken, as a matter of one cause, right? But one cause is able to, what, prevail over many others, huh? For hate comes from a more permanent cause than what? Anger. Anger, right? For anger arises from some commotion of the soul on account of the injury, what? We see. But hate proceeds from some disposition of a man, according, as he regards it as what? To himself. The one, what he eats, yeah. And therefore, just as a passion more quickly passes away than a disposition or an habit, right, so anger more quickly passes than what? Hate. Hate, huh? Even though hate is a passion, what, coming about from some, what, disposition, huh? An account of this, the philosopher says in the second book of the rhetoric, that hate is more incurable than what? Anger. How would you apply that to the Middle East there? And sometimes you have these tribes, too, you know, that seem to have a long hatred for each other, right, huh? And it goes on from generation to generation, that kind of permanence, right? Yeah. But Adenauer and De Gaulle can get together, and Germany and France are reconciled, right, huh? You know, like there's not the hate there, but there may be, you know, with anger at the time, you know, but that can be dissipated by, unlike De Gaulle and Adenauer, right? But the anger, you know, goes on and on in these countries, right? I think some of the Shiites and the Sunnis and so on, they really kind of hate each other, right? And it's kind of a permanent thing. I guess they hate us, too. And they can harm us infidels at will, you know? It's okay, you know? So many people in the public realm, I guess political leaders, academics, bought into Marx's view that everything boils down to economics. But John Paul II would disagree, he would say, no, everything boils down to culture. I think culture is cult, religion. And whereas all these contemporary progressives might say that all religions are the same, no, they're not. And you can see certain religions preach love, whether the practitioners actually follow the precepts, but others preach hate or inculcated hate, such as Islam, especially the serious precepts of Islam, and so the importance of culture and its influence on the virtues is kind of an interesting interesting thing. Now Christ is saying, love your enemies, right? Yeah. And I don't know whether you bring up these young Palestinians in out to eat the Jews and so on, right? I don't know. So this tweet is on the emotions is good for an awful lot of reasons, right? Yeah. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. For their anger is to those only to whom there is what? Justice, right? This is the seventh article. To the seventh one goes forward thus. It seems that anger is not only to those to whom there is justice. For there is no justice of man to irrational things. You get angry at a tool or something. Like a wood. But a man sometimes becomes angry with irrational things. Things without reason. As the writer from anger, right? Throws a pen, right? It's not working right. Or the what? Horseman strikes the horse, right? Therefore anger is not only to those to whom there is what? Justice, huh? So, what about this? I'm talking about that one. I'm trying to think about it when I get angry things out. The thing won't work. I feel like I'm getting angry at the computer now. They can't get the computer to work and do what it's supposed to do, huh? Do you want to get angry at the computer? At least once. It's usually because it's doing exactly what it's supposed to be doing. Yeah, it's more logical than you are. There was a great commercial some years ago where there was an office worker on a cubicle who was having problems with his computer, it froze up or something, and he starts freaking out and he pulls out some sort of, like, bat or something like that. Knocks the cubicles down. I forget what they're advertising. That's a good representation. I saw the same thing. It was the duck who was trying to offer his computer something like that, and he's got a mallet like this to smash it in under it because it says on the computer, if you're having trouble, it's to strike any key. Moreover, there is no justice of man to himself, huh? Nor to those which are of oneself, right? As is said in the fifth book of ethics, huh? That's the book where Estelle talks about justice, right? The fifth book of the Nicomache ethics. But man sometimes is angry with himself, right? As the one who is penitent is angry with himself on account of his sin. Whence it is said, but we say something, I could kick myself, right? Whence it is said in the fourth psalm, huh? Become angry and do not wish to, what? Sin, huh? Therefore, anger is not only towards those to whom there is justice, right? This is angry to a person now, but not to, what? Prison and we can have justice, justice towards another, right? Moreover, justice and injustice can be someone to a whole, what? Genus, right? Or to a whole community, huh? When the city, what? Injures somebody, right, huh? But anger is not to some, what? Genus, but as the philosopher says, to some singular individual person, right? The source tells us we can hate a whole class of people, like we hate the thief, right? We don't care we hate the terrorist or something, right? But you get angry with a particular individual, right? Therefore, anger is not properly towards those to whom there is justice and what? Injustice, huh? But the contrary of this can be taken, what? From the philosopher in that second book of rhetoric, right, huh? Wasn't that the book that, what's his name, the English philosopher liked? Aristotle's rhetoric, huh? He's a famous English philosopher. What did he do, you said? You know, the guy who talked about, you know, the state being very powerful and so on? Who's that? Hobbes? Hobbes, yeah. Didn't Hobbes like the rhetoric? That's his famous, the book of our study likes, right? You can see why, huh? How I like it. Yeah, yeah. He wouldn't like the Nicomagini ethics or something like that. No, no. But the rhetoric, huh? Yeah. He wouldn't have control of a weak mind. Yeah. Let's see what the master says here, huh? The answer should be said, as has been said above, that anger desires the bad insofar as it has the aspect of a just thing indicating, right? Something has been done. And therefore to the same is anger to whom there is, what? Justice and injustice, huh? For to infer revenge pertains to what? Justice. Justice, right, huh? But to injure someone pertains to injustice, right, huh? Whence both on the side of the cause, which is the injury bestowed by another, inflicted upon you by another, and also on the side of the what? Revenge itself, huh, vindication, which the angry man desires, right? It is manifest that to the same, what, pertains anger to whom also justice and injustice belongs, right? Okay? So I'm angry with you because you're an unjust to me, right? And I desire to get even with you, because justice is evenness, right? That's what Thomas does in the body of the article, right? I've got to answer these, getting mad at your ballpoint pen or your computer, whatever it might be. To the first, therefore, it should be said, that it has been said above, that anger, although it is with reason, right? Because there's a reason why you're angry, right? It can nevertheless also be in, what? Brute animals. Brute animals, which lack reason, right? Brute animals, right, insofar as by a natural instinct, they are moved through the imagination to something like the works of, what? Reason, huh? Thus, therefore, since in man there is both reason and imagination. That's interesting. In two ways in man can, what? Rise up the motion of anger, right? There is the word motus there, right? Motus irae, right? And we call the passions, what? Emotions, right? In one way, from imagination alone, announcing what? Yeah. And thus there arises some motion of anger even to irrational things, inanimate things, according to a likeness of that motion, which is found in animals against something, what? Harmful, right, huh? So when you try to take a bone away from the dog, you might, what? You might get angry with you, yeah. In another way, from reason, announcing the injury that's been bestowed, right? And therefore, as the philosopher says in the second book of the Rituric, in no way can there be angry to, what? Insensible things, nor to the dead, right, huh? That is to say, the anger that arises ex ratione annunciante, right? It arises from reason. But it could be the way, right? From the rising from imagination, huh? Then because they do not, what? Sorrow, right? Which, most of all, those who are angry seek in those ones with whom they are angry, right? That they will be sad, yeah. Also, because there is not revenge to them, because it's not of them to, what? Make an injury, right, huh? So did my, my, uh, whole point pin running out? It's like an injury. Yeah. I'm trying to write a check out or something, huh? Or did my computer still an injury upon me by freezing up? You can perceive it that way.