Prima Secundae
Lecture 122: Anger as a Special Passion: Nature and Composition

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It seems like you're one of these instances of the emperor has no clothes, where you're getting deeper and deeper in reality through weird ideology and stuff like that. And things don't seem to work well. Things get messed up. Families fall apart. People fall apart. But I'm just always curious how can, what can be done to a burst of tide within the academic world? This weird slippery slope slide that we're going down now. I know, because it's a few good schools, right? I was, you were saying recently in the news there that 80% of high school graduates in New York City can't read. They read that bad. I know it's bad. It's just probably get worse with these computers too. When you see people coming out of the elite schools who are exceptionally intelligent, they've been indoctrinated. And reason is just they're impervious to it. And yet they have analytical minds that could use reason most incredibly well if they could reason in certain things. They can in certain technical areas, but then in more philosophical areas, they're blind. It's weird. It's weird. It's weird. In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, Amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, Guardian Angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. Deo gracias. God, our enlightenment, Guardian Angels, do the lights of our minds, order to move our images, and rouse us to consider more quickly. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor. Pray for us. Help us to understand what you have written. Amen. Amen. Amen. You missed the account of the death of Fernando the Saint, right? Yeah, yeah. With the angels singing, right? Oh, my goodness gracious. Is that on the last part? Yeah. I read it, the account from the beginning of the last. Irving has one of the works, one of the works, the chronicles of Fernando the Saint, right? It's a beautiful account of his death, you know. Even after, you know, he's dying, first the angels are singing, right? And then they bury the body, you know, in the mausolean, you know, the things heard, you know, around spades, singing angels, so. It's beautiful. Beautiful. Oh, sure. We missed our prayer, but we can go back to the praying room here, the era on anger here, huh? Then we're not to consider about anger, and first about anger by itself. Secondly, about the cause that makes for anger, and its remedy, right? I'm sure you get help from Ernest Tyler, right? Because anger is an important emotion and rhetoric, right? In the courtroom, right? That you can get the people being angry, and you have to convict them and punish them more severely, right? But on the other hand, if you're trying to defend the guy, you've got to know how to soften the anger, huh? And third, about its effect, right? So there you have that same kind of distinction or division that you had of love, right? And it's a beautiful thing to understand, right? Considered by itself, and then its cause, and then its effects, right? Now, about the first, eight things are asked. Don't you know all these things were asked? First, whether anger is a special, what? Passion or emotion. Some people speak of anger as if it's, what? Combining. A couple will see. Secondly, whether the object of anger is something good or something bad, huh? Well, my prize is something bad, right? You're stepping on my toes, right? But to avenge something good, huh? Getting even? Settling a score? We'll see what he says, huh? I don't get angry, I just get even. Yeah, yeah. Third, whether anger is in the concubisable. Now, that's strange that should arise at this point, huh? All I can think of there is, you know, the way that temperance and mildness are considered together there, right? In the secundi secundi. You know, he considers the three theological virtues and then the four cardinal virtues. And then he attaches other virtues to one or another of the cardinal virtues because they share the mode, right? So temperance is moderating my desire for food and drink and sexual pleasure and so on. And mildness is moderating my anger, right? So they're similar, right, huh? And I always quote the words of Shakespeare there, you know, where in Enchilac it says, they're in the very wrath of love, right? Cubs do not part them, right? So he shows it, you know, that's a metaphor from species to species, right? So it's interesting that you can compare that to, you know, similarity. So maybe there's something to do with this. Well, we'll see what Thomas does. But in this little mind here, they see these things. Where their anger is with what? Reason, huh? Now, when I was young, I had some texts of Thomas where he was saying that the irascible appetite is in a way closer to reason than the kibba's appetite. Because this, for the sake of that and so on, it's more like reason. And that's why Mozart wrote those piano concertos, right? Because it's more irascible than them, right? I thought my first suggestion to my own teacher because it's very kind of. Five, whether it is more natural than cubisence. That's very strange, huh? What can be more natural than hunger and thirst and desire to reproduce and so on, huh? Six, whether anger is more grievous than, what, hate, huh? I think it's going to be a reverse, right? Because anger, what, seizes more or less when you succeed in punishing a person, right, huh? And a person's anger is either a person with a bloody nose and that's kind of satisfying you, you know? But eight, you're almost out to, what, destroy the person, huh? And whether anger is only towards those to whom there is, what? Justice. Justice, huh? And eight, on the species of anger, huh? That's a great species, huh? Now, sometimes it's hard to tell when you come to a, what? What is called a lowest species, right? I used to talk about lowest species in logic. It's pretty easy to see what a lowest species is, let's say, a number, right? Or in a figure, right? Some square. There aren't different kinds of squares, right? They're all the same shape, right? But you get to say something like, is dog a lowest species or are there different species of dog, right? That's a little more obscure, right? And other species of anger, right? We'll let the master illuminate us, huh? To the first, then, one goes for it, thus. It seems that anger is not a special passion. For from anger is denominated the irascible power. But of this power there is not only one passion, but many, right? Therefore, anger is not one special passion, right? That's a question partly of how it's named from anger, this, just like the concupiscence was named from concupiscence, right? It's only one of the six passions, right? Moreover, to each special passion, there is something contrary, as is clairinducente, inducing, to singular, right? So, for love, there's hate, right? For desire, there's aversion. For pleasure, there's pain, right? For hope, there's despair. For fear, there's, what, boldness, right? Well, it seems, you know, by kind of induction, that everyone is a contrary. Well, what's a contrary of anger? Why doesn't it, you know? It's kind of a strange passion. Every other one has got a contrary, right? Why doesn't anger have one, huh? Maybe it ain't a special passion, right? Okay. Maybe it isn't. Moreover, one special passion does not include another. But anger includes many passions. For it is with sadness, right, huh? Causing me sadness, I get angry, right? And it's with delight, huh, when I get revenge, huh? And with hope, right? When I think I can punish you, you know, for what you've done. As it's clear through the philosopher in the second book of the rhetoric, right? Therefore, anger is not a special, what? Passion, right, huh? Those are good objections, huh? But against this is what Damascene is. He used to quote Damascene in a number of places, right? He lays down anger to be a, what? Special passion. And likewise, Tullios, right? Or Cicero, right? In the fourth book of the Tuscaloans, questions, huh? I answer. It should be said. That something is said to be general in two ways, huh? So if Thomas looks before and after, he must look for distinctions, right? And he's always seeing distinctions that other people don't see, huh? Talking to them about the students last night there, you know, the first two fallacies outside of speech are the fallacy of the accident, huh? And the fallacy of simply and not simply, right, huh? Now, say how to correspond to these two very famous kinds of distinctions, right, that you'll meet over and over again in philosophy, huh? And Michael Groh there, out of TAC there, was saying, You know, there's a disagreement amongst them as to whether we desire to see God as He is by a natural desire, or whether it's a desire that arises because of the faith in us, right? I guess they had some speaker on campus, too, who had said that there is no natural desire to see God, right? And so I was thinking a little bit about this question, that there are two sides over this, right? And in, of course, my favorite book, The Summa Contra Gentiles, Thomas, in one place, will argue that there is, what, desire, because he says, when we know that something exists, right, we naturally want to know what it is. When we know that God exists, therefore we naturally want to know what God is. So we must have some natural desire to see God as He is, right? Or he says, when we know an effect, we naturally want to know its cause. But we know this effect called being in general, right, which is what a wise man studies, right? But therefore he naturally wants to know the cause of this, huh? And that's God, right? So it's a natural desire, right? Okay. But then there are other texts in Thomas where he seems to say, you know, that you need, what, faith, right? And you could say to somebody, do we know what God is? If you don't know what God is, you don't know what it is to see God, do you? And if you don't know what it is to see God, how can you want it? This may be like people are looking for the cure for cancer. Yeah. Yeah. And I say, well, simply, right, or perfectly, right? Because it's going to be a picture of means perfectly or completely, right? We don't know naturally or philosophically even, perfectly or completely, what it would be to know God, right? But in some way, you know, in some way, in a perfect way, right, huh? So maybe that distinction you could give to show these texts of Thomas are in harmony, right, huh? And therefore you don't have to choose one over the other, right? That's what affects me, right, huh? Or another thing was, you know, Thomas was in the Summa Conjunctilas. Because he's showing, you know, that man's happiness, than he naturally desires, he doesn't really have his happiness, right, in his life. He's going to have to find his happiness after his life, huh? What about his master now, Aristalt, right? When we look at Machinetics, right, takes up what happiness is, right? And first of all, he defines it in the first book, right? And then more fully, he develops what it is in the 10th book, huh? And Thomas says, of course, Aristalt is facing these objections from the poets and from Solon, you know, call no man happy until he be dead, right? You never know until it can happen, right? But it's something you want in happiness. You want it forever, right? And so on. So you can see reasons to say that we don't have happiness in this life, huh? And you might get Alzheimer's or something, right? And, you know, I don't even know what this is in front of me here, you know? You know, with Regan there, he had Alzheimer's. They'd play, you know, because not great, he didn't know what the heck that was all about. He'd put his point in front of me or put some of God and Gentiles in front of me. I don't know what that is, you know, if I'm going to get him here by my Latin son. So, but Aristalt, you know, seems to reject, you know, that, as an argument, right? But then he says, finally, you know, that what? They will be happy as men, he says. What does that say? Is that speaking, is that some pichitir? Or is he couldn't have quit? Yeah, happy as men, right? He had that uncertainty, right? And at least you're going to die, too, you know? And so, you can be happy in this life as men can be happy, right? But that's not happiness in the perfect sense, right? So, he's not opposing Aristalt, right? He said that Aristotle is what? He's teaching there, right? This is the way to be happy as a man to be happy in this life, right? Could you join with that what Aristotle says elsewhere, which I'm hearing you say about we should not live merely as men, we should live like God. Yeah, even there he's talking, you know, in the 10th book, he distinguishes two kinds of happiness, right? And one's a kind of human happiness, right? Which is according to, what, foresight, the virtue that perfects the practical reason, right? And especially the foresight of the leader of the city, right? And so, when Churchill got to be, you know, prime minister, he felt happy, right? He had arrived, you know, and he could lead the country in this great war and so on. And, but then Aristotle spoke of another happiness, right, which is more divine, right? And that's the happiness that you have in possessing, what, wisdom, right? But the wisdom we can get by natural reason makes us, what, nevertheless happy as men and not perfectly happy, right? So maybe there's not a contradiction between, you know? Because Aristotle is silent about, at least in the text we have, you know, about happiness after life, right? And Plato, when he talks about happiness in the next life, he stops the dialogue, gives him muthas, huh? He says in the text, right? So, Socrates, in a couple of the dialogues, he stops his usual way of proceeding, right, in the dialogue, which is reasoning, you know? And he tells a muthas about this condition, or what happens to the soul after what? Yeah. Yeah, so why does he tell muthas, right? Well, because what happens to the soul after death, in any complete way, you know, escapes natural reason, right? And so, he's kind of indicating that by talking muthas, and not trying to proceed, as he does in the dialogues, right? Which is an argumentative way, but Aristotle, what we have is to silence us to it, even though he knew that the soul was going to survive death, right? Well, I was saying, until last night, Aristotle said to have died, you know, by overwork, right? That's the account, so he was still trying to learn, you know, even, so he wasn't completely satisfied, obviously, right? He was still trying to learn about the moon and the stars, and animals, and plants, and so on, right? And who knows what else? So, it's important to see a distinction there, right, you know? Between happiness simply, right? Happiness in some diminished or imperfect way, right? Ah. Well, okay. And in some improved way, we can be happy in this life, right? Okay? Unless you ate a puss or something, and you fall into these things, right? You know, Shakespeare, you know, in this terrible play, Titus Andronicus, right? Which, in the first complete edition of Shakespeare plays I had, a little introduction said, began with, this disgusting play. It's got all these horrible things, a Greek tragedy, you know, eating your son, you know, and some big stuff. And meals, all these horrible things. People had tongues cut off, all kinds of horrible things. But it begins, you know, coming back from the battle, right? And, of course, Titus is saying, you know, that those who have died glorious in battle, they're assured of their happiness, right? But those of us who have survived the battle, right, we never know, right? Of course, he reads the rest of the play. It's like what happens to Oedipus, or, you know, or to Crayon or something, and suffered these great tragedies and so on. So Shakespeare's aware of that, you know, and Aristotle's aware of that. But we could still be happy as men, right? We could avoid the misfortunes of Oedipus or Crayon. The answer should be said that something is said to be general in two ways, huh? Now here's a distinction coming up. In one way, by being said, all right, predication in Latin. Just as animal is general with respect to what? Yeah. In another way, by what? Cause. As long as you see this distinction state in Latin, the universale in predicando, right? Which is general in the first way, per predicationum. And then the universale in what? Causando, right? Ron MacArthur, the former president of TAC there, he tells about being trapped with another guy from Laval, you know, and driving along, and the sun coming up. It's a gorgeous sun, you know. And the other guy says, look at that universale, Causando, you know. Just throwing the whole sky, you know. And he never said calling. Well, only a man who knew these distinctions would speak that way of the beautiful sun, right? Another way, by cause, as the sun is the general cause. of all things which are generated in these, what, lower things, right? According to Dionysius, huh? And when do we use the word general in the second sense? Right, the army. Yeah, so Douglas MacArthur, general of the army, right? But in the other sense, the general would be, what, soldier, right? Soldier is set of everybody in the army, right? And MacArthur's not set of everybody in the army, right? But he's the, what, universalist causality, right? He's moving the whole army, directing the whole army, commanding the whole army, right? So those are the two senses of general, right? Student, I mean, soldier, and, yeah, teacher now. He's universal in Kazando, right? You're looking at universal in Kazando here, see? But student is general in another sense, right? Okay. Just as the sun is the general cause of all things which are generated in these lower things, right? According to Dionysius, in the fourth chapter, Divine Names, right, huh? And for Dionysius, it speaks, you know, the sun is being kind of a metaphor for God, right? Of course, it's kind of beautiful when they develop that metaphor, huh? Because the sun enlightens the world before it, what? Yeah. And so God enlightens our minds by faith before he wants them by, what? Charity. Charity, right? That's why in that beautiful Ukrainian German day, right, they quote Augustine at the end, right? That by believing, you might come to hope, and by hope, you might come to, what? Love, right, huh? Now, it points out something else about this. For just as the genus contains many differences in what? Power. Yeah. Now, that's in the, what? Passive sense of power, right, huh? Now, when Aristotle distinguishes, in Greek word, of course, is a dunamis, right? But you have the passive sense of power, right? Which is the kind of ability that matter has, right? And then the, what? Yeah. The power of the maker, right? The mover, right, huh? And Aristotle says, you know, the first sense is the active power. Now, you see, when you translate to a dunamis, or potencia in Latin, by power in English, power is stuck in the first meaning, okay? So, myself, when I would teach that book there, I would use the term ability, right? Because with ability, although we would think, first of all, as we should, that it's active, right, huh? You know, I say, the pianist playing the piano, who's got ability, the piano or the pianist? You think of the pianist, right, huh? But the, what? The piano is playable, right, huh? Okay. Or I say, if you put Perkis in the ring with a crash of clay or something, right? And Perkis gets beat around, you see, he's got no ability there, right? But he's beatable, he's breakable, right? So, you use the word able there, right, huh? But by what sense of ability is Perkis beatable or breakable, right? Yeah. The ability to, what, undergo something, right, huh? The ability to be acted upon, right, huh? Now, the genus is more like that ability, right? And that's why we see the genus is to the species a bit like matter is to, what, form, right? So, just as the matter can be formed in different ways, right, so the genus can be, what, formed, in a sense, by different differences, right, to different, what, species, huh? But he's making a beautiful comparison. Just as the genus contains many different potestate, right? Now, if you translate it power, you've got a problem in English, right? Yeah, yeah. Because it's kind of stuck there in the first. According to the likeness of matter, which is pointed out by Aristotle and pointed out by, in the Acts of Golgi, right, by Porphyry, right? He talks about genus and differences and so on. And, of course, species probably comes from the word for form, right? So, likewise, the agent cause contains many effects according to a, what, active power, right? In Virtu, Jesus, there's a syndrome for power, right? Okay. So, you know, you take the senses of in there in the fourth book of the soul, I mean, in the nature, the physics, so-called. Well, the first three meanings of in are something actually in something. You and I are in this room, right, huh? I have teeth in my mouth, the second sense. The genus is in the species, right? But then the fourth sense is the reverse of that. The species is in the genus. And then it's in that, what, passive ability, right? And then the fifth sense is, what, the form is in the matter, right? In the first ability. And then the whole is in the parts, right? And then it comes to, you're in my power, right? The efficient cause, right? That's the other sense, right? But there's a certain likeness there, right? You know? It's interesting, huh? To move from the active to, you know? Yeah. But I mean, among the senses of ability there, you come to the sense then of the species in the genus and form and matter before you get me being in your power or something like that. Now, it happens that some effect is produced from a coming together, right? They're running together of diverse causes, right? And because every cause in some way remains in the effect. It can be said also in a third way that the effect produced from the bringing together of many causes has a, what? A kind of generality, right? Insofar as it contains many causes, in a way, in act, right? Okay? So you resemble your mother or your father maybe. Maybe in different ways, right? Okay? Now, in the first way, in the way that he spoke of as, what, genus, right? Anger is not a general passion, right? It's not like the genus of passions, right? Like that one objection was saying, you know, the irascible is what's common to all these passions here. But it's divided against the other passions, as has been said above. Likewise, it is not in the second way he says, right? For it is not a cause of the other passions, right? But in this second way, that can be called a general passion, love, right? So love gives rise to desire in the absence of the object. It gives rise to what? Pleasure, right? In the presence of that, right? It gives rise in some sense to what? Fear, is there something going to... But it's kind of like universal cause, right? Later on, they say the charity, which is a kind of love, right? Is the form of all the virtues, right? But it gives rise to something of itself, right? It stamps all the other ones, huh? For love, he says, as Augustine says... Which is Augustine's always quoting? In the 14th book about the city of God, right? Love is the, what, first root, huh? That's nice. Love that word. Love is the first root of all the passions, as has been said above, right? So love is most general passion in what sense? Not that it's said that it is, right? Because desire is not love. Pleasure is not love, right? Fear is not love, right? But it's general in the sense of being what? Universal cause, right? Like the sun that makes the grass grow, but the trees grow, and the bushes grow, and all these different things. But in a third way now, huh? Anger can be called a general passion, insofar as it is caused from the running together of many, what? Passions, huh? So am I an individual man, or am I just my mother and father? Am I really an individual, or am I just my mother and father over again? Yeah. But in some sense, I am my mother and my father again, right? Sitting here with my cousin Donald after my father died. He says, that's just like your father. And I said, I said, what? Something I was doing, you know. That's my sister when I was in Chicago in December. My sister-in-law. She was waiting for me in the car and I had to run out of the building, and I get in the car and she says, you run just like your brother, which is her husband. And of course, afterwards I thought, that's because my brother runs just like my father. That's why we both run a lot, because we're just like that. The outsiders think me and my brothers, they're also saved, they're also saved, you know. They're not wrong, they're different, you know. To the outsiders, they'll be like, you know. Now, how's this Saul, he starts to explain this. For there's not rise up the motion of anger, except on account of some, what? Sadness. Sadness, huh? Provoked in you. And unless there also be the desire, right, and even the hope of getting evil, yeah. Because, as the philosopher says in the second book of the rhetoric, the man who is angry has the hope of what? Punishing, right? But if you were too weak and you couldn't possibly do anything, you might just fear this guy, right? He's affecting pain upon you, right? He's afraid he's going to do more to you, right? And you don't even think of rising up. Okay? So, but the angry man, huh, has the hope of punishing, right, huh? Again, that's a sign that hope is more of a primary emotion, right, than anger. He desires, what, vindictum, huh? Venge, I guess, as possible for him, right? Venge, if a very excelling person it is who bestows the harm upon you, there's not foul anger, but only sadness, as Avicenna says, right, in his book about the soul. So, does he mean, does he mean just excelling like he's superior at strength or whatever? Yeah, yeah, yeah. You can't possibly think of fighting back against this guy, right? You just want to escape from him, right? Terribly afraid he's going to harm you more. You're not thinking of revenging him for what he's done, getting even to what he's done. He's afraid he's going to do more to you, right? Like the people who lost a constant failure, they couldn't do anything. They're completely wrong. Yeah. Or, it's just occurred to me, maybe there's some kind of comparison you could make, it may not be what he's referring to, but I think of that line in the Psalms, if a just man strikes or reproves me of his kindness, to have that insight that a good man is punishing you, you might just accept that you're not going to seek revenge. But that's a different thing, that's what I'm talking about anger. Or the lack of fear. Yeah. It's like his husbands, you know, misbehaving with their wives, you know, and hitting him, you know. Sometimes you get the wife and get angry enough to shoot the guy. Yeah. But I mean, for the most part, they might just have a pooper, you know. That's what they do. They're afraid of him again, you know. Yeah, yeah, yeah. And they don't think of it, even. Yeah. That's what there is in the story. The story about the children who are being abused by their father over, and over, and over, and over. And finally the son grew up, and he shot his father because he was sick attack. Not just for himself, but he was watching his sister get beaten repeatedly. Yeah. He had enough to kill his father, which is awful. Now, when he applied the first objection, he's going to touch upon the way this power is named, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said that the irascible power is named from what? Anger. Anger, not because every motion of this power is an anger, right? But because to anger are terminated all the motions of this power. And also because among other motions of it, it is more what? Manifest, right? I can understand that second reason better than the first, right? We can see somewhat how hope leads to what? Anger, right? I think the reason why the appetitive power in general is named from what? Desire, right, huh? And not from love, right? Because appetitous means desire, right? That's the word appetite, huh? Even carrying over into English. And it goes back to what Shakespeare says. Things in motion sooner catch the eye but not stir us. And desire is like a what? Motion. An emotion towards something, right? Why pleasure is more like resting in the thing, right? And love is not necessarily the type of motion. I can't get the source of it, but motion is what stands out for, right? And anger is a very strong motion, right? Movement, right? And so we name things by what's most known. Now to the second one about contrariety. From this, that anger is caused from contrary passions, to wit from hope, right? Which is of the good, right? And from sadness, which is of the bad, right? It includes in itself some contrariety, right? And therefore does not have a contrary outside itself, huh? Just as in the middle colors, right? There is not found contrariety, huh? Except which is of the simple colors like black and white or something, from which they are what? Caused, right? Hot and cold, right? Nukewarm is the kind of mixture of the contraries. And then the last one talked about anger including many passions. Well, anger includes many passions, he says, and he applied to the third actions. Not as a genus species, right? But more according to the containing of a cause and effect. Question? I thought we said, to give an example, if a person can't get revenge, he's angry, he can't get revenge because he's overpowered by this person. Yeah. He's not angry with them, he's sad. Yeah, yeah. And he fears maybe to be, if anything, hurt more, right? He's afraid they've got to do more to him, right? Well, fear kind of excludes, in that sense, hope, right? You know? I don't hope to revenge myself in this brute, but I fear he's going to maybe harm me more, right? You know? I hope he knows. I hope he's not going to beat me more. You know? Is sorrow saddens? What? Is sorrow saddens? Is he using this? Yeah, yeah. Well, it says here, from the very fact that anger is caused by contrary passions, he says, by hope, which is good, and by sorrow, which is illegal. Yeah, see, I get angry because, partly because you're causing me some sadness, right? You're causing me pain, right? You could be more spiritual sadness, you know, you're insulting me and so on, right? But it also arises from hope of being able to get even with you, right? Or to punish you, you know, to avenge myself upon you, right? So, it arises both from sadness, which is about something bad, the insult of the pain you're causing me, and the hope that I can avenge myself, right? That I can get even with you, right? Pay your back! You know? So, it's kind of, has something of both in it, but that doesn't mean that it is those other two, right? I have something of my father in me, right? And I have something of my mother, right? And sometimes I see, you know, that I was influenced probably more by my father than how I think. I don't think I think much about my mother. But my emotions probably are influenced more by my mother, right? You know? So, you see that you're influenced in some way by your father, in some way by your, what? Mother, right? I can't really enjoy a dirty joke that my mother used to do. Dirty jokes, you know, huh? And not to have a Puritan, you know, but I just can't, I can't enjoy it. It doesn't, it doesn't, it doesn't, it doesn't, you know, people kind of always, people have an expression of themselves. I just can't, I can't relish those ways. I can't, I can't use them myself, you know, huh? It just, it just doesn't, so I have an emotional reaction to these things, you know? But that's my mother, you know, huh? Has there been anything ever said about anger as it applies to political systems? It sounds like a comment coming out of the left field, but if you think about it. Yeah, Aristotle talked about that in politics, yeah. Yeah, yeah. With like a democracy or a republic, you can be angry and take it out in the voting booth. Yeah. But under some sort of totalitarian regime, you are a cow of this admission. So there is no hope. Yeah. And there is only sadness and no anger, necessarily. Yeah. That's why my whole impression of communist Russia was that it was grey skies every day. It was like, grey. It was the, you know, evening there, remember that commercial. Everything is, there is no change and there is nothing you can do about it. Yeah. That's my emotional reaction. Thank you very much. Thank you very much.