Prima Secundae
Lecture 115: Fear as a Special Passion of the Soul

Transcript
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To the second, one goes forward thus. It seems that fear is not the name of a special passion, right? For Augustine says in the book on 83 questions, that the one whom, what, fears it, does not, what, take away his soul or spirit, right, then? Nor does, what, cupidity, desire, waste it. Nor agritudo, that is, sadness. Tears it, I suppose. Nor a vein and, what's just yin's there? Did not ventilate, huh? From which it seems that having removed fear, all other passions are removed, huh? Therefore, it is not a, what? Special passion, but a, what? Genuine, it's a condition, maybe, of passions, right? Moreover, the philosopher says in the sixth book of the Ethics, that pursuit and flight have themselves in the appetite, the repetitive power, as affirmation and negation in the, what? Understanding, right, huh? If I pursue something, I'm affirming it, right? And when I see it, I'm negating it, right? But negation is not something special in the intellect, just as neither is affirmation, but something, what? Common to many, right, huh? Therefore, neither is flight in the appetite, but fear is nothing other than a certain flight from the evil, from the bad. And therefore, fear is not a special, what? Passion. Moreover, if fear were a special passion, you would be especially found in the irascible, right? But there's also a fear in the concupisable, as if you're confusing the issue here. For the philosopher says in the second book of the Rhetoric, that fear is a certain sadness. Now, it's strange thing that Aristotle doesn't say that. And the Damascene says that fear is a virtus desiderativa. That's the thing that quoted in the last passage, right, remember? Desiderativa. But tristitia and desire are in the concupisable, as has been said above. Therefore, it is not a special passion, since it pertains to what diverse powers, right? But against this, that it's divided against the other passions of the soul, as is clear by Damascene. Or from Damascene, in the second book of the Orthodox faith. Now, Thomas' reply is fairly short here. I answer, it should be said, that the passions of the soul receive their, what? Species, as opposed to the genus, right? From their, what? Objects, right? Whence, that is a special passion, which has a special, what? Object, huh? But fear has a special object, just as hope is a special object. For just as the object of hope is a, what? Good, future, arduous, possible through obtained. So there's four parts in the definition of what? Hope, right? I mean, I used to do the object of hope. It's a good that is future, but difficult, yet possible to be obtained, right? She used to tell the students, they'd say, defining is like spelling. Leave one letter out, you've misspelled the word, you know? And I remember there used to be some of those tough assumptionists, you know? They'd say, you know, you hand in the paper, you know, a written thing, one misspelling, your thing is Lord one great. Wow. You can imagine after having that happen to you, each guy reads the other guy's over, and they read your other thing over, you make sure there's no misspelling in that thing, you know, it's just, wait, huh? But a definition is a very exact thing, right? And then, you know, I before E, except after, et cetera. So if the order of the letters is not correct, it's misspelled too, right? Well, it's like the definition, there's a lot more definition than that, but I mean, there's a, what? Yeah, you've got a number of parts, and if one of them is missing, you haven't fully defined it, and there's a order among the parts, right? So notice the order here, right? Bonum, something good, that's the most fundamental, right? But it's a good that is in the future, right? Not one that is, what? Present, right? And it's, now, now, it's just a bonum futurum alone, and that would fit, what else besides hope? Yeah. It's desire is for a good that is in the future, right? I want to eat, right? Okay, well then, eating is in the future, right? And it's something good, presumably. Okay? So you have to add then the arduum, right? That's about a future good that is arduous. But would there be hope if you thought you couldn't, what? Overcome that difficulty, you couldn't attain the thing, right? No. So, four things in the object of hope, right? Now, if you leave one of those out, you have misdefined, right? And if you put them in some different order, you are going to be, have your grade in order, what a grade of purpose, okay? Just so you're forewarned, right? Okay? So, likewise, the object of fear is, and those are what he gives first. Malum, huh? It's something bad, huh? Is it evil that's already been forced upon you? No. It's the evil that is what? Future, right? But if we stopped with malum futurum, that would fit also what? Aversion. The opposite of desire, right? Okay? If we stopped in malum, it would fit even eight, right? Eight, huh? Okay? But futurum, and if we stopped with malum, we would figure sadness, too, right? But futurum separates it from what? Yeah, which is about the present good, right? Okay? And hate is not what? It's for either present or future. It's different, I think. But then, you have to add this fourth part, right? Third part. Difficulate, right? Okay? And then, to which the one cannot, what? Resist. Yeah. The order that you named? The order that Thomas gives it, yeah. There is, there is a future, good, difficult, and possible to obtain. Yeah. That's the other thing, okay? Well, that's for hope. That's for fear. Yeah, not for you, it's a malum, future, difficult, ko resisti, non potas, right? You think you can't resist, you can't, you know. Whence fear is a special passion of the soul, right? But you get to see that, when the object is defined in this way, by these four parts, right, then you see that it really is a special object, then. Now, what about the first objection here, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said, that all passions of the soul, are derived from one beginning, right? To wit, from love, right? In which they have to each other, a, what? A connection, So reason looks before and after, right? It's just an order among these, but then love is before all the rest, right? And, by reason of this connection, when fear is removed, one removes other passions in the soul, not because it is a, what? Passion, a general passion, would be something said of, of many passions, right? So if I love steak, and when I don't have steak, I want steak, right? When I have steak, I enjoy it, right? And if the dog gets the steak, then I'm angry, right? And so on. So you see, All these things are arising from what? Love, but they're not love, right? My anger at the dog is not love, right? Love is not anger. And my love is not my what? Desire, right? After I satisfy myself with the snake, then I still love it. But I don't have any desire for it. What about flight now? Well, if you just said flight alone, maybe you could argue this way, right? To the second, it should be said that not every what? Fleeing, you know, of the appetite is fear. But flight from a what? Some special object, right? And therefore, although fuga is something general, right? Nevertheless, fear is a special what? Passion, right? To the third, it should be said that fear in no way is in the what? Incubisible, right? For it does not regard the bad absolutely, but the bad with some difficulty or harshness, right? And one to which one hardly, vixen, is able to resist, right? But now, it's an important thing, because it's a man who looks before and after, right? But because the passions of the irascible are both derived from the passions of concubisible, like we said that what? Hope and what? Despair arise from what? Desire, right, huh? And fear and boldness from what? Aversion, right, huh? Okay? And anger, you know, will rise mainly from sadness, right? Or pain. So, they're both derived from the passions of the concubisible, and they, what? Terminate them, right, huh? Okay? So, if you escape, you know, the thing you fear, you might have some, you know? And, but if you don't escape, you know, then there's going to be sadness, right, huh? Okay? And because of that connection, right, that they derive from or they into them, then to fear is attributed sometimes those things which pertain to the, what? Cubisible. Cubisible, right, huh? For fear is said to be sadness insofar as the object of, what? Fear is something that saddens us, right? If it were present, right, right? Whence the philosopher says there that fear proceeds from the, what? Imagining of some future evil that would be corrupting of one or saddening of one, right? Likewise, also, desire is attributed by Damascene to fear, because just as hope arises from the desire for the good, so, what? Fear from the fleeing from the evil, right? But the flight from evil arises from the desire for the good, right? So, I want to save my life, so I flee the, you know, the murderer or something. So, you can see that sometimes in our way of speaking there, you can use the adjective to name the, what? Cause or the effect of something, right? What's the vicious blow? And the proceeds of vice of the cause of the body. Can you get time for another one here? Yeah, sure. Okay. Whether there is... some natural fear, right? To the third one goes forward thus, it seems that some fear is natural, right? For Damascene says in the third book that there is a certain natural fear, the soul not wishing to be divided from the body, right? I was just reading there about in the Gospel of St. John there, you know, Thomas is talking about Christ and yeah, the fear of death, right? This is natural, he's letting the natural emotion of the body, right, arise there in him, huh? What does this mean? Is Thomas going to deny that there's a natural fear? Some people are naturally lazy, laziness is a kind of fear. When somebody say, you know, work fascinates me, I can watch other people working, you know. Fear arises from love, as has been said, right, huh? But some love is what? Natural, right? As Dionysius says in the fourth chapter of the Divine Names. Therefore also there must be some what? Some natural fear, right? What Thomas was saying there, that error is a magnaparism his area, right? He's fearing, huh? He loves truth, he fears error, right? It's natural love truth, isn't it? Yeah. Moreover, fear is opposed to hope, as has been said above. But some hope is of what? Nature. Which is clear through what is said in Romans 4.18 about Abraham. Against the hope of nature, he believed in the hope of what? Grace. Grace, huh? Therefore also there is some what? Fear that is natural, right? Fear. But against those things which are natural are commonly found in both what? Animate and inanimate things, huh? But fear is not found in what? Inanimate things. And therefore fear is not natural, right? And you go to the nursery and they say, what? This plant wants a lot of sun or wants a lot of water or wants broccoli is a big feeder and so on. And so we use the terms like, you know, desire, right? But we speak of fear, right? You know? Flower fears too much. We might say, you know, this plant doesn't like a lot of sun, right? Or I guess your cacti, you know, you can't feel too much or something or, you know? But you wouldn't say that this plant fears the sun, would you say that? No. It has something to do with the fact that the irascible is closer to reason, right? You see? And so you're more apt to speak of natural desire in the plants than natural fear or, you know, to plant hopes to produce the shear. You see? No, farmer hopes to produce the shear. Yeah, yeah. Well, let's see. This is Thomas. Interesting guy, this Thomas, huh? I wonder what his table of conversation was like. Yeah. How was his taps and mic? I like his light conversation. See, I know the one story where Thomas was at the dinner table of the King Lewis, right? You heard that story, right? And somehow in the middle of the dinner, he slapped everything and he said, that finishes the Manichaeans. And everybody's looking at him, you know? And of course he has to apologize, you know? Yeah. But he was thinking out an argument against the Manichaeans, right? And then all of a sudden, you know? And of course, being a saint, St. Louis, you know, it's not, you know, quickly, somebody write down what Thomas has thought of, you know? That's what he said, you know? So, kind of a marvelous contact between the two of them. I think you can do a nice comparison to Aristotle with Alexander the Great and Thomas with St. Louis. Aristotle had a falling out of Alexander later on. Well, I answer, Thomas says, that it should be said that some motion is said to be natural because nature inclines to it, right? But this happens in two ways, huh? In one way that the whole is perfected by nature without any operation of the knowing power, just as to move upwards is a natural motion of what? Fire. And to grow is a natural motion of animals and what? Plants, huh? In another way, emotion is natural to which nature inclines, right? Although is not perfected except through what? Knowledge. Yeah. Let's use the word apprehension, right? If I use the word grasping for knowing. Yeah, yeah. Because knowing takes place by the known being in the knower, right? As opposed to love, which takes place by the lover being in the loved, huh? I left my heart in San Francisco, right? But learning, you're trying to get something into your mind, huh? So it's kind of a contrariety between the two, right? So we tend to use the word take for the mind, right? But not to characterize love. Love is more to give, right? Okay. But to take and to give are kind of what? Contrary, right? But it shows the kind of contrariety between the movement of knowing and coming to know and that of loving, right? So love, in a sense, like Thomas says there, what, ecstasy, right? You go outside of yourself, right? So we always go back to the example of Augustine there, you know, where he's thinking about the Trinity and he meets the little boy in the seashore and the little boy is running down to the ocean and he's dug a hole and he's putting water in there and Gus says, what are you trying to do? And he says, but they're in the ocean, they're in the hole here. Gus says, you can't get that in there. And the little boy says, you can't fit the Trinity into your mind either, you know? So, but notice, you could jump into the ocean, right? You know, so the, so the way is to say the will is more proportioned to God, right? And then the what? Yeah. Yeah. See, I can more jump into the ocean, right? Then I can put the ocean inside of me. But to know something, you got to get into your head, right? So you use the word apprehension, which is in the hand. You grasp something, it's contained in the hand, right? Okay. That's why the parable of the judgment, that's when God says, enter into the joy of the Lord. Mm-hmm. Because we can't get it into us. Mm-hmm. We can't get it. Mm-hmm. But in the beatific vision, you see, God is, is joined to our mind is that by which we see it, and not only what we see, but that by which we see. Because we can't, we can't see God as he is by one of our thoughts, but by God himself being joined to our mind, right? We should be like him, because we shall see him as he is, right? As light, we shall see like him. So, in another way, he says then, emotion is called natural, to which nature inclines, although it is not perfected, except through, what? Apprehension, through grasping. That's a good English word, huh? Knowledge. Because, as has been said above, the emotion of the knowing and of the, what? Desiring power are reduced to nature as to a first, what? Beginning, huh? And in this way, also, the acts of the knowing power as to understand and to, what? Sense and to remember. And also, the emotions of the, what? Repetitive animal power. Thank you. sometimes, what, called natural, right, huh, okay, but they're not just natural, right, and in this way, one can perhaps speak of a, what, a natural fear, right, huh, and it's distinguished from a fear that is not natural according to the diversity of the, what, object, right, for as the philosopher says in the second book of the rhetoric, now why does Thomas go to the second book of rhetoric, and he's talking about the emotions, yeah, it's one of the means of persuasion, right, huh, so rhetoric is the art of persuasion, right, and Aristotle distinguishes three means of persuasion, right, the image you projected yourself, you know, as a man who's noble, got your good in mind, feels your pain, and then the second means is the way you move the, what, emotions and prejudices and so on of the people, and then the third is the arguments or parent arguments, which are at least a four to me, and so, Aristotle talks about a whole number of emotions there, right, in particular as to how they are, what they are, and how they are aroused, and how they're, what, uh, quieted down, and so on, right, huh, and then, uh, you, uh, that's the reason why Thomas soon refer out a lot to the rhetoric, right, you know, because Aristotle says a lot of very nice things there about the emotions in particular. The deanimators go into the emotions that much in detail, right, for as the philosopher says in the second book of rhetoric, fear is about something bad that is corruptive of oneself, right, which nature refuses an account of the natural desire of being, right, and therefore such a fear is called, what, natural, right, huh, there's also a, what, an evil that saddens, that is not repugnant to nature, but is repugnant to the desire of the desiring power, and such a fear is not, what, natural in the fullest sense, right, just as above love, desire, and what, and pleasure are distinguished by natural and what, not natural, right, but according to the first exception or taking of the word natural, it should be known that, uh, some of the passions of the soul are sometimes, what, called natural, ones like, what, love and desire and hope, while others are not able to be, what, yeah, and this because love and hate, desire and flight, imply a certain inclination to pursuing the good and fleeing the bad, which inclination pertains to the, what, and therefore, there's a love that is natural, right, huh, and desire or hope can be in some way said even in natural things, yeah, oh no, it's strange to say hope there, huh, but other passions of the soul implies certain emotions to which in no way does the natural inclination suffice, either because it's of the notion of these passions, that there be sense or knowledge, right, which apprehension is required for the notion of what? Pleasure and sadness, right? So can the tree be, is this tree ever said to be joyful or sad? I don't think you say that about the tree, right? You have to be in some way aware of this, right? To be joyful or sad, right? But you would say that the tree likes water, you know, the tree wants water, you know, you see, who would say that in the house there, you know, the plant isn't in water or something and it's drooping, you know, they want some water, yeah, yeah, but you wouldn't say that it delights in the water, I think so. Yeah, so the willow tree, they seek the source of water, they destroy your foundations, you bite them, and the other, they seek water. Whence things that lack knowledge cannot be said to what? Or because motions of this sort are against the notion of what? As desperation, despair, refuses the good on account of difficulty, right? And fear refuses the fighting of the what? Contra evil, to which there is a natural combination. And therefore, the passions of this sort in no way are attributed to inanimate things, huh? Yeah, right. And so we're so frightened by something, so fearful that they can't resist the bad. When they talk about wine, I mean, about vineyards, you know, and how they have a poor soil, right, huh? And they have to make an effort to, it's a little bit like hope, right, huh? And that they're, they're improved by this sort of thing, right? Maybe hope would be applied a little bit to them, at least making an effort, right? In no way would you speak of pleasure pain, right? I saw off a branch, you know. I'm just, you're feeling like that makes it a stick or something, you know? But then causing the plant any pain, right, huh? When they cut back on the plant, it wants to grow out there, you know? You know, we have this, this thing that goes over the, you know, we have to kind of, oh, it's got to be cut mostly, so it's going on. It's all underneath the deck and so on. Music things, some of these things. We have time for one more article or what? Sure. We have to get to this question here. Yeah. Yeah. Whether you are suitable or assigned a species of fear, right? Well, this is apparently something that Damascene does, huh? To the fourth, one goes forward thus. It seems that unsuitably, Damascene assigns six species of fear. To wit, signitium, what is that? Sloth, sluggard, less weak, feeble. Laziness, does it mean like that? Okay. Shame, eruditionium, right? Yeah. Another part of this, too. Yeah, so what's the difference between viracundium, eruditionium? What is it? Shame, facetiveness. Well, what's the other one? There's one after it. Shame, facetiveness, and shame. Shame, facetiveness, and shame, that's helpful. We'll see that again in the body article. Admirationum is what? Wonder. Yeah. Stupor. So you see, I admire somebody, right? Stupor, huh? What is that? Overwhelming, maybe. Yeah. An agonium, huh? It's a Greek of struggle, but I don't know what the name is. Anxiety. Anxiety. Well, this is really getting difficult stuff here now. For as the philosopher says in the second book of the rhetoric, fear is about an evil that is what? Sadness. Yeah. Therefore, the species of fear ought to correspond to the species of sadness, huh? But there are four species of sadness, as has been said above. Therefore, there ought to be only four species of fear corresponding to them. I hate to be involved in a debate with Thomas, right? Polarizing. He made me make it. I'd have erubricentium, and I'd be red in the face. And I remember when I was teaching in California there at St. Murray's College there, you know, in the University of California, and they wanted us to come down there and put on a medieval debate, you know. So, see what it was like. Moreover, number two, that which consists in our act, right, huh, is subject to our power. But fear is about something bad that exceeds our power, as has been said. Therefore, what? We said laziness, right? Shame and so on. We'll see what those things are more particularly. Which we guard our operation should not be, what? Lay down a species of fear, right, huh? Because they're... They seem to be related to what we're in. Yeah, yeah. I can do the shameful act or not, right? Yeah. Moreover, fear is about the future, as has been said. But veracundia is about a bad act, I mean a... Shameful act. Shameful act, yeah. Jan Kamiso. Well, that's in the past, right? So I'm embarrassed to confess my sins, right? But sins are in the past, yeah. Therefore, veracundia. It's not a species of what? Fear, right? Moreover, fear is not except about the bad. But wonder and stupor are about the great and the not customary, right? Whether it be good or bad, right? Therefore, wonder and stupor are not species of what? Fear, yeah. Now, the fifth article. Moreover, the philosophers from wonder are moved to inquiring the truth, as is said in the beginning of the physics. But fear does not move one to inquire, but more to flee. There you go. Therefore, wonder is not a species of fear. What are we going to do with this? I don't know, Michael. But in the contrary, suffices the authority of Damascene and Gregory Nyssa, which is apparently not Gregory Nyssa's. Well, this one didn't make reference. It says Damascene and the bottom of the light page. Oh, wait. You may not. Yeah, up above they said that, yeah. The third injection. So what else is that, young man, down there? Thomas thinks it's Gregory of Nyssa, and the footnote says it's in Amysseus. What? Accidental equivocation? Yeah, equivocation, yeah. Gregory. Yeah, Gregory. There's a lot of examples of this thing, right? In history, you know, where even scholars, you know, have got the wrong person, right? Damascene. Yeah. That's a tough thing. I saw some of you, our friend there, he and his wife had died, they had the same name as the other man and his wife, you know? They're not the two men of the same name, but each man had the same name for his wife, you know? I mean, there's all kinds of things, you know? Yeah. And I remember an assumption there, and there was a guy whose name was Michael Joplin or something like that. He said, Joplin has died, and I guess it's some kind of a band guy, you know? Well, it wasn't the guy who did it if I was to get their friend, you know, and a little bit, right? That's a common thing, right? I think the Greek commentator sometimes, they'll take the example of the individual man's name, right, to illustrate the facility of this question. My brother Mark and I were teaching, what's this D-Berquist, M-Berquist? You're confusing the students. Thomas, we need you here now. The answer should be said that, as has been said, fear is about a future evil that exceeds the power of the one, what? Fearing. That he's not able to, what? Exist it. Yeah. Now, just as the good of man, so also the evil man is able to be considered either in his, what? Operation itself or in exterior things, right? Now, in the operation of the man himself, a two-fold evil can be, what? Feared, right? First, a labor weighing down the, what? Nature. And this and thus has caused, what? Yeah. Signitia, is that the way you translate it? Laziness? Right. Okay. When one refuses to operate on account of fear of the excessive, what? Labor. Labor, huh? Secondly, the, what, disgrace, I guess, turpitude, which, what, destroys one's interpretation. And thus, if turpitude is feared in committing the act, there is, what? Shame. Shame. If, however, it is about something, yeah, it is your kundi, right? What I call one embarrassment, you're embarrassed when something happens, whereas, it's past, you're ashamed of the past. Yeah. So, we can translate into shame and embarrassment for me and a half. Embarrassment, I would think of embarrassment as something present. I was embarrassed because I got caught doing this, I was really embarrassed, whereas I'm ashamed of something I've done, ashamed of my past, because I think we speak down a bit. Yeah, yeah, like the politics now, they're always looking around, you know, seeing something shameful in the guy's past that they can bring forward, right? Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah You shouldn't say I'm more ashamed of some things in my past and I'm embarrassed by them, right? You know, I'm embarrassed by something happening right now, you know? So, what translated Verakundia by shame and that one by embarrassment or something? I think. Okay. The one that looks to the future is kind of, I don't know, the experience is like, you know, a teacher calls on you in class and you are scared of messing up the answer. Yeah. You get red in the face or you're scared about what you're going to do. Embarrassed. Or the present. Yeah, you're feeling embarrassed. I don't know about that being future. I think an embarrassment is like you got caught with your hand in a cookie jar and you're suddenly embarrassed. Yes, that's the present. And he says it's a little bit of being, yet to be done. No, young facto is, well, it's either in octo comitendo, in the act being committed, while it's being committed is this, right? I'm calling embarrassment. But the other one's already done, young facto is already done. Yeah, I mean, my shame, you know? Shame, yeah. I'm ashamed of my past. It may not be the best translation, but it's a good idea. It's a good translation, I think. Yet to be done. Yeah. Yeah. Okay? Where does it say that? It says, and thus, if disgrace is feared in a deed that is yet to be done, there is shame for goodness. That's not what it says here. That's not what it says here. No, no, no. He's dividing these six. He has to follow the rule of two or three, right? He's limited by that, huh? And so, the first three are about a, what? Something in man's operation you're doing, right? And the last three is going to say are in, what? Exterior things, right? So you can divide them into two and each of the two. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Okay. But then, when you divide the first three, you divide signitia, which I guess is laziness, right, huh? Mm-hmm. Now, the evil that is in exterior things, for a, what? Three-fold reason, is able to exceed the faculty of man to, what? Resist, huh? And first, by reason of its magnitude, as when someone considers some great evil, whose way out, it's not sufficient to consider a way out, and thus it is, what, admiration, huh? Remember seeing the thing there where the guy's talking about the emotional effect of Shakespeare's plays, you know, and he's quoting the thing there from The End of Hamlet, War or Wonder is the name of it. I notice the idea that wonder is brought in there to taking the effect of all these bodies on the stage there, right? Kind of wonder there, right? It just happened here, right? Second, by reason of, what? Yeah. Because some unaccustomed evil is offered to our consideration, and because it's unaccustomed, it seems great in our, what? Yeah. And this way is stupor, which is caused from? Unaccustomed imagination. Yeah. So my Cindy, I used to talk about these two, you know, and the intellectual life, right? Because that enriches the help to the intellectual life and stupor, you know? Yeah. Like that student I was talking about who gave up, you know, from the University of Minnesota there, right? I told you that story, you know? I think so. I was at a function there, and I got talking to, I don't know, some doctor's wife or something, and what are you studying, and what are you studying in philosophy? Oh! You know, he talks about this young man, you know, who went to the University of Minnesota and read author, and he said one thing, and author, and he says something else, author, you know, see, and get more and more confused, and finally he junked the whole thing, and he goes off and is on a farm now, and he refuses to pick up a book. You know, you happen to me, you know? Maybe he should have read Bukla first. Yeah, yeah. But it happens a lot, right? You see, there's kind of a stupor there, right? Or, you know, if you see all these objections here, you know, huh? You know, Thomas doesn't use any objections for beginners, you know? But you may have, you know, 20, 30 in the dispute of questions, you know, and say, well, that'd be a stupor in the student, right? And he said, how can you ever? My cousin used to be bothered by all the different opinions there in the, the continuori, right, huh? You think he used to do that, you know? Well, which one is it? Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah I was not too hesitant or something, you know, or not, you know, maybe you still like that, you know, so. Strike while the air is hot. Yeah, yeah. So I guess I can't do that. Well, we're replacing him. That's it. You're out. Done. Finished. What about the past now, right, then? The third objection is taken, you know, from the definition, it seems, of what the object of fear is, right? So how can I have fear about the past? You can do something with it. Yeah. A body past act can be, what, feared? A, what, opprobrium or a convictium? A conviction or something. Yeah. That is the future, right? Okay. So I'm ashamed of my past acts, so I feel they might be revealed, right, by the... Reprograms. Yeah. You know, trying to defeat me in office, right? Running for office, right? Yeah. Like I've found purposes back there. There must be something that... Rating for that. Reprograms. Purpose is ashamed of, you know, and then we bring it up at his press conference, that'll be the end of him, you know? It's like bringing these women to, not Obama, but Clinton was involved with, you know, to his press conferences. Okay. Now he says, not just any, the fourth one is more saying, well... Can't wonder and stupor be about, but the good as well as the bad and so on, right? So he says, not just any wonder or, what, stupor or species of fear, but the wonder which is about a great, what? Evil. Evil. And stupor, which is about a... Uncustomated. Yeah. Unusual. Yeah. So you have to be careful there about that, right? Mm-hmm. Or it can be said that just as laziness refuses the labor of the exterior operation, right? So wonder and stupor refuse a difficulty of the consideration of a great thing and an customary thing, right? Whether it be good or bad, right? Mm-hmm. And in this way, wonder and stupor have themselves to the act of the understanding, as signitzias, legionist, to the exterior act, right? Now this is the text, Thomas, I mean, that Thomasin used to always point about, couldn't him here, right? To the fifth, it should be said that the man wondering refuses for the present to give a judgment about the thing that he, what? Wonders, huh? Fearing, what? A defect, right, huh? But in the future he inquires, right, huh? But the one, what? Duplified. Stuified. Fears both in the present to judge and in the future to... To inquire. Yeah. So he goes back to the farm and fears to pick up a boat the rest of his life. Turned out of a flood in the rest of his life. Whence adveratio is a wonder, is a beginning of philosophizing, right? But stupor is an impediment of philosophical consideration, right? Okay. Hmm. It's interesting, huh, that Aristotle has in the third book of the metaphysics a kind of universal doubt, a doubt about all things, right? I used to point out that for Aristotle, the universal doubt comes in the last part of philosophy, right? Why, for Descartes, it comes at the beginning, right? The beginning of all things. Yeah. So, when it comes at the beginning, universal doubt, you doubt everything, then you have stupor, right? Frozen. And that prevents you from being philosopher, yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Aristotle waits to the end there, right, when the mind has been already, what, formed in the lower and more proportional disciplines, right? And then he does it at the third book of wisdom, right? Interesting comparison between Descartes, right, and the father of modern philosophy, right? And my teachers there at Laval there used to make fun of the title of Descartes, the father of modern philosophy because he has no children. So, we'll start with question 42, right? On the object of fear. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you.