Prima Secundae
Lecture 100: Pain, Sadness, and Their Contrariety to Pleasure

Transcript
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Come here, back just in time. Speak of the devil, as they say. The second one goes forward thus. It seems that sadness is not dolor or pain. For Augustine says in the 14th book on the city of God that pain is said to be in the body. But sadness is said more in the soul, right? So I think that is reflected in even our own daily speech, right? Sadness is more spiritual, we'd say, right? Than pain. So if somebody's taking a pin in you or you're getting a shot, it's painful, but sadness is something more spiritual to cause. Also, moreover, pain is not except about a present evil, right? But sadness can be about the past, right? And about the future, right? For penance is sadness about the past, huh? And anxiety about the future, right? Therefore, sadness differs altogether from, what? Pain, huh? More pain does not seem to follow upon except the sense of, what? Touch, huh? But sadness can, what? Follow from all the senses, huh? Therefore, sadness is not, what? Pain, but has itself in many things, huh? But against this is what the Apostle, that's St. Paul, right? He's called the Apostle by Antonia Messiah, Ian and Peter, huh? So I was married in the feast of Peter and Paul, huh? So we have an attachment to that, apart from my attachment to Antonia Messiah. And against this is what the Apostle says to, this is what the Apostle says to Romans, chapter 9. To stitzi es mi magna, there is, what? Great sadness in me, and continual, what? Pain in my heart, huh? For the same using, what? Sadness and pain, as if he's kind of using his sentence almost, right? I answer it should be said that pleasure and pain are able to be caused from a two-fold, what? Apprehension or grasping. To wit, from the grasping of the exterior sense, and from the interior grasping, either of the understanding or of the, what? Imagination, okay? Now there's a likeness between the intellect and imagination, and they both know objects in the absence of them, right? And, you know, when you think about something, you form a thought of it, right? And when you imagine something, you form an image, right? Now in English, you know, when you speak of an idea, people are sometimes confused as to whether they're talking about a thought or a, what? Right, yeah. And, you know, if you read the English empiricists, you know, they kind of mix up, you know, thought and image, huh? Under the word idea, right, huh? And people, it's like an idea, you know. It's a man's ideas. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So I start, say, to class, I say, if the philosopher says I have an idea, it should be a thought, right? But the girl says you don't get ideas. He's probably talking about images, right? You don't get any ideas. Yeah. I thought that they crossed the idea a little bit, what the difference was. But the inward grasping extends to more things than the, what? Outside, huh? In that whatever things fall under the outside grasping, huh? The exterior grasping, fall also under the, what? But not the reverse, right, huh? Only, therefore, that pleasure, which is caused from an inward grasping, is named, what? Joy. Right, right, as has been said above. And likewise, that only, that, what? Pain, which is caused from an interior grasping, is called, what? Sadness. Sadness, huh? And thus, that pleasure, which is caused from an outward apprehension, is named, what? Pleasure, but not, what? Joy. Joy. All right. Pain. Pain. Pain. Not, however, what? Sadness. Sadness. Thus, therefore, sadness is a certain, what? Species of pain, right, huh? Just as joy or pleasure, right? I don't know if he always uses the words that way, but he's saying here that pain and pleasure are more universal, right? And the pain or pleasure, and the pain or pleasure, and the other one that's more inward gets the name sadness, in one case, and joy, in another case, right, huh? So, you know, Augustine says, the attitude is gaudium, de veritate, right, huh? He didn't say delectaxe, although he could say that sometimes, you know, Scripture speaks of pleasure and efficient, right? But it could also be called joy, right? And you're getting better, right? C.S. Lewis' book, Surprised by Joy, it's not the scripture, the sensual pleasure that it's covering, you know? But it's something more spiritual, right? Surprised by joy, you know? And that's well said, huh? It's interesting that Thomas takes pain and pleasure there as more universal, right, huh? Meaning the words, right? It's kind of interesting, huh? So what did you have in this lecture, you know? Pain or sadness, huh? You say both, right? To the first bear, if it should be said, huh? The text from Augustine there. The dolor in corpore bus d'icitor, right? That pain is said in what? Body things. The first, therefore, it should be said that Augustine speaks there as regards the use of the, what? The wording, yeah. Because pain, maji shizitatra is more used, right? In bodily, what? Pains, right? Which are more known than in, what? Spiritual, what? Pains, right, huh? Okay. To the second, it should be said, huh? That the outward sense does not perceive except what is here and now, what is present, right? But the knowing, the interior knowing power can perceive the present, but also the past and the future, right? And therefore sadness, which names more the interior, right? Pain can be about the present and the past and the future. But bodily pain, which follows the grasping of the exterior sense, cannot be except about the, what? Present. So notice how Thomas is kind of judicious there in the way he applies that certain objection, right? Because there's something to be said for it, right? The basis for it, right? The basis for it, right? The basis for it, right? The basis for it, right? The basis for it, right? The basis for it, right? The basis for it, right? Okay, now the thing about the sense of touch, that the sensibles of the touch, right, the object of the touch, are painful, not only insofar as they are disproportion to the grasping power, to the knowing power, but also insofar as they are contrary to our, what, nature. They're destructive of our nature, right? Heat a man up too much and cool him down too much, you kill him, right? Okay, but the sensibles of the other senses can be, what, disproportion to the grasping power, but not however contrary to nature, except in order to the sensibles of, what, touch, right? Now, I'm very interested in what he says here. Whence man alone, who is an animal perfect in knowledge, not as far as the angels, right, but as far as the animals, right, he delights in the sensible objects of the other senses by themselves, like Perquist rejoices in the sound of Mozart's music, right? But other animals do not delight in them, except insofar as they refer to, what? Yeah, yeah. Yeah, so he took the delight in Mozart, as far as I could see, but if I had wrapped a little sandwich meat, you know, you could hear that, you know? When I was a boy, we had the cats to stay out in the garage, you know, and the garage was separated from the house, you know, by, you know, longer than this, you know, on the sidewalk there, you know? And when you opened the door in the morning, the cat would jump out of the garage and went up the steps to the house. So the idea was, could you open the door so silently, you know, that the cat would not hear it, you know? And we never could do it, just like that, you know? They'd train for that sort of thing, you know? We need to train a little scratch, you know, but not because they rejoiced in that sound of the scratch, but maybe it's a mouse or something, you know? That's definitely interesting. Every morning I come through to get a cup of coffee. Every single morning she's waiting right there, unless she's outside, but if she's inside, I'm waiting right in the step for me to come in. As soon as I get a meow, the first thing I do. And that's why the, what, the pleasure that you take in the, what, painting or in the music or something like that is kind of raising us above the animals, right? To the pleasures that are, what? Like Ashley says, right, the pleasures that are properly, what? Human, right? So the pleasures of eating steak or pork, you know? I shared that with Tabitha, right? She enjoyed that, right? But I couldn't share with her the pleasure of hearing Mozart, and, but the pleasure of understanding, I shared that with the angels, right? Pleasure more than me. And therefore, about the sensibles of the other senses, it was not said to be, what? Pain. Pain, according as it is contrary to, what, natural pleasure, but more sadness, which is contrary to animal joy, right? Thus, therefore, if pain is taken for bodily pain, right, which is more customary, right, then the pain is ex supposito, right, divided against sadness, right, according to the distinction of inward and outward, what, grasping, right, huh? Of those who guards objects, pleasure extends to more things than, what? Pain. If, however, pain is taken more generally, then pain is the genus of, what? Sadness has been said. Well, I've talked about that before, that way of naming things, right, huh? Where sometimes the same name is given to the genus and to one of the, what, species, huh? I was talking to the students last night there were talking about the fallacy of equivocation, right, huh, and what equivocation is. But I was talking about the word that Aristotle uses for equivocal, right, or equivocation. You have it in the categories, right, as well as in the book on sense of refutations. And the Greek word is homonomia, right? If you look it up in the Greek dictionary, homonomia, it's got the word onoma in there, you know, and homo, which means what, like, so, or same. And so they give us kind of the meaning of homonomia having the same name, right? Okay, so Aristotle is distinguishing the beginning of the categories between the equivocal name and the, what, the univocal name, right? But the name in Greek for equivocal is having the same name. So I asked the students, I said last night, but doesn't, in the case of the univocal name, don't they have the same name? See? So why is the phrase, have the same name, which in Greek is one word run together, why is that used for equivocal, right? They both have the same name. Aristotle's example there of an equivocal name is when the word man is said of you and that thing over there on the wall, right? It's a man, you know? Or if you had a statue of a man, you know? Well, it's not a man in the same, what? Yeah, yeah. And why, if animals are the dog and cat, it's univocal, right? They're an animal in the same sense of the word animal, right? Or, you could say, you know, that in both equivocal and univocal name, you have, what, the same name, right? But now if you divide having the same name equivocally and having the same name univocally, why does equivocal keep that same phrase, having the same name? Yeah, yeah. But in the text, in the categories, Aristotle says, things are named equivocally when they have the name only, right? Okay? Well, you're kind of saying that, too. But the logost isusias, the definition of what it is, is not the same, right? So, that's all they have is the same name, right? So, they keep that phrase, have the same name, and then the other one gets, what? A new name, because they have, in addition, right? They're having the same name, they have the same, what, meaning, right? Okay? But then, what word does Aristotle use for univocal? You've got to be careful, because the word, that is one in one sense, it's sunanuma, right? We get the word sunanum, right? But Aristotle's not using the sense of sunanum, right? Because sunanum means you have, what, two words that mean the same thing, right? And he talks about synonyms in that sense, in the poetics, right? He talks about language, right? But, what does the word sunanuma mean, right? You get the word onuma in there, but it means, in a sense, named together, right? That's kind of the meaning of it. Well, when things are named, univocally, they're named together, right? So I say, you know, a man, a man, a man, right? I don't name one of you before the other, I name you together a man, right? I look at you and say, you're kind of, you know, you're all, you know, you're all two-footed, you're all biped, you know, and so on, right? And, so you're named together a biped, right? But in the case of an equivocal one, it's either equivocal by chance, and then you're not named together, right? So one of my students last night was named Richard, and my oldest brother's named Richard, right? Now, would they name Richard together? So, so I looked at him and said, well, you know, see something, these two guys. No, no. When my brother Richard was named Richard, and this guy was named Richard, right? You know? Quite independent, right? So there was a equivocal, by what? Chance, right? They're both named Richard, right? But if you have a name that's equivocal by reason, then there's an order among them. the names, right? And so the name is placed upon one thing first and then carried over and placed upon a second thing by reason there's some connection with the first, right? There's some likeness to it, there's some ratio to it, or something like that. And so they're not named together, right? So it's kind of interesting the way Aristotle names these things, right? Some things are named together. See? Some things have the same name. It can be very confusing if you don't understand the fact that we do that all the time, right? So my mother didn't want me to call a man an animal, right? I said, well, he's not just an animal. He's an animal that has reason. Well, that's better, she said. So, yeah, something of this problem here with pain and what? Yeah, because sometimes pain is used in the broad sense, like a genius, right, for an interior or inward pain and an outward pain, right? But sometimes the outward pain keeps the name, what? Pain. And the inward pain gets the new name, which is, what? Sadness, right, huh? Sadness. Well, maybe sorrow, too. Maybe sorrow would be a similar word. Sorrow, I think, is, of course, you serve me. You serve me, yeah. Pain. Yeah, yeah. I'd probably say I'm pained. Because, you know, it seems a more intense thing, you know, huh? But it gets more known to us, huh? So sometimes Thomas will, you know, distinguish a pleasure and, what? Joy in the same way as he does pain and sadness, right? But it's like this is more known, this distinction, right, than that of pleasure. Let's go on to Article 3 now. Thank you. Is this a painful treatise? For some people. But in some sense of painful, it is what? It's full of pain, right? It's all about pain, right? But in other sense, is it causing pain? I hope not. But causing joy, right? Pleasure. So how can a painful thing cause pleasure, right? Pleasure. Yeah, so it can be pleasant to learn about pain, right? But it's not pleasant to be caused to be, yeah. To the theory, one goes forward thus. It seems that pain is not contrary to pleasure, huh? I'm surprised you should, you know. An article on this, huh? That was obvious, huh? Yeah. For one of two contraries is not the cause of the other, right? But that's true, per se, anyway, right? The gratinance of those. But sadness can be a cause of what? Pleasure. For it is said in Matthew 5, Blessed are those who, what? More. Yeah? Because they shall be, what? Consoled. Therefore, they are not, what? Contrary, huh? Moreover, one of contraries does not name, denominate the other, right? But in some things, the, what? Pain or sadness is pleasant, right, huh? For Augustine says in the third book of the Confessions, that pain in, what? Spectacles, huh? Yeah. Delights, huh? Okay. So people enjoy crying in the tragedy, right, huh? Have a good cry. And in the fourth book of the Confessions, that weeping is a, what, bitter thing, right, huh? You wept bitterly, right? Like Peter went out there, right? Wept bitterly. And nevertheless, sometimes it, what, delights, huh? Right. Therefore, pain is not contrary to, what? Pleasure, huh? Hmm. Moreover, one of two contraries is not the matter of the other. Because contraries are not able to be together. See more. But pain can be the matter of what? Pleasure. For Augustine says in the book on penance, always the one in penance is, what? Pain. Sorrow. And he rejoices over his sorrow, right, huh? So I rejoice that I'm sad about my, what? Sins, huh? And the philosopher says in the ninth book of the Ethics that a converso, the bad man, what? He's sad about that, that he, what? Has been pleased, right, huh? He's lost that, I guess, huh? Therefore, pleasure and pain are not contrary, huh? And those interesting objections, huh? We'll get corresponding interesting distinctions. But against this is what Augustine says in the 14th book about the city of God. That Laetitia, right? That's a name for some joy, expanding you, I guess, huh? Making you wild, right, huh? Okay? The guy goes like this, you know, ah! Beautiful morning, you know, ah! Laetitia is the will in, what? The agreement or consent to, right, huh? Of those things which you will, right, huh? Sadness is the will in dissension from those things which we, but all. But to consent and to dissent are, what? Contraries. Contraries. Therefore, Laetitia, joy, and justitia, sadness, are, what? Contrary, right, huh? What Thomas says. I answer, it should be said, as the philosopher says in the 10th book of the Metaphysics. There's a long consideration of what contrariety there is, the book on the one and the many, right? That contrariety is a difference, secundum formum. Form, right? Now, the form or species, huh? Of a passion or emotion is taken from its, what? Object or its end, yeah. When, since the objects of pleasure and of sadness or pain are, what? Contrary. To it, a present good, right? And a, what? Present evil. It follows that pain and pleasure are, what? Contrary, right? And desire and aversion are, what? The bonum and bonum and malum, what? Absent, right, huh? They're not there yet, right? So they're contrary because they're, what? Objects are contrary. Now, to the first objection. Nothing prevents one of two contraries to be the cause of the other, paracidensa. Aristotle, in the, what? Chapter on cause, right? Distinguishes between the cause per se and the cause paracidensa. Thus, however, sadness can be, what? Thus, sadness is able to be a cause of pleasure. In one way, insofar as, what? About the absence of something, right? Or of the, what? Presence of its contrary, makes one, what? Seek more vehemently, more strongly, right? That in which he delights, right? Just as the one thirsty, huh? More vehemently, seeks the pleasure of, what? Drink. Drink, yeah. As a remedy against the sadness when she, what? Undergoes, huh? In another way, insofar as from the great desire of the pleasure of something, right? One does not refuse someone to undergo, right? Sadnesses, right? They might arrive at that, what? Yeah. Yeah. And in both ways, the present, what? Lictus? Is that pain or? Mourning or something. Present struggle, I guess, huh? Leads one to the consolation of the future, what? Life, huh? Because from this, that a man, what? Mourns for his sins or for the delay, huh? Of glory, he merits eternal consolation. Well, that must be what purgatory is like, huh? Delatio. Yeah. Delatio gloriae, huh? Likewise, also, what? Someone merits it, that from, what? This, that, in order to attain it, it is... Not refuse the labors and the difficulties, you must sustain an account of it, huh? So, I was in high school, I was on the draft team, and I'd go out with my friends and they'd run eight miles in the hot sun. I didn't even think about it. My mother said, if I asked you to walk one mile to the store to get a loaf of bread, you'd tell me I was torturing you. I found more pleasure to be with my friends doing that than walking to the store to get a loaf of bread. Now, to the second it should be said, that pain itself can be what? Pleasant, right? Crouching, that sounds very strange, right? Insofar as it has a what? Wonder joint. Joint, yeah. As in spectacles, right? That's kind of interesting, huh? Because in Aristotle, when he talks about tragedy, he talks a little bit about wonder, right? And isn't the wonder that you have in tragedy connected with the fact that it's a downfall of a man who's in some eminence, right? He's a long way to what? Yeah. So the person who's tragic must be in some kind of eminence there. You don't have somebody who's just an ordinary Joe, you know? Starving there by the roadside because it doesn't arouse any wonder, right? But, you know, Othello's in such happiness there with Desdemona, right? Or we see what he's in Kriana, right? In Antigone, right? He loses everything, right? His son is called no man happy till he be dead, right? You know? Oedipus, you know? Whom all men call the great, you know? So we saw before that wonder how it's a sudden pleasure, right? Don't people, you know, sometimes when they read these paper and they see somebody on some crazy accident, you know, and so on, you know? Some wonder, you know, kind of unusual, you know? About ten cars, I guess, in Worcester, they're colliding today, you know, because it was a little slippery earlier, you know? I said to Rosie, they probably voted for a bottle. Ten people who voted for a bottle and crashed today. Or insofar as it makes for a, what? Recalling of a thing loved, right? Or insofar as it makes one to see the love of that, of whose absence. What's the famous words in Roman Juliet? That parting is such sweet sorrow, right? So sweet, you know, is the idea of being pleasant, right? So how can a sorrow be sweet? Well, the sorrow you have in parting is a sign of the love you have for each other, right? You realize how much this person loves you, right? And therefore, that's pleasant to be loved, right? So you recognize how much this person loves you, right? You know, I always tell the story, you know, where I was going off to give a talk someplace, they're going to fly out of Worcester there and go give a talk. And so I was saying goodbye to the kids, you know, and so on. And the boys said, oh, I see you, Dad, you know, and so on. And they went off to the bus. And then my daughter was saying goodbye. And you could see she was fighting back, you know, breaking into tears, you know. And so on. And then finally she went off to the bus, but she didn't know if to. And so Chris and I just said goodbye to my wife. And she says, that's a hard act to follow, she said. You know, you can see how I'm really, you know, she's so, so glad I'm going, you know. And I remember getting an airplane, you know, and she always said, get off this day. I remember playing, you know, because you never know to get on the couch. See that poor little girl, you know, with your daddy being dead, you know. What a horrible thing it would be. But that's the idea, right? Right, you know, in Romeo and Juliet, partying is a sweet sour, right? It's projective in a sense, right? It's not that the sorrow itself is pleasant, right? Because it's a sign of the love that they have for each other, right? Because it makes you recalling everything loved, right? When since love is what? Delectabilis is delightful, right? Pleasant, pleasing. That what? Sensor pain. That follow from love, right? So you're saddened in this prison, your love is leaving you, right? Insofar as in them one senses what? Love. They are what? Pleasant, right? That's very interesting, isn't it? An account of this, also, pains, dolores, and spectaculis, right? In spectaculis, so that means, you know, plagiarism. Are able, right? To be pleasant, right? Insofar as in them is what? Conceived towards those who are what? Yeah. Augustine talked about that, too, in, I don't know, some of the confessions, but he talked about, in some way, the vanity of people who spend an excessive amount of time with that, because, especially with tragedy, oh, they go and they weep and weep and weep over the tragedy of the play they just saw, but if they see the poor man out on the street, they don't care. Yeah, yeah. That's kind of a waste. They don't tell the story of the great tyrant going into the theater, you know, and he's going to, you know, tear it to him. You don't want to see that he was feeling sorry for this fictional character, you know, and he's, you know, cruel and real life. That would be like seeing the communist Politburo or something, and they're watching some Shakespeare playing all weeping. Yeah, yeah, yeah. You can see, though, nevertheless, how this is nevertheless good for the tyrant, you know, to feel some kind of pity, even if it's produced by a tragedy or something. In this case, the moral effect of great fiction, right, huh? Now, to the third, it should be said that the will and reason come back upon their own acts, right, huh? Insofar as these, what, acts of the will and the reason are taken under the good and bad, yeah. And in this way, sadness can be a, what, matter of, what, yeah? Or a universe. So I can rejoice that I'm sad over the election? We can rejoice with you. Yeah, yeah. It shows your will is right. Yeah. It's having to cry. Yeah. I'm saddened by the rejoicing of the onions. Yeah. And in this way, sadness can be the matter of pleasure or the reverse, right? Not per se, but, what, per action and some. That's a great distinction there, per se and per action and some. Insofar as both are taken under the aspect of good or what? Bad. That reminds me of that great, that great scene that's in the last part of The Lord of the Rings. I read, when I read it in the book, I saw the third part of the movie and I don't remember that they showed this, but when the city of Gondor was being attacked by all the bandits.