Prima Secundae
Lecture 99: Pain and Sadness as Passions of the Soul

Transcript
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father and son holy spirit amen thank you god thank you guardian angels thank you thomas aquinas god our enlightenment guardian angels strengthen the lights of our minds ordinal images and allow us to consider more quickly saint thomas aquinas angelic doctor help us to understand what you're written father son holy spirit amen so christ in the cross is called christ for which reason christ for his own blood yeah i mean you know we anoint what the priest and the kings and the prophets right so it's primarily as a priest it seems to be he's he's christ right though augustus is also the chair of the teacher right you know the cross also teaching us on the cross and i suppose it has into this kingship too but you think of his priesthood most of all right well on the sermon on the mount there what do you think you know there's just he's a prophet teacher there right okay i got to think of a passage in shakespeare you know and i thought i'd forget in here just to give us a little bit of variety in our life here but to go back to the wisest of all poets huh and to the definition of reason that shakespeare gives us huh his agitation to use reason and he says it's the what ability for large discourse looking before and after right and we saw that the word before and after had many senses huh in the chapter in the categories the 12th chapter the categories where there are just donald distinguishes in order the four central senses right of the word before and then brings in on the side of the second huh the crowning sense of the philosopher that causes before the effect but what is the first meaning of before and after aristotle gives there in the categories which is that yeah before and time right now in the dianima in the dianima when aristotle gets into the third book there and he has finished going through the senses in the second book right and the vegetative powers in the second book and then the third book he's dealing with intellectual powers and then finally the what last thing he takes up is the ability to move yourself around right okay now in the course of this there's a lot of things said right and down in the 15th lexio huh uh i propose some things that have been said huh thomas says at 829 there he excludes a certain objection okay upon what has been said before where aristotle has shown that what apparently that appetite does not move right to this that the what those who are continent do not follow their appetite huh okay but this argument he says is solved because in man there are contrary desires huh contrary appetites one of which the continent follows it's a type of reason of course and the others repugnant right okay he says therefore aristotle that because they are there can come to be what desires are contrary to each other right huh this happens when reason is contrary to concupiscence so you got the sense desire concupiscence right for what is pleasing to the senses right and reason can be contrary to this as we all know right but then pray to us in what aristotle says and this happens in those having the sense of time aristotle says now sense there means really what reason he's saying that he's thinking of man right that we have the sense of time right that is those who not only know what is in the present what is here and now right they like the book that tracks the sense desire but they consider the past and the future right because the understanding sometimes orders us to withdraw from something concupisible something pleasing to the sense desire on account of the consideration of the future as when to the man who has fever right example for ancient medicine right now from the judgment of the understanding it seems that he ought to abstain from wine huh here and now right um less the fever what boil up it comes to what in kalesha but concupiscence incites one to taking it on account of what is here and now okay okay that is an account of that which is in the present it seems that in the present it is delightful right well it seems that what is in the present what is here and now pleasant is simplicitare delictabulae ad bonum right but it's not really simplicitare but from the fact that they do not consider it as the future right that's very interesting because there you have the first sense of before and after which is in time right huh and you start to see already a little bit how reason might go against the concupisible because it looks before and after not just in the more elevated senses of before and after but in the very fundamental one of what yeah i used to always tell the students you know when you talked about the fallacy of simply and not simply or some teacher that this distinction is something that you're overlooking all the time your daily life right so you're choosing something bad simply because it's good in some way right or you're um uh avoiding something good because in some way it's bad right okay okay and give simple examples of this that they can understand okay now in the greek of that passage that thomas is uh quoting from uh he's saying here um since orexies and desires come to be contrary to each other huh this happens when hologos reason them and a epithumia that's the greek word for concupiscentia that thomas says when they are what in nantie when they're contrary right huh and this comes about in tois hwanu islacin ecusin in those having the islacin now the sense of time right they look before and after right now it's interesting when aristotle takes up time in the fourth book of the physics right he points out that time wouldn't fully exist without reason numbering the before and after right for he says whole men garnus the noose the understanding on account of the what future right huh it anathel kain kalueh uh commands one to abstain right huh but epithumia dia through the what edi what's here now right then and aristotle says uh it seems finitai guard to edi right huh what is pleasant what's here now he do right to be also haplos simpliciter had he do and agathon haplos right and say an account of not to see the future bea to mehoran to melo right huh okay now i'll go to the wisest of poets right remember eric shakespeare's words in the agitation right he says what is a man if is is Chief good and market of his time, he put to sleep and feed, a beast no more, right? And he goes on to talk about, sure, he that made us with such large discourse, right? Gave him not to fuss on us unused, huh? Now, who is Shakespeare's greatest comic character? Yeah, Falstaff, right? And where does Falstaff first appear in the books of Shakespeare's plays, huh? Yeah, Henry IV, part one here, right? Okay. These are beautiful editions there, you find these, you know, country traditions, huh? Only a couple of them, a few of them, about half a dozen or so. Delicious little ones, huh? Okay. Now he's introduced in Act I, Scene II, right? So it's in London, in the Park with the Princes, huh? And into the Prince of Wales, huh? Whom Falstaff always calls Hal, right? And, H-A-L, and Sir John Falstaff, right? So, Falstaff begins the conversation. Now, hell, what time of day is it, lad? He's asking about the time, right? He's a very health-one mind now. That's grossed out a bit. And the Prince says, Thou art so fat-witted, With drinking of old sack, that's sherry, right? And unbuttoning thee after supper, And sleeping upon benches, right? Afternoon. It's almost like, he says the other part, right? That thou hast forgotten to demand that truly which thou wouldst truly know. Well, you ask me about the time, right? You who fat-witted with drinking old sack, And eating too much, right? And sleeping on benches, and so on, huh? Unless hours were cups of sack, And minutes capons, And clocks the tongues of bods, And dials the sign of leaping houses, Leaping houses means brothels, huh? And the blessed son himself, a fair hot witch, In flame-colored taffeta, I see no reason why thou shouldst be so superfluous To demand the time of the day. Isn't that significant that Shakespeare should introduce His greatest comic character, Who's obviously a man who lives like a beast in a sense, right? As is indicated by these things said of him, By having him ask the time of the day, And Prince Alcien, What's that got to do with you and the life that you're leading, right? It's kind of a marvelous thing that Shakespeare should have done that, right? Amazing, it's amazing. That's natural genius or something. Why should he introduce his greatest comic character in that way? What time of the day is it? What is that to you, you know? Unless you care, you know? It comes to sack, hours, you know? Yeah, it's amazing, Shakespeare. It's like our greatest writer there, huh? Washington Irving, you know, At the end of his life to his nephew there, right? It's kind of idle for us to pay anything for our thing, you know? Shakespeare has said it all, right? That's it. Okay. So let's go to Article 4 here now. To the 4th one goes forward thus, It seems that pleasure is not the measure or rule of good and bad morals. We're going to find out on what sense it is, right? But now we first can see why it can't be. For all things are measured by the first of their kind, huh? As is said in the 10th book of what? Yeah. That's a tough physical. But pleasure is not first in the genus of moral things, huh? But there go before it both love and desire. Therefore, it is not the rule of goodness and badness in moral matters, huh? As you know from your study of before and after, right? Something can be before something else and vice versa in different senses of before, right? Okay. So wine might be better than grape juice, but grape juice comes before time, right? And bread might be better than flour, right? But flour comes before time, right? Moreover, a measure and a rule must be, what? Uniform, huh? And therefore, the motion which seems to be most uniform is the measure and rule of other motions, as is said in the 10th book of metaphysics. So for the most part, people measure things by the sun, right? It seems to be kind of regular going around, so. But pleasure is various, huh? And of many kinds. When some of them are good and some are bad, right? You know, therefore, pleasure cannot be the measure and rule of moral things. It has to be something firm and fixed, you know? Moreover, a more certain judgment is taken of the effect to its cause, in the reverse, huh? But the goodness or badness of an operation is a cause of the goodness or badness of the pleasure. Because good pleasures are those which follow good doings, huh? Good operations. Bad, bad. Okay? So the pleasure I take in torturing you is, what? A bad pleasure, right? Because torturing you is a bad act, right? But the pleasure I take in understanding God is a good pleasure. Because understanding God is a good activity, right? Even understanding the square, right? And the circle. And the triangle, right? Is a good thing, right? And so I take pleasure in understanding the square and the circle. So that's good pleasure, right? But against this is what Augustine says on Psalm 7. That God is, what? Scrutinizing the hearts and the, what? Kidneys, yeah. For the end of care and thought is the pleasure to which one tries to arrive. And the philosophy says in the seventh book of the ethics that pleasure is the, what? Principal end, right? Which, looking towards each one, what? This one bad, we say simply, right? Okay? Yeah. I think objections are very good because they're showing you the way not to understand the way in which pleasure is a measure. I answer it should be said, he says, that the goodness or badness, moral goodness or badness, chiefly consists in the will, right? But whether the will is good or bad, most of all is known from the end. Now that is had for an end in which the will finds rest. Now the rest of the will and of any desiring power in the good is called, what? Pleasure. And therefore, according to the pleasure of the human will, is especially judged a man to be good or bad. For he is good and virtuous, who rejoices in the works of, what? Virtue. Seeing justice done, right, huh? Okay? How we rejoice in this courageous act of a soldier. So, but the bad man is the one who rejoices in, what? Yeah. Okay? Like Aaron there in Shakespeare's play, right? He rejoices in doing something evil, right? But the pleasures of the sense appetite, right, are not the rule of the goodness or badness that is moral, right? For food communitaire is pleasant to, what? According to sense appetite, both to the good and to the bad, right, huh? But the will of the good delights in them when they are, what? In agreement with reason, right, huh? Which the will of the bad does not care about, okay? Now the first objection was saying you measure something by what is first, huh? Well, first, like before. Before has more than one sense, right? So he says, to the first thereof it should be said that love and desire are before pleasure in the road of generation. They're generated first, right? But pleasure is before according to the notion of a what? End, huh? Which in operable things and actions has the definition of a beginning, right? Right? From which most of all is taken judgment, right? Just as from a rule or measure, right? Just like the grape juice there is for the sake of the wine, right? Or the flour is for the sake of the bread, right? So I notice Thomas is touching upon the fact that there, what? Prior, which is a Latin word for before, right? In a different way, right? And the way in which pleasure is before is, what? It's more the way of judging because it's according to the razzio than in, right? Judge things most of all by your intention, right, huh? To the second it should be said. This is the one saying, was in pleasure invariable? Well, it is, but every pleasure in this is uniform that it is a, what? A rest, huh? In some good, right, huh? And according to this, is able to be a rule or a, what? Measure. For he is good, whose will rests in a true good. And he is bad, whose will rests in something bad, huh? So that their will was resting in the nation of the Jews, right, huh? Okay, so that was a bad will, huh? On to the third one, huh? To the third it should be said, that pleasure perfects operation in the manner of an end, right? For that is not able to be a, what? An operation that is perfectly or completely good unless there be, what? Pleasure, delight, in the good, right? For the goodness of a thing depends upon its end. And thus, in some way, the goodness of pleasure is a cause of goodness in the operation. It's kind of an added thing to it, right? It perfects it, like Dearest Donald said, beauty perfects youth. So, now we turn the page, and what do we meet? Sadness, huh? Or pain, right? Now, let's stop for a second here and just a little bit about Thomas' order here, right? He first talked about love, right? And then what did he talk about after love? He talked about hate. Then he talked about desire, right? And then he talked about pleasure. And now he's going to talk about pain. Now, which is closer to love, right? Hate or desire? So why should he talk about hate after love rather than talking about desire immediately after love, right? Or why should the consideration of hate be closer to the consideration of love than the consideration of desire or of what? Pleasure, right? You can know things that are opposites. Yeah, yeah. Because the thing that goes back to Plato, right, huh? Aristotle and Plato are famous for saying that there's the same knowledge of what? Opposites, right, yeah? So when you take up the virtues, say, and the vices, right, huh? Like Thomas does in the Secunda Secunde, right? Does he take up the virtues first and then takes up the vices? So what the virtues are, aren't they closer to each other because they're all good, right? And the vices and things along together because they're all bad, right? Or does it make sense to talk about the, what, this virtue and the vices opposed to this virtue and then talk about this virtue, right, you know? So when you talk about courage, you talk about cowardice and foolhardiness, right? And then when you go out and you talk about temperance and then you talk about intemperance or, you know, don't even have a name as Aristotle since or the other vice. We call it puritanism, you know, britannical or something like that. And like the puritanism, you could be, you know, you could be in danger of kissing a girl or something, right? And so on, you know, to each virtue, you take up the vices they're opposed to, right? Because in terms of knowing, one opposite is closer to knowing its opposite, right? Even more so than what? Is there the same knowledge of cause and effect? It's not as much, right? But you go from love to desire, you know, to pleasure, right? If you invite me to your house and serve me salmon, I will be sad or in pain, right? But why? Because I hate salmon, right? So there's a connection between, you know, my hate and my sadness in this case, right? But it's a connection of cause and effect, right? But if you serve me a filet mignon, I'm going to be fearful. But in terms of knowing love and hate, one helps you to know the other, huh? It's kind of interesting, right, huh? I think Gerstel does the Nicomache and Ethics, right? Does he take up the virtue and the vices opposed to it, right? And the same thing Thomas does in the Secunda Secunda, right? But hearing out the passions, he seems to do that, right? So he took up love and then hate and took up desire. He didn't take up the opposite of desire, but that's important. And now he's taking up, he's just taking up pleasure, joy. And now he takes up sadness or pain, right? The same knowledge of what? Opposites, right? I told you about this kind of a fresh student there we had in California there, where he's kidding us philosophers, you know, we shouldn't be teaching, but ethics, because at the same time you learn how to be bad as well as to be good, right? Since people are inclined to be bad, you're teaching them how to be bad. We had a point, I thought. And, you know, Aristotle has this problem, it raises a question there in the Book of the Rhetoric, right? Because the rhetorician, by his art, knows how to persuade and how to what? This way, yeah, yeah. And so isn't there a moral problem there about teaching this art, right? Explain how to handle that, huh? So there's a little word here about the order that Thomas has, huh? I suppose he does things in an orly way, because he's got a good reason, huh? I fell into my bad habits, I was telling the father before class there, I started to pick up the Summa Congenitias again, you know, and hearing things. It's marvelous, the order he has there, you know, in the prologue chapters there. It's really amazing. How many times I see this, you know, I just kind of wonder at the order that he has there. Then we'll have to consider about, what, pain, dolor, I guess, and tristitia, right, huh? I married Brother Richard and married a girl named Dolores. I can help with the pun of this, you know. You thought you were sad before. He's a fiery Italian one, you know. I said, put a stiletto in you, if you're unfaithful. I thought he would say for that. And about this, first, we're not to consider about sadness or pain by itself, huh? So couldn't even say it, translated by itself, huh? Secondly, about its causes, huh? Third, about its effects. So we saw something like that when he talked about, what, love? And we talked about, what, pleasure, right, huh? It's a beautiful way of dividing and ordering your consideration, right? But then he adds some things that are kind of special here. Fourth, about its remedies, huh? They don't look exactly for remedies for pleasure, right? Or joy, right? But for sadness, yeah. And then, interesting enough, about the goodness, it's goodness and badness, huh? Or badness, huh? Which mind he had, huh? Amazing guy. And about the first, eight things are asked. I'm sure you've asked all these yourself sometime in your life, huh? First, whether, what, pain is a passion of the, what, soul. Secondly, whether sadness is the same as pain. You see, he asked the same question about joy and pleasure, right? Is joy the same thing as pleasure, right? But it's kind of easier to consider whether pain is the same thing as sadness, right? Of course, you might suspect, huh? Sadness and joy are more spiritual, right? And pain and pleasure are more, what? Bodily, yeah. Have the sense of touch and so on. But they're used to some extent interchangeably, right, huh? They're not altogether, you know, perfectly synonyms, huh? Third, whether sadness or pain is contrary to, what, pleasure. Interesting, you should ask that, right, huh? Because we were saying that's the reason why he considers these two next to each other, huh? Fourth, whether every sadness is contrary to every, what, pleasure, huh? Fifth, whether to the pleasure of contemplation there is some sadness contrary, right? Mm-hmm. This apocryphal story of Thomas having to have some, you know, medical operation, you know, and, you know, there's not any painkillers in those days and so on, you know, so get him thinking about something and he won't be aware of what we're doing, you know. This is one thing, you know, exaggeration about Thomas' concentration, you know. We were in Kassurek, my old teacher there, an undergraduate there, describing being in the same room with Deconic when he was studying, you know, and he would stop reading until he finished the paragraph. I'm kind of driving Kassurek, you know, mad here, you know, to be in the same room with this guy, you know, in the concentration of Deconic, you know. Kind of interesting. Talking about apnea, huh? That's waking apnea. So whether to the pleasure of contemplation there is some sadness contrary, right? That's a very interesting question. Six, this is a very interesting article. Whether one more ought to flee, what, sadness than to desire pleasure, right? Seven, whether exterior pain is greater than interior pain, huh? That's very interesting, huh? And last but not least, about the species of sadness, huh? Well, when I was writing my thing on comedy, right, and going into comparison of comedy and tragedy and so on, well, when Aristotle defines what? Tragedy, he puts the purgation of pity and fear, right, in its definition, right? So pity is a species of what? Sadness, right, huh? Now, sometimes you find these authors attributing melancholy, you know, to tragedy. And that's a mistake, I think, huh? Melancholy is another kind of sadness. And it's not really the sadness that tragedy is arousing or purging, huh? But pity is, huh? So that's a big mistake, right? Then envy is another sadness, huh? That's a bad, that's a devilish. That's what the scripture says in the parable about the workers in the vineyard. The vineyard owner, it's translated as, or you're just, or you're just, or something like that, but the literal text says, or is your eye evil because I do that? Wow, that's really powerful. That's more powerful to put it that way. Because that's the root word of envy, I don't want to see, I can't stand to see this, am I, I, evil? That's interesting. But interesting, you know, the Greeks, they're, you know, I guess they, in their meetings there where they had the plays, they'd have two or three tragedies and then they'd have comedy, right? So, although I don't think the proper effect of tragedy is melancholy, because after seeing a number of tragedies, you might get a little melancholy. And comedy purges melancholy, so they know what they do in those Greeks, so they're pretty knowledgeable about these things. Okay, to the first, then, one goes forward thus. It seems that dolor, which I guess means pain, is not a passion of the soul, right? For no passion of the soul is in the, what? Body. But pain is able to be in the body, right? For Augustine says in the book on true, what, religion, that the dolor, the pain, which is said to be of the, what, body, right? Is a, what, sudden corruption of the safety of something, right? Which, using badly, the soul, what? The idea of harmony, isn't it? Corruption. Therefore, pain is not a passion of the soul, right? It's always struck me, you know, they speak, you know, the emotions as passion as anime, right? And you've got to be careful with that, right? Because it doesn't mean that it's taking place in the, what, soul and not in the body, right? Because emotions are something bodily, just although I guess it's the beginning of the Diyanima, huh? So why do they call it passion as anime, right, huh? Well, it means that they're, what, less bodily, right? Than just, what, the way in which even a stone can be affected, right, huh? It's a way in which you can be affected only if you had a soul, an animal soul, right? But, you know, we've got to be careful with that expression, passion, anime. Moreover, every passion of the soul pertains to the desiring power, right? But pain does not pertain to desiring power, but more to the, what, apprehensive. For Augustine says in the book on the nature of the good that, what, it makes for pain in the body when the sense is resisting a more powerful, huh, body. And therefore, pain is not a, what, passion of the soul, right? Do you feel any pain, the doctor says, you know? Well, feeling is a kind of, what, apprehensive power, right? Isn't pain there something in the sense of touch, right? Moreover, every passion of the soul pertains to a, what, animal appetite. But, no, it's animal, it counts as an animal, right, huh? But pain does not pertain to the animal desire, but more to natural desire. For Augustine says in the 8th book, on Genesis to the letter, unless some good would remain in nature, right, huh? Of no good lost, would there be, what? Yeah, yeah, so some good would remain in nature. It's nature that is punishing you, so to speak, right? It's making your punishment possible. Therefore, pain is not a passion of the soul. But against this is what Augustine says in the 14th book of The City of God, huh? Where he lays down pain to be among the passions of the soul, bringing in that of Virgil. So, this they, what, fear, this they desire, this they rejoice in, this they are keen, right? Okay, so, we need to be illuminated, Thomas, huh? Enlightened, huh? Answer, it should be said that two things are required for what? Pleasure, right? To wit, the joining of the good to you, right? And secondly, the, what, perception of this good, this joining, huh? So, if I take pleasure in the music of Mozart, the music of Mozart, the sound of his music, has to be joined to my ear, right? And I've got to perceive this union of this beautiful sound with my ear. Then I have pleasure and delight. I say, how beautiful this is. Magnificent, huh? I'm going to go to the Boston Symphony Orchestra. Somebody's paying my way for it this Friday. I'm going to play Mozart's Jupiter Symphony. Ooh. I remember finishing an exam at the Connick, you know, and I was going out the door, and I was making a conversation with him, and I said, you think the Jupiter Symphony is a representation of magnanimity? And he says, yeah, probably right there, he says. He says, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Aristotle, interesting enough, in the Eighth Book of Politics, he talks about music, huh? He says it's a likeness not only of the emotions, but of the, what? Virtues, huh? And he thinks he means the virtues are concerned with the, what? With the emotions, right? So, when I was a little boy, I used to always try to find a march on the freeway. But in a sense, the march is a, what? Likeness of, what? Courage, right? You know? But the Jupiter Symphony is a likeness of, how do you get the name Jupiter, you know? The English gave it that name, right? It's a likeness of the virtue of magnanimity, huh? I think the 36th Symphony, too, is the Lens Symphony, is a likeness of magnanimity. For why, I tried to pretend that the Lens was Psyllitimia, the lesser virtue, considering the honors, and then magnanimity, then it's Jupiter. But I think both of them are, right? I always remember the first time I heard the 36th Symphony, it was at the St. Paul Public Library, they had a music room where you could go listen to these things. And it was one of these days where the beautiful blue sky, you know, these puffy, you know, powerful-looking things, and you had the beginning opening of the 36th Symphony, and as one critic said, you know, if all that had survived of Mozart was the beginning of the 36th Symphony, it would be enough to establish his greatness. It's not impressive, you know, huh? It was just, it's divisive. I used to have, I remember when I was first, you know, thinking about music, and so I had a debate with my brother Richard there, you know, which was greater than Mozart's piano concertos, or his symphonies, right? And I was arguing, kind of, from my influence of the, you know, the poetics of Aristotle, that the piano concertos were better, right? Because when Aristotle talks about, say, the plays, right, he says that the plot is the soul of tragedy, right? That it's higher than the character, right? We have more of a plot in the, what, in the concertos than you do in the symphonies, right? And you have that at the beginning of Linn, right? In, in, uh, and especially like in a concerto, like the 23rd piano concerto, in A, or the 20th concerto, 27th and so on. And, uh, actually, I don't know what ever happened to him, but he was now, you know, the plot of these things, you know, and so on. And, uh, he used to show it to Father Baumgartner there at the seminary, you know. He was impressed with that, so. Um, Richard was saying, you know, yeah, but that's, you know, the plot and the emotions is kind of a, you know, lonely thing, right? And, uh, I mean, Chris, the, the symphonies, you know, are more noble, you know, huh? You know, the Jupiter symphony and, you know, and, uh, but I was kind of influenced too much by the poetics, you know, maybe thinking too much along the lines of drama, right, huh? Where the character is not as, the soul, like the, like the plot, right? But now I, I, I've come around to my brother Richard's position, right? That the symphonies are higher, right, huh? And certainly in terms of moral education that Aristotle talks about in the book of the Baltics, the symphonies are more, you know? I mean, he gave you a love of these virtues, as well, you know. You know, give us a bit. But in a sense, um, the, you know, Aristotle says the magnanimous man does great things in all the virtues, right? So it's a very, very virtue, magnanimity. But it's still a virtue that is concerned with the emotions, right? Which is what music can represent, right? Music can represent, I don't think, justice very well, or, or foresight, right? But it can represent courage, it can represent temperance, magnanimity. But it seems like magnanimity would be the greatest that it could represent. And this is what you have in Mozart's 3d6 and his 41st, huh? And they're both in the key of what? C major. C major. Yeah, see? But the Prague symphonies in the D major. That's more representing what? Courage, huh? And the 40th symphony of course is C major. You know, but, uh, you get kind of a key, you know, sense of Mozart's keys, right, huh? You know, what's in the significance the keys have for him, right? So some keys are more to represent the irascible, right? And others to represent the, what? Yeah. So C and D are a little more. I mean, I don't see this actually because it's done everything, but they're more for the irascible, right? And B flat or G major or something, you know, more towards the irascible, right? E flat is a little more in between, you know, but, uh, Mozart's real understanding of the keys, you know, it's a very subtle man, right? The opera's, you know, written in the key, too, huh? In the beginning, middle, end, harmonically, and in the side, he's probably beginning, middle, end, low, way down to the last thing, huh? But, I mean, it's not by chance that Don Giovanni, say, or in Marriage of Figaro was in D major, right? Like, cause you want two to use a C major, huh? Okay, carried away by thinking about Mozart there. I told you to have him, and he was in class, he mentioned Mozart and Bach together, right? So I caught him after class, I said, I noticed you said in class, he mentioned Mozart and Bach together, I said, would you put them equal? And the conic says, oh no, Mozart's a separated substance. It's like you call Thomas the angelic doctor, as long as I said, you can separate, you know? But when I read about the conic's life, I think as a younger man, he was attracted to Bach, you know? Okay, so also, he says, for pain, two things are, what? Required, right? One, the joining of something bad, right? I mean, it's bad because, what? For that reason, it's bad because it lacks some, what? Good that you have, right? And secondly, the perception of this conjunction, right? So I was in the restaurant there with Warren Murray there, you know, and they're playing this awful background music. Let's get out of here, you know? You get this awful sound, and it's joined to your ear, right? And now you're trying to carry a conversation with what it is, and you perceive that sound, you know? Or you can do what Father Valais did there, you know, where he said, because this is a machine, they're playing, but I mean, it was a live thing, he sends up me some money to have them stop playing. Not a request, a request, it's an unusual request, you know, to stop playing. We get salt of a nothing, he can maybe get him to stop. Now, whatever is joined, if it does not have, with regard to that to which it is joined, the aspect of something good or bad, right, cannot cause what? Yeah, yeah. So you sniff the wine, then you taste it. Mmm, right? And you're a pleasure, right? Because you perceive the union of something that is suitable to the tongue, right? From which it is clear that something, under the aspect of good or bad, is an object of what? Pleasure and what? Pain, huh? For good and bad, as such, right, are the objects of desire and power, huh? So good is to the appetite, bad, but true and false are to the reason, right? Whence it is clear that, what, pleasure and pain pertain to the, what, desiring power, right, huh? Now, he says, every appetitive motion, right, or inclination following upon, what, apprehension as opposed to natural desire, right, huh? So the guy who tells you the plant might say, this plant wants a lot of sun, or this plant wants a lot of food, right, huh? Well, broccoli is a big feeder, isn't it? That's what I read in the book. You can't feed broccoli to make a video. But everyone that falls upon some knowing, some grasping, right? It's wonderful, Tom uses that word, right? So she translates the word by apprehension or by grasping. Grasping. Grasping. It pertains either to the intellectual desiring power or to the sense desiring power, right? For the, what, inclination of a natural desire does not follow the apprehension of the knowing. of the one desiring, but of another who has made that nature, right? When sense, pleasure, and pain presuppose in the same subject, sense, or some grasping, right, some knowing, it is manifest that pain, just as pleasure, is both in the, what, intellectual, the understanding desire, or the sense desire, right? Now, every emotion of the sense appetite is said to be, what, a passion, right, is said above, and especially those which, what, sound to be in some defect, right, okay, because passio means what, originally suffering, right, the passion of our Lord, right, means the suffering of our Lord, right, and as Aristotle, you know, you can see in the Dianima, he carries the word suffering over to, what, to the senses, right, but you drop off the idea of it being, what, you're receiving something that's not destructive, it's perfecting the thing, and then he carries it over, finally, to, what, understanding, understanding is going on. Now, the English word suffering, of course, is stuck on its first meaning, right, and, you know, I always made a joke about the guy who was teaching, you know, philosophy there out west, and he says to me, you know, I look down at the students, and they seem to have an explanation, why are you doing this to me, you know, because they're suffering, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. But the student should suffer in the Greek sense, right, you know, he should undergo something, right, from the teacher acting upon his mind, right, yeah, and, but he should act upon the mind in a way that is, what, good for the mind, huh, okay, the same way, music, Mozart acts upon the, you know, emotion in a way that's good for them, right, okay, that's what he says, because the word passio originally has a sense of something bad, right, now, I, I translate postures sometimes, but undergoing, right, huh, and I think undergoing has originally a bad sense, right, so you say about someone he's undergone a lot, right, good things, okay, but you sit in the class, I want you to be on, and you undergo something, right, oh, you, you, you know, it's almost too much, you know, it's one case, it makes me nervous, but he's so delighted in what he's, what he's, what he's bringing out, you know, it's kind of marvelous, you know, you have to take a little text that you remember, familiar with in some way, you know, but you would see so much in it that you didn't see, you know, the same with the iconic, you know, the first time I went up there, you know, the iconic was always teaching the first year students, either the first book of the physics or the second book, right, so you get them in your first years there, and so he was teaching the first book of the physics, and I, of course, have read that book a million times, Thomas's commentary, and I proofread, you know, Gassar's translation of the Thomas's commentary, so I said, this is something I know, or I'm familiar with, this is a text, let's see if you can say anything that I, I was thinking in my own mind, you know, you know, I always describe this being a quantum leap in understanding of the text, the iconic, you know, just amazing, those guys, but I've been teaching it since 1935, the iconic says, I still see something new every time I go through there, right, you see that, okay, whence pain, according as it's in the sense appetite, most properly is said to be a passion of the soul, just as what bodily harming, right, are properly said to be passions of the body, right, but you know, in the third book, say, of the, of the physics, right, Aristotle takes up motion, right, and then he takes up acting upon undergoing, right, and you don't necessarily have the bad sense there, right, but there is the active and the passive sense there, but here he says, what, molestiae, right, the bad, whence Augustine says in the 14th book of the city of God, that pain especially is what, called a sickness, you're sick, we say, okay, to the first therefore it should be said, that pain is said to be of the body, because the cause of the pain is in the body, right, as when we suffer something, what, harmful to the body, but the emotion of what, pain is always in the soul, because the body cannot, what, sorrow, without the soul sorrowing, Augustine says, right, and they don't care for that, when he says, motus doloris semperes daima, I don't think he means in the soul alone, right, by itself, it's not really until you get to understanding and willing, that you have an activity of the soul, that is not in the body, this guy, you know, was poking the guy's head, you know, what do you imagine, I imagine steak, I imagine chocolate, or something, you know, but he couldn't get, he said, and imagine an active will, he couldn't, you know, he couldn't have any active will, when he had his head, so, the Canadian doctor concludes, you know, that the will was not in the brain, it wasn't there, you know, there must be some other part of the body, no, it's an experience, all right, you know, you know, yeah, that was in the point, yeah, yeah, so when your soul separated from your body, your will is said in scripture to fall, towards God or some other way, and then that's where it lays for the rest of, okay, to the second time, that pain is said to be of the sense, not because it is an active sense power, that's a kind of what, sensing, right, but because it is required for bodily, what, pain, you got to perceive the fact that this pen is not suitable to you, right, it's being stuck in you, right, just as what, it's required for what, pleasure, right, there has to be the union of a good or a bad thing for pleasure or pain, right, and the perception of this union of something good or bad, too, right, to the third, it should be said that pain or sadness or the loss of some good, demonstrates the goodness of nature, right, not because pain is a act of natural desire, but because nature desires something as good, huh, which when it is, what, sense to be taken away, there follows, what, the passion of pain or sadness, in the sense, appetite, so when the electricity goes off and Mozart stops, so when it comes to the end of the day of the day of the day of the day of the day of the day of the day of the day of the day of the day of the day of the day of the day of the day of the day of the day of the 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