Prima Secundae
Lecture 96: The Effects of Pleasure: Dilation, Desire, and Reason

Transcript
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Thomas is looking in the treatise on love and in the treatise on pleasure, he looks before and after, right? So he takes up, if you remember correctly, love itself, right? And then he talks about the cause of love and then the effects of love, right? Looking before and after, like Shakespeare says. And he does the same thing with pleasure now, right? He talks about pleasure in itself, what it is, right? And then he looked before at his causes and now he's going to look after its effects. So he gives a certain full development for love and pleasure, right? And there's perhaps many reasons why he does that, right? But in terms of theology, what do you have in God? Yeah, no desire in God. He doesn't want anything. He doesn't lack anything. He's a man who's everything. I mean, the one who has everything, right? So it's kind of interesting that the ones that will be carried over to God, right? And he's more, you know, that's not the only reason why he does it, but it's just as he does it. You mentioned this before, that's what, I think it's in commentary in Matthew or whatever, that that's what God himself says, this is my beloved son, in whom I am well pleased. So then he considers, we're not to consider about the effects of pleasure, right? And about these four things are asked. First, whether it belongs to pleasure to dilate you, right? Would sadness and all kind of contract you, maybe? Second, whether pleasure causes thirst of itself, right? My flesh pines and my soul thirsts. I was studying the Psalms one time, and I guess there's three Psalms of thirst, and there's one in each of the three groups of the Psalms. Interesting, yeah? And the one that's one of the last of the penitential songs, right? Did you find one of my secret parents in the Aqua TV? I was like that. We were going through the Psalms, you can only find these three Psalms, and I probably got one in each. Whence about the precept of charity in Psalm 118? It is said, latum, that means wide, I guess, huh? Your command, nimi, exceedingly so, right? But pleasure is a different, what? Passion from love, huh? But pleasure is another passion from love, isn't it? You didn't finish going through the four, up at the beginning, the priming. Oh, okay, okay. I went through the priming. You didn't finish. Oh, okay, okay. I'm getting old. I'm 76 years old. I've been asking for excuses, doctor. Whether pleasure impedes use of reason, huh? And then Aristotle talks about the Tenth Book of the Ethics. So the pleasure perfects operation. It's beauty youth, he says. Okay. I stand corrected, as my mother would say. So dilating, huh? Would seem to pertain to love more than to pleasure, he says. So he gives these two quotes. But pleasure is a different passion from love. Therefore, dilation is not an effect of, what? Pleasure, right? Mm-hmm. So if you love, your heart gets bigger, I guess. It's not even physically, you know? Yeah. Broken bridge, yeah. Maybe some other things, too. Yeah. My dad took me into his place there in Rome, you know? Place where they... That's interesting. Interesting. Okay. Third, I mean, second, more from this that something is, what? Dilated. It is effected or made more capable of receiving, huh? Some people have narrow hearts. I can't love very many people, right? But some people, you know. A narrow mind that can't know much. I remember when Paul VI was made pope, you know, and they're asking, like, they're asking stupid questions, you know, but what is it like to be pope, you know? He said, well, you get this sense of universal fatherhood, right? He's the father. I think it's got beautiful, but he said it, you know? But your heart has to expand, right? If you're a bishop or before it's ever for the pope, right? But reception pertains to desire which is of a thing not yet had. Therefore, dilation more pertains to desire than to, what? Pleasure, right? So one argument against it is more love than the other than it's more, what? Desire, right? Moreover, constriction is opposed to dilation, right? But constriction seems to pertain to pleasure. For we are, what? We constrict or grasp that which we firmly wish to retain. And such is the affection of the appetite, a body thing, what? That's delightful, huh? Therefore, dilation does not, what? Retain to pleasure, huh? But against this, it is, this is an interesting quote here, to the expression of joy. It is said in Isaiah chapter 60, you will, what? See? And you will become affluent, wealthy, huh? And you will, what? Marvel? And your heart will be, what? That is, huh? Moreover, the pleasure from dilation gets the name as, what? Pleasure itself from dilation gets the name that it is called, what? Letitia, right? You know what you said for a woman's name, Letitia or something? That is, as has been said above, huh? Okay. Can argue from those words, right? Is beauty more the object of the reason of the will? I think so, yeah. Everyone, I was first thinking about this, and I was thinking of the word lovely as a synonym for beautiful, right? But lovely seems to be named from love, right? So, therefore, it seemed that it was closer to, what? The good, which is the object of the will, right? And Dionysius, the pseudo, takes it up together, beauty, with the goodness link of God, right? And so on. But I still think it's more reason, yeah. Thomas makes me say. You see that when Aristotle talks about geometry, right? And mathematical sciences, and there's nothing, there's no goodness there, right? But there is beauty, right? So it's obviously, you know, logic of the mind there, huh? I answer, it should be said that latitude is a certain dimension of a bodily magnitude, right? Whence in the affections of the soul, it is not said except by, what? Metaphor. For dilation is said to be, as it were, a motion to, what? Produs, right? And it belongs to pleasure, according to two things which are required, what? For pleasure. One of which is on the side of the knowing or grasping power, right? Which grasps the union of some suitable, what? Good, huh? And from this grasping, a man grasps himself to have, what? Attained a certain imperfection, which is spiritual magnitude, huh? And according to this, the soul of man is said to be magnified through pleasure, or to be, what? My soul magnifies the Lord. Another is on the side of the desiring power, which ascends to the, what? Delightful thing, and rests in it, huh? In a certain way, lending itself to what? Grasping it inwardly, huh? Does that sound okay, that translation? Sure. In this, the affection of man is dilated, right? Through pleasure, as it were, what? Hending himself over to containing inwardly the, what? Thing delighting him. That's kind of interesting what Thomas says, huh? So you've got to have something in the grasping power, right? As well as the will and the siring power. To the first, therefore, it should be said that nothing prevents us in those things which are said metaphorically for the same to be attributed to diverse things according to diverse similitudes, right? So the common example is a lion there, right? The devil is a lion going about thinking we may devour, right? And his cruelty, right? And so on. But then the lion is also plied to the tribe of Judah. But for different similitudes, right? And according to this, dilation pertains to love by reason of a certain, what? Extension, insofar as the affection of the one loving is extended, what? To others, huh? That he takes care, not only, or cares for not only those things which are his own, but for those things which are of others, right? But to pleasure, dilation pertains insofar as someone in himself is what? Yeah. As it were being rendered more capable, more capacious. More, maybe more capacity, huh? More capacity, huh? The good of the Messiah was promised, but it was delayed. So it was, and God did this because it would be more desire. To put off a goodness desire, to delay it, it increases the desire. So we can say that both love and, what, pleasure, dilate us, but in different, what, ways, huh? Now what about desire, though, huh? The second should be said that desire has some amplitude, huh? From the imagination of the thing, what? Desire, huh? But much more from the presence of the thing, now, what? Delighting. For the soul gives itself more to the thing, now delighting it, than to the thing, than to the thing that had desired it. Since pleasure is, in fact, the end of, what? Desire, huh? That you get those cheap Spanish additions. That's what happens when you get the cheap Spanish and it's falling apart. No, I like them all. One of my students gave me a copy of Augustine's, you know, de Tiricata, you know, one of those Spanish additions, you know, it's the one I kind of use. To the theory, it should be said that the one who delights constricts the thing delighting when he, what, strongly inheres, or adheres to it, right? But he, what, widens, you might say, or amplifies his heart as, what? He might enjoy something perfectly, what? Delightful, right? Whether pleasure now causes thirst of itself, to the second one goes forward thus, it seems that pleasure does not cause desire of itself. Why? Because every motion comes to an end when it arrives at, what? Rest. But pleasure is, as it were, a rest of the, what? Motion of desire, as has been said above. So unless they always compare desire to what? Motion of the three of them. And that's why desiring powers are named from desire, the appetitive powers. Because most things in motion sooner catch the eye, Shakespeare says, or it not stirs. But the motion of desire ceases when it arrives at, what? Pleasure. Therefore, pleasure does not cause desire, right? It's not too hard to answer. You know, you want to have it again, right? Or you want it to continue, right? All good things must come to an end. That was always said to us as kids when we're playing, you know, you've got to go to bed now or something. All good things must come to an end. Moreover, when opposite is not a cause of its opposite, but pleasure in some way is opposed to desire on the side of the object. For desire is of a good, not what? Not had. Had. But pleasure is of a good, not had, yeah. Therefore, pleasure is not a cause, does not cause desire of itself. Moreover, fastidium, what's the best way to translate that, Father? Taidum, or, well, taidum, I don't know, but I guess boredom. Boredom? Well, not boredom is even the best. It's molestous, you know, what do you say? Unpleasant in some way, I don't know. Here's the, I have a dictionary in here. Loathing, disgust, then they, other senses, squeamishness, scornful content, pride. And here, here, disgust would be a little bit too hard. Disgust, maybe, or whatever. Yeah, repulsive, in a way, I suppose, yeah. More disgust is you plug into desire, but pleasure often causes disgust, right? Therefore, it does not make for a desire of itself. Too much chocolate, you get disgust. Yeah. Yeah, so here, it's, I mean, if it causes the fastidium, it's almost as causing this some, I mean, English, you know, it's a lot of people say taidum, you know, boredom. And, yeah, doesn't quite give the same, yeah. It's just a lot of diminishing returns there, yeah. But it's, yeah, it's, but it's more than just a diminished pleasure. It's more of the, I, I, just think of it in terms of food. I mean, you've had too much pizza, you've had too much pizza. You don't even want to smell it anymore. Yeah, right, right, right. Yeah, anyway, he has it. In fact, it seems to be the first time to come to mind. He has a bodily type pleasure. I mean, you've had enough ice cream. That's it. Yeah, don't even talk to me about it. Again, this is what the Lord says, huh, in the fourth chapter of John's Gospel. Who drinks from this water will thirst again, right? But through water, however, is signified, according to Augustine, the bodily, what? Pleasure, right? It's with that, well, there with the Samarian woman, yeah. Okay. I answer, it should be said that pleasure can be considered in two ways, huh? In one way, according as it is in act, in another way, according as it is in memory, huh? Also, thirst or desire can be taken in two ways, huh? In one way, properly, according as it implies the desire of a thing not at, in another way, commonly, huh, communicator, according as it implies the exclusion of disgust or boredom or whatever. So, according as it is in act now, pleasure does not cause, what? Thirst or desire of itself, per se lo quendo, right? Not at, but only per se lo quendo, huh? If of our thirst or desire is said to be of a thing, what? Not at, it's a desire of a thing not at, right? For pleasure is an affection of the appetite about the thing that is present. But it happens that the thing present is not perfectly, what, at. And this can be either on the side of the thing had, or on the side of the one having it. On the side of the thing had, in that the thing had is not totesimo. Well, you listen to music there, and you listen to, or you watch the, read the play or something, right? It's not totesimo. Yeah. Can't be all together at once. Once it is successively received, right, huh? And when one successively, what, receives, and when someone delights in what he has, he desires to drink, I guess. That's what you mean, huh? Just as the one who hears the first part of the verse, and delights in this, desires to hear the other part of the verse, right? As Augustine says in the fourth book of Confessions, huh? And in this way, almost all, what, bodily pleasures cause, what, thirst to themselves, until they are, what, consumed, huh? And that such pleasures follow some motion, right? This is clear in the pleasures of food. So you can't eat the ice cream sundae all at once, right? You can try. On the side over of the one having him, just as when someone, when something, what, does not perfectly have something existing in itself, perfectly, but bit by bit he, what, acquires it, huh? It's that word, paulatum, bit by bit is what we kind of translate in English, right? But that's the way our mind gets the truth, you know, paulatum, that's what we always like the word. He says that, that's what he says in his commentary on Job, I remember he talked about it, no use of this. Just as in this life, huh? Receiving something imperfectly of divine knowledge, right? We are delighted, right? And this pleasure excites or arouses thirst or desire for a perfect knowledge, right? According to what, according as one can understand what it's had in Ecclesiasticus, 24, 29, who drink me will still, what? Still thirst. Thirst, yeah. If however, by thirst or desire one understands only the intensity, right, of the affection, taking away, what, boredom, thus spiritual pleasures most of all cause thirst or desire of themselves. But bodily pleasures, because they are, what, when they grow too much or continue for too long, right, they cause a super excrescence of the natural habitude, right, huh? And they become disgusting or painful, as is clear in the delight of, what, foods, huh? And account to this, when someone arrives at, what, perfection, huh, inviolably pleasures, he becomes, what, boredom, right? I used to call it the diminishing returns. I used to call it the diminishing returns, I used to call it the class. And he sometimes, what, desires other ones, right? But spiritual pleasures do not, what, exceed the natural, what, disposition, but they, what, perfect nature, right? Whence, when one arrives at a conservation in them, then they are more, what, yeah? Except, perhaps, progenyms, insofar as to contemplative operation, are joined some operations of bodily powers, which, through the... The, the, the, uh... Attenuation, I'd say, the robbering become what? Weary. Weary, yeah. And in this way, it can be understood what is said in Ecclesiastics. 24, 29, the same quote, right? Who drink me will still what? There it is, huh? Because also the angels who perfectly know God and delight in Him, it is said in 1 Peter 1, that they desire to look upon Him, right? The desire to be ever left. And it says there that you'll be like a temple, right? Don't go out anymore. No, no! I'm going to be cabin fever. You can't understand that very well, I don't think. Don't you get bored? Same sight over and over again? Is that going to the theater and seeing the same movie every time you go there? Little do you know. Little do you know. If however one considers what? Pleasure insofar as it is in memory and not in act, then per se, it's naturally apt to cause thirst and desire of itself. When a man returns to that disposition in which was what? Delightful to him, what has already passed away. If however he is changed from that disposition, the memory of the pleasure does not cause in him delight, but what? Disgust. As the full existing memory of food. that's like, my father, John, his uncle, so it's the brother of the man who's talking to me, Roland Chouinier. We were cleaning out the house where his uncle had lived, but I was cleaning up and breaking down the bed, which was the place where Roland's parents used to stay when they were alive, which was long ago. a long time ago. And he just, he looked at the place, he was kind of reminiscing, and he said, he said, you know, the longer they're gone, the more I miss them. This is how he's desired to see them as grown. It's his past memory of loving his parents. After the first injection, right? But from the rest it is pleasure, right? It tends to be posed to motion, right? Can't be in rest in motion at the same time, can you? Not at the same time. Not at the same time. Not at the same time. Not at the same time. So the first effort should be said that when pleasure is perfect, then it has, in every way, rest, huh? And there ceases the motion of desire tending in what is not had, right? Isn't that also the reason why hope would not be in heaven? So, kind of, what's the kind of desire there here? It satisfies what you got. But when it is imperfectly had, then not altogether it ceases the motion of desire tending and it not had, huh? So I think I understand the text fully, you know, which I don't very often think that I'm at rest, right, huh? But I think I don't fully understand it, then, to have that kind of desire, right, huh? Like De Connick said, you know, that I've been teaching the physics since the 1930s, right? And I had him in the, what, the late 1950s. But he still saw something new when he went through that, right, huh? And once he'd done probably not something he didn't see. Kind of would say, how could I have taught this 20 years and not seen that? It's kind of nice to see the humility, you know, on his part, huh? You know. And I went to ask him to my thesis what he thought about this question. And I says, you know, what would you ask me when you've got the honors you're advising? So I still want to see what you're saying. Oh, I'm sorry. The second should be said that that which is had imperfectly is had secundum quid. Now there's a famous distinction there. Simplicit here in secundum quid, huh? And according to this, secundum quid, right, right, it is what? Not had, right, huh? And therefore, together, about it, there can be both, what, desire and pleasure, right? It's the woman, yeah, that's the woman. What was it, John on the cross? And I think St. Teresa has a version of it that I'm dying because I do not die. What you desire, you're dying to have it, but that's what's making you like, but that's the expression of the poem, I mean, it's dying, I do not die, or I'm dying because I'm not dying. Dying to die, I mean. Yeah. Dying to die, yeah, yeah. Now about colors and opposites. Well, pleasures, in one way, cause disgust, another way, you desire, right? So, it's like in the third corollary, the four kinds of causes, right? The same thing can be a cause of opposites by its presence and absence, right? So it's not the cause that the ship captain, it's a cause of the safety of the ship or of the destruction of the ship, but not exactly the same way. The guard is a cause of the safety of the camp, right, by his intelligent guarding and seeing the enemy approaching and the administration is in trouble with that business down in Libby, right? Oh, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Yeah. Shall we do another article or get time? I want to know here about this. It may be important for me to know whether pleasure impedes use of reason. The third one goes forward thus. It seems that pleasure does not impede the use of reason. For rest, most of all, confers or contributes to the suitable use of reason. Whence it is said in the seventh book of the physics, natural hearing, that in, what, calming down and coming to rest, the soul becomes knowing and prudent. Of course, notice the word understanding, right? It comes from the word stand rather than from motion. And in Wisdom 8, chapter 8, verse 16, going into my house, right, I rested, right, with it, meaning wisdom. But pleasure is a certain rest. Therefore, it does not impede, but more aids the use of reason, huh? I could have better laid some days. I laid there and completely had rest. Then I can take something out that I couldn't hang out before. You don't want to go and get any sleep, though. I couldn't get certain things. I was laying bad last night and I had this thought. Yeah, it does keep you awake, though. You're resting in some way. Whoever, those things which are not in the same, even if they are contrary, do not impede each other. But pleasure is in the desiring part of the soul, and the use of reason in the grasping part. It's amazing how Thomas, you know, often used that term, didn't say the knowing power, but the grasping power, right? The thing known is in the mind, huh? That's, uh, yeah? No, who else would do that? I don't know who else would use so consistently like he does identify that part as the grasping part, huh? Therefore, pleasure does not impede the use of, what? Reason, huh? Sort of digesting my food there impede my thinking? Depends on what you eat. If you had salmon, it will. Yeah, I know. I've got more. More of that which is impeded by another seems in some way to be, what, changed from it. But the use of the, what, grasping power more moves us to, what, pleasure, right? Or more moves pleasure than it moves us from pleasure, right? For it is a cause of pleasure, right? And therefore, pleasure does not impede the use of reason, huh? But against all this nonsense is what the philosopher says is in the sixth book of ethics. That's the book devoted to the virtues of reason, right? And he says, watch out for pleasure, right? Pleasure corrupts the, what, estimate of, what, prudence, huh? So, here's some examples of that in our prison society. Quite a few. The answer should be said that, as Aristotle points out in the tenth book of the ethics, the pleasures that are proper, right, to them increase their operations, right? So, if you take delight in hearing something, you'll hear it a little more intensely, right? Delight in seeing something, you'll look, you know, more intensely, right? If you delight in, what, understanding something, you'll understand it more, right? More intensely. But extraneous pleasures, what, impede, right? It's not pleasures that are tied to the operation itself, huh? Now, there is a certain pleasure which is had about the very act of reason itself, just as when some odd guy delights in contemplating or reasoning, right? And such a pleasure does not impede the use of reason, but more aids it, right? Now, that's why the students had such a hard time, you know? They didn't take any pleasure in these things, right? So, yeah. Because that more, we, more attentively, we do, in which we, what, delight, huh? But attention, what, ease, what, operation, right, huh? But bodily pleasures impede the use of reason. Oh, this is the heart of the matter now, here. For a three-fold reason. Can I leave now? For a three-fold reason, huh? First, by reason of, what, distraction, huh? Now, what did the great de Tocqueville say about the greatest advice of the mind in democratic times, huh? He says, it's a distraction. Is that right? Yeah, yeah. And he didn't even know about cell phones. Yeah, yeah. That's interesting. That's the biggest disrespect. Because it had something to do with democracy? Yeah, yeah, yeah. Because all these commotions in society. Yeah, because I guess that, yeah. As opposed to aristocratic society, where your father was a carpenter, you'll get a carpenter, you know. Oh, and things are fixed. It's at rest. They're more stable in society, yeah. Yeah, yeah. Yeah, yeah. And I think some of that is the, well, I'm going to jump into a big thing, but I guess in some ways the competition, as I might say, in a capitalist type society too, the competition is more intense and sort of unrestricted, which is, what I think is based on, or from Belloc, what Protestantism introduces is the isolation of the individual. So then you have every individual competing against another, and I guess that's kind of a distraction from, it destabilizes everything. Everything competing for your attention in our society, you know. Advertisements, you know, ad nauseum, and so on. That's what, the three steps in every sin, is distraction, attraction, contraction. That's the same bottom line, that's the three steps. It's like Eve, she was distracted, she got attracted, and she contracted. Yeah. That's every sin. I wonder about, you know, the saying of the devil being, you know, Beelzebub, you know, you know, the Lord of Flies. You know, you get a lot of flies around, you know, they really are distracting. I'm trying to read your book and the flies by me, aren't I? It's like the devil, you know, behind this, you know, the idea of distraction, he sees that. Most people lead a very distracted life, it seems to me now. Okay, first by reason of distraction, huh? Because, as has been said, to those things in which we delight, huh? We pay, what? More attention, huh? But when intention is strongly, what? Adhering to something, it's debilitated about other things, right? Or even is totally, what? Called back from them, right? And according to this, if the body pleasure is great, it either wholly impedes use of reason, drawing to itself the intention of the soul, or it multum impediate, it much impedes it, right? Moreover, I mean, secondly, rather, by reason of what? Contrary, this is something a little different, right? For some pleasures, especially those that are excessive, right, are counter, against the order of what? Reason, right? And in this way, or through this way, or in this way, the philosopher says in the Sixth Book of the Ethics, that bodily pleasures corrupt the estimate of prudence, right? Not, however, speculative estimation, right? That's a little saving for me there now. To which they are not contrary, right? As an example, that the triangle has three angles equal to two, right? So that's not going to corrupt my thinking about whether it does or does not have that. That means too much, right? But in the first way, it doesn't feed, right, and I actually say about alcoholics, you know, that I've known and so on, they don't really deny that the principle you shouldn't drink too much. What they deny is that they drink too much. Is that a couple of ousy drinks I heard them say, you know? And they've always obviously had too much, you know, making kind of a fool of themselves, you know, but, but, okay. But the first thing is talking about something that is not necessarily, what, contrary to virtue, but, you know? If, you know, the Shakespeare play is on the TV or something, you know, I can't sit there with a book and read, you know, or I get the music, you know, and listen to Mozart, you know, a little bit distracted, you know, you know, it's not that the Mozart is contrary to reason, like, you know, but it does distract you, right? The second one is tied to what moderation is the greatest virtue from Herodotus, in order to wisdom, what does it say, St. Thomas's commentary, you're talking about the Greek name for moderation and temperance is saving reason. I remember when you were teaching a kind of a seminar class, you know, and you had the boys and girls on the whole side, there's a nice looking girl there, you know, you know this guy, he's paying some attention to her, you know, and you don't know how she's drinking in your words, you know, because he's distracted, right, you know? In the third way, he says, according to a certain, what, binding, okay, insofar as to bodily pleasure, there follows a certain transformation of the, what, body. More also, in some passion, right, insofar as that the appetite is more vehemently affected to a thing that is present than to a thing that is, what, absent. So avoid this circumstances of what he thought, what's the word, thinking of the occasions of sin, right? Oh, yeah. Yeah, yeah, yeah, the things that are present, right? For he says, these bodily disturbances here impede the use of reason, as is clear in Vinalentes, I guess that's the drunks, huh? Mm-hmm. Who have the use of reason bound or impeded, huh? St. Thomas is a really powerful example. He says that certain sins of the flesh, in particular, blind the mind so much, if a man knew that the object of his desire was right before him, but as soon as he touches it, goes straight to hell, he doesn't stop. And it's how blind a man becomes, isn't it? Mm-hmm. That's it. Now, he says, to the first it should be said that bodily pleasure has the rest of the, what, appetite in the pleasant thing, right, huh? Which rest is sometimes, what, contrary to reason, huh? But from the side of the body, it always has some kind of, what, change, huh? And as regards both, it impedes the use of, what, reason. So here, you know, somebody gets kind of angry in a conversation or disagreement, you know, and when they calm down the next day, then they kind of, you know, see the light, you know? For the time being, they can't, because of the body. Now, he says, it's true that the desiring power and the grasping power are diverse parts, huh, diverse potential parts of the soul, but they're of one soul, right? And therefore, when the intention of the soul is vehemently applied to the act of one, it's impeded from the act of the other, right, huh? So they describe Mozart as being, you know, entirely in his, what, ear, right, huh? You know, you've heard that kind of time when Mozart first got to hear some piece by Johann Sebastian Bach, who wasn't playing much in those days, you know? What is that? You know? But he's just kind of in his ear, right, huh? My brother Mark was describing these artists there in Detroit there, where he says, you know, they come into a room like this and say, oh, I've never seen a shade of blue just like that, huh? Yeah, yeah. Oh, they're entirely in their eyes, you know, huh? It's like they're, you know, 20 years, you know, huh? Well, they have any wiling like that. I'm just dull, I can't see them. Yeah, yeah. The third one, huh? The third should be said that the use of reason requires the suitable use of the imagination. That's why you need fiction, right, to refresh the imagination, huh? Because it's a slave of reason. And also the other sensitive powers, which use the bodily organ. The imagination uses the bodily organ, too. And therefore, from the bodily change, the use of reason is impeded when the act of the imaginative power and the other ones are, what? Impeded, right? Mm-hmm. Try to do it with the regular figures there in the solid geometry there, trying to imagine them, you know, find those little cutouts, you know, hanging from the lights. Help your imagination a bit. Okay, time for the last article in this question, or what? Do you want to stop now, or what? The bell right? Yeah, I think maybe. Yeah, we don't get in trouble with the powers that be, right? No, it would be our pleasure. Yeah.