Prima Secundae
Lecture 89: Pleasure, Joy, and Motion in the Soul

Transcript
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That's kind of a hard distinction, but it's one that Aristotle talks about, too. So now, with that distinction in mind, he says, Thus, therefore, it should be said that pleasure, by itself or in itself, is not in what? Time. For pleasure in the good now obtained, right, huh? For pleasure is in the good now obtained, right? Which is as the term or limit or end of the, what? Motion, right? But if that good which has been attained is subject to transmutation, right, to change, pleasure will be perotidens in time. If, however, it is entirely within, not so much a change, right? The pleasure will be neither in time, not in time, neither per se, nor perotidens, right? So it's a pleasure of seeing God as he is face to face, huh? What will that be? That be in time in any way. And the beatific vision is really before and after. No before and after there, right? And as you're partaking of eternity, right, huh? That's why we call it eternal life, right? You're partaking of eternal life. So there won't be any, what? There won't be subject to any kind of change, so that perotidens, right? It's not like Plato says, you know, well, that's why you get kind of bored or something. You want to be reincarnated, you know, and so on. Tom says, well, never be bored. You can never make the mistake, you know, your mind is so enlightened, you can never make the mistake of thinking you'd better go back to the body, you know, the changeable body, you know? Yeah. So, a friend of mine in high school said, Andrew Gorky, he said, well, after a few million years, won't we get kind of bored? After a few million years, won't we get kind of bored up there? We're going to do something else. It's kind of amazing, you know, you know, you've had a passage of Augustine where he says, miserable the man who knows all the things but not God, right? Blessed the man who knows God and if he knows nothing else, right? Blessed also the man who knows God and other things but not for knowing the other things but for knowing God alone, right? So, I was reading something where Thomas was saying something along the same effect, you know, that even if you saw only God and see God, I mean, seeing God gets the other things, right? But if you saw only God and seeing God, that would still be perfect happiness, huh? It's kind of interesting. See, but our thinking in this life is subject to change in some way because we use what images we think, right? And our body gets tired and we fall asleep, you know? So, there's this fantasy about Aristotle, you know, holding a steel ball over a metal basin, you know, so if he started to fall asleep, he would drop out of his hand and I'm sure you wouldn't do anything as stupid as that, but people couldn't realize that he got so far that he was thinking, you know? But Aristotle, you know, when he's wondering about God, right, huh? You know, he wonders because God is, what, always in this state, you know, of understanding the wonderful things and primarily understanding himself. Aristotle knows that. That state we can only be in, what, sometimes, right? So, we've got to sleep or we've got to eat or we've got to, you know, do something about it. And so, we're only, we're always being interrupted, you would say, in our contemplation of the best things, right? So, he says, if God is always contemplating the best thing and we only rarely can become the best thing, how much better he is than us, right? And, and if he, well, he is, he's a fairy, right? The way he's, he's contemplating it, you know, even more so, right? He compels, he compels our, what, wonder, Aristotle says, huh? But in the beat of vision, you won't be, what, seeing God using images at all, right? So, in no way you're going to be subject to change there, right? So, that's what, like, taxio non-errit and tempori, per se, Nick Pratchett is, huh? You can apply that to the beat of vision, huh? See, we'll do it sometime, right? He doesn't do it here. It's not appropriate. Now, to the first therefore it should be said that as is said in the third book about the soul, Aristotle, motion is said in two ways, right? In one way, and this is the first meaning of motion, that it's the act of the, what, imperfect. And then he's quoting, what, part of the definition there, right? Where Aristotle says it's the act of the, it's what exists in potency as, what, such, right? Quantum voos modi. So, it's, by its very definition, something incomplete and perfect, right? And such a motion is, what, successive and in time, right? You know, you can stand in English by saying it's the act of what is able to be insofar as it's what, able to be. So, it's still, it's always something incomplete. Another motion is the act of the perfect. That is of what exists in act. And of this kind is intelligiate to understand, to sense, right? And to will, and also to delight. An emotion of this sort is not successive, nor is it as such, per se, in time. And Aristotle is contrasting those two things, huh? And just remember about the word motion, right? I mean, Aristotle usually uses the word motion in the strict sense for the act of what it's able to be, right? Insofar as it's still able to be, right? But in the third book on the soul, he sometimes will call this more perfect activity, the act of the perfect, he'll call that emotion too, right? I mentioned how Plato, right, says that God moves himself, meaning he understands and loves himself, right, huh? When Aristotle is contrasting these two, right? The first meaning and the second. And Thomas, you know, he'll use motus for the first and he'll use the operatio for the second, right? But there's not really a good word for it, maybe. You know, Aristotle says that, just to give you an example, I want to, when I'm walking home, have I walked home yet? But when I'm seeing you, have I seen you yet? So when I'm seeing you, I have seen you, which implies the perfection of it, right? But when I'm walking home, I haven't walked home yet, have I? And when I have walked home, am I walking home? No. So, so long as I'm walking home, my activity of walking home is incomplete, right? And once it's completed, once I have walked home, I'm not walking home anymore, right? Okay. But when I'm hearing the music of Mozart, have I heard it yet? Unfortunately, I now have, because I've listened to it for a long time. See? And when I understand what a square is, have I understood what it is yet? Yeah. That's kind of a nice way of kind of seeing the difference between the two, right? So my walking home is something that is by its very nature successive, right? Okay. It's understanding what a triangle is, or understanding what a square is, to take some sure examples of things I might possibly understand. Is that by its very nature successive? You got it. Now, when I'm pleased, have I been pleased yet? So it's really like an operation rather than a motion, right? We call it motions in the second sense, which is the act of the perfect, right? So man's end does not consist in motion at first sense, because that's something by its very nature, perfect. Is this the distinction? I've often, I've thought about it, and I don't know if I've, maybe I've read some things about it. That's the difference in our speaking between, in Latin, the word labor, labor, and opus. I'm thinking of the opus day, but labor is what we do when we go out in the field, or we're mopping the floor. I think Aristotle would use the word maybe interlakeia or something, you know, for that perfect thing, but Thomas uses the term operatio a lot, you know, but, you know, I'm not saying that the words, you know, gave a use necessarily have that meaning. Separation would be involved, you know. Well, I'm thinking of, in St. Benedict, he speaks of the Pope was dating, he's chanting in the office, but then he says, ora et labor, pray and work, but he means labor, he means, I think he means manual work. And I sometimes, I think of this along the lines of something like the servile arts and the liberal arts, something like the different kinds of work. But praying, like, if I'm saying our Father is a student movement there, right, from one petition to another petition, right, and so if I, have I prayed yet, you know, you might say, well, you know, I'm praying, you know, complete my prayer yet, right, okay. But if I'm just, if I start contemplating God, then I have contemplated God, right, then. And now is that an operation? Yeah, yeah. It would be more than an operation. It would be more than an operation. Yeah, that's what Thomas used to term operatio, I'm not sure how much Latin, you know, but it's really the word, opus, obviously, operation, you know, but the opus is something complete, right, opera or something, yeah. Somebody said, I put the Opera Omnia of St. Thomas. Oh, I didn't know he wrote an opera. I said, yeah, just one, it's called Omnia. Yeah, yeah, yeah. It's like, you know, that's when you talk about the trivia in school, you know, and all you can think of as, you know, trivia games or something, you know, what do you do there, you know? You play trivia games or something. Oh, I do all day. Yeah, yeah. You've got an award recently, you know, from one of the best schools in the country, you know, Catholics, you know. Oh, when was that? It was recently, it was a weekend, I mean, it was a fall, really. Oh, wow. It was a ceremony and so on. So we're not playing trivial games there. No. They don't know trivium and quadrille, that's what meaning of all these people. So, to the second, it should be said, that a pleasure is said to be Dio Eterna, the link there, right, the amorosa, according as it is paracidens in time, right, huh? Now, what about to the passions? Are there any more emotions? For the other passions do not have for their object the good obtained, as pleasure does, right? Whence they have more of a notion of emotion and perfect than, what, pleasure, right? And consequently, it more belongs to pleasure than to them to not be, what, in time, huh? There's kind of a little difference between Aristotle and Plato and Aristotle. The story is told of Aristotle coming down to the academy and when he got there that day with Aristotle, he says, well, he's a whole school in himself, so. Now, I admire, you know, I think I mentioned this before, but I admire the thing when the older man, right, who's in a, you know, in a superior position in some way, is not envious of the younger man being greater than himself. So, Albert the Great, for example, he was called Albert the Great, right? He arranged a kind of debate between himself and Thomas, where Thomas, of course, won, right? And he says, well, this guy, you'll call a dumb ox, you know, his bellow will be heard around the world, you know, but there's no, no, what, envy, right? And that's the beautiful relationship between Heidi and Mozart, right? And when they played the, when Heidi, in a musical evening, you know, when they were playing Mozart's quartets, and Heidi came to Mozart's father and said, honest man, you know, your son is the greatest composer you're going to be, you know? So, actually, Mozart went home and dedicated those six quartets, so they call it the Heiden quartets now, you know, they dedicate them to Heiden, you know? But Heiden, actually, no jealousy or envy at all, you know? Heiden says, he wrote Don Giovanni for me, my friends, you know, and I think I really appreciate, you know, you know, and he said, he went over to England, you know, and told them how ignorant they are, they haven't hired votes, you know, for a year, so on. So those are three beautiful examples that I know, right? And he saw something like that, too, you know, in Deconic and Dion, because Deconic was more famous than Dion, right, you know, come around and let you tour and so on. But he was very clear, you know, I know when Warren Murray tells me he went up there, you know, and Deconic said, you know, Deconic is the greatest mind up here, you know, and made it very clear, you know. And I know when Mary Shane went up there, you know, and she did this Deconic, and he'd make it perfectly clear to his wife, who admired her husband very much, you know, that Dion was the greatest mind up there, you know. I always remember walking by in the sidewalk there, and once Deconic was going to go into Deconic's house, they were going to discuss something, you know, and Dion was going back and forth, and he was just finishing his thought about it, you know. I didn't even know what he brought, he said, hello, I walked out in it quickly, I didn't engage in any conversation, you know. But it's good to see that right now, a man who's older, maybe the teacher in some sense, you know, and the younger man, maybe he's learning, you know, things from him, you know, but then he sees this guy, he's superior, and he has no envy, you know, that's beautiful it seems to me, you know, as opposed to the modern philosophers, you know, everybody trying to excel the guy before him, you know. And with respect that Thomas has for Aristotle, and respect he has for Augustine, and the others too, of course, but those guys stand out, you know. You've read John Paul II, he's got one of those, I don't know, it's a cyclical letter on Augustine, you know. It really kind of lays out the importance of Augustine, how great a partner plays, you know, in the catechism of the Catholic Church, you know, the number of quotes of Augustine, there's a lot from Thomas too, but Augustine, most of all, amazing, you know, so it really, and Augustine didn't have the advantages that Thomas had, you know, knowing Aristotle, really, and so on, so, that to really admire. I have his movie out about Augustine, I don't know, it's going to be the good, I'm afraid what it's going to, what liberties will take, you know, it's going to be out in October, I think, you know, I'll probably see it as if it is, but. Is this a Hollywood movie, or something else? I don't know who made it exactly, I don't know, but I think it's made under fairly, you know, church, I don't know, but. Respectable. I think so, but I don't know, it must take some liberties, you know, and so on, you know. I think when Augustine died, wasn't the city being attacked by the vandals, and then he stayed there, but he died before they catch the city? He died before the, yeah, I don't remember. But I just heard a little thing about the thing, I mean, it's representing him as, you know, there was an offer for him to be removed, you know, or to escape, whatever it was, and he just had to stay with the flock, or something, you know, which maybe he did, I don't know, but that's maybe accurate now. Could be, I guess, to me. It's kind of interesting, you know, when Thomas is talking about the Psalms, right? And the Psalms are, most of all, a book of prayers, you know, and prayer is what, tied to what theological virtue, most of all. Hope, yeah, yeah. And Thomas talks about, well, you know, David made some serious mistakes there, like with Bathsheba's husband, you know, and so on. They were very serious, you know, sins he followed into, right? But this is part of giving us hope, right, that he could, you know, be converted, right, you know? And I think that's probably the popularity of a little bit of Augustine, right, that he was, you know, led a somewhat disled life, I guess, and then, you know, there's hopes for the rest of us. If there's, if there's, it reminds me a little bit of David in that sense, I mean, in fact, why was David given, you know, the authorship for the most part of these Psalms, right? If not for our hope, right? It's like Thomas, you know, was doubting for our faith, you know, and loved it, and Peter was allowed to fall, you know. To the third, then, one goes forward thus. It seems that Gaudium, right, which we translate today as joy in English, is altogether the same as, what, pleasure. Well, we'll see what Thomas says about that. For the passions of the soul differ by their objects, but the same is the object of joy and of pleasure, to it the good that has been obtained, right? So love is just of the good period, right? Whether you have it or don't have it, right? By desires for the good that you don't have yet, right? So pleasure has its object of good obtained. It's the object of both joy and pleasure, so I'm not saying the same thing. Therefore, joy is altogether the same thing as pleasure, right? Moreover, one motion does not end in two ends, but the same is the motion which ends at, what, joy and pleasure, to it concupiscence, right? Therefore, joy and pleasure and joy are altogether the same thing. Moreover, if joy is something other than pleasure, it seems for like reason that laetitia, right? And exotatio, right? And jukunditas, right? Somebody's got the idea of what, overflowing, you know, and so on, signify something other from, what, pleasure? And thus, these will be altogether, what? Different passions, which seems to be, what, false, right? And therefore, joy does not differ from pleasure. But against this, this is very interesting, this is a counter. But against this is that in the brood animals, on the erection animals, we do not speak of joy. That's interesting, you don't speak, you know. I used to, you know, give the cat, you know, little tidbits on the table, you know, huh? And I got a cat there where my daughter is now, and I'm the guy that's getting little tidbits of the thing, you know. But, you know, you don't, you know they're pleased with this, you know. And with the other cat we had at the house, I'd say to her, you know, we're having steak tonight, you know. And she seemed to understand. Oh. Pork chops. They like pork chops. I mean, they're pork, you know. And so you can see they read something in common. We both like steak. But I would never think of saying that, you know, it was joy in her, right? You know, it was pleasure, right? You know. I suppose it was interesting to get the sadness, I suppose, and the beast is, you know, the dog, you know, his master dies or something, you know. They seem to have something. But in the beast we speak of what? Pleasure, right? Yeah. Therefore, joy and pleasure are not the same thing, right? The answer should be said, huh? That gaudium, or joy, as Avicenna says in his book about the what? Soul. Is a certain species a particular kind of what? Pleasure, right, huh? For it should be considered that just as there are some concupiscences that are natural and some that are what? Not natural. But it's kind of a fun distinction that it's made here. But follow upon reason, right, huh? So there are some pleasures that are natural and some not natural, which are with reason, right, huh? Because sometimes we distinguish reason and nature, right? Or, as Damascene and Gregory Nyssa say, some are bodily, right, huh? And some are what? Yeah. Soul. So we more speak of joy over the truth, right? And Augustine says, a beatitude is gaudium de veritate. It doesn't say delictatio. You know? So it's a connotation of being more spiritual, right? The gaudium than delictatio, right? And so if I stick a pin in you, you know, we speak of pain, you know, and then I move the pin on you. Some pleasure is with him, the pain. So we delight, take pleasure in those things which we naturally, what? Desire. In attainment. In attainment, right? And in those which we, what? Desire. Desire according to reason, huh? Because the word pleasure could be more broad, right, huh? Okay. But the name of joy does not have place except in, what? The pleasure which follows reason, right? So I might say I'm pleased with thinking about God, or I'm pleased with, you know, philosophy. But I might also say I have joy, right? Okay. But I don't think I would use the word joy so much, you know, if I had my favorite meat tonight or something, you know. Or living the rain pie or something, I had that, like, you know. Okay. Whence we do not attribute joy to good animals, but only the name of, what? Pleasure, right, huh? I mean, the way she's playing it now, pleasure can be divided into pleasure and, what? Joy, right, huh? And joy is the name given sometimes to the pleasure that follows upon reason, right? And the other ones that don't follow upon reason, are tied to the senses, keeps the word pleasure, right, huh? Yeah, okay. But he says everything that we desire according to nature, right, huh? We are also able with, what? Pleasure. A reason to desire, right, huh? Yeah. But not the reverse, right? Whence about all things about which there is pleasure, there can be joy in those having reason, right, huh? So it's been joyful that one's favorite food is being served tonight. Mm-hmm. Right. Although not always about all things is there, what? Joy, right? For sometimes someone senses some pleasure according to the body, about which he does not rejoice according to what? Reason. Reason, right? And according to this or in this way, pleasure is in more, it's more universal, right, than what? Joy, right, huh? Okay. He's careful every time, he's not speaking too recisely, right? But joy seems simply to be, what, more narrow in its meaning than pleasure, right? Did you enjoy your dinner? No, but there you enjoy, I got the word, you know? I don't know if enjoyment is the same as joy so much, huh? Yeah, yeah. He wouldn't say, yeah, I didn't rejoice over the stage. Yeah, yeah. He'd say, I kind of enjoyed it with me. Oh, my God. Yeah, yeah. One thing is, it always comes to my mind when I think about this is, a few years ago when Pope Benedict got elected, I remember that afternoon, I was euphoric. It was just, it was joy. I was joy. Yeah. You know, the first objection was that joy and pleasure had the same, what, object right now? And Tom says, well, not all together, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said that since the object of an animal desire, as opposed to the natural desire of plants for the sun and so on, is a good apprehender, known in some way, right? And that was one of the causes of love, knowledge, right? A diversity of apprehension, a diversity of what? Knowing, right, of knowledge, pertains in some way to the diversity of what? Object, right? So the object of the animal desire is an object known in some way, right? So to be known in some way pertains to the object, right? And if you recall when he talked about love, and he said that the first cause of love is the good, and the good is the cause of love because it's the object of love, and then he added what? Knowledge is the second cause of love, but it's a cause of love for the same reason that the good is, because it's on the side of the, what, object, right, huh? Knowledge is the second cause of love. Knowledge is the second cause of love. And then he goes to the other cause, which is like this, right, huh? It's much inside of the, what, object, right, huh? Inside of the subject, huh? So he's saying it's a diversity of apprehension, a diversity of knowledge, then in some way pertains to a diversity of, what, object, right? And thus the animal pleasures, which are said, or called gaudia, right, joys, are distinguished from the bodily pleasures, right, which are called only delictationes, right, just as above it was said about concupiscences. Now the second thing is saying, well, you have one end for emotion, right, and concupiscences, like a movement, huh, you're seeking something. We said a like difference is found also in concupiscences, right? Thus the delictatio responds or corresponds to concupiscence concupiscence and joy to, what, desire, right, which more seems to pertain to the animal concupiscence. So the one is a more spiritual desire, right? So concupiscence, we saw, had more of the bodily sense on concupirate, with the body, right, huh? And thus, according to the difference of motion, there's also a difference of the rest, huh? So he's not denying the principle, but showing how it can apply to this distinction, right? So the first objection is solved by putting out that there was a difference of object, huh? And the second one, that there was even a difference of the motion to that object, huh? So my desire to know the truth is somewhat different than my desire to eat. Now what about all these other names? To the third it should be said, that the other names pertaining to pleasure are imposed from, what? The effects of pleasure, right? For the titsia is placed upon pleasure from the dilation of the, what? Heart. Did you know that? No. As if one was saying, what? Titsia, right? I suppose, you know, this doesn't, don't you speak of sadness as kind of narrowing, you know? Pinching you? Mm-hmm. You're kind of oppressed. Yeah, yeah. Why? Pleasure kind of what? Spirits. Yeah, yeah. Exultatio, right? Is said from the outward signs of the interior, what? Pleasure, right? Which appear exteriorly, right? Insofar as the interior joy bursts forth, right? To the outside, huh? I remember when I was looking at comedy there and you say, what's the difference between mirth and merriment, huh? Well, mirth names more the inner, what? Pasio, right, huh? By merriment, huh? The outside. Yeah. You're making merry, you say, right? Yeah, yeah, yeah. And so the outside sign, right, huh? Shakespeare's a place called the Merry Ways of Windsor, right? They're playing jokes on Hamlet. I mean on Falstaff. On Falstaff, yeah. Merry Ways. Jokunditas is said from some special, what, signs or effects of what? Letizia, right? It doesn't say anything with the air. And nevertheless, all of these names seem to pertain to what? Joy, huh? For we do not use these except in rational natures, huh? Mm-hmm. Yeah. So what would the prayer of Thomas after communion there, right, where he end up by asking for the beauty of vision, right? It takes his spiritualness, spiritualness, one of them. And Gaudium, yeah. Gaudium, yeah. Jokunditas, consumita, so he does use that word, see? Jokunditas is more spiritual than the animal doesn't have Jokunditas, huh? Jokund, so I guess you can say Jokund, yeah. Well, that's what the Bonamit Jokundi Method Psalm we did last week. Mm-hmm. It's good and pleasant. I don't know how many translations of it. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Okay. Now, where the pleasure is found in the... if everything, just think things would be like if everything was in real life like it is on TV, then he says, well, if everything in real life was like it was on TV, what would TV be like? That's a perversion of the mind. That's how it holds. Once the philosopher Aristotle in the 7th book of the Ethics says that God rejoices by one simple operation, that's a beautiful text, Thomas will quote that one, you know? Deus unisum tici operazione. There you have the word operazione, right? He rejoices in himself. Self-sufficient. And Dionysius says at the end of the book on the celestial hierarchy, that's the one Albert the Great commented on, Thomas did on the divine names, his master, Albert the Great, on the celestial hierarchy, that the angels are not susceptible of our, what? Undergoing possibilities. But they, what? Rejoice with God, right? According to the joy of incorruption. So heaven will be right. You wonder what in heaven you'll ever think about this life you know? My dear mother, she asks me more and more, what's it going to be like? She's going to say, well, Ma, I think of the best thing you can think of, and it ain't good enough. That's all I can say. That's all I can say. It's not that, it's much better than that, whatever you can think of. Because she thinks about it more and more. What about us in the boots, right, Tom? To the third, it should be said, that in us, that only is there pleasure, the pleasure in which we, what? Communicate or have in common with the boots, right? But also that in which we come together with the, what? Angels, right? Whence there, Diannation says, that holy men, right, huh? Many times, enter into, what? Partaking of the angelic, what? Pleasures, right? So they call this guy the angelic doctor, right, huh? And thus, in us, there's pleasure not only in the sense-desiring power in which we, which you have in common with the boots or beasts, but also in the intellectual-desiring power in which we communicate with the angels, right? You know, it's kind of an interesting thing there. It was in Locke, you know, his idea of good is very limited, you know, to pleasure, right? And some objected to Locke, you know, that's a philosophy for beasts, you know, huh? And he said, well, he had a good defense and he says, no, you're the, what? You're the beast because you think we have only pleasures in common with the beast, right? But you have pleasures, you know, that the beast don't share, right? But sometimes, I will divide pleasures into, what, three instead of two? So the pleasures we share at the beast, pleasures of eating steak, and the pleasures we share in the angels, which is pleasures of understanding things, right? And then there are the pleasures that are, what, fit man, right? And I'm using that phrase from Austerle, right, in the Torts of the Irish of the Vizic, that the pleasures of the fine arts are too high for the beasts and too low for the angels, right? But they kind of involve one's body and soul, right, huh? So they're kind of the human pleasures, right? I think it's important to that point, huh? And therefore, the pleasures of the fine arts are kind of a, what, stipping stone to the pleasures of philosophy and the pleasures of, what, understanding, right, huh? We haven't found the angels, right? And then, you know, you can compare these and say, well, we don't understand as well as the angels do, right? So we share those pleasures of the angels as the pleasures of understanding God, but in an inferior way, at least in this life, right? Okay? Now the pleasure that we have to become the beast, we have it a little higher way because we, we have our wine sauce and we cook our meat, you know? We don't eat the mouse or raw, you know, like the cat does. I think my dad was trying to discourage me to feed the cats, you know? They want the cat to capture these mice and so on that bother them around in the barn sometimes, you know? And if you feed the cat and he will show, it's got a mouser, I guess, or something. But we have the pleasures of the table and so on in a little more refined way than the animal has, right? We cook and season our food with the salad dressing and all so that. And the rabbit doesn't put salad dressing on it. The cat that puts some pepper on his meat and so on. But then these other pleasures, you know, are the ones that seem to be, what, properly, but human, right? The pleasures of the fine arts. So you have to kind of be led from the lower pleasures to the higher pleasures, huh? And Aristotle, you know, and Plato talk about that, right? And Thomas himself says, no man can live without pleasure, right? So if you don't appreciate the higher pleasures, right, you're going to go to excess and the lower pleasures, you know? They keep talking about all the obesity in our society, you know, and other things, you know, people taking drugs and so on. But they're seeking, you know, excess of the lower pleasures because they have no taste for the higher pleasures, right? But the pleasures of the fine arts are kind of stepping stone to the pleasures of philosophy or the pleasures of theology, right? But they're easier for us, right? It's interesting that we can enjoy the pleasures of the fine arts longer in time than the pleasures of eating, right? You eat so much and the pleasure is gone, you know? And I always see, you know, somewhere else at Thanksgiving you know, when people tend to eat more than they should, you know? Oh, I'm so uncomfortable, you know? I can't sleep. Yeah. Or the guy at the party was drunk too much and now he's going to throw up, you know? It's like Socrates says in the dialogue there, you know, that these are tied to pains, you know? So, but you can also, you know, listen to say a Mozart opera longer than you can philosophize, right? because you're not straining your, you know, your body, you know? Because your imagination and even your senses are kind of like a slave of reason in philosophy or even in theology, right? And so, we can, of course we can sit down and the people sit down and sit down and go to a novel or something and they read it over three or four hours, you know? They sit down and sit down and sit down and sit down and sit down and sit down and sit down and sit down and sit down. So, in some sense, the pleasure of the fine arts are the human pleasures, right? But they're in between. suddenly it's nice to make a three-fourth division rather than just, like Thomas was saying, the ones we have the beast and we have the angels, right? My great angel takes him to Light and Shakespeare and I doubt it very much with him. Within the human realm of pleasure, could you say that there are active pleasures and passive pleasures, like reading the novel as opposed to studying philosophy, the novel being more passive with most people when we read anything? Yeah, the novel involves the imagination more, right? And fiction too, right? You're trying to please the imagination, right? Now, you use your imagination, you philosophize because you have to, but you're not trying to please the imagination and it's kind of pitiful that the modern philosophers sometimes try to please the imagination because that's the purpose of philosophy, you know? It's not to please the imagination, it's to enlighten the reason, right? So I like to use that three-fold division, right? But influence the philosophy, you can pray for it, you know? It's an influence upon me, you know? Happy reading those things, getting into those things. So we're up to Article 5, do you want to start that or not? Maybe we'll wait, it looks like. Yeah, it's kind of long, okay.