Prima Secundae
Lecture 88: Pleasure as Passion and Its Relation to Time

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But pleasure does not consist in being moved, but in what? Having been moved. That's interesting, he says that. For is caused pleasure from the good now attained, right? Therefore, pleasure is not passion, right? And so we speak of the beautiful scenery as being what? How restful. How restful this is. Moonsight's music is restful. That's tough to hear. What did C.S. Lewis say? Hell is a kingdom of noise. I learned a saying from Francis. Maybe he talked over in French. He says, le bruit ne fait pas de bien. Le bruit ne fait pas de bruit. The noise doesn't do any good. And the good doesn't make any noise. So there'll be music in heaven, right? Very beautiful music in heaven. Thomas talks about that. In hell there'll be noise, huh? I remember a guy being in the army and saying, they're trying to sleep at night there in the kind of dormant. They don't play these little popping radios, you know, you hear the same crazy stuff all night long. I know my cousin, he was in the Navy, you know, he would sleep in the shop because... He'd be quiet. He'd be quiet to get away from the noise. He said, when you hear these, the other guy was saying, you hear this same crazy song being played all night long, it goes through your head all day, you know, it just doesn't... That's why we're all just supposed to crack it up. Yeah, yeah. Don't use this kind of rock music to soften up these guys that are trying to, you know, interrogate you and get the answers out of you. I wouldn't surprise you. You go, how do you mind? You have to, well, three of these things. Moreover, pleasure consists in a certain perfection of the, what? One delighted, right? For as Aristotle says in the 10th book, in Nicomache Ethics, it perfects, what? Operation, right? So when I'm pleased hearing the music of Mozart, I listen more, what, intensely, right, huh? I'm pleased with the words of Shakespeare, and I meditate on those words, huh? Wisely and slow, they stumble, they run fast, and so on. And the same way if you enjoy thinking about God, right, then you think more intensely about God, huh? And his knowledge of future contingents, and so on. But to be perfected is not to undergo or to be, what? Altered, huh? As is said in the 7th book of physics, huh? And even in learning, you know, would you say that when you learn, you're altered or changed? To be perfected is to be changed? Would you say that Michelangelo altered the marble? Changed the marble, or he perfected it? Yeah. The diitas. Yeah. And the 2nd book of the Dianimam. So it's certainly a pleasure in the perfection of the, what, operation, right, huh? So whether it be the eye or the ear, right, huh? And Brother Mark was visiting his friend in Detroit there, and this guy had friends who were into art, you know, painters and so on, right, huh? And they're tearing their eyes, right, huh? And they described, you know, he'd come into this room, and he'd be looking around at the shades of color, you know, and so on. Oh, I've seen quite a, you know, shade like that, you know. They're so taken up in their eyes, huh? Like they say about Mozart, you know, the man who's tearing his ear, right, he's listening to music, right, you see? But there's an intensity of Mozart's, what, hearing there, right, huh? He heard the music more than anybody else, right? And there was more delight, right, because the music was beautiful, right? And this guy won't sit there, and he heard some piece of Bach, and he didn't have too much of the old Bach, you know, around that time, his music, you know, won't say, what is that? You know, he'd heard this, you know, and so it's just a pleasure, right, huh? So it's not an altering of the thing, but a perfection of it, right, especially in terms of operation, right? My enjoyment of the music of Mozart is, you know, it kind of perfects in some way my, what, hearing that music, huh? Or my delight in the painting of some good painter, you know? So this is said in both the seventh book of physics, or natural hearing, and the third, the second book of the soul. Therefore, pleasure is not a passion, right? But against all this is what the great Augustine says in both the ninth and in the fourteenth book about the city of God, where he lays down pleasure, Sive Gaudium, right? Eletitium, right? He puts them among the other passions of the, what? Soul, right, huh? Okay. Well, Thomas has got to clear up the words, right, huh? Doctor, did you say that, you gave an example, you said, you're hearing, you're listening to Mozart as a perfection of what? No, my pleasure I take in listening to Mozart's music is a perfection of my hearing, right? Or the pleasure I take in seeing the Fridge of the Rocks there, by Da Vinci there, right? My favorite opinion when I was in college, right? Intensifies my seeing, right? Or the pleasure I take in understanding God, right? Intensifies my understanding of God, right? Dwelling in it, huh? Keeps me awake, doesn't it? Thinking about God, okay? In the famous passage of Aristotle, you know, where he talks about even a little imperfect knowledge of the higher things, delights us more, you know, than this leisurely knowledge. If I know how many chairs there are in this room, you know, it would be kind of easy for me to know how many chairs in this room. But I have to count them. It wouldn't be too hard to count them, you know. But it wouldn't be any great pleasure to know the number of chairs. I don't know. I don't know the number of chairs in this room, do you? And even though we could easily know it, it wouldn't give me any delight, right, huh? I can't know God easily, but the little bit I do know about him, it lights me more. He makes a beautiful comparison, he says, it's just as a glimpse of someone we love, right? Delights us more than a leisure view of the boss at work or something, you know. Or someone else, or the bus driver, whoever it is, you know. Okay, well, Tom says, I answer it should be said, huh? That the emotion, right? The emotion, we could say in English, right? The emotion of the sensitive, desiring power, right? A petit twist there doesn't refer to what? The act of desire, but to the desire of power, right? We explained before why the desiring power is named from that particular passion. It's more like emotion, right? It stands out. So he says the emotion of the sense-desiring power, appropriate, properly, is called a what? Passion, as has been said above. They started talking about these things. For any affection proceeding from the sensitive apprehensione, that's the sense-knowing power, is a motion of the sense-desiring power. So he had these two desiring powers in us, the will, right? And then the sense-desire, and one follows upon the reason and the other upon the sense-ism. And this necessarily belongs to what? To pleasure, right? For as the philosopher, and that's again Aristotle, right? Says in the first book of the rhetoric, that pleasure is a certain motion of the soul, right? And a what? A constitution, simul tota, huh? The second trinity, right? And sensible, existing in what? Nature, huh? Now, Thomas says, for the understanding of this, right, we should consider, or it should be considered, that just as it happens in natural things, huh? That some things, what? Follow or attain, I guess. There are natural perfections, right? So this also happens in the, what? Animals, huh? And although to be moved to perfection is not. all at once. Probably it's in English, right? But in Latin they say totum simul, like every definition of eternity, right? So even though to be moved to perfection is in time, right? It's not, it's a before and after. It's not all together, right? In the categories there, chapter 12, it talks about before, and then in chapter 13 about simul, or hama in Greek, right? Together, I would say. But nevertheless, to have achieved the natural perfection is totum simul, is all at once, huh? So one is moved to perfection in time, right? In emotion, but one is perfect all at once. Sounds kind of funny at first, right? But it took time to get there, right? So the pietas, you know, when he's making the pietas, there was motion, right? He was chipping away and so on, right? But all at once, the thing was done, right? Another example might be Arthur Rubenstein, but perfecting one of Chopin's pieces or something like that. He's worked on it, he's worked on it, he's perfected it. Is that the same thing? Well, the question he plays is, he speaks of motion, of the movements, right? Movements of a piece. So it's going to be in time. Oh, okay. I remember, this reminds me of a short verse by Belak, after his wife had died, he had some affection for this woman named Julianne, somebody, and he took a kind of a comparison in words with the way we understand the Trinity, and he says, of three in one and one in three, my feeble mind would doubting be, until grace, grace and something and beauty met and all at once were Julianne. I said, all at once, oh, there it was, and he experienced perfection, right? All at once. But you would say, you know, all at once he completes the piece, right? He completes plenty, right? And that's... Let's say it took ten minutes to finish. Yeah, yeah. But I mean, it's all at once that it's finished. Yeah, okay. It's all at once that the pie is ready, right? To beat it, huh? Yeah, yeah. So, although to be moved to perfection is not all at once, totem simbo. Nevertheless, to have achieved, right, the natural perfection of a thing is all at once. Now, this, however, is a difference between animals and other, what, natural things that are not alive. Because the other natural things, when they are constituted in that which belongs to them according to nature, they do not sense this, huh? But animals, huh? Sense this, right? They feel great, right? Cat starts purring after he's been fed, you know? Or you're given a little rubbing and so on, yeah? And from this sense, huh? It's caused a certain, what? Motion of the soul in the sense appetite, huh? And this motion is, what? Pleasure. To this, therefore, that is, it has been said, that pleasure is a motion of the soul, it's placed in its, what? Genus, right? It doesn't mean that the soul by itself without the body, right? But it's because you have a soul, right? They call it the emotion of the soul, right? Sometimes they call it emotions there, you know, passion is anime, right? And you've got to be careful about that because you might think it's in the soul by itself, right? It's in one because of the soul, right? Through this over, that is said, constituted in its, what? Existing nature, right? That is, in that which exists in the nature of the thing is laid down the cause of the, what? Pleasure. Because that's due to the presence of a good that is connaturally. So if the water is, what? Too hot, right? Or too cold, then the body is, what? Doesn't fit the body, right? So it's not going to give you, what? Pleasure, right? And if the music, the sound is too loud, it's going to be, turn that down! Because it's hurting the ears, right? It's not proportion, it's not the natural, right? But through this, that it is called all at once, simul tota, it shows that the constitution ought not to be taken insofar as it is being constituted, right? But insofar as it is in the state of being constituted, as it were in the term or limit or end of the, what? Motion. For, and this is the difference in Plato and Aristotle, for pleasure is not a generation as Plato, what? Laid down, huh? And they give reference there to the philebus, right, huh? But it consists more in being made, right, huh? As is said in the seventh book of the ethics, huh? To this hour that is called sensible excludes the, what? Perfections of things without sensation in which there is no, what? Pleasure, right? So the rocks have no pleasure, right? Not even the poor trees, right? Thus, therefore, it is clear that since pleasure is a motion in the animal desiring power following upon the, what? The grasping of the senses, the knowing of the senses. Those things are very apprehensive, for them. I was talking last night about the words here. You have the two words, error, right? And the word mistake, huh? And the etymology is not the same, huh? Error comes from the word to wander, right? It suggests that error is a result of the mind's wandering, a disordered movement of the mind. But the other word mistake there kind of says you're missing and taking, right? But take is another word for almost for grasping, you know? So it's referring to the knowing power originally, right? To take, you know, and miss what you're trying to take on. Interesting. One of the few words I learned in German to perceive is a combination of true and take. You were not under a misapprehension, were you? I kind of like the word misapprehension, yeah. It's a beautiful word. So notice, we see this a lot, consequence apprehension, the apprehension, the grasping of the sense, right? Because the thing known is in the, what? Knower, right? Where your treasure is, there are hearts, you'll be. The heart of the will is in the, what? In the object, more, right? I left my heart in San Francisco, right? That's half my mind in San Francisco. A lot of people lost their mind in San Francisco. Yeah, that's true. Yeah, that's true. Yeah, one of the people told me, one of the last times you were down in San Francisco, some guy wanted to sell him drugs, and one says, I don't need it, I don't want it, you know? He says, I need the money, he says. Why is he? He doesn't want the drugs. I don't want the drugs. I don't want the drugs. I don't want the drugs. I don't want the drugs. I don't want the drugs. I don't want the drugs. I don't want the drugs. I don't want the drugs. I don't want the drugs. I don't want the drugs. I don't want the drugs. I don't want the drugs. I don't want the drugs. I don't want the drugs. I don't want the drugs. I don't want the drugs. I don't want the drugs. I don't want the drugs. I don't want the drugs. I don't want the drugs. I don't want the drugs. I don't want the drugs. I don't want the drugs. I don't want the drugs. I don't want the drugs. I don't want the drugs. I don't want the drugs. I don't want the drugs. I don't want the drugs. I don't want the drugs. I don't want the drugs. I don't want the drugs. I don't want the drugs. I don't want the drugs. I don't want the drugs. I don't want the drugs. I don't want the drugs. I don't want the drugs. I don't want the drugs. I don't want the drugs. I don't want the drugs. I don't want the drugs. I don't want the drugs. I don't want the drugs. I don't want the drugs. I don't want the drugs. I don't want the drugs. I don't want the drugs. I don't want the drugs. I don't want the drugs. I don't want the drugs. I don't want the drugs. I don't want the drugs. is fitting to its nature, right, the natural, and when this is not impeded by something extrinsic, right, there follows what? Pleasure, right, which consists in being perfect in some way. Thus, therefore, when it is said that pleasure is in operation, this is not the predicoctio per sensium, and we met this before, right, but per what? Causum, right, so we met that term before, remember, predicoctio per causum, right? That's like, was that by effect? Yeah, no, that's a different thing, yeah, but like Aristotle says, sensing is an undergoing, right, because the senses are acted upon by their what, object, right, but the actual sensing is a result of the object being joined in some way, huh, to the sense of power by acting upon, right? So it's really a definition or a predication, it's being said of it by reason of its what? Caus, then by reason of what it is, huh, okay? Now we speak that way sometimes, huh? If you know the length and width of this table, then you know its area, yeah, but it's knowing the length and width of the rectangle to know the area, that's not the area, you can, yeah, it's a cause of annoying the area, yeah, yeah, but the practical man would say, you know, length and width, then you know the area, you know, but it's a predicoctio per causum, it's, it's, it's, it's, uh, not really saying what it is to know the area, yeah, so we do speak that way in day of life you don't realize it, huh? So you could also say, well, you know the perimeter now, do you know the perimeter? Yeah. The perimeter's not the same things either, yeah, yeah, but I know the length and width, so. Yeah. That's what he explains, huh, damn scene there, huh? You take pleasure to be in the operation, right? Well, it's not the operation, but it's an effect of the operation being fitting to your, the power, right, huh, and, uh, not being impeded, right, huh? So Aristotle, you know, when they talk about the beating vision, right, for example, huh, I was going to be gaudy in their pleasure, right, huh, uh, in, uh, seeing God, right? That's because of the perfection of the operation. So the operation is, is not the pleasure, but it's the cause of it, right? I would say, say, hearing the music of Mozart is an enjoyment for me. Well, is it really? Or is it the cause of my joy? It's a cause, right? Right. See, but I don't speak of it, right? Steak is my pleasure in life, or beer is my pleasure in life, you know? Take away my beer, take away my pleasure, the working man might say, right? See? But is beer his pleasure in life? Some pleasure. He might say that, right? He might speak of it, right? Yeah. You know? My wife is my pleasure in life. Ice cream is my pleasure. What? Ice cream. Yeah, ice cream is your pleasure, right? Okay? But it's not your pleasure, right? It's the cause of your pleasure. We speak that way, right? I don't know why we do it, but we do it a lot. Dr. Burns, is there a distinction to be made? You said, listening to Mozart is... My pleasure. That's your pleasure. Yeah. But Mozart and listening to Mozart are two different things. What's the distinction? Well, I'm saying that the listening to Mozart's music, Mozart's music is natural to my ear, right? And if I hear it without, you know, any distractions, you know, or outside noises or things, you know, then the result of hearing the music of Mozart, the perfection of my hearing, will be a pleasure, okay? So, hearing the music of Mozart is not the pleasure, but it's the cause of the pleasure, right? Okay? In the same way seeing this beautiful painting, right, huh? This beautiful scenery, right, huh? I remember driving up in Vermont there, you know, in the fall there, you get this nice thing, you know. It's like, what a beautiful place, you know, just to have a house, you know. I mean, oh, it's gorgeous, you know. They showed up there's a house there. That view, you know. See? So, I'm getting... But I'm seeing something very beautiful that is proportioned to my, what? Yeah. The thing I notice about, I used to compare in the class sometimes, you know, the fall foliage, right? And then if you go down to a department store, you know, all these bright, you know, colors and these things, you know? It's not particularly pleasing to the eyes, right? You walk around a department store, you know, they're selling clothes and other things around the galleries, red, you know. See? Why nature, you know, moderates it, you know? There's nothing gearish about the colors of the trees, right, you know? Right. When you say I drove up right now, you've got more trees up here that are a little more north. Where I am, you know, there's even more color up here along the highway, you know, and so on. And it's very pleasing to the eyes, right? So, seeing colors that are proportioned to my eye, and I'm not too distracted by driving because it doesn't require much mental activity, you know? You know? Then I have pleasure, right, huh? Okay? So, seeing the fall foliage is a pleasure for me. That's a pretty coxie, right? You know? So, that's what he's explaining, huh? Our friends here used to... to the second, huh? The second one was the ejection in terms of what? Being moved or... Yeah. He says, in the animal, a two-fold motion can be considered, right? One according to the intention of the, what? End. End, which pertains to the appetite. The other according to the carrying out of this, which pertains to the exterior operation, huh? So, although in the one who was now, what? Achieved the good in which he takes pleasure, there seizes the motion of what? Execution carrying it out. Yeah. Of which he tend to the end, huh? There is not, however, a seizing of the motion of the desiring power, which just as before desired something not had, so afterwards it delights in the thing had, huh? Yeah. So, although pleasure is a certain quiet of the appetite, and that's why we speak of this fall foliage as being very restful, right, huh? Considered the presence of the, what? Good, which is delighting one, right? So, essentially, appetite is at rest now, right? Not resting in the beauty of this, huh? Which is satisfactory to appetite, right? Nevertheless, there remains some, what? Change of the desiring power from the thing desired, by reason of which pleasure is a certain, what? Motion, huh? So, he's not altogether denying that this motion can continue even, right? After you see or hear the beautiful, right? Now, what about this third objection, huh? To the third should be said that although the name of passion more properly belongs to passions that, what? Corrupt and tend to something, what? Bad. Just as are, what? Body sicknesses and sadness and fear in the story. Nevertheless, also, some passions are ordered to the good, as has been said before, like love and desire and so on. And according to this, pleasure is said to be. Thank you. Thank you. Passion, right? Well, you know, there's always a question in English, how do you translate the word passion, right? And the first meaning you see of passion in Latin, or the Greek word that they use translated by passion, would be suffering, right? And the reason why this is the first one is because it's most known, right? So, if I'm sticking a pin in you, right, you're very much aware of the fact that I'm acting upon you, right? Okay, but you're acting upon me now and I see you, right? But not in this painful way as if you were sticking with a pin, right? So, the first meaning, we name things as we know them, the first meaning of passion is suffering, right? Well, in English, the word suffering has stuck on that first meaning of something, what, bad, right? So, if you're suffering, you're undergoing something bad. But in Greek and in Latin, the word was carried over, right? By dropping out the idea of something bad, right? But keeping the idea that you are receiving something, right? Okay? So, Mozart's music, when I hear it, is acting upon my ear, but not in a way that's painful, but it's pleasing to my ear, right then? So, Aristotle says, you know, that sensing is a passio, right? Right? But now in a new sense, right? Okay? You carried the word over, but you dropped the meaning of it being something bad, and so on, right? Now, in trying to find a word that in English is carried over, I sometimes use the word undergoing, right? That's my thing. It's not a perfect, you know, response exactly. But, um, uh, you sit in class, huh? You're undergoing something? Yep. I remember this guy, first teaching in college, you know, this guy I knew. And, uh, looking down at the faces of the students, you know, they seem to be saying, why are you doing this to me? You know, because you're making distinctions and things that are hard to grasp, you know? And probably, for the first meaning of undergo is something bad, right? So if I say, you know, that, uh, so-and-so has undergone a lot in life, that probably implies, what? Bad things, right, huh? Okay? But it's not quite as, uh, stuck on that meaning of bad as the word suffer is, right? So I went to Laval, and I went a lot from Katsurik. But, you know, that's, it's undergoing, corresponds to acting upon, right, huh? And so if the teacher's acting upon you, presumably he should be acting upon you in a way that he's approving you, right, huh? So it's good to be acting upon your ear by the music of both sides, right? Or your ear by the, by Hans-Huillian or Charles de Connick, you know? Even Katsurik, you know? I regret it. So in that sense, undergoing can even be, what? Perfecting, if you're right. The expression, suffer me, suffer me to do something. Suffer the children to come to me. That's not the words, okay? Suffer the children to come to me. That's allowing something. Yeah. It's a little different there. So, this is what Thomas is touching upon here, the Latin word passio and the Greek word, you know, pascain, you know, and so on. And so Aristotle, in the De Anima, he will carry the word over and give it, you know, drop out part of its meaning, right? And he'll say that, he'll explain it. He's using the word now in a new sense, right? But it has some connection. But you see, when I grew up here and my eyes were being acted upon by the fall footage, I didn't even think about the fact that I'm being acted upon, right? But if someone was sticking a pin in me, I'd be very much aware of the fact that he's acting upon me, right? You know, someone was kicking me or something, you know? I'd know that, right? So it's more known, right? The first one. So it's interesting, you know, that the word that in its original meaning, right, involves something bad can be eventually carried over to something good, right? Nothing to speak of that way the saints is undergoing, right? Something from God, right? Because God is acting upon them in a way that is, perfecting them, right? And maybe they are perfected more by God acting upon them than by what they're trying to do of their own free will, right? I think that's what the mystics talk a little bit about, don't they, you know? As you get to the higher stage of, you know, of the spiritual life, they're more being moved by God than moving themselves, right? He takes over in a way that is interesting. Now, whether pleasure is in time, right? Thank you. Thank you. But if pleasure is really more a kind of a rest than a motion, it's going to be in time, right? That's the question. To the second, then, one proceeds thus. It seems that pleasure is in time. For pleasure is a certain motion, as is said in the first book of the, what, rhetoric. The philosopher says that, right? But all motion is in time. Therefore, pleasure is in time, right? You know, sometimes the word motion, of course, is even carried over to understanding, right? And, you know, when Plato says that God moves himself, right? Thomas says he doesn't really mean motion in the original sense, right? But he means God understands himself and loves himself, right? And, of course, grammatically, of course, the verb always signifies with time, right? And, therefore, it looks back to the original meaning, right? But it's maybe something now that is no longer, what, emotion is to sense, huh? It's all at once, right? So God's understanding himself and loving himself is tota simoid, like as the waves make towards the pebbled shore. So do our meditation to their end, each changing place with that which goes before. And seek with toil all forwards to contend. Well, there you see the connection between motion and what? Time, right, huh? Aristotle says the before and after in the road is before the before and after in the motion over the road. And that's before the, what, time it takes to go, right? But they correspond with the three, right? And so when he gives the first sense of beginning, right, huh? The point is the beginning of the line, right, huh? To that first sense of beginning is beginning of the motion and the beginning of the time that the motion takes, right? Very close, right? In the same way the first sense of before that Aristotle gives in the 12th chapter of the categories is before and time, right? But to that sense would be reduced or led back because it's not the same sense, but by certain likeness. The before in time, right, huh? Even the before in the, what, magnitude, right, huh? Those are senses that are added on the side, right, rather than in the going forward in the meetings, right? Just like the first meaning of in is in place and to that is reduced in time. The second meaning in the central senses is part in whole. Then genus and species and species and genus. Man, he has to order those eight meanings. I was reading this difficult article to Thomas today. He said, gee whiz, Thomas, I said, I would have been frowning over the place here all by myself. And he said, some say this, and so do I ask wrong, and some say this, you know. What are those that I have fallen into, you know? He says, I need you right now. Like he says in that passage in the Daniel, he needs to teach you, right, to avoid mistakes, huh? It's amazing. Moreover, the, what, lengthy, I guess, the euternum, right? Or the dwelling too long. It's said according to time, right? But some pleasures are said to be morose, huh? Therefore, pleasure is in time, right, huh? I can't see a morose. Moreover, the passions of the soul are of, what, one genus, right? But some passions of the soul are in time. Therefore, also, what, pleasure, right? But according, but against this is what the philosopher, meaning Aristarchus, the philosopher, says in the 10th book in the Camachian Ethics, that according to no time does one take, what, pleasure, huh? I can think of an example of that with someone you love very much and haven't seen them for a long time. You're engaged in conversation, you're like, it's three in the morning, though. Where did the time go? There's no time in there. Yeah, yeah, yeah. I mean, that makes it a concrete experience, right? Some pleasures don't last long, right? Brother Mark used to say, you know, the first sip of beer tastes the best, you know. Yeah, first bottle of beer tastes better than the second bottle. The first sip, the only thing you really enjoy is the first sip, he says. Well, the seventh, you don't really care. Yeah, sometimes you have two helpings to dessert, you don't really enjoy it, you know, and just hunger makes good sauce, I should say. Thomas says, I answer it should be said that something can be in time in two ways, huh? In one way, by itself, right? In another way, right? Through some other thing, right? And so we're gratidants, huh? Because time is a number of things that are, what, successive, huh? Well, like he says in the fourth book of Natural Hearing, it's the number of the before and after in motion, right? Okay? Those are said by themselves to be in time of whose very, what, notion it belongs to there be some succession or something pertaining to succession. As motion, right, involves, what, the before and after, right? And rest, I see rest in the strict sense is the lack of motion in something that could be in motion and it could be in motion in time so that the rest, right? Take five minutes, right? Rest, you know. Could keep you working for another five minutes, but that's in time, too. The kutsio, right, huh? It takes me some time to say what I want to say. It's not in a bad sense, necessarily, but it takes me some time to say anything. Yeah. At least a sentence. Not even a word, huh? Okay. But according to another, right, and not to itself or by itself, right, things are said to be in time whose, what, ratio, huh, whose notion is not some succession, right? Or of whose ratio is not some succession, but nevertheless they are subject to some, what, succession, right? Now, notice the example he gives you. It's very interesting. Just as to be a man, of its very notion does not have any, what, succession. For it is not the emotion, but the end of emotion or change, huh? To it, that emotion which is called its generation. But because the being of man is subject to changing causes, right? You get old and you die and so on. According to this, man is said to be in time, right? So, you know, when Aristotle says, what is it that's in time? He says it's something that has a beginning and an end in time. Okay? Now, emotion is going to have a beginning and an end in time, right? But in a different way than my existence does, right? Because emotion, as such, is saying, right? Nobody's saying per se, right? I said kundum se, per se. As such, emotion is in time, huh? Spread out in time, right? Is my existence of that sort? No before and after in my existence. But my body is subject to change and so on. And that can terminate my existence, right? Okay? And I was generated, right, huh? And that's the beginning of my existence, right? So my existence is in time to another, right? But my walking is in time per se, right? As such, huh?