Prima Secundae
Lecture 83: Self-Hatred and the Distinctions of the Self

Transcript
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Now, the fourth article, right? Whether someone can have hate for himself, right? It's interesting, Tom, you should have this article here. Now, in the Marietta text here, there are references, you know, to the Secunda Secunde, to the second book of the Sentences, third book of the Sentences, Exhibition of the Psalms, thing on Ephesians. This is quite a thing, right? You know, people are supposed to wake up, you know, they see all fat there, I hate myself, right? That's what the woman says. Women say that a lot. Yeah. I think that's also in that book, that book on abortion, that's the result, a woman has an abortion, she has a certain loathing for herself because of what she's done. She doesn't know about repentance or something. It's interesting that Tom, you should stick this article in here, right? The first article was on the cause and object of hate, right? You can see why he began with that, and that's fundamental. And the second and the third articles are about hate and love, right? One is the effect of love, which is stronger, right? But it's connected to that, right? But now he's talking about, what, in 4, 5, and 6, about some more particular things, right? Particular objects, right? So one object I hate to be not only the bad, but myself. After the fourth one goes forward thus, it seems that someone is able to have himself in hate, huh? For it is said in Psalm 10, A man who loves iniquity hates his own soul. So the scripture is saying that someone hates his own soul. But many love iniquity, therefore many hate themselves. So obviously, in some way, a man must be able to hate himself. That's the thing in the Psalm, right? To be more clear. Who loves iniquity hates his own soul. Who loves rock and roll, hates his own ears. Who likes salmon, hates his own sense of taste. Or maybe his sense of taste is wounded. They're going too far, though. The first Friday of the war, I was here, by the way. Got salmon for Warren and himself. Turned a fish for you. No, it'll, you know, fish with the stuff over it, you know. The two of them sitting there enjoying their scent. Not those two. I knew they do that. Just to exclude you. We hate that to which we wish and do what? Bad. But sometimes someone wills and does to himself, somewhat. Yeah. As an example, those who, what, kill themselves. Therefore, some have themselves in hate. Chesterton has an interesting observation on that. He says, suicide is kind of like, it's not directed so much against me. It's against the whole world. None of you is worth living for. That's kind of an interesting insight. Nothing's worth living for. The way, you know, Mozart and that Mozart, Shakespeare presents Brutus, you know, and Cassius, you know, as nobody killing themselves, right? That sort of thing, you know. Or theopathy killing yourself rather than being led as an object of division there. More of a brief is says in the second book of the Consolation of Philosophy that avarice makes men hateful, from which it can be taken that every man hates the, what? Avaricious. But some are avaricious. And therefore, they hate themselves. Interesting argument, son. But against this is what the Apostle says. This is Ephesians. That no one ever had his own flesh in, what? Yeah. He's probably not to marriage, wasn't he? At that time there were. Yeah. Some men killed their wives, right? I think they killed themselves, right? But no, it's that. So how do you reconcile it? Nimo unquam carlim suam odio habut. No one ever had his own flesh, right? Someone hates his soul. Right? Well, Thomas, again, you'll see the distinction there, right? Let me give you Shakespeare now. I'm going to read you, don't you? Richard III. You know what he played, don't you? General Richard III? Richard III, you know, sets out to be, what, King of England, right? And there are many people standing in the way between him, right? And so what he does is to kill them one off after another, right? And then at the end there would feature Henry IV, right? Come back, you know? And it's going to be a battle, right? And Shakespeare presents the night before the battle. They were both having a dream, right? And everybody who's, you know, has been killed by Richard, you know, they come to Richmond, who's going to be the future Henry IV, right? And they bless him, you know, for the battle, right? And then they all come to, what, Richard III and they curse him, right, huh? We'll be fighting against you tomorrow, right, huh? You know? So it's a terrible nightmare's dream, huh? See? And Simon and he's all part about the ghost, but they've all cursed him, right? And they all, things like that. And then Richard starts out of his dream, right, huh? He says, give me another horse! Bite up my wounds! He's dreaming, right? Have mercy, Jesu. Soft I did but dream. O coward conscience, how dost thou afflict me? The lights burn blue. It's always a sign of the ghost of the Henry. It is now dead midnight. Cold, fearful drops stand on my trembling flesh. What? Do I fear myself? There's none else of I. Richard loves Richard. That is I am I. And just like we speak of likeness as being the cause of love, right, huh? But you're even, what, more like yourself than someone else, right? You are yourself, right? Do something more than like yourself, right? So he says, give me the cause. Richard loves Richard. That is I am I, right? Is there a murderer here? No. Yes, I am. Then fly, what? From myself? Great reason why. Must I revenge? What? Myself upon myself? Alack, I love myself. But then he says, wherefore? For any good that I myself have done unto myself. No, alas, I rather hate myself. For hateful deeds committed by myself, right? I am a villain. Yet I lie, I am not. Fool of thy self speak well. Fool, do not flatter. My conscience hath a thousand several tongues, and every tongue brings in a several tale, and every tale condemns me for a villain. Purge me in the highest degree. Murder, stern murder, in the direst degree. All several sins all used in each degree. Throwing all to the bar, crying all guilty, guilty. I show despair. There is no creature who loves me. And if I die, no soul shall pity me. Nay, wherefore should they, since to die myself? All right. myself with pity to myself we thought the souls of all that i had murdered came to my tent and everyone did threat tomorrow's vengeance on the head of richard my lord comes in to wake him up right who's there the early village cock had twice done salutation to the morn your friends are up and buck one their armor which he says oh ratcliffe i've dreamed a fearful dream that's how he says you know fools be well their self does he love himself well in one sense he eats himself right another sense he must love himself which i am i why would i love myself it's kind of interesting i like the way shakespeare plays on that right because it kind of corresponds to the subject matter article four here right does richard love himself or not yeah in some way he doesn't right so there's some distinction you have to see to understand you know the representation that shakespeare's given there which is very so thomas hans is right away it's impossible that someone per se lo quenna right hates himself right for naturally each one wants the what or desires the good right nor is someone able to what want something for himself except under the what yeah ratio of good for the bad is outside of the world right can't really can't will the bad as bad as such yeah as danisha says in the fourth chapter the divine names for to love some one is to wish good to him right this has been said whence it is necessary that someone loves himself an impossible no so strong kind of says right it's necessary that he loves himself right unnecessary is what must be cannot not be an impossible that someone hate himself that can be per se lo quenna right okay but progenza it can happen that someone hates has himself in hate i think i mentioned before um in the thirteen kinds of mistakes that aristotle gives in the book on situation reputations right six of them come from words right and the other seven from things right and the first one among words right is the false equivocation as i call it but it's the mistake for mixing up the senses of the word right and then uh outside of words the first kind of mistake is one for mixing up the pair of seo and the progences right so the second one is the simply and some respect right so here you can tell people can be misled right in a sense right but in some sense you must say right yeah sacrifice to say you know can a philosopher cook dinner what would you say no not in the philosophy yeah not per se right see but it could be project by happening right he happens to be a cook right okay mr conic was a very good mrs de conic was a very good cook right and someone asked her how'd you learn how my husband taught me so i don't know that was you don't think or whatever so or eisenhower was known for being a good man on the grill there you know the stakes for his soldier but he said that's a friend of mine that's a paleo value so a general conclusion right but uh it's brachians right now in what way can someone have himself and hate brachians right well this can take place he says in two ways in one way on the side of the good that someone wishes to himself right for it happens sometimes that that is desired as most expression here sequundum quid what bonum so the other distinction comes in right to be what good simpliciter mountain and i've talked to you about that before i used to talk to students they said you know this distinction between uh it's so simply it was so not simply but in some way right this is very important in ethics right because you may have a hard time understanding distinction right but explains what you're doing mostly or not doing you know you're doing something you shouldn't do because in some way it's good and you're not doing something you should be doing because in some way it's bad right so getting up to go to mass on sunday morning might prevent you from getting a little more sleep right and so on but notice those those two distinctions distinction of parisian brachians and simply in secundum quid right um those correspond say to the first two what mistakes outside of words right and of course aristotle makes the famous saying you know that the the foul sea of the action ends you know the sea is even the wise right and you know very strong if you go through modern philosophy you know the kind of used to say in class you know now i'll teach you how to start your own philosophy if you want to you know just ignore the distinction here between the first two questions you got a new philosophy you know so make a lot of money that way yeah now we mentioned how in the great dialogue they're called the mino right now uh mino was saying you can't investigate what you don't know so i'd say to the students but why are we paying these guys to find the cause of cancer or some other disease right now yeah they're not talking for what do you pay a guy to do you know and so but it seems that you can't uh direct your thinking into what you don't know yeah but is it possible that you could know in some imperfect way what you don't know you know what you don't know somebody's name but you don't know what the name is you don't know you know or actually you take the example i think i told you in class you know i'd say how many students are in class today i don't know right but i know enough about what i don't know to realize i should count to get the number of students in class today i don't know how many chairs are in this room but i know how to get there i'm pretty smart you know to direct myself to what i don't know if i count these chairs and i get you know 15 or something right i didn't know i was looking for 15. but 15 is a number of chairs in the room let's say and i knew in some way 15. i knew i was looking for the number that's not stupid speaking to noah i used to take a girl from the class boys i'd say yeah i'm going to get her to conduct herself right so i'd say to the girl you know do you know my brother mark and she'd always say no right and i said do you know what a man is and she says yes the other brother is yes that's what my brother mark is see you didn't know what you see you didn't know right see but obviously to know what a man is and knowing what a brother is you have to know simply and fully my brother mark is but in some ways to know my brother mark right in some way i know every man in this world i know what man is just like when i know what a chair is in some way i know every chair right you know but not simply that that's a famous foot mistake but when you say that sounds kind of abstract and it's a famous foot mistake and it's a famous foot mistake and it's a famous foot mistake You know, talk about the mean or something like that, maybe, but when you talk about people in their day to life, right, you know, if you had a delicious poison, right, it's good in some way, right? It is delicious, right? You call me stupid. I've used that with some people in terms of pornography, as to pornography, it's like sweet poison. Yeah, yeah, yeah. And Hirstall speaks in the Dianne, kind of fundamentally, that what is good here and now is very often, what, not good simply, right, huh? And if you look before and after, then you kind of, what, see that, right, huh? You know, people, you know, people get cancer from smoking and see, and they do, right? But if they do, you don't get it from one puff, you know? But that, you know, if you look at before and after, you know, a course of a lifetime, then you see maybe you're going to get this thing, you know, you might get it anyway. So Aristotle had often talked about that distinction between good simply and bad simply in some way, right? So this is one way, huh? So I give you, you know, I prepare the poison that I'm going to kill you with, right? And I, and I, and I have a good flavor, right, huh? And I say, sniff this, you know, it smells good. I said, do you want to drink it? Oh, yeah, I'll have one. I'll have one, right? So is it true that you want this drink? You've got to say, you're answering, you know, you want it, right? But it's not really good simply, right? But it does smell good. It tastes good, right? But still you see, it's not good to drink that, huh? I told you about that pill I had when I was a kid, you know, cinnamon on the outside, like a cinnamon drop, and I don't know if it's in my mouth too long. I didn't die, of course, but I didn't get it. It's a little bit of taste, right? And I did it again, right? It was good to try to suck through, you know, to the inner sort of thing was. So basically those two kinds of distinctions are, right? There's a truth that's come down to us from one of the Greek philosophers there, I was in Dronikus, but on division, right? And Albert put a little work on it too, you know, kind of paraphrasing what he said, right? He distinguishes, you know, about six kinds of division, right? And most of these divisions are divisions in the strict sense, huh? But what's the difference between distinction and division, huh? Like I talked to you about that before, right? But what's the distinction of distinction and division and definition for that matter, right? Remember that? Yeah. So every division is a distinction, right? But not every distinction is a division, right? A division is a distinction of the parts of some whole, right? And so the two main kinds of division are the division of an integral or composed whole, a put-together whole, into its parts, right? And the division of a universal whole, into its parts, like he's talking about, when you divide a genus into its, what, species, right, huh? The Greek word kakalu comes from the Greek word, what, holos, meaning whole, right? And the word particular comes from the English word part, right? So those are the two main kinds of, what, division, right? And there's accidental division, like you might divide white into snow and, you know, milk and, you know, those kinds of accidental divisions, but not as important as these two, right? Now, he puts in there the distinction of the sense of the word, but I'm not so sure that that's really a division in a strict sense, that it's a whole in the same way as he's going to work. But he doesn't have the distinction of the parasitic project ends there, right? Because it's not really a division, right? And he doesn't have the distinction of simply and not simply, right, huh? So those two kinds of distinctions, it seems to me, and I would put myself the distinction of the sense of the word, right? Those three kinds of distinctions are extremely important in philosophy, right? They appear over and over again, right, huh? And the more you get used to these kinds of distinctions, you know, you can pick up quickly when this kind of distinction is relevant again, right? But there's no real part of logic where these are formally taught, although in a way it corresponds to the treatise on what? On the circurifications, right? Because the first one is mistake from mixing up the sense of a word, and then the one from the first here in the project ends, and then the simply and what is not so simply, right, huh? And so, and of course, you kind of appreciate the importance of the distinction, and you see how people are misled by not seeing this distinction, huh? And in a way, you know, to give the fallacy, right, is to kind of make them aware of the importance of that distinction, right? So, like, you know, I've told you this example many times, but it's easy enough to see. I'd say to students, you know, as a whole, always more than the part, well, yeah, you know? And then I'd say, you know, well, what is man, right? Well, he's an animal, right? And I'd always make a joke about my mother that didn't like me when I said that. And she'd like me to say that man is an animal. And I'd always say, well, Mama, he's not just an animal. He's an animal that has reason. That's better, she says. Remember when they went to college, but she had some sense, right? And so then I'd say, well, then animal is only a part of what a man is. He doesn't tell you the whole man, right? Okay. And then I'd say, but animal includes besides man, dog, cat, horse, elephant, right? So sometimes the heart, the part has more than the whole, right? And I'd say, yeah, yeah. Well, if you call and question that the whole is more than the part, jhammati's gone. Ritmati's gone. You must forget, right? You know? Even the very important thing in practical philosophy that the whole is better than the part, right? It's all gone, right? You know, if the whole is not more, you know, you can't, you know? And then you realize the importance of this distinction, right? You see? And, or I was saying, you know, is geometry, analogy, a reason? The guy says, yeah, yeah, it's analogy, a reason. And I'd say, well, yeah, but geometry doesn't tell you what reason is, so I'll think it's analogy, a reason. You see? That's not, it's maybe as important, but it's kind of, that's the second kind of mistake there, right? Where you have a multiplicity in the, what, speech rather than the word, right? Okay? When I say that Shakespeare's definition of reason is the analogy of reason in both senses. It's a knowledge whereby reason is known, right? But it tends to what it is. And it's also a knowledge which reason has, right? By the definition of square, it's a knowledge of reason in only one sense, right? Or like the great Aristotle says that wisdom is a knowledge of God in both senses. And it's a knowledge of the first cause, and the first cause is God, so it's a knowledge of God, right? But it's a knowledge also which God either alone has, or at least who only has it fully, right? So, you kind of learn the importance of these kinds of distinctions, right? And the distinction of these kinds of distinctions by the, what, famous mistakes, right? That are made, huh? You know, the early Greeks, you know, they say, if you become something, you are, right? If you become a scoundrel, you are a scoundrel, right? Okay? So if the cold becomes hot, then the cold is hot. That's what Hercules seems to say, right? Well, that's a mistake, right? But the mistake of the accidental, right? It's not the cold as such that becomes hot. But the metal that was cold, right? But the coldness is lost, you know? And when the ignorant, you know, come to know, then the ignorant know? No, no. But it's the ability to know, right? That knows, huh? That's a mistake that French existentialists made, right? It identifies the ability to choose with the lack of choice before you choose, right? So that freedom is a kind of non-being, right? Man is the one by whom non-being came into the world, right? That's a nonsense. But you make the same kind of mistake as early Greeks, right? You'd be saying, you know, you can't come to know unless you're ignorant, right? So it's ignorance that makes you capable of coming to know. Well, that ain't true. You're confusing the parasitic actions. But like the kind of saying, I can teach you, you know, how to imagine a kind of philosophy. You want to just overlook one of these distinctions. So it's very important. But Thomas here, he used the distinction of per se and paratchitans here. And then when he's explaining paratchitans, how that's possible, right? The first one, he uses the distinction of what? Simply and not simply, right? Okay? Okay? But then, notice the second he says. Very interesting. In another way, ex parte sui ipsios, right? Well, let me finish the first part there. And according to this, someone per achitans wishes to himself evil, which is to what? Hate himself, right? But he's wishing it under the fact that it's good in some way, right? If I get rid of you, I'll be the king. You know? If someone stands between you and promotion, right? If they get rid of him, then you'll be promoted. But in another way, on the part of the one himself to whom he wishes what? Good, huh? Because each thing, most of all, is that which is chiefly in him. Okay? So they always say le ta se moi, right? I'm the king. I said, well, half the faculty is gone now, I said. When the island died, it was all over. I said, no, I should go wait out. So Aristotle says in the Nicomachean Epics there at the end there in the book 10, that reason more than anything else is man, right? Principal. Once the city is said to do what the king does, right, huh? So the king declares war, then France is at war, okay? As if the king be the whole, what, city, right? But it manifests that man is most of all the mind of man, huh? The reason more than anything else is man, Aristotle says. Now, it could happen that someone estimates in self-esteem most of all that which he is according to his bodily and sense nature, right? That's kind of interesting, huh? And we think of ourselves primarily in terms of our body, right? Anybody home? Is somebody here? You know? We don't say, you know, any soul here? Some soul here, right? And the soul seems to be kind of a, you know, ghost-like thing in the body, right? I was saying to Warren the other day, I said, you know, when the soul is separated from the body, you realize what your chief part is. The body is really kind of the transitory part, right? The part that's, you know, corruptible, right? The soul goes on, right? But as long as you're in this world with your senses, right, and your body, it seems the body is, what, you, right? And some people don't even seem to know if they have a soul, right? You know? They always say it's not, you know, ignorance of being, like Heidi said, but ignorance of the soul that is behind us, right? Once they love themselves according to what they estimate themselves to be, right? You see? But they hate that which they truly are when they will what is contrary to but reason, right? And in both ways, the man who loves iniquity, right, hates not only his soul but also, what, himself, huh? That's for you. I used to talk about the distinction when we take the words of Polonius there, right? Mm-hmm. This above all to thine own self be true, right, huh? Well, you know, I used to take the example there of Coriolanus, right? Coriolanus is a man who's, what, extremely brave, courageous, right? A great soldier and so on. But he has a temper, right, an anger, right? And the tribunes, you know, don't like him because they think he's against the people, you know, and that sort of stuff. And if they can get him, you know, aroused, right, huh? Then he's going to, you know, hurt himself, right, huh? And, of course, the friends of Coriolanus are trying to keep him, you know, you've got to show your wounds, you know, in order to get the people's voice and so on, you know, all these different things. And he says, I'm having to be false to myself, right? Okay. But is he being true to himself when he's true to his, what, his anger, right? You know? And I used to use the example, too, in marriage, right, huh? Yeah. So when a person, say, is married, and they get some passion for some other woman, right, you know, and they pursue this other woman, right, huh? Are they being true to themselves, see? Well, they're being true to their passion, right? Okay. But is that what's most of all you? Because you're married by a choice, right, huh? And is your choice more you or your passion, you, right, huh, see? So when I'm true to my wife, I'm true to my choice, you could say I'm being true to myself, but when I'm true to my passion, right? Or I used to take the example of the man who has a problem, let's say, drinking, if I might have started, right? And he smashed up the car or whatever it was. Anyway, in a quiet mood, he realized, I've got to stop this thing, it's ruining my life, and so on. But now he's going to be tempted sometime to have a drink, right? I mean, he's one of those guys that can't stop once he starts, right? And now, is he being true to himself when he, what, has that drink? Or when he follows his reasoned choice to give up drinking, right? And calls his buddy who's going to support him through this conflict or however they do it. You see what I mean? Well, it depends upon what you think is more yourself, right? But I suppose a baby or a little child thinks of himself as being, what, primarily a body, right? And so these movie actresses think of themselves that way, right? And so, not unless it's a different way now than the other way, right? I mean, you could have both of them involved in the same thing, but in one case you're, what, wielding something that is not really good for you, because it seems in some way good, right? In some way it is good, right? And sometimes you are, what, doing what the body wants, but it's not reasonable, right? And then you're not, what, you're wielding what's not really you. But in both cases that's a mistake, right? And thus it is clear in response to the first one. So the man who loves iniquity, loves his, hates his own what? Soul, right? He loves iniquity because in some ways it's good, right? And he's loving his body rather than his soul, right? Which isn't really himself, right? So it's having your soul separate from your body. There won't be the body in the coffin there, wherever it is in the ground, to say, what happened to my soul? So, is he loving himself parashions? I don't know what you're trying to think. Well, you see, you naturally love yourself, but you love what you think is yourself. You see. So, his love will be parashions for what he thinks is himself. Well, yeah, but the point is this. I don't know. I don't know. I don't know. I don't know. I don't know. I don't know. It's not really myself, right? We're not chiefly myself. And one of the other questions in the distinction in the sentence of St. Thomas addresses that by saying that he loves himself in his actions, his emotions, but he really hates him. When you're mixing up one is the object, the other is himself. Based on your knowledge. I've always had a hard time with her saying courage and his thing. I'm trying to see. I'm going to say, it's not like that distinction there, you're saying one way in which you can do the project of us, right? Again, my friend Jim Frantzak was a Golden Gloves boxer, right? But he described these guys working out all the time, you know, and so on. And they kind of worshipped the body, you know, strong, you know. He solved one. But in a sense, they're thinking of what? I'm being good to myself, right? I'm making something of myself, you know? And, you know, well, that is part of me, but it's not the main thing to be made something of, right? So I'm kind of identifying with my body, right? Or the woman, the movie actress, whatever it is, you know. His body's got to be beautiful, you know, and so on. And everything's ordered to that, right? You know, some of them go and have an abortion, right? You know, because it's going to refer to their figure or something, right? And pregnancy doesn't refer to their figure, you know. It makes more of it. Yeah, I mean, you know, not just temporarily, I mean, you know, the body's... or, you know, the famous feminist tennis career, I mean, was, you know, but she's an abortion, you know, because it's going to refer to their tennis career, you know, and so on. So what's important to me, what I am most of all, right, is this bodily excellence I have in tennis, you know? So, so she's doing what's bad to her soul because it seems to be good to her body and she thinks it's herself, right? So it's not mainly herself, right? I used to take the example of the students that say, you know, that other things being equal, are you going to judge a murder of more, murder of passion or a premeditated, right? And most students would say a premeditated murder, right? And it's because it's more you doing it, right? You know? But you choose to do, right? More, right? You've had time to meditate on it. You really choose to commit a so-and-so, right? I told you, like he's in California there where the guy comes home at noontime to, you know, and his, you can hear the voices in the bedroom, you know? So he's too impressed to go in. But then he saw this real, you know, the convertible that the guy had arrived at, you know? So he backs up his men's truck. Because the guy tries to sue him, you know? And I guess the judge dismissed the case if I was justified. Delirious men, you know? I mean, you say that, you know, in Italy, you know, that if the man comes home and finds a wife with somebody else and a passion kills the man, you know, case dismissed, you know? I mean, just, I don't know if that was the way they tell you. You were more talented than I do. But that indicates something, right? That, you know, it's less you doing it if you're doing it in a passion, right? So you see the distinction then, right? There's two distinctions here, huh? There's three distinctions, right? Distinction of the paracet and the paracet ends. And then, what? The paracet ends. Yeah. He's subdividing the two ways that you can paracet ends about hate yourself, right, huh? The first one, he uses the distinction of simply and not simply, right? He doesn't use those words in the second one. You might try to do that a little bit too, but there's a famous thing that the Greeks know they self, right, huh? Well, in a sense, that could be said to be an exhortation to know what the soul is, right? Because if you don't know the soul, you don't really know yourself. That's more you than the body, huh? Most people seem to be so, right? Anybody home? Nobody's home? That's what Father Hardin used to say about the angels. He said, they have no bodies. But that doesn't mean they're nobodies. Okay, so Article 5 here. Whether someone can have and hate the, what? Did we do it? Oh, excuse me. Okay, okay. The second should be said, right, huh? That no one wishes to himself, right, and does something bad, except insofar as he grasps that under the notion of good. Yeah. For even those who, what, take their own lives, kill themselves. This, which is to die, right, they grasp under the notion of something good, insofar as it ends their misery or, what's that? Or pain, right, huh? Okay. So it's an escape from misery or pain or dishonor, or whatever, you know, they could be with those romans and so on. So, like the Japanese, you know, generals, you know, they lost the battle or something, you know. You know, so, it's good to escape misery, pain, this death of dignity stuff to talk about now, right, huh? You see? Trying to, what, just do something bad under the notion that there's something good, right? Okay. To theory, it should be said that the average man hates something, right? Happened to him, is that? The theory. The advisor hates something accidental, true himself. Yeah, some true himself. Yeah. Not an account of this, however, does he hate himself, huh? Just as the sick man hates his own sickness, right? So the actor's saying, I hate myself because she's put on some fat or something, right? And this follows the fact that he loves himself, right? That you don't want to be sick or fat or something, right? Or it should be said that the average makes, what, one odious to others, right? Not to oneself, right? Insofar as it's caused some of the disordered love of oneself, huh? According to someone about temporal goods, wills to himself more than he ought to, right? So in answer to the question whether or not he can hate himself, is the answer he can hate himself there, actually? Yeah, yeah. That's the answer. I mean, you know, not this exact question, but something similar, Aristotle defines this as, the good is what all want. That's the definition of the good, right? This is the very beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics, right? The good is what all desire, what all want. And he gives a kind of little induction, right? And then he says, and they say, well, therefore, the good is what all want, right? Okay? And now, somebody comes along and says, well, I know people want bad things. So how can you say, the good is what all want, right? How do you defend it against that kind of objection, right? Or is this written down under the fact that there's, I think there's something around, right? He must think what he wants is good in some way. Yeah. So, this is in a sense per se, right? Because they do this what all want, right? The bad as such is not wanted, right? Mm-hmm. Yep. They say, the bad as such is not wanted. Okay? But we have to admit,