Prima Secundae
Lecture 82: The Nature and Causation of Hatred

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Instead of three, like he had on love, right? And let's look at the premium here, right? Then we're not to consider about hate, right? About this, he's only going to ask six things, huh? Now, the first thing he asks, seems a reasonable place to begin, right? Whether the cause and object of hate is what? The man, right? Well, that corresponds to the, what, first article and the second question on love, right? Whether the good is the cause of what? Love, right? And they go together, cause and object, right? Because the object here is one that moves the power, right? So what is the object of love as a cause of love? Because the object of hate is the cause of hate, right? So he says it, utum causa et objectum, right? If they go together, right? And just like the object of fear is what causes you to be afraid. You know, the guy comes in with a gunner, you know, a terrorist or whatever it is. Then he's going to arouse some fear in us, right? So the object of fear is the cause of my fear, right? What I fear is the cause of my fear. Right? The rest of some guys there for trying to blow up the bridge there in Cleveland, I think it was. Really? Yeah, yeah. Kind of a bunch of incompetents, I guess. I don't know whether they're guilty or not. Did they get a bunch of kids or something? Well, there's some kind of anarchist. I don't know. Oh, really? In Cleveland, in all places. Yeah, I don't know. It's a telephone. I don't know, right? So it doesn't have a whole question like you had about the nature of love, right? And the kinds of love, right? It doesn't have a question on the nature of hate. Kind of hate. Yeah. I mean, you kind of know it from what's opposite, right? Then secondly, for there, hate is caused from what? Love. Of course, that's a little different now because love is the fundamental emotion, right? But love can be caused by another passion, but with another object, right? But here, whether hate is caused from love. So both of those articles are about the cause in a way of hate, right? But then rather than saying, you know, what does the effect of hate, it's a strange article. Whether hate is stronger than love, huh? Why should he stick that in, right? Because you expect the effects of love to be contrary to the effects of love, right? So maybe he would admit that, but he'd take that as being, what, noble from what's gone before, right? So if love, first of all, unites us with the love, right? Then hate, what, yeah, that is embodied to have an article on that, you know? But mutual anhesio, right, huh? What would be the opposite of that for hate? Mutual exclusion. Revolition. And then there's a third effect of love. That was the second one. Don't conchie. Ecstasy. Hatred must make you draw to yourself. I don't know. I think so, yeah, yeah. You hate people, you don't go out to them. Except, yeah. Introversial. Yeah, I've heard that expression. Somebody hates somebody so much. If he was on the other side of the street, I wouldn't come across the street to spit on him. You know, if he was on fire, I wouldn't come across the street to spit on him. But it's kind of surprising. You wouldn't expect this third article to be what it is, though, right? Whether hate is stronger than love, right? Should he ask that, huh? And now, whether someone can have and hate himself, right? That's like love is love of the good as known. Then whether someone can have and hate the truth. Can you hate the truth? Does it patch it in so you can hate the truth? I don't know. And six, whether something can be had, what? And hate universally, right? Aristotle says, you know, we hate all these. But we don't anger every man, you know? Because the anger is kind of a more particular cause, right? Well, anyway, before we get there, we'll look at the rest of the article here. However, whether the cause, huh? To the first one proceeds thus, it seems that the object and cause of hate is not the, what? Bad, right, huh? For everything that is, as such, is, what? Good. Good, huh? Augustine says sin is nothing, right? To the man who sins, it becomes nothing, right? If, therefore, the object of hate is the bad, it would foul that no thing is had in hate, right? But only the defect of some thing, which is clearly false. Further, to hate the bad is praiseworthy, huh? A daveli. Whence in the praise, as some it is said in the second book of Maccabees, that they guarded optimae, well, right? That's the laws, right, huh? On account of the piety of when I was the priest, the pontiff. And, what? And hatred. They had bad things and hate their souls, right? Yes, they had a soul, yeah. Is that the abitur there, Udiyo? I think so. Yeah, because their souls in hate had bad things, right? Yeah. They had bad things and hate. If, therefore, nothing is hated except the bad, it would foul that every, what, hate is, what, praiseworthy, huh? I suppose it depends on what you hate, right? So is hate good or bad? It depends on what you hate, right? Yeah. Peristyle says in the premium to the dianima, that all knowledge is, what, good as such, right? Not all love. Not all hate is bad, right? Don't they tell you you shouldn't hate anybody or hate a thing? Hate some things, anyway. More of the same thing is not the same time, good and bad, right? But the same to diverse people, I guess, is, what, hateable and lovable, right, huh? You know, Salmon? I love Salmon, you hate it. Therefore, hate is not only of the good, but also, of the bad, but also of the, what? The good, huh? Perfectly good, Salmon. But against this, hate is contrary to love, huh? But the object of love is the good. Therefore, the object of hate is, what? Quite hope and despair opposites, but, yeah. Different kind of thing, yeah. Answered should be said, that sense of love is not only of the good, but also of the good. Since natural desire is derived from some grasping, right, some knowledge, although not what? There seems the same, what, reason about the inclination of a natural desire and of a what? Yeah, which follows a grasping that's joined to the animal, right? Yeah, when the tree wants sunshine, it doesn't know about sunshine. Someone else does, nobody. Now, in natural desire, this manifestly appears, that just as each thing has a natural harmony with or aptitude to that which is suitable to it, right, which is natural love, so to that which is repugnant to it and corruptive of it, it has a certain dissonance, right? Natural dissonance, which is natural, what, heat, huh? So the stone doesn't want to go up, right? It wants to go down. Thus, therefore, both in the animal desiring or in the understandable, understanding, desirable power, love is a certain, what? Harmony. Harmony, which the appetite, which is apprehended as suitable to it, right, huh? Hate is a dissonance, certain dissonance of the appetite to that which is apprehended as repugnant, right? Or harmful, right, huh? That's definitely the way I sound, huh? Now, just as everything suitable as such has the notion of the good, right? So everything that is, what, repugnant or harmful has such has the notion of the bad. And therefore, just as good is the object of love, so bad is the object of, what, hate, huh? So he's arguing partly from hate being the contrary of love, that its object is, what, the bad, right? And partly from the likeness to, what, natural love and hate, right, huh? You know, you read about some of these vineyards, you know, and they seem to be, you know, what we would consider poor soil, you know, for farming, you know? But the, a lot of these vines, they like the kind of rough soil, and they don't like a rich, you know, tree-on-straw thing, you know? They hate that, you know? You see in the wine books, you know, Bacchus, Amat, Colas, you know? Well, you know, Bacchus, the god of wine, loves hills, right, you know, and so on, huh? To the first, therefore, it should be said that being, insofar as it is being, right, does not have the, what, ratio, character of repugnance, but more of being, what, suitable, because all things come together in, what, being. But being, insofar as it is a, what, determined particular being, has the notion of some repugnance to some, what, other determined being. And according to this, one being is hateable to another, and is, what, bad for it. Although, not in itself, nevertheless, in comparison to, what, another, huh? So, I wouldn't want to be burnt at the stake, huh? You wouldn't want to be burnt at the stake? Yeah. Would I want to be? Yeah. No, I think I don't know. But as far as something bad? Something bad? Yeah. We actually used to cook our, all the point of pregnancy, cook our hot dogs over the fire, right? Sure, yeah, or the marshmallows. It's good for the hot dog to be in the fire. It's good for the marshmallows, too. Not good for me to be in the fire. It's good for the water to be heated up for tea. Yeah. To the second should be said, just as something is apprehended as good, that is not, what, truly good, right? So something is grasped as bad, that is not truly, what, bad. But, once it happens sometimes, that neither is, what, of the bad, nor love of the good to be good, right? Yeah. So what do the witches say in the beginning of Hamlet? It's foul. Hover through the fog and fill the air. So there's two areas there, right? Fair is foul, the good is bad. Foul is fair. Bad is good, right? And then two causes, the fog that the mind is in, and the filth of the appetite there, right? That's a good example, you know, there's a portion thing, right, huh? That portion is good, right, huh? Abstinence is bad. So the mind is in fog, right, huh? Instead of filth, right? What's going on in the world? That's said with that brevity of wit, huh? Brevity of wisdom. Well, I'm going to tell you if somebody's defending abortion, you know, fair is foul, and foul is fair. Hover through the fog and filth the air. That should be the slogan of plant air. Yeah. Exactly what they do. Yeah. They mark it, filth, and then insult people abortion. To the third, it should be said, that it happens the same to be lovable and hateable to diverse ones, according to what? Natural appetite, right, huh? From this, that one and the same is suitable to one according to its nature, and repugnant to the other, right? Just as heat prolongs to fire, is repugnant to what? Water. Water, right, huh? And according to animal appetite, from this, that one and the same thing is grasped by one under the ratio of something good, and by another under the ratio of something what? Bad. Bad, huh? That's salmon between us. Yeah. That's probably natural. Repugnant. We all have our natural enemies, right? That's what one of our teachers used to say about Brussels sprouts. They were intrinsically evil, because God didn't intend to make them. Or something like that. They naturally did. Okay, we've got another time frame on here. Sure. Okay. Whether hate is caused from love, the second one precedes thus, it seems that love is not the cause of hate. For those things which are divided as opposites, right, naturally are what? Together, as you said in the predicaments. But love and hate, since they are contraries, are divided ex opposito, right, as opposites. Therefore, naturally, they are what? Together. Yeah. Therefore, love is the cause of what? Hate. So, I think you take a genus, right? What's the common definition there, kind of, of contraries, right? Well, they're species that are furthest apart in the same genus, right? Okay, so, you divide, say, quality up and you get habit, right? And you divide habit into good and bad habits, differential and vice, but they're what? Hama, together, zimo, right? So, habit is before virtue, right? The genus is for the species, right? But the contrary opposites are what? Together, together, right? Together, right, huh? Okay? Virtue and vice, huh? So, shouldn't, you know, love and hate be like virtue and vice, right? They should be Hama. But if love is the cause of hate, but if love is the cause of hate, that's the so-called fifth sense there in the chapter in the categories, chapter 12, or chapter, yeah, well, cause is before the effect, right? Okay? Chapter 12 is about before, right? And chapter 13 is about Hama, right, huh? Okay? And so, moreover, one of two contraries is not the cause of the other, right? When you say that beautiful is the cause of the ugly, or the ugly makes some things beautiful. But love and hate are contraries, therefore, love is not the cause of hate, huh? It's definitely more convinced, aren't you? Moreover, the posterior, the afterward, is not the cause of the before, right? But hate is before what? Love, huh? As it seems, huh? For hate implies a, what? Recess from evil. Love and excess to the good, huh? Therefore, love is not the cause of hate, huh? So, in the act of contrition here, right? Recess from evil, huh? Recess from evil, what? Boss of heaven? Recess from evil. Recess from evil, yeah. But, you see, you've got to kind of leave your sins, right? And then you kind of pursue the good, right? We've left all things that fall through. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So, a person gets up to him and Danny says, I hate myself, you know? You know, you know? Maybe it's just that he's facing too fat or something, you know? And something, he hates himself, right? His sins are where they are, right, huh? So, he turns away from the other, right? Just some hate come before love, right? He turns towards the good, right, huh? So, those are interesting arguments, right, huh? Smart guy, that Thomas, huh? Damn smart, huh? Against, this is what the great Augustine says in the 14th book in the City of God. That all affections are caused from, what? Love, huh? That's the word affection, it doesn't mean, you know, affection, you know, love, right? It's used for all the emotions here, right? The way you're affected, huh? Okay. And therefore, also hate, since there's a certain affection of the soul, is caused from love. How do they translate that, affection, there? All emotion. These are emotional, yeah. So, I don't know how affection got to be love, right? Yeah. It's a little bit like, you know, when you talk about luck, right, huh? There's good luck and there's bad luck, right? But then, for some reason, if you say somebody's lucky... It means good luck. Yeah. And you want to say, the other guy's got to say, unlucky, right? I don't know why, but it is, you know? And I guess I'm like that in other languages, too, you know? Right. You know, in Latin, if you say somebody's fortunate, that means good fortune, right? Unfortunate. It's bad, huh? We do have an expression, in English, when you say somebody's down on his luck. Yeah. It's luck and it's good. Yeah. Well, Thomas says, huh? I answer, it should be said, that love consists in a certain, what? Agreement, right? Of the lover to the loved. And hate consists in a certain repugnance, huh? Or dissonance, huh? But it's necessary in each thing, prius, right? To consider what fits to it, what is suitable to it, right? Than that which is, what? Repugnant to it, huh? Because something is repugnant to another, because it is corruptive, or it impedes that which is suitable to it, right? Whence is necessary that love is before, what? Hate. And that nothing is had in hate, except through this, that it is contrary to what is suitable that is love, right? And according to this, all hate is caused from, what? Love. Thomas is always looking before and after, isn't he, huh? Was I talking last time about these distinctions of four, right, huh? Well, in the twelfth chapter of the categories, you have the distinction of, what? The senses of before, right, huh? And therefore, the kinds of before, the kinds of order, right, huh? And then, and my friend, there you go, St. Victor, but Thomas says it in the day of the Commentary on the Ethics, right? He has a distinction of order in comparison to reason. So, if reason is defined by looking before and after, don't you want to know the senses of before and after, the kinds of order there are, the species of order, right? And then, how order is compared to reason, right, huh? Which gives rise to the different kinds of knowledge that reason has, huh? Because an order says that reason doesn't make, it only considers. And that order is considered in natural philosophy and later on in first philosophy. Then there's the order which reason makes in its own acts, and that's considered in magic. Then the order which reason makes in the acts of the will, that's considered in the ethics, and then the order which reason makes in exterior matter, and that belongs to the servile and mechanical arts, right? So, you divide, in the way, human knowledge by the, what, order it considers, right? You have to first see the distinction of order in comparison to reason, huh? So, you don't use the distinction of the kinds of order, you know, to distinguish the kinds of knowledge, but you need this other distinction, which is also before. Comparison of order to reason, right? To get a philosopher and that, right? What kind of a, how you've been looking before and after without even considering these things, huh? You better get into, you better read Aristotle and Thomas, right? Mm-hmm. One of those modern philosophers, ricocheting. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Yeah, well, you already do it, Thomas. Yeah, well, you already do it, Thomas. Yeah, well, you already do it, Thomas. Yeah, well, you already do it, Thomas. Yeah, well, you already do it, Thomas. Yeah, well, you already do it, Thomas. Yeah, well, you already do it, Thomas. It says about the Latin of Erasmus, right? They speak as if wisdom began with them. Let's assume that's the way Thomas, you know, when he borrows from and learns from Aristotle and learns from Dionysius and learns from Augustine, right? And the Atheist, right? They even have a Senate, right? You know, I told you that I was looking at the article there, or this equality of the father and the son. Is that a real relation or a relation of reason? Yeah. In the Athanasian Creed, he says they're equal, you know, magnitude and power and so on. Well, Thomas says it can't be a real relation, right? You can't base them in the fact that they have one nature, right? Because it's not a real relation of a thing to itself. So you see, Socrates is the same as Socrates, Socrates, Socrates. That's not a real relation, right? And that's one kind of relation of reason Aristotle talks about, right? And then he says there can't be a relation of a relation. And that's what Avicenna, one of the kinds he spoke of, right? So there he brings in, you know, Avicenna, who he's taken, you know, that, and actually taken two kinds of relations of reason, Avicenna distinguished, and two that Aristotle did. And he puts the four together, right? He's using one of these and one of these, you know. That's because if wisdom began with him, right? He's taking this from his master Aristotle, and taking this even if we have a son, you know, even though he disagrees with that of a son sometimes, right? That's where the modern philosophers are. They speak as if wisdom, you know, began with them. That's a really good way of describing them. Now this is what I think. Yeah, that's what Ratzinger had in Rome some years ago, some group of scholars for a certain publication, celebrating the anniversary of their publication. Ratzinger was one of the founders of this thing, so they invited him to give a talk. He kind of gave kind of a, what's the word, cautionary exhortation to, don't kind of get closed in on your own little world of discourse and your own ideas, and just keep talking to yourselves. It's not to be more. Oh, it's an open, and one of the stuffed shirts that was there raised his hand and said, who are you talking about? And Ratzinger just bowed his head and said, I guess cheaply myself. What a jerk. That guy was, whatever he was. He spoke as if wisdom started with him. Now, what about this first objection, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said that in those things which are divided ex oppositor, right, some are found which are naturally, what, single, right, together. Both secundum rem, right, and secundum rationa, right, just as two species of animal, like dog and cat, right? Dog before cat, or cat before dog, or two species of what color? Green and red. Now, some are what? Together, according to reason, but one is what? Before the other, and its cause, as is clear in the species of what? Numbers, figures, and what? Motions. So, like locomotion is a cause of the other kinds of motion, right? Alteration is a cause of what? Growth, right? Presupposthood, right? Okay. One can be without two, but not vice versa. Two can be without three, but in figures, a triangle enters into the square, right? To all those, those parallelograms, right? So, and what's he saying there? There are simo, secundum rationum, but one is really before the other, right? And it's cause, huh? So, when reason says number, let's say, of two and three, right? Is two more a number than three? But secundum rem, two is what? Three, yeah, yeah. And notice when Aristotle gives the second sense of before there, right? His example is one is before, what? Two. Thomas is criminal, right? Okay. But I don't remember Aristotle this distinction, this explicit one he does, you know? Some are not, what? Simo, or together, neither secundum rem, nor secundum rationum, as substance and, what? Accident, huh? For substance, secundum rem, realiter, right? Is the cause of accident, right? And being, secundum rationum, right? Is attributed to substance before accident, right? Because it's not attributed to accident except insofar as it's in what? Insofar. Yeah. So, now, if you didn't know the categories, how would you understand this text, right? Now, love and hate naturally are, what? Secundum rationum. Really. So, you know, it's dividing emotions, right? You see? You divide emotions into love and hate. Other emotions, too, but, you know? So, emotion instead of love, it's one emotion, it's another emotion. So, they're kind of equal, aren't they, right? They're together, right? But yet, love is, what? A cause of hate, right? Like he explained in the Bible article, right? So, secundum rem, love is for hate. But, is emotion set of love before hate? In some ways, I'm going to say in one of the daily articles here that hate is more, what? Sensible. And love, right? Okay. Yeah, viscerally. Yeah. Now, one day, I divide Shakespeare's plays into four kinds, right? But the, you have one in, though, you have, what? Tragedy and comedy, right? And the plays in between, you know, during the Renaissance, they were trying to understand, not so much Shakespeare's plays, but plays that don't seem to be their tragedy or comedy, right? But something in between. And so they coined a word that was tragicomedy. Tragedy, you know, for one of their names, right? Okay. Historically, the word, what? Romance, right? But there's the medieval romance and there's the Greek romance. And so there's two middle kinds in Shakespeare. One that goes back to Greek romance, right? And it goes back to the, what? The medieval romance, right? Now, the new editions coming out of Shakespeare, you know, they don't follow the original division of the plays, right? Which was into tragedies and comedies and history, right? I mean, they may keep the histories in there and tragedies and comedies, but then they take the last plays of Shakespeare, the last four, and call them what? Romances, right? The Greek romances, right? Then the other one could be called romances, too, you know, but the different sense of romance, huh? But in some sense, those ones in between are tragic comedies, you know, they're called dark comedies sometimes, you know, but it seemed to be like, what? A mixture of tragedy and comedy, in a way, right? And therefore, to be, what? In a sense, posterior to tragedy and comedy, right? When you divide it into... In species, you make them kind of what? Ex equo, right? This kind of play, this species, this species, right? So it'd be ama secundum rationum, right? White play would be before secundum rationum, right? Not secundum rem, unless you're a platonist. There are forms, right? They're taking it up, these things, right? Okay. So love and hate are simul secundum rationum, but not secundum, what? Rem, right? Now, if you know the fifth book of natural philosophy, right? You know, of the natural hearing, you know, the fifth book of the physics. That's where our style divides, what, motion into its, what, species, right? Okay. Now, probably you knew in high school, you know, if not in college, kind of the popular division was into physics, chemistry, and what? Biology, remember? Or the natural sciences, right? Well, that division goes back to Aristotle. But it goes back originally to the fact that he distinguished locomotion, change of quality or alteration, right? And then change of quantity and sense of growth, right? So that the oldest part of physics was about change of place, right? And then chemistry was about change of quality, right? And then biology about change of what? Growth, things in growth, and other changes that follow up on life, right? So that became traditional, right? Coming down from Aristotle. But when it became customary, they didn't understand the basis for the division, right? Which is a distinction of three kinds of change, or emotion, rather. And so they just started getting things like, say, atomic physics, right? Which really is not getting the change in place, right? When they, you know, they discovered it on physics, it wasn't that right? And so when you come to Heisenberg, right, and he's dividing the physical sciences, right, huh? He puts atomic physics with what? Chemistry, right? That's kind of the completion of it, right? See? So if you put atomic physics with mechanics, it comes to over here, you know. That's because you're not, you know, that's kind of the accidents of the way things developed, you know, huh? And it's not understanding the original reason for the basis for the distinction of the three, right? So if you divide the genus into species, secundum rationum, the genus is before the species, but the species are, what, together, right? But nevertheless, Aristotle will say that, what, if you want to, what, alter things, want to melt the wax, let's say you've got to bring the wax to the fire, or the fire to the wax, right, there's got to be a change of place, right? So there can be a change of place, but there can be a change of place without a change of quality. But there can't be a change of quality without a change of what? Place, right? When the sun comes up, you know, then it forms the earth, right? Okay? But there can't be growth without a change of quality, because you have to, what, change the food into something. It can be assimilated to you, right? So, there was an example he gave was in the text, or one of the ones there, where he says, some things are simo secundum rationum, right? But one is really before another in a cause, as it's clear in the species of numbers, figures, and, what? Motions, right? So, when I was dividing motion into three kinds, it's kind of, what, ama, right? Those three kinds, right? Secundum rationum, right, huh? Okay? That's where we speak in the categories, right? When you divide, right, huh? So, it's like when you divide, let's say, rectilineal plane figure, right, into triangle, and quadrilateral, and pentagon, and hexagon, right, huh? They're being divided, what? Secundum rationum into, what, things that are ama, right, huh? So, triangle and quadrilateral would be divided against each other, right, huh? But yet, maybe one is, what, before the other, right, because triangle is simpler, and every other rectilineal figure is composed, potentially, right, explicitly of triangles, right? It's the Marvin's theorem, right, that the diagonal of the, what, parallelogram divides into two equal triangles, right? Tell you, he's some guy, this is Thomas, you know? Mm-hmm. Thomas was looking before and after secundum, what? Rationum, and secundum, what? Whim, right? Thanks, Keith. I'm just getting, he's just getting us. Which is, which is before secundum rationum, the wisdom of Aristotle, the wisdom of God? Yeah. Don't we know the wisdom of Aristotle before the wisdom of God? We do, yeah. Yeah, yeah. But secundum rem, the wisdom of God is before, right? But, you know, when they talk about, you know, is the word wise carried over from human wisdom to God, you know? There's some change, obviously, you know? It is, yeah, yeah. But secundum rem, right? The wisdom of God is the original wisdom, and our wisdom in some ways is, but the effect of that, and, you know, faith and likeness of it, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on, and Yeah, yeah. Now, what about one contrary is not the cause of the other, right, huh? Well, love and hate are contraries when they are taken about the, what? Same thing. Same, huh? But when they are about contraries, they are not contraries, but they are falling upon each other, right? And what does he mean by that, right? Well, to love salmon, and to hate salmon are what? Contraries are about the same thing, right, huh? But to love beauty, and to hate, what? Ugliness, right? Are they contrary? Or to love virtue, and to hate vice, are they contrary? No. And in a sense, my hatred of vice, he says, presupposes my love of what? Virtue, right? I wouldn't hate vice if I didn't love, what? Virtue. I wouldn't hate the ugly if I didn't love the beautiful. So they're not contrary, but same vicium, consequentia, right? For, is that the same rationes, right? That something is loved, and that its contrary is hated, right? That one loves virtue and hates vice, right? That one loves the truth and hates, what? Falsehood, right? And thus, the love of one thing is the cause that its contrary is hated, right? That's a beautiful distinction, right? But it's not hard to see when you stop and think about it, right? Now, he says, in execution and carrying out, first is to recede from one, what? Term. Then to exceed to the other term, right? But in intention, it's a reverse. Because on account of this, one recedes from one term, one might exceed to the other, right? And the emotion of the desiring power more pertains to intention than to the carrying out of something, right? And therefore, love is what? Yeah. Is before hate, since both is emotion and repetitive. I pray I stop now. for a moment at the primum there in article 2. Thomas has a three-fold distinction there. And those things which are divided ex supposito, right? Some are found which are naturally together, huh? Both secundum rem and secundum rationum. Like two species of animal or two species of what? Colour. Now it's secundum rationum. Her style talks about that in the chapter 13 of the categories, right? He talks about the senses of hama, right? Simo. Some are what? Simo secundum rationum. But one is really before the other and a cause of it, huh? Notice the examples he takes here. Just as in the species of numbers, right? Well, Her style is getting the second sense of before, right? The foreign being, right? This can be without that, but that can't be without this. And he gives example of one is before what? Two. Two. On the same way, you could say two is before what? Three. Three, right? But that's secundum rem, right? That's secundum rationum. When you divide number, right? Into two and three and four and so on, right? One is not a number before the other. See? They're equally a number, right? And then the second example is the figures, right? And that's the way in which the triangle is before what? The quadrilateral, right? Quadrilateral before the pentagon, right? Okay, so you can divide these into these figures, huh? And then of motions, right? But change of place and change of quality, change of quantity, the sense of growth, you divide it, what? Into these species that change, right? So secundum rationum, huh? They're species of one, what? Genus, right? And by one division of genus. So they're hama together, right? But change of quality can be without growth. Like in chemistry, right? But growth cannot be without change of quality. And change of place can be without change of quality. But you can't have change of quality without bringing the things together in the same place, right? So there's a before and after there, he says, in the things. I couldn't remember that, right? Let's put them right, so on them, they're the, what? They're hama. Okay? Notice how important that is, right? As Aristotle distinguishes in the 12th and 13th chapters of the categories, right? The senses of before and the senses of hama, right? And now you're seeing how it's possible for something to be, what? Before in one way and not in the other way or something like that. Or hama in one sense, right? Simo, together. And then some things are not, what? Together. Neither secundum rem nor secundum ratzionum has substance and what? Accident, right? For substance really is the cause of accident and being secundum ratzionum even is attributed to substance before accident, right? Just like thing, right? My nose is more a thing, it seems than the shape of my nose or the color of my nose, right? Not getting ready is it too much? Okay. That's a beautiful distinction, right? Let's go on now to the third article. To the third one precedes us. It seems that hate is stronger than love, right? For as Augustine says in the book of the 83 questions no one is there who does not more flee, what? Pain than he desires pleasure, right? But to flee pain pertains to your hatred of pain, right? Therefore the desire for pleasure pertains to love, right? Therefore hate is stronger than love, right? So it's harder to be brave in battle, right? Than to abstain from overeating or overdrinking or something, right? Because it seems like it's, you know, this fear is stronger and so on. It's hatred. Moreover the weaker is conquered by the what? Stronger. But love is conquered by love, huh? What happened to Amor Vincen? When love is converted into what? Hate, huh? So therefore hate is stronger than love, right? There's some truth in what the objection is saying, right? If these objections are what? Probable, right? There's some part of the truth in them, right? So it is true that some hate overcomes some what? Love, right? That may not be the whole story, right? Moreover, the affection of the soul is made known through its effect. But more strongly does a man insist to repel the what odious than to what? Pursue the loved. Just as beasts abstain from delightful things at a count of blows, right? As Augustine says in the book on the 83 questions, huh? Therefore hate is stronger than love, right? You used to use a stick there, huh? You know, they separate the dogs and they manage each other, right? But against all this is the truth that the good is stronger than what? The bad, huh? The mean tithes do both because these are worse, right? People look at history, you know, what's going on in the world and so on. And the reason for this is that the bad does not act except by virtue of the what? The good. As Dionysius teaches us in the fourth chapter of the Divine Names. But hate and love differ according to the difference of good and bad. Therefore love must be simply stronger than hate. I know St. Thomas says in the reply here, right? First he argues from the, what? Second article, right? That love is a cause of hate. The answer should be said that it's impossible for the effect to be stronger than its, what? A cause. But every hate proceeds from some love is from a cause as has been said and shown there in the second article. Whence it is impossible that hate be more strong than love simply speaking, huh? But now he goes on to make a second distinction here, a second point. But it's necessary further that love simply speaking is stronger than hate because more strongly is someone moved towards an end than he is towards those things which are for the end. But to recede from evil is ordered to the what? Yeah. just as to an end when simply speaking stronger is the motion of the soul towards the good than in the what? Bad, huh? Notice in the Our Father there, the first two petitions are for the end and the third and fourth petitions are for the means to the end and then the last three are the impediments to the end, right? They're ordered that way, right? So is my love of truth stronger than my hatred of error, right? It's about to you, Dianna that error was his natural enemy, right? It's just he came with some new idea you know his first thing is almost to be rejected automatically, you know you have to try to justify it you know if you could but be careful. but nevertheless sometimes hate seems to be stronger than love, right? On account of two things first because hate is more sensible than love it's interesting you should say that, right? He's thinking of course more here of the emotion maybe, huh? For the perception of sense, right, is in a certain, what, change. And then from this, that something is already changed, it is not, what, sensed, as when it is in being changed itself, right? Whence the, what, heat of a, what? Fevered, what is that? Hectic air. Doesn't matter, measure of it. Hectic heat. What? Hectic heat. Yeah, is it a longer lasting one? It just doesn't matter. Yeah. Although it is a greater one, right, huh? It is not, that's sensed as much as the, what, tertian heat. Tertian heat, I've heard of that. I don't know what that one is. Yeah. But because the hectic heat, hectic heat, what that means, is already turned, as were, into a habit and a what? Nature, right? In account of this also, love is more sensed in the, what? Absence. Absence of the love. Absence makes the heart grow fonder. It's a problem, right? Once Augustine says, in the Tenth Boy of the Trinity, that love is not, what? Felt as much. Yeah. In account of this also, the pugnance of what is, what? Hated. He is more sensibly perceived than the, what? Agreement of that which is, what? Loved, huh? So I was in the car there with Warren Murray and turned on a slumber, right? And, of course, he's got kind of a theme song, you know, kind of a, you know, kind of thing. What are we listening to this for, Warren? He gets more immediate reaction out of him, you see. That's a theme song, you know. But it's for, you know, he more, what, senses, you know, the hatefulness of this, right? So I script something. Maybe if you started out with Mozart, he wouldn't have noticed. Yeah, yeah, yeah. I'm always talking Mozart every morning. What if you say about pain and pleasure, right? That pain in some ways is more sensible than pleasure, right? I'm more aware of the fact that I'm feeling pain than I'm being pleased. Maybe I'm being pleased, but I don't think I notice it quite much. It could possibly, if you're relieved of the pain suddenly, then you're ready. Yeah, yeah. Like, the first time you put on shoes, it really fit. I remember for days, I was, every time I put my shoes on, I was so relieved. Oh, thank God. But if the shoe doesn't fit, you're going to notice it more than if the shoe does fit, right? Yeah, sure. It's like you were saying before, you know, how these sense-desiring powers are named from desire, right? It's more like motion, right? You know, the word in Latin there, passio, to undergo, right? When you're undergoing something bad, it's more obvious that you're undergoing it, right? You know, if I'm laying my head on the pillow, you know, to notice it as much as if I've got a pin there in the bed or something, you know, or a needle got left in the bed or something, you know. You notice that right away. Yeah, yeah. It's curious, huh? It's a fact, you know. Secondly, because one does not compare hate to the love, what, corresponding to it, right? It's a different point now. For according to the diversity of goods, there is a diversity of loves in greatness and in smallness, to which are proportionally opposed hates, right? Whence the hate that corresponds to a greater love more moves than the lesser love, right? And from this, he says, is clearly a response to the first objection. For the love of pleasure is less than the love of the conservation of oneself, to which corresponds the flight from, what, pain, right? And therefore, more does one flee from, what, pain, than that one loves, what, yeah? Immediate thing, you know, pain, you want to do something about it, right? But that's because your love of the conservation of your own body is greater than your love of the pleasure, right? To second about hate conquering love, as it does sometimes. Some hate conquers some love, right? But hate never conquers love except in account of a greater love, to which, what, hate corresponds. Just as a man more loves himself than his friend, right? An account of this, that he loves himself, he has in hate, even his friend, if he is, what, contrary to him, right? Cassius gets annoyed with Buddhists, right? A famous scene that he says, shows how Shakespeare understood men so well, you know? And then the art, using regard to the third question there, right, that more intensely someone acts to, what, repelling the things he hates, because hate is more, what, sensible, yeah. So the animal feels the pain of the stick or something, right? My brother was riding in a bike with another guy, and this dog was going, yeah, yeah, yeah, you know. The guy stopped, the bike got off, gave the dog a one good kick. The dog, that's one way of hand to get there, you know? What's with the dog, it's a big deal, take a bite out of your leg, but... Yeah, yeah, yeah. So he's been saying, he won't hurt you. When he was a kid, you know, he said...