Prima Secundae
Lecture 77: The Good as the Cause of Love

Transcript
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that a rectified will is a good love, right? And a perverse willing is a, what, bad love, right? Because, however, amour, which is a passion of the concubisable appetite, right, inclines many to, what, bad, right? And therefore, it has the occasion, right, for some to assign before said difference, right? Okay. So especially the strong passions, like the sexual passion, right? I suppose the passion for drink and drugs and so on, and anger and so on, they're always in the paper there, right? You hear about, I mean, you hear about the news, you know, but now the news is the president went down to Columbia, right, and they had prostitutes there for the sicker service people. And so, you know, they're going through them. A few people are obviously ready to be able, probably out. And so people are always in trouble with these things, right? And so, apparently some guy wouldn't pay his bill to the prostitutes, or whatever it is, or the escort, or whatever they call them. And she complained, and the thing blew up, and finally came to the notice of the authorities. The public notice of it. And then the GSA, you know, having these big parties, you know, spending thousands of dollars, you know, spilling it up. It's been, they're being forced out, too, I guess, some of them. So, but I was pointing to the word concubiscence on that. It's a little bit of that kind of sense of something bad. And I remember coming up, you know, wasn't, as a kid there, I think, even a, you know, in the Baltimore captives, wasn't anger kind of like a big sin, anger? Yeah, I think. Yeah. Well, of course, anger names one of the strongest of the passions, right? They're in the very wrath of love, as Shakespeare says, obviously. The similarity between those passions. Well, you've got to be kind of careful to say anger is, you know, because even our Lord has anger, right? There's rectified anger and so on. But, well, why should that way of speaking arise if it wasn't that people are often let astray by the passions, especially by the strong passions, right? You know? So it's kind of misnomer to call anger, but you can see how people speak that way, right? Anger is a sin. You've got to be kind of careful. That's why I thought no one better, the bad kind of love. He always used to refer to it as L-U-V. Love. I remember when John Paul II came to America there, and the nun is there, you know, with her insubordination, you know, and I think, you know. Or he went to, you know, Switzerland, you know, and the priest, you know, that was disordered there, you know. I get a little angry at that, you know, to see that kind of a thing, yeah. But in the gospel there, our Lord gets angry, you know, at the hardness of their heart, right? Beelzebub, you know, that's why he casts out the devils, you know. He did the video about envy. Pilate did this. He knew there was a lot of envy. He did the camera mark. Yeah, yeah. But probably more strictly speaking, I'm more as it can be good or bad, right? Depends upon what you, what, love, right? The Bible says they're abominable as the things they love, right? You know, that shows you how love goes out to the thing itself, right? You know, as I say, if you love disgusting things, you are yourself disgusting, you know. But if you know what's disgusting, that doesn't make you disgusting, you know. If you know what is bad, does that make you bad? No, but if you love what is bad, that makes you bad. See all these complications that Kant has as to, you know, what makes a bad will, you know. And you just want to see the simple thing, you know, you can't love something that's bad. Now, what about the fourth objection here, right? It's the same country, yeah. But it says in the text here. To the fourth it should be said, that therefore some lay down, even in the will itself, right? That the name of Amoris, right? To be more divine than the name of what? Direction. Why? Because of more, more than what? Direction implies a certain passion, a certain undergoing, right? Of being moved, you might say, right? Especially, it implies that according as it's in the, what? Sense appetite, huh? Why, direction, chosen of, right? Presupposes the judgment of reason. It's pro-choice stuff, you know. It's not about choice at all, right? It's not about being informed to make a choice. But notice what he says here. Moreover, man is able to tend towards God through love, being moved in a way, right? Drawn by God. Then his own reason can, what? Lead him, right? And that seems to, what? Pertain to an idea of deletio, right? It's a chosen love. Therefore, it's a love that arises from reason, right? So that's why he said the love of wisdom is very much a chosen love, right? But he says this love of God is stronger, right? When one is, what? Moved by God, right? You know, he's always quoting that guy, who is it? Herotheus. He, what? Speaks of God as we're undergoing divine things, you know? But isn't that what you think of the prophets, too, you know? Kind of as undergoing something, right? I'm told that once the word, the scriptures, when we read the translation, it says the word of the Lord came to Jeremiah or something. The Hebrew words are told. It actually means the word happened to him. Yeah. Which is what St. Thomas talked about later with states of life and perfection. Yeah. It seems that the bishop is one who does perfection, but the religious, the consecrated soul undergoes perfection. He doesn't do it. Yeah. So, I mean, when the Holy Spirit came down upon them at Pentecost, you know, this is more like they're being, what? Moved, huh? Drawn, huh? Attracted. On St. Francis' cell, he was criticizing, he called this treatise on the love of God, you know, on war. And if somebody criticized him, you should use him, you should use paradise. Mm-hmm. This is kind of a reason why. Yeah, yeah. This is when you're talking about this text, you know, sometimes. Yeah, I think it's even in that and or in the, introduction to devout life. He makes, I think it's based probably on this article. He makes a distinction in the meaning of love. But maybe in the series, I forget. Thank you. So let's look at the fourth article now. Notice in the third article, in a way, although he's making a lot of distinctions there, you are touching upon the difference between the love that is an emotion, right? And the love that is an act of the will, right? It's hard for people to separate that, right? But now you get this other distinction of two kinds of love. To the fourth one proceeds thus, it seems the love is unsuitably divided into the love of friendship and the love of concupiscence. Now those are kind of the consecrated terms that came down even before Thomas, right? But you could call them the love of what? Wishing well and the love of what? Wanting, huh? Because concupiscence, I mean, the wanting, right? For amor is a passion, huh? As the philosopher says, but friendship is a, what? Habit. But habit cannot be a part dividing, what? Passion. So since love is a passion, you can't divide it through, what? The love of concupiscence and the love of friendship, because friendship is a habit, right? That's part in the naming thing there, right? Whoever and nothing is divided through that which is numbered with it. For man, for man is not numbered with animal, right? But concupiscence is numbered with love as a different passion from love. So therefore, love cannot be divided by wanting. It's like saying, you know, one kind of love is wanting, but one is not love, isn't it? Moreover, according to the philosopher in the, my book says it, the third ethics, but this is in the eighth book, right? Yeah. What do you have? You have a title. Yeah. This is eighth. Yeah. Three-fold is friendship. The useful, the pleasant, and the honorable, right? But the useful and the delectable friendship have what? In concupiscence, right? Sharing your money. I want, you know, to be pleased by you, you know, the pleasure of your company. He saved the life of Leo Alvarez in Korea when his friends said to him, he'll get in the transport truck. And they said, come over here and tell some of your stupid jokes. And he said, no, no, no, no, he's going to get this one. And they said, come on. Well, he couldn't resist the crowd in telling jokes, so he went and joined that truck, this truck in a mine, killed everybody. So their love of friendship becomes out of their love for wanting his entertainment. See how God works? He condescends so many times. Okay. Of course, useful and delectable friendship are not friendship in the full sense, right? So you can see, I can misunderstand this distinction, right? But against this, some are said to love those things, to love, because they desire, right? Just as one is said to love, what? Wine. Wine, account of the sweetness that he desires in it, huh? I like to dry wine more than the sea, right? As it's said in the second book of places, huh? Yeah, especially the ancients there. The Greeks, huh? Greek wine, I guess, was quite a pleasant thing, you know? Samuel Johnson, Samuel Johnson and Bosley, and sitting around taking a couple bottles of port, you know? Warren says, you know, and they got, you know, gout, and they took one or two vows of, you know, that's one of the other, quickly being wine, you don't take a fortified wine, like a, and I could take a whole bottle of regular table wine without any serious effects, but you get a whole bottle of sherry or something like that, you know, it just is, you know, it's too much, you know? And port is a fortified wine, too. Those things, sweet things, huh? But to wine and things of this sort, we do not have friendship, right? Therefore, other is the love of concupiscence, the love of wanting, and the love, other is the love of friendship, right, huh? Now, where does Thomas begin, huh? Well, you're going to quote the philosopher in the rhetoric, huh? Because in the rhetoric, Aristotle takes up the emotions, right? Some of them in more detail, right? Because he's talking about how you're going to arouse these emotions or calm them down, right? In order to convict somebody or get them off or get them elected or get them defeated and so on. So answer should be said that as the philosopher says in the second book of the rhetoric, to love is to will, but good to someone. And I'm curious, you know, sometimes there's a distinction in the rhetoric that's very fundamental for practical philosophy or moral theology. And Aristotle, you know, he talks about law, you know, the natural law and so on, something very explicit in the rhetoric, you know? These beautiful quotes, you know? So Thomas is not ashamed to quote the rhetoric, you know? Which is a golden river of words, as Cicero said, to persuasion. Once you're doing it, I said that persuasion is found first in music and then secondly in what? Fiction. Then third in what? Rhetoric, right? I was looking at a little thing at Coleridge there where he's talking about Shakespeare, you know, and he's talking about the earlier works of Shakespeare like Venus and Adonis and the great Lucreese and so on and what signs there are of him being the great poet he will be, you know? In these really works, huh? He's talking about how melodious the work is, right? And, you know, the way that man who has no music in his soul, you know? So this can be said, especially the poet, right? So there's something musical about these works of Shakespeare, you know? You see that persuasion there, huh? Yeah. Of course, we still have all these words you know, I mean, tragedy means a goat song and so on. And we use ode, you know, which is a original musical term, right? Or a lyric, lyrical poetry, you know, and so on. It was actually sung a lot of people and so on. Demidocus, you know, next down. This is what Father Owen Bennett used to say when, oh, no, he reminded me about Paul VI was referring to the dip between the preacher and you might say he uses rhetoric to persuade people and the artist in various arts. He says the artist has, especially in fiction, he says he has an advantage over the preacher because he can persuade people by identifying with the protagonist, whereas the preacher is always kind of an antagonist, at least a priest who's preaching because he's going to reach against him or whatever. And so he's always kind of antagonistic, appealing to the conscience, whereas somebody in a story can identify the protagonist who's virtual in the story. Uncle Thomas Cabin, you know, is very persuasive, you know, people are getting so sleepy, right, more so than speeches would do, you know. Persuasion means through the sweet, right? Mozart is even sweeter than Shakespeare, if I'm not, huh? Incredible how Shakespeare says things so well, though, huh? I always think of these things, you know, he says about somebody's death, you know, when Horatio says, you know, now cracks a noble heart, good night, sweet prince, and flights of angels sing thee to thy rest. How could you say that better than that? He isn't annoyed. Or when, you know, when Juliet is found apparently dead on her wedding day, this happy day for her, and finally, you know, it started raving rampant, but then the father says, death lies on her like an untimely frost upon the sweetest flower of all the field. You could see how more beautiful than that. He's annoyed there. He's the master there, you know? Incredible, he says those things. It's like Mozart. I didn't know where the melodies came from. They just came to him. That's amazing. I mean, there's things like this, you know, come to him, you know. At the end of his concert, he'd sit down and he'd play the piano, you know, just improvise, you know. They seemed to enjoy it even more than the thing, you know. When Beethoven heard Mozart's 24th piano concerto, he turned to the other guy and said, Now he says, we shall never recall that. Never recall that. What did Gysi King say when he got to recording the solo music for the piano of Mozart? There was only Mozart. You have a little treasure in these quotes? Oh yeah, oh yeah, oh yeah. He's in Mozart and Konya. Yeah. He could say in Mozart. When Brahms talks about the marriage of Frigo, you know, he cannot believe it. Every number is perfect in there. He says, it's never been done. You know, it's just incredible. So you get different, you know, people are struck by this or that piece of Mozart, you know. How perfect it is. He is the musician, right? Antonio Messina. It's like Shakespeare's Federalist Papers, the poet. Long farewell to all my goodness. So, going back to the body now of the article. I answer, it should be said that as the philosopher says in the second book of the rhetoric, to love is to will, or to wish, good to someone, right? Thus, therefore, the motion of love tends towards two things, right? There's two objects in a way there, right? To wit, towards the good that someone wills for someone, right? Either to himself or to another, right? And in that to which he wishes, what? Good. Good, right? To that good, therefore, which someone wills to another, he has the love of, what? Wanting. Wanting, yeah. To that good, to that which he, what? To one to whom he wishes some good, he has the love of, what? Friendship. So, I call one sometimes the love of wanting, right? Because concubines is kind of a word for wanting. And friendship, say that it's the love of, what? Wishing well, right, huh? Okay. So, I used to take that example in class. I used to go to the mixer, you guys. You see a good looking girl there, right, huh? You know? Mama, you wishing good to her? Or you want her, right, you know? See, she's the good you want for yourself, right? Okay? You're not, you know, thinking the fact that I'm so good for her, you know? I might be bad for her, but, you see? But you see, very much what the kind of love is there, right, you know? I remember one of the girls saying, you know, to me, you know how, you know, she reflected upon, you know, the stable marriage of her mother and father, right, huh? And she thought it was through the fact that they really wished well to each other, you know? And so, the love of wanting that you have when you go to the mixer, you see the nice looking girl, you know? That's not the kind of love that makes maybe the start or something, but it's not the... You've got to have this love of wishing well, right, huh? And that's what you have to have in friendship there between Horatio and Hamlet and so on, right? I love wishing well, right? Not that you're good for my bank account or something. My real life, you can't remember. Yeah. Yeah. And he says, this division is secundum prius et posterius. It's not what? Univocal, right? Just like the division of being into substance and accident is secundum prius et posterius, right? And the division of being into act and ability is secundum prius et posterius, right? Okay? For that which is loved by the love of friendship, simplicitara, in per se, to itself, is loved, huh? Very often, simplicitara and per se go together, right, huh? But simplicitara always has the sense of what's fully something, right, huh? Okay? What is loved by the love of wanting is not simplicitara, negative, right? And it's not what? Secundum se amante, right, huh? But it's loved for another, right? Just as being simply is what has being, and that's substance, right? Being secundum quid, what is in another, right? Okay? So did I come to be when I came to be in this room? When I dressed this morning, did I come to be? I came to be clothed, yeah. You have to say in some way, right, huh? See? But when my parents generated me, God created my soul, then I came to be simplicitara, yeah. Simplicitara, yeah. Yeah, yeah. Shakespeare had that famous, you know, sonnet, you know, love is not love, which all those were adulteration finds, and so on. And he's been kind of talking about, you know, love, simplicitara, right? You know? Because she thinks it's so obvious. The final puppet says, if this be error and upon reproved, I never writ, nor no man ever loved. It's just marvelous. He's saying stuff, right? Okay? You can't see this, you know. You know, I never writ, nor no man ever loved. You know? He's talking about love. It's a leech there, right? Okay? So that's what this girl saw in her parents, right? That they had that kind of love. That's why they were solid, right? When kids first become friends, why do they become friends, huh? We need somebody to play baseball with, or football with, huh? So also, in the case of the good, which is convertible with being, right, huh? Simply is that which itself has goodness, right? But what is the good of another is good secundum quid, right, huh? And consequently, the love by which is love something, yeah, is love simply. The love by which is love something that might be the good of another is love secundum quid, right? And this is more a distinction, it seems to me, of the love and the will, right, to have either one of these loves, right, huh? Or in the case of the emotions, do you really have the love of friendship, right? In a sense, the love that's, strictly speaking, an emotion is ordered to what's pleasing to the senses, right, huh? Okay. So if I love something because it pleases me, what kind of love do I have for that which pleases me? Yeah, yeah. So what kind of love do I have for the music of Mozart? Yeah. That's the good I want for myself. The plays of Shakespeare, right, huh? Incidentally, the word poet means what in Greek? Maker. Maker, yeah. But it seems like he's named by Antonio Messia, huh? I'm going to use it as an example in one of the dialogues when he's working on this. As if it would be no example. As if this is the most wonderful thing to make, right? What Homer made, huh? What is the market to say? Homer made a world in verse, right? Quite a world, huh? Okay, now in regard to the first objection, love is not divided through friendship and concubiscence, but to the love of friendship in a concubiscence, right? That's just the way they're named, right? For he is properly said to be a friend to whom we, what? Will some good, right, huh? That we are said to want that we will for ourselves, right? You know, if the girls in my class got the idea, you know, you know, when the guy approaches you, what kind of love do you have for me in the love of wanting of friendship? That would probably science the guy for a while. Getting stumbling over it. I don't want you. I just wish good to you. I wish you good. And are you good for me, though, saying it, because you want to restore yourself upon me. It's a fundamental distinction, right? But, you know, I don't think, you know, that people hear that distinction explained very often, you know. But it's so fundamental to marriage and friendship, right? And so it's clearly implied to the, what? Second one, right, huh? And then, of course, in friendship, right, huh? In the useful friendship and the pleasant friendship, huh? One wishes, what? Some good to the friend. And to the extent he does that, he, what? Yeah, throts your friendship, huh? But because that good, he refers further to his own, what? Pleasure or usefulness, right? Hence it is that the useful friendship and the pleasant one, insofar as they are drawn to the love of what? Of wanting. Fall short from the ratio of true what? Friendship, right? So when Cicero writes his book on friendship, he wants to call only the amicizia nesta, right? Friendship, right? He doesn't want to even use the word friendship for their ones. Aristotle says, well, you should use words like men in general use them, right? And because we do speak of these people as being friends, right? When it's based on usefulness and that, well then, we will, but we will distinguish, right? So he distinguishes, you know, them, right? And my father used to go to the ball game sometimes with the guy who sold the paint. So I imagine it started out as a useful friendship, right? Because my father needed paint for the awakens and so on, other things that were painted in his company, right? They made and the other guy, of course, I was going to need to sell paint to make other paint. But then they got to like each other's company, right? And so they had to go to the ball game together. Not very often, well, it's a while, you know, so. I don't know if they got to the highest kind of friendship or not. I never questioned my father about such intimate things. I mean, when our great friend there, St. Bernard Carvot, distinguishes, you know, the love of God, right? He has these four stages, right? Well, the first kind of love you have of God maybe is what? The love of wanting, yeah, yeah. You need him, right? But then as you get to, what, like him, well then give me a little friendship of pleasure, I mean, taste and see how sweet is the Lord, right, huh? It's got to work up to, I mean, because the friendship of, I mean, the love of charity is going to be a love of what? Yeah. Take a little break now. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. We're passing from the 26th to the 27th question, right? And the 27th, we pass to the 28th. But no, the 26th is about the nature of love, you might say, right? Kinds of love and so on. And then the 27th is going to be looking before love, right? At the causes of love, because the causes are before the effect. And then 28th will be looking after, right? So he's obviously following Shakespeare there, right? And looking before and after, right? It's kind of beautiful the way this treatise says these three questions, right? The nature of love, you're looking at love itself, and then you're looking before the causes and then after the effects. So this is the most well-ordered and complete fundamental consideration of love that I know of. Much more fundamental than the symposium of Plato, although that's interesting things to do in there. But no, it's much more. This is really... I don't know where you can go, you know, finding it as fundamental as this. That's why I have to use these three questions there in my course of love and friendship, you know? And that reminds me, I just discovered, just for incidental reasons, I just discovered a work that was published, an early work of Jane Austen. It was a fictional work, I think, of letters that she wrote. As a very young girl, she wrote this, and the title is Love and Friendship. And I have a... I haven't read it, but I just noticed it the other day I saw it. So now we're going to look before it, the causes of love. Then we're going to have to consider about the cause of love. And about this, four things are asked. First, with the good, is the what? Soul cause. Cause of love, right, huh? And secondly, whether knowledge is a cause of love, right? Now these two causes, the good and knowledge, will not be, you know, separate or really distinct, right? Because the good as known is a cause of love, right? So the good is the fundamental cause, but it's got to be known to be loved, huh? And so Thomas would say that knowledge is a cause of love, to some extent, for the same reason that the good is, right? It's on the side of the object, right, of love, right? But then you get the likeness, that's really something kind of fundamentally different from what? The good, right? And I used to like to get the students going on this, you know, by saying, which is a stronger cause? Are you more attracted to someone who is good, or someone who's like you? And, you know, the great language that we think in the English language, if I say, I like you because you're like me, right, is that equivocal, the two uses of words there, by chance, or is there a reason why? Because sometimes it seems that likeness is a stronger cause, right? And then, what, goodness, right? I don't know if that's the way it should be, but it still has a tremendous influence, right? And now, fourth is really when you're talking about, what, some other passion, but that arises from another love that's more fundamental, right? So you're saying, can love, you know, another love be a cause of this love, right? So is my love of logic caused by my desire to be wise? Because my desire to be wise is, because I love wisdom, right? Okay. Warren used to joke about that. But see, do you have some crazy idea about how many years you have to spend studying logics when you can do philosophy? And people are completely lose their interest in wisdom. They haven't spent all these years on logic, you know. It's like, it's like, Warren used to say, you know, when people learn languages, they used to, in the old days, you'd spend, you know, a year or two doing scrammer, you know, and then they'd try to be crazy, you know, right? You have to kind of get people into reading the text right away, you know. In the beginning was the word, and the word, you know, that nice, simple Greek and archaic, you know, I can kind of follow that. But, you know, so, that's a beautiful way that these are ordered, isn't it? Just, just amazing. What a man, what a mighty man, huh? I mean, Aristotle knew, I think, these things, but, you know, but it's kind of scattered around, and it's laid out even for numbskulls, you know, to get to know something about this. To the first, then, one proceeds thus. Yes, it seems that not only is the good the cause of love, huh? For the good is not a cause of love, except because it is, what? Loved. But it happens also that the bad is loved, huh? According to that of Psalm 10, who loves iniquity, hates his own soul. So people love iniquity. Otherwise, every love would be good, huh? But so, in every knowledge is good, huh? So, Aristotle, in the beginning of the Nicomagnetics, he's going to talk about the desirability of this knowledge of the soul, right? And he says, what? Although we hold that all knowledge is, what, good and desirable, right, huh? Some knowledge is more desirable than other knowledge. And then he gives two criteria, right? Either because it's about a better thing, or because it's about, it's more certain. But elsewhere, he talks about the criterion, in terms of what you know, is more important in terms of certitude, right? It's better to know a little bit about God, than to know I have five fingers, you know. I'm more sure that I've got five fingers, maybe, than to come up with my knowledge of God, especially the Holy Spirit. Therefore, not only is the good the cause of love, but also the, what? The bad, huh? Moreover, the philosopher says in the second book of the rhetoric that we love those who say, what? Bad things about themselves, right, huh? Okay. Therefore, it seems that the bad is a cause of love, right? Someone tells me there are embarrassing moments in life, you know, when we laugh, and kind of enjoy that, right? You like someone who tells about their faults, huh? You know, some woman asks, you know, Johnson wrote the dictionary, you know, you may know, and, but he has, you know, some mistakes in there, right, huh? And so some woman asked him about this, you know, why he said that, you know, she's expecting him some, run around, he says, sure, ignorance, he says, madam. Sure, ignorance, he says, madam. Just a lot of surprises, you know. You know, think of how he felt this here, you know. Well, you like that, right? But is it good to be ignorant? No, see, but I want you to love Johnson because he, you know, or sorry, but I made the same mistake myself, right? You know, mistakes, which is another guy for speaking of his own mistakes, right? Moreover, Dionysius says that not only the good, but also the beautiful is lovable for all, right? But against all this nonsense is what Augustine says in the eighth book about the Trinity. Certainly nothing is loved except the good. Augustine, he's quite a, he's quite a mind. So he's in the case, Augustine, really, you know. He didn't have, you know, the advantage of reading it. Aristotle much at all. The only thing he mentions is the categories he came into contact with, you know. He didn't win this mind, Augustine. I always think of Augustine and Thomas' the two greatest minds that we've had in the church. The good only, therefore, is the cause of love, right? Okay. I am sure it should be said, that it has been said above, love pertains to the desiring power, right? Which is a, what? Power that... undergoes, that's true even of the will, right? Whence its object is compared to it as the cause of its motion, or the cause of its what? Act, huh? When Aristotle distinguishes the powers of the soul, he distinguishes the powers of the soul by their acts, right? And the acts by their objects, right? But you have this fundamental distinction between the powers that act upon their object, right? Like the digestive power which acts upon the food, right? And the sense power, for example, that is what? Acted upon. So though grammatically I say I see, or I hear the sound, right? It's a sound that's active, and the ear that is passive, right? So that's kind of the fundamental distinction. Does the object act upon the power? Or does the power act upon the object? And it seems that if neither was true, there'd be no reason for this to be called the object of the thing, right? Okay? So is the desiring power like the ear, the sense power? Or is it like the digestive power, right? Yeah. Act upon, right? But it's the principle of acting, and then it goes out. Yeah, act has been acted upon, yeah. But it's first, you know, something makes an impression upon it, and then there's motion towards that object, right? That's the distinction I'm saying. For instance, the salesman is in turn, the love of complacency. That's how we're acted upon. And then the love of the devil is. Whence its object is compared to it as the cause of its motion or its act, right? This is going to be, therefore, the most fundamental cause of love, huh? So it's necessary that that is properly the cause of love, that is the object of love, right? But the proper object of love is, what? The good. Because, as has been said, love implies a certain, what? Connaturality, huh? Or, what? Complacence, agreement of the lover to the loved, huh? But to each thing that is good, which is connatural to it, and, what? Proportioned to it. Once it remains, that the good is the proper, what? Cause of love, huh? So you could say that love is a kind of, what? Agreement of the desiring power with its object, right? Whereas a real look to a thing is what fits it, right? What fits the thing is good for it, right? Therefore, the object of love has to be the, what? What's good for the thing, right? So the plants that want a lot of water, it's good for them. They have a natural love of water, yeah. So they want a lot of sun, right? Something like she. Yeah, I'm trying to grow some grass right now. Wait a minute. How much does it take for grass seeds to come up? How do the grass come up? Ask me. I think it takes more than a week, right? It depends on how many birds eat them first. I can't make sure that you, you know, you've got those cold nights to make it hard. Yeah. Yeah. We'll see what happens. Those robins are out there. Nothing's going to spread. One place I try to grow grass, you know, the other years, it doesn't seem to old, you know, but the tree there has been weakened and it lost a lot there in that terrible snowstorm there, you know, the early snowstorm. Probably that fell on top of the roof of the house. Yeah. It didn't really do damage as far as I know. Now, first it should be said that the bad is never loved except under the, what? Yeah. Insofar as it is secundum quid bonum, right? And it's grasped as simply good. So I tell the students, you know, they're making this mistake of simply and secundum quid, right? All the time, right? Because they're doing something bad because it's good in some way. Or they're not doing what is good because it's bad in some way. And thus some love is bad insofar as it tends towards that which is not simply, what? True good. And in this way, man loves, what? Iniquity. Insofar as by iniquity, it tends to some good as, for example, pleasure or money or something of this sort, right? So the bad is prejudice, right? The object of love. Now those who say bad things about themselves, right? Are not loved on account of those bad things, right? But on account of, but on account of which they say the bad things. For to say one's own bad things has a notion of something good insofar as it excludes fiction or similar sort of sign of pride, humility, right? Which admits you're false, right? So we love them for something good, right? Excellent. Yes, and his compassion. Yeah, yeah. So Aristotle has a virtue there, right? Which is truthfulness, right? Okay. I never made the mistakes. He's got a deer into the person who says that. I don't make mistakes. I don't know how to fix mistakes because I never make them. I don't know how to repair things. What's actually helpful about his instructions is he shows you how to make mistakes. So he's able to correct you before you do it. He says, watch out for doing this because if I do this, then he shows you what happens. It's very helpful. So the first two objections were dealing with the bad seeming to be love, right? People choose, what, abortion because it's, what? Yeah, yeah. It doesn't continue their career or something, right? It moves in embarrassment, you know, for this and so on. This is the second objection there, right? Again, it's not really the bad itself that's being loved, right? I don't like you because you're a mistake, but because you admit your mistakes or something, right? The third objection was a different thing, right? Because the beautiful is not something bad, right? To the third, it should be said that the beautiful is the same as the good, differing only in its definition. For since the good is what all would want, of the notion of the good is that in it the appetite what comes to rest. rest, but in the ratio of the beautiful retains that in the knowledge of it and the aspect of seeing of it, right? The appetite, what? Rest, right? So you see a beautiful, you know, you've got beautiful gardens, so you know, restful in this rectal, got these beautiful gardens, right? That was Larry Brown one time, got a new sweater, and I like the color. And I said, Larry, I like your sweater, I like the color. And he said, it's restful. It's restful. I said, yeah. That's a good description. Sirach used to complain about, you know, the romantic composers, you know, they tear you out, he says, you know. I don't like it. I don't like it. I don't like it.