Prima Secundae
Lecture 76: Love as Passion: Nature, Distinctions, and Definitions

Transcript
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In the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, Amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, Guardian Angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. Dios, gracias. God, our enlightenment, Guardian Angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, orden the woman, our imagines, and arouse us to consider more correctly St. Thomas Aquinas' angelic doctor. Pray for us. And help us to understand what you have written. In the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, Amen. And one of the objections, you know, Chrysostom is saying that the Father is the cause of the Son. I think Basil, I think I first saw Basil, but both Basil and Chrysostom are, you know, Thomas, of course, is the same way. He's using it loose to the word, you know, and so on. But, uh, Aristotle's pretty good on that, you know. That the beginning is more universal than cause, right? Not every beginning is a cause. I watch these guys, Basil and Chrysostom, once in a while, right? Even though Thomas is going to transfer. You know, Paris for Chrysostom's commentary on John, was it? Yeah. Okay, so in Article 2 here, in Question 26, whether amor, huh, is a passion, huh? Undergoing, right, huh? Well, no virtues, huh? No virtue is a passion, huh? But every love is a certain virtue, as Dionysius says, huh? In the fourth chapter, in the Divine Names. Therefore, love is not a, what? Passion. Well, what does Dionysius mean, huh, Thomas? Well, that's that. Moreover, love is a certain union or connection, according to Augustine in the Book of the Trinity. But union or connection is not a passion, but more a, what? Relation. Relation. Therefore, love is not a, what? Passion, huh? I was reading the article there in the sentences on whether the Holy Spirit is the nexus, right? The connection of the Father and the Son, huh? And in what sense is he, huh? Not in the way that essential love is, their connection. So he says, compares it to, almost I think, to husband and wife, right? Husband and wife are united in their offspring, right? And this is the way the Father and the Son are united in the Holy Spirit, yeah. As he proceeds from them, right? Yeah. So it's kind of interesting. It's interesting because when St. Maximilian Kolbe refers to the Blessed Mother as the created Immaculate Conception, the Holy Spirit as the uncreated Immaculate Conception, the same notion as in St. Bonometrius, he refers to the Holy Spirit as the Concepcio of the Father and the Son, in that sense, of like making the same comparison. I think that's what he's saying. It's not a natural procession, but it's like the parents, mother, father, and the United Concepcion. More of a Damascene says in the second book that passion is a certain motion, right? Well, Aristotle takes a motion in the third book of an actual hearing, the third book of the physics, right? And he attaches to that a consideration of what? Acting upon and what? Undergoing, right? So if you're moving because I'm pushing you, right? Is your motion pushing and being pushed in some way? Then Aristotle compares it, right? It takes up acting upon and undergoing, right? Attaching it to motion. That's where Thomas stops and says, we've got to understand the whole categories of this, you know? What does this mean, you know? So passio is a motion, quidam, right, huh? So you're being pushed, right? It's just a motion, right? But love does not imply the motion of the desiring power, because that's what? Desire. But the beginning of this motion, right? Therefore, love is not a passion. But against all this is what the guy called the philosopher says in the eighth book of the Nicomachean Ethics, that amor es pasio, right? Well, that's a pretty good one. Yeah, that's pretty good. Now, Thomas says, I answer, it should be said that passion or suffering or undergoing, right, is an effect of the agent on the, what, patient, right? Okay? Now, in Latin, they'll speak of what? Axio and pasio, right? In Greek, it's what? Poien and pascain, right? But I use the term sometimes in English, acting upon and what? Undergoing or being acted upon, right? But a natural agent has a two-fold effect, huh? In the one undergoing, right? For first, it gives the form. Secondly, he gives the motion that follows upon the form. And then the simple example from the ancient science there. Just as the one generating, right? If I generate a stone, right? The one generating the stone body gives it, what? Weight, huh? Gravity, huh? And then the, what, motion that follows upon gravity, right? And this weight, which is the beginning, the source of motion, to the natural place and account of the weight, can in some way be called natural, what? Love, huh? And that's why Augustine will kind of compare it, right? My love is my weight, huh? So, in a similar way, right? The desirable, right? The petibule, gives to the appetite, that is to say, the desirable power, first, a certain, what? Yeah, co-acting, a coordination of something, right? Which is the, what, agreement with the thing desirable, right? And from this, there follows emotion towards the thing desirable, and you don't have it, right? Of course, Aristotle points out in the third book about the soul, the motion of the appetite is done in a certain circle, right? Okay? So, something makes an impression upon me, right? And then I'm kind of, what, adapted to that thing, right, huh? I'm fitted to it, so to speak, right, huh? And then, as a result of it being fitted to me, then I seek it, right, huh? And then I try to, what, possess that thing, right, huh? And so, what started from the thing acting upon me, and I turned going out to, what, join myself, what? To it, yeah. There's kind of a circle there, right, huh? Okay? For the desirable moves the desiring power, huh? Making itself, or producing itself, in some way, in its intention, right? And the desiring power tends in the desirable object, really, in reality, right, you might say, pursuing it, right? So, that there is the end of motion, where was the beginning of it, right? Okay? So, the desirable thing that was the beginning, that is to say, that acted upon, right, is the thing that is the end that you're pursuing, right? The good that you're pursuing. Now, so here you have the two effects then, right, huh? The first, therefore, change of the appetite from the desirable is called amor, love, which is nothing other than the agreement with the desirable, right? It's pleasing you, in a sense. From this agreement, there follows motion to the desirable. In that moment, Emotion is what? Desire. And last, what? Rest, which is what? Joy. That's how we call it, beautiful, restful. Since, therefore, since love consists in a certain change of desiring power from the desirable, it is manifest that love is a passion undergoing. Strictly speaking or properly speaking, according as it is in this one sense, desire and power can give us an appetite, right? But speaking more generally and by extension of the name, according as it is in the, what? Will. So the guy or the girl goes to the party, right? And someone makes a big impression upon them. But notice the expression, make an impression upon them, right? You know, if I lay my hand on something soft, it starts to make an impression upon this table. You know, it's hard to make, but a hard-hearted person or a hard, see? But, you know, someone who's soft-hearted, right? You can give an impression upon that heart, right? And it's like giving it a, what? A form whereby it's conformed, right? To the object, right? But the desire will also be an underwhelming, right? So, because the girl has made an impression upon my heart, right, then I'm going to, what? Pursue the girl, right? But the desire also is an underwhelming, right? And it's hard to distinguish. They're both passions. Yeah, yeah. That kind of follows the fact that my heart has been in some way conformed to that object, right? It, uh, say about Mozart's music, right? It just fits my heart, right? That's why I keep on putting it on every morning, you know. To Rosie says, that's enough. No, I can remember myself to one or two CDs, you know, for a day. Amazing. I told you how they kind of, one day in class there, you know, he happened to mention Bach and Mozart, you know. So, I confronted him after class and said, I noticed you mentioned Bach and Mozart. So, you put them on the same level. I says, oh, no, no, Mozart. Separated substance, you know. It's like Thomas would call the angelic doctor, right? It's a great substance, you know. They say that the kind of first, you know, it's a tagline to Bach, you know, but then they don't realize Mozart was the one, huh? Now, what about the objection from our great friend Dionysius, right? Well, to the first it should be said that because virtue signifies a source, a beginning of motion or action, therefore love, insofar as it is the beginning of the, what? Yeah. Is called by Dionysius, say, what? Virtus. Virtus, yeah. Incidentally, the word principium, what's the English word for principium? Yeah, yeah. Now, if you look at the fifth book of wisdom, when Aristotle takes up the word arche, principium, the first three meanings of beginning are meanings of beginning where the beginning is in that of which it is the beginning. So, for example, the point, the first meaning of beginning would be like the point is the beginning of the line, right? Or the line is the beginning of the surface. Or the surface is the beginning of the body, right? And the point is in the line of which it is the beginning. And then the second sense of beginning is not the beginning of the line, but where you might begin on the line, might be halfway down the line. And then the third sense of beginning is the fundamental part. So that the foundation of a house is the beginning of the house, right? So those first three senses of beginning, the beginning is in that of which it is the beginning, right? Now, in English, right, the word beginning has those meanings. You could speak of the foundation of the house, you know. That's the beginning of my house, right? But when you get to the fourth sense of beginning, right, is that so much in English? Has the word been moved that much? Would you say, for example, that I'm the beginning of my son? Does that seem a little more, yeah, a little bit odd, right? Because I'm not in my son in the way the point or the foundation of the house is in the house, right? Okay? So when you translate the word, you've got to kind of extend the English word, right? See, what happens is sometimes the natural carrying over the word is kind of by accident imputed in English because we take over the Greek or Latin from when we learn some things, right? We take over their word, right, and use that, okay? So when I was in grade school, you know, they're always telling us the difference between a principal, P-A-L, and principal, P-L-E, right? Well, principal, P-A-L, would be the fourth sense of beginning. And principal, P-L-E, the principles of science, would be the fifth sense, right? Okay? But it would sound kind of funny to say that the prince of the city or the principal of the school is the beginning of the school, right? You may think that they're down there in the foundation somewhere. And you've got to kind of force people to say, you know, that the axioms say the definitions are the beginnings of what? The science, right? Okay? So, I'm all in favor of moving the word, right, huh? I was going to mention that same thing about the word birth, you know? But Shakespeare, you know, the last sense of birth, of nature, rather, in Phousis in Greek, and nature in Latin, is what a thing is, huh? And do we use the word birth for what a thing is? But notice in that passage I quoted from Shakespeare, right? For not so vile, John, the earth doth live, but through the earth some special good doth give. Not so good, but strained from that fair use, huh? Revolts from true birth, stumbling out of use. Well, in a sense, revolts from true birth means revolting from your true, what? Nature in the sense of what a thing is, right? So there Shakespeare has moved the word, right, huh? Once again, you talk about people can't move the word, right? Their minds are clogged, right, huh? You know, but you have to go back and, you know, use the Greek or the Latin, you know, but you have to follow the word up from there, you know? If we take over the Greek or Latin word in the later meanings, and don't take over the first meanings with it, where our mind is out of order, right? So you've got to extend these things, huh? So I'm the beginning of my son and my daughter, huh? And the carpenter is the beginning of this here, right? You know? Yeah. And the tailor is the beginning of my shirt or my pants, right? That's the fourth sense of the beginning, huh? So prince and principal and P-L-E and principal and P-A-L, those are all basically the word and referring to these later senses of the beginning and this. So he says here, Virtus signifies a principium motus racionis, right? Well, that's a, what? Maybe an exterior beginning, right? It's interesting when Aristotle goes on from beginning to the next word, which is cause, the first two meanings he gives of cause is matter and then form. And those are what? Intrinsic causes, right? They're in that of which they are. are a what? A cause, right? So the wood is in the table, right? And the form of the table is in the wood, right? The table. So Aristotle defines matter as that from which something comes to be existing within it, right? Now it comes in some way from the mover or the maker, but he's not in the thing that he's made, huh? So in that way, the cause and the effect are both in different senses? Well, the cause is the beginning, not the effect. Let's talk about the effect and the end. That's the kind of cause. Different ways of looking at the table. You say the maker is the beginning of the table in one way, the wood is the beginning of the table. No, that's not the thing. Yeah, different kinds of causes. I actually explained the four causes. I read the boards, C, A, T, right? I said, now, it's the word captive, you don't know. And what's the most obvious dependence that this word on the blackboard, right, has, huh? What does it depend upon for its existence? Well, C, A, and T, right, huh? You see? And someone says it doesn't depend upon C, and A and T will take away C, A, and T, I raise them. Obviously it depends upon the right. It's gone, right? Okay. And so that's the first kind of cause, right? And then I say, but now, I write next to the word cat, the word act, right? Same word, same letters. And now they're forced by the truth itself, as Aristotle would say, to say that there's something that the word cat depends upon besides the three letters it's made on. Otherwise the word act would be, yeah. And I'm talking to the graduates of Thomas Aquinas College and they always refer to it as T-A-C, so I have to get in sometimes too, but not for a student's assumption, but anyway. And then I go on and I say, now, did the letters C, A, T get in that order because they are those letters? But now you're introduced to a third kind of cause, right? Okay. And this is the mover or maker, right? Now is my ability to order the letters, does that explain why I put them in that order? Because I could have done a T-A-C or T-C-A or, right? I've got a lot of ability, you know, for ways I can arrange the letters, right? Why did I put it in the form C-A-N-T? I wanted to talk about my favorite animal, which is the cat, right? Okay. If I wanted to talk about, you know, ability and act and metaphysics, then I would have put them in the order A-C-T, right? I wanted to talk about the first act, the pure act, the A-C-T, right? So now you're forced to the fourth kind of cause, the what? End, right? I take the example, you know, of the carpenter, right? Why does he make the roof like this? Why does he make it like this? Is his ability extended to this, but not to this? You can't explain why his ability, right? But if you have snow and rain, you realize this is better than that. So it's for the sake of, you know, you're forced to cause this, but in the very order, Aristotle gave them, right? Matter, form, mover, and in. So I think Aristotle's got a good reason to put him in that order, huh? But there's also the history there, you know? The Greek philosophers are talking about matter first. Water is the beginning of all things. Or even before the philosophers, Mother Earth is the beginning of all things. Because in the Greek philosophers, to some extent, you see the natural movement of our mind, huh? Because they're the first philosophers, so they start with what's most known. And then people, you know, later on, they start with whatever Professor X was talking about the first day of class. Could be anything he's talking about, right? You know? And by no means where you should begin, huh? Okay, what about union, huh? Because union pertains to love, but union is not a passio, union is a, what? Relation, right? Well, Thomas says, to the second should be said, that union pertains to love insofar as the, what? Of the agreement of the appetite, right? The one loving has himself towards that which he loves as towards himself, right? Or as something of himself, right? Remember my mother saying that, shouldn't I? Fathers look upon their wives and their children as something of themselves, part of their establishment of life, right? Aliquid sui, you know? And thus it is clear that love is not, what? The very relation of union, right? But that the union is something following upon the love, huh? Whence the great Dionysius says that love is a virtus unitiva, right? A power that unites, right? And the philosopher says in the second bit of politics politics, that union is the opus, the work of love, right? So great Dionysius and philosopher, they're... The man's stick alive. Yeah. Yeah. Marvelous, huh? And Thomas says, great respect for Dionysius and great respect for the man he calls the philosopher. Now, what about passion being an undergoing and undergoing being motion, right? And the motion of the appetite is what? Desire, not love. To the third, it should be said that love, although it does not name the motion of the desiring power tending towards the thing that is desirable, nevertheless, it does name the motion of the desiring power by which it is changed by the, what? Desirable, right? Or by the, what? Desirable, what? Makes an impression upon the heart, right? Conforming it to that. So that it is fitting and pleased with, you might say, huh? The desirable, right? So love is something passionate now, we know that way. Now. Whether love is the same thing as, what, dialectio, right? Now, dialectio, etymologically, comes from a word, I guess, for what? Choice, yeah. So, when I was trying to translate this, I would call it, what, chosen love, right? The third one goes forward thus. It seems that love is the same thing as dialectio, right? For Dionysius says in the fourth chapter in the Divine Names, he says that in this way, love and dialectio have themselves as, what, four and twice two. And rectilineal and having right or straight lines. But these signify the same thing, right? Might have said, like, you know, 12 inches or one foot or something, right? Therefore, love and dialectio signify the same thing, right? Moreover, the emotions of the desiring power differ in their, what, objects. But the same is the object of, what, dialectio, chosen love and love, right? And therefore, they are the same, huh? Moreover, if dialectio and amor differ in something, most of all, they would seem to differ in this. That dialectio is taken as in something good, right, huh? But amor in mago, huh? As some say, right? According to the best of the narratives, right? I think it's a little bit like the word, what, for desire, the other word that he has here, concupiscencia. You know? If you take the English word there, concupiscence, right? It kind of, it tends to have kind of a bad connotation, seems to be, right? You know? Doesn't it? Concupiscence? Yeah. And so he's thinking, you know, love has a bad sense, right? According as Augustine narrates in the 14th book on the city of God, huh? But in this way, they did not differ because, as Augustine says there, in sacred scriptures, both are taken, both in good and in bad, huh? So I have to ask students sometimes, which is better, love or knowledge, huh? But love can be good or bad, right, huh? I love to torture people, that's good? No. So love can be good or bad, right? But knowledge is always what? Yeah. That's an advantage that knowledge has over love, right, huh? Therefore, amor and dilexio do not differ, right, huh? As Augustine self concludes, that it's not other to say amorim, love, right, and to say, and another thing to say, what, dilexio, but be saying the same thing, right? So most of these arguments are taken up as to how exactly these two words are used, right, and how are they related? Are they simply synonyms or is there still some, you know, difference in meaning there, right? But against this is what Dionysius says in the fourth chapter, divine means, that to some of the saints it seems more divine the name of what? Love. And I think the Greek word there is eros, right? Okay? So that eros in Greek may be more clearly than now more in Latin has the sense of what? Sense love, right, huh? Sense love. But I think, you know, our word amorous, right, usually refers to kind of romantic love, I would call it, you know? So, I mean, Dionysius is writing, I think, in Greek, right? But he's saying the name of eros is more divine, some say, right, than the name of dilexia, right? See? I don't want to see the Dion talking about the meaning of this, huh? Okay. Well, Thomas is going to try to clear up now this confusion about names, huh? I answer it should be said that there are found four names, huh? Pertaining to the same in some way, right, huh? Close, huh? To wit, amor, dilexio, caritas, and amachitia, right? Now, amachitia means what? Friendship, right, huh? Caritas, I suppose the Greek word would be what? Agape. And we talked a little bit about amor and dilexio, right, huh? Okay. Now, they differ in this, that amachitia, according to the philosopher in the eighth book of the ethics. So, books eight and nine of the ethics are concerned with, what, friendship, right? And Aristotle says it's more like a habit, right, huh? Okay. So, he starts to take up friendship, he says, it belongs to ethics because it's either a virtue or effective virtue, right? Virtue is a habit, huh? But amor, in dilexio, signify more, what, in a manner of an act or of a passion, right? But charity can be taken either for the habit, right? So, charity is one of the, what, theological virtues, right? And virtues, they're habits, right? But also can, in the act, I suppose, agape, maybe. Okay. But now he's going to talk about the difference of these, right, a little more. But these signify differently acts through these three things, huh? For amor is, what, more general among them, huh? For every dilexio or caritas can be called a love, right? But not every amor is dilexio or caritas, right? Okay. So, it's not going to get it wrong when they translate agape love, right, huh? I think, trouble is the word, charity has got kind of downgraded to kind of exterior things, yeah, yeah. Okay. I don't know what I listed there, my charitable, charitable. It's like charitable tax write-off. Yeah, yeah, yeah. I sit down with the check that they're in, write out the charitable, I say to Rosalie. Okay. But dilexio adds, over love, right, above love, a, what, choice preceding it, right, huh? As the name itself, what, sounds, right? Dilexio. Next we have to word, what, election, right? That's in root there, I guess, huh? Election is choose, right? Choice, right? You really have elections as a choice. It's rigged. You don't have a choice. I'm not sure. What was it, if God wanted us to have a democracy, he'd give us choices? Of course, choice refers to the, what, the, you know, involves reason, so he refers to the, what, to the will, right, rather than to the sense. Is there? Whence dilexio is not in the concubiscible, right, which is part of the emotions, the sense desires, huh? The concubiscible and the irascible, right? But it's in the will only, right, and is only in the, what, rational nature, right? Now, caritas adds above love perfection, it's in perfection of love, insofar as that which is loved is estimated to be of great, what, price, great worth, as the name itself designates. So I suppose car roost means deer, right, huh? The Shakespeare's is the word deer in that sense, you know? The Irish, the Irish speak that way, I remember as a kid, that they would have heard, if something was very costly, it's very deer, it's very deer. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Yeah, we still used that, I guess, yeah. Yeah, it cost you dear. It cost you an arm and a leg. I remember buying my first big car, you know, a new car, you know, kind of, and driving on to like here. You've suddenly been relieved, you know. You've gone through the eye of the needle, you know, or something, you know. You're relieved of all your money, you know. You're no longer a man of substance, right, huh? It's always like that, you know. But you hope you're not a man of accidents with a new car. So now he's going to clear up these objections here on the basis of the distinction seen in the body of the article, right? So Dionysius is talking about these things as being like four and twice two or rectilineal and having straight lines, right? Dionysius speaks of love and deletio according as they are both in the, what? In the intellectual appetite. Power, yeah. For thus, love is the same thing as what? Teleksio, right? So I used to say to students, you know, when you get up there to get married, you know, does the priest ask, you know, now do you have a real warm feeling for each other? No. He's really asking you, do you choose this person as your husband or choose this person as your, what? Wife, right? And you're expressing not your warm feelings, which I assume you have, but but you're expressing your, what? Choice, huh? Okay. Your revocable choice, huh? In Basel's life was Samuel Johnson, right? He's writing to Beretti there, who's an Italian man who'd come to England and spent some time making him, you know, a friend of him. He's gone back to Italy, and he's writing in Milan, and I guess Beretti is thinking of getting married, you know, and Johnson is saying, you know, a few things, you know, disturb the judgment of reason, you know, like the prospect of a, you know, long life with an amiable woman, you know. Because of all. Funny. Funny. I guess the mother of Johnson, you know, took care of him to be, what, blessed by the king, you know. And Basel said to him, you know, I'm surprised he didn't take all the way to the Pope. Because he's so conservative in some ways, Johnson, you know. It's a beautiful conversation in that movie there, the October baby, you know. Oh. When she takes, she goes to the, she's a Baptist, but she goes to the Catholic cathedral there, you know. Sitting there, and the priest comes down and says, they're about to close the church, and then they get talking, you know. And he quotes a beautiful quote from St. Paul, you know. You know, Christ has forgiven us, therefore we should forgive each other, you know. Beautiful. Beautiful, you know. She does. Nice. Good book. I'd buy Obama a ticket, I said. If he'd go watch it, maybe he would, you know, occasionally have to rethink his thinking about that. That's the way he voted, you know, in Illinois, you know. He voted against the... Re-hat. Yeah. Yeah. Terrible. I remember that little girl, she was like eight or something, and she was watching this little kid's program about lying. And then she got off and said she wanted to send the thing to the president. I said, Mom, you gotta send it to Mr. President. It was a little handicapped girl, she was just with a heart. I guess, you know, sometimes, it's funny the way these things work, but I guess there was a guy who was a young man there, he was kind of tied up for the communism like that, and he was marching on one of their parades, you know. Uh-huh. And this old lady, you know. That kid wore the head with a umbrella and said, you ought to be ashamed of yourself, right? Chained him around and eventually became like a Dominican, I think it was. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. The second objection is pointing out that love is more general, right? Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. When Aristotle's comparing, it's interesting when he compares the philosopher and the sophist, right? And the dialectician. He compares the three, right? And he's trying to manifest, you know, the universality of wisdom. And, of course, the sophist is seeking an apparent wisdom, right? So, no matter what you say, he's going to refute you, right? That he's seeming to be, you know, wise, right? And the dialectician has a method for thinking about all things, right? So, he's like the wise man, but he doesn't have the certitude. He differs from the wise man in his, you know, probability as opposed to certitude. But how does the philosopher differ from the dialectician, you know? Well, I mean, from the sophist, well, he says, by his choice of life. Well, he used the word choice there, right? It's actually chosen love, huh? This love of wisdom, huh? So, you have to know what wisdom is and deliberate a bit about to realize, right? This is what I'm going to choose, right? My chosen love. Nevertheless, we speak of the philosopher as being, what? A lover of wisdom, right? Okay? Okay? So, love is more general, right, than terexio. So, every terexio is a amor, but not every amor is a terexio. So, the object of love, he says, is more common than the object of terexio. Because love extends to more things than terexio does, he says. That's what's said, huh? To the third, it should be said, that amor and terexio do not differ by the difference, or according to the difference of good and bad, as has been said, right? And in the intellectual part, the same is amor and what? Terexio. And thus, Augustine speaks there that way about love, huh? Once, a little bit afterwards, he adds.