Prima Secundae Lecture 75: The Four Principal Passions: Joy, Sadness, Hope, and Fear Transcript ================================================================================ On the article 4 here? To the 4th one goes forward thus. It seems that there are not these four, what, principle or chief, right, passions, joy and sadness, hope and, what, fear. For Augustine, in the 14th book of the City of God, does not lay down hope, but, what, cupidity or desire, right, in its place. You know, Augustine's not as careful as he should be sometimes, huh? But we'll see you tell us, huh? Excuse him a bit, right, huh? He's a busy man, right? Yeah, yeah, yeah. Moreover, in the passions of the soul, there is a two-fold order, as we've seen before, right? Namely the order of intention and of carrying out a generation. Either, therefore, the chief passion should be taken according to the order of intention, and thus only joy and, what, sadness, which are last or final, are the chief, what, passions, huh? Or, according to the order of carrying out a generation, and thus love will be the principle, what, passion. Therefore, in no way, I want to say that there are four principle passions, these four, joy and sadness, hope and, what, fear. Moreover, as boldness is caused from hope, so fear from, what, desperation. Either, therefore, hope and desperation ought to be laid down as the chief passions, right, as were causes, or hope and, what? Affinity to each other, right, huh? Because they're both, what, approaching your object, right? Hope approaching difficult, good, and striving for it, and boldness, the difficult evil. But, again, this is what Boethius says in the book of the Consolation of Philosophy, right? He enumerates the four, what, principle passions. So, what's, is that the pelle? That's, they're disturbing them in the time, the passions, or something? I think, if I looked it up here, if it's a command, it means drawing something out. Yeah, yeah, maybe that's when Lady Wisdom is, you know, say, you know, forget about your emotions now. But, anyway, Gaudia, Timorum, right? Spem, okay? And Dola, right, huh? So, joy and sadness, right? Timor and spem, hope and fear, right? Now, in my footnote there, in the reply, it has a reference to Cicero, and one to, I guess, Gregory and Demisius, you know, and then one to Jerome and Ezekiel, right? So, apparently there are some other great lines there that nobody's for, you know, but the Sincanto gives Boethius too, also, right? Hmm? The rhyme, it's just his... He has rhymes in there, but, I mean, I don't know what the whole thing is, yeah. Okay. I say, I answer, it should be said that these four passions, community are commonly, right, huh? Are said to be the chief ones, right? That's when they have this footnote that I mentioned here, right? So, reference to Cicero and Demisium, which I guess is Gregory and Demisius, right? They did Tura Hominis, and then Jerome and Ezekiel, right? Of which two of them, to wit, joy and, what, sadness, are said to be chief, because they are, what, completing and final simpliciter, right? With respect to all the passions, on their most principle, you might say, right, huh? Whence they follow upon all the passions, as is said in the second book of the Ethics, right? So, I get angry and I get revenge and I have joy, right, you know, okay? Now, fear and hope are principles, right? Not, as it were, being completive, right, simpliciter, not being, completing simply, but because they are completing in the genus of, what, motion, right? In the imperative motion to, what, something, right? For, with respect to the good, motion begins in love, and from there proceeds to desire, and comes to an end in, what, hope, right? With respect to the bad, it begins in hate, and proceeds to aversion, and ends in, what, fear, right? And therefore, it's customary for the number of these passions to be taken according to the difference of the present and the future, right? For motion regards the future, but rest is in something present. So, for a present good, there's joy. For present evil, there is, what, sadness. For a future good, there's hope coming at the end there, right, huh? And the future evil is, what, fear, right? Now, all the other passions, which are about the good or the bad, present or future, are reduced to these as completing, right? Whence also by some, these are said to, what, the principle of these four passions, because they are general, right, huh? Which is true if hope and fear designate the motion of the appetite, generally tending towards something to be desired or fleed, right? That's why he tries to excuse Augustine, right, huh? To the first therefore, it should be said that Augustine lays down desire, or cupiditatem, in place of hope, insofar as they seem to pertain to the same thing, namely to a future what? Good, huh? So Augustine had some part of truth there, right? To the second, it should be said that these passions are said to be principled according to the order of intention and of what? Completion, right? And although hope, fear and hope, are not the last passions simply, because that's joy and sadness, Sarastasia said, nevertheless they are the last in the genus of passions tending towards another as it were something, what? Future, right? Nor can there be an instance or objection except about anger, right? Which nevertheless is not laid down to be a principle of passion because it is a certain effect of what? Boldness, right, huh? Which cannot be the principle of passion as will be said below, more fully manifested, right? So I'm going to be a little bit more about this, right? In the third objection. Okay. To the third, it should be said that desperation implies a receding from the good, which is, as it were, what? Perotence to, what? To receive from the good, right? Okay? Because the good is what's all desired, right? And audacity implies a, what? Approach to the bad, right? Which is also perotence, right? Tell this to the poor soldier, right? Right, yeah. But he would admit that, right? You know, he said, the soldier above all prays for peace because he must bear, you know. That's the late, great Leo Albert, that's what he had on his car. He was a Marine in Korea. So on the one hand he had his Marine sticker with the sword and the other one said pray the rosary for world peace. Yeah. And therefore these passions cannot be principled because what is parachidens cannot be said to be white chief, right? And thus also neither can anger be a principled passion because it follows I was up on audacity, right? There's some boldness there in anger, right? I think I can get rid of you causing me this pain, right? Now, I'll give a little text here from one of the constitutions in the Second Vatican Council. There are four constitutions in the Second Vatican, I think. And two of them are dogmatic constitutions, right? But now one of the pastoral constitutions is what? The Church in the Modern World, right? And the very first paragraph in that says, The joys and hopes and the sorrows and anxieties of people today, especially of those who are poor and afflicted, are also, now he repeats the same four words, are also the joys and hopes, the sorrows and anxieties of the disciples of Christ. And there is nothing truly human which does not also affect them. Now, those seem to be touching upon the four, what? Principal passions, right? Joy and hope by name, right? Gaudium et spes, right? The same one as Thomas says. The sorrows and anxieties, well, look to us as sorrows, right? Which would be the sadness and so on. Anxieties, you might say, is referring to your fear, right? I'm anxious about this election coming up! Fear that you might get reelected or something, you know? You're left up to destroy the country, yeah. So, those four are said twice here, right, you know? So, they're kind of associating themselves with the whole feelings of people in general, but they signal out the four, what? Yeah, yeah. Now, I mentioned before how myself, when I was first studying fiction there and read Aristotle's book on the Poetic Art, and the part on comedy has been lost, right? Although we have some remarks on comedy, right? And so, I was kind of, without knowing it, using a dalet of a place, right? That tragedy and comedy are contraries, right? Therefore, there should be some contrariety in the definitions of them, right? And therefore, the emotions that tragedy moves us to should be contrary to the emotions of comedy, right? So, I was trying to, you know, work out the definition of comedy, right? Well, I knew that tragedy moved us to, what, pity, which is a form of sadness, right? And fear, right? Pity and fear, that's very clear in Aristotle, right? And if you looked at the prologue to Rowling and, what, Juliet, right? Those are exactly two emotions that, you know, the fearful passage of their death marked love, right? And in a sense, those are, you know, piteous, misadventure, overthrows, right? So, something piteous and something fearful, right, now is going to be presented to you in this Roman Juliet. And so, then I said, well, then comedy should move us to some kind of joy, right? Which joy probably is called mirth, right, yeah? And merriment is the kind of exterior manifestation of it. And then, and that's the contrary, you know, joy of sadness. And then, instead of fear, it should be what? No, no, no, I said boldness, right? Because that's, that's the opposite of, you know, okay? And that doesn't fit perfectly, right? Okay? But then, when I started to meet this, I think it was in the De Veritati, but it's the same teaching here, you know? The De Veritati Question 26, Article 5, this is the reference there, right? But anyway, same place. Then I began to understand the principal passions, right? And then the list was not, was with joy and sadness, yeah, and fear, but hope rather than, you know? And then I said, well, maybe it makes more sense to say that comedy moves us to some kind of joy and mirth and to hope, right? And that tragedy and comedy are like the principal or chief forms of fiction, right? And the other ones seem to be what kind of a mixture of these two in some way in between, right? So maybe the chief or principal forms of fiction should move us to the principal passions, right? And therefore, it should be hope rather than boldness, right? And then, as I got into more, I found more evidence that it was hope rather than boldness, right? And I remember in particular, you know, reading a book, Terence's comedy's in it, right? It's Thomas quotes sometimes in the, you know, in Moral Matter, right? It's Terence. And, but the man, you know, was quoting St. Paul saying, you know, you know, St. Paul says, Faith, hope, and charity remain, right? But the grace is a charity. But in comedy, it seems to be a hope, he says, right? So here's a guy who translated the comedies of Terence and, you know, was thinking about comedy, obviously, right? And so hope, you know, seemed to be the principal thing there, right, huh? Was sitting in irascible, right, huh? You didn't see boldness, right? But hope, right? And so that's one place in this, you know, in my own thinking, you know, about comedy, right, huh? Was led to define comedy in terms of a kind of joy, which was mirth, right, and hope, right, huh? Although it also, I think, you know, can be said to purge away melancholy, right, huh? Okay, but that's kind of the effect of moving us to hope, right? So, that, and then when I saw the beginning of this, right, in the English translation, I used to have an English edition myself, I used to have a Latin now, but it's the joys and hopes, you know, sorrow, it is more, even more clear than anxiety, right, I think they might use the word fear or something, you know, but it seems to be the principal passions again, huh? If you look up, see what Gregory says and what, you know, Jerome says, you know, but we have the one here from the great, right, but apparently it's a reference here, the Cicero too, you know, the finibus, bonimale. It's interesting because, you know, modern comedy has always really despaired, so, yeah, it's interesting. Yeah, yeah. You know, who I think of in particular, I was never, I don't remember much of him except was George Carlin, remember George Carlin? Yeah. He could be really, really funny, but he was so bitter, he, and I, from what I understand, to die a few years ago, I don't commit suicide or what, but, pardon? Yeah. But, but, I think that was kind of the impression I got when, basically, that he was a very, very bitter. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. I just put it down. I just put it down. Come rope. If you're a little oldie, just give me another schlitz. Yeah, I saw a production that the salesman does an opera. It was so grim. You just look at the press. It's always like, oh my god. There's nothing left. There's nothing left. It was on television. It was a play. I mean, it was well done. It was well produced. It was so grim. Who wrote that again? I don't know. The salesman Arthur Miller? Arthur Miller, yeah. I think so. Last night at the class, I was watching a little bit of the thing. They were talking about Catch-22, you know. I never read that myself. I read it. We had to read it in high school. I worked at a bookstore. I never read it. Yeah. We read it in my senior high school. It was kind of another dark sort of story. Yeah. About the war a little bit or what? The war. It was sort of like the Catch-22 was their expression for, like there's no way out. And the military is a perfect example of that. You get into certain situations where there's no hope to get out of the situation. That's undesirable, whatever it is. And if I do this, I get blamed for that. But if I make appeal to this, I get thrown back to something else that's worse or whatever. I don't remember the details of the story. And it comes through. People use the term Catch-22 all the time. Yeah. Conversation, you know. They must have read the thing or heard the story. Yeah. Catch-22 is basically you get two options and both of them are just bad. And they just sort of lead you back to something else. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. I was kind of surprised when they tried to compare it to the Iliad, right? You know, because I still think the guy does an anti-war thing or something. I don't know. The Iliad is kind of a silly war, you know, or a purpose war, you know, or a thing like that, you know. And this is supposed to have been the author's favorite work, you know, the Iliad, you know, and so on. And so I don't know whether... I haven't read the Catch-22. I don't even know what it is. Is that the Vonnegut book? Crit Vonnegut? I don't remember. I have no idea. I don't remember. We were supposed to... We read a... Is it Hans in there or Hans in like that? I don't remember. It was not one of the most memorable things ever. Yeah. I just remember the one line that one of my classmates picked up on while we were reading is one of the characters in the story where whatever happened, he'd just say, oh, well, what the hell. Oh. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So... This is what a girl, she said it the whole time we were reading. She could say, oh, well, what the hell. The thing is, you know, since we've written you from the Bells toll, you know, those are depressing things, you know. Yeah, yeah. And I don't know if we need that melancholy, you know, it's not... Especially for teenagers, huh? Yeah. That's exactly what it is. Yeah, there's strange books that, yeah. I'm telling you, this is my summer reading lesson. Yeah. I remember one summer we read, what was it, A Rish Terbithya, A Light in the Forest, and then later on, A Light in the Forest. That was about the Indian boy. That was about the Indian boy. Both of them. I read them. And then the pearl. I read them. I read them. I read them. I read them. I read them. I read them. I read them. I read them. I read them. I read them. I read them. I read them. I read them. I read them. I read them. I read them. I read them. I read them. I read them. I read them. I read them. I read them. I read them. I read them. I read them. I read them. I read them. I read them. I read them. I read them. I read them. I read them. I read them. I read them. I read them. I read them. I read them. I read them. I read them. I read them. I read them. I read them. I read them. I read them. I read them. I read them. I read them. I read them. Consequent there, right? We're not to consider about the passions of the soul in particular, right, in speciality. And first about the passions of the concupisable, secondly about the passions of the, what, irascible. Now the first part, it's a reason not to be threefold. See, inviting the two, inviting the three, you know, that's usually, right? For first, we'll consider about love and hate, right? Secondly, about concupiscence and flight now. Now I tend to want to call that passion aversion, but you use the word fuga, you know, flight. I mean, flight, doesn't it? You get the word fuga now. Fuga? Yeah, yeah, yeah. Third, about pleasure and, what, sadness, huh? Now about love, three things ought to be considered, huh? First, about love itself. Secondly, about the cause of love. Third, about the effects of it, huh? Looking before and after, right? Looking at love itself and looking before it and looking after it, huh? I finally get started in this two, three business here. About the first, he asks four things, right? First, whether love is in the concupiscible. Secondly, whether love is a, what, passion. And we call, what do we call them in English, huh? You don't call them passions, do we? Emotions, you know, let's take them as a word for emotion, right, huh? So it's good to be named from those things like desire, right? Appetite, which are like emotion, right? Emotion, it's most like emotion, but being, mostly they don't find. Whether love is the same thing as, what, terexio, right, huh? Just taking it from the word, apparently, for choice, huh? Chosen love. And four, whether love is suitably divided into the love of, what, friendship, and the love of, what, concupiscence, right? So actually, the third and the fourth articles there are about two different, what, divisions of love, right, huh? Because if you contrast love with amor, forget the word amorous, right, huh? Amor keeps more the sense of the sense love, right, huh? The, when the, right, terexio is more the love that's in the, what, the will, right? Yeah. And, you know, from, you know, teaching, you know, college students there, you know, it's very hard for them to see the difference between the love that's in emotion and the love that's an act of the will. And sometimes even the priest touches upon this in a, you know, sermon or something like that, right, where people have a hard time seeing that difference, right, huh? And he's supposed to love your neighbor, right? What does that mean, right? You're supposed to have this, you know, warm, emotional feeling about your neighbor, you know? And, you know, one priest has got it, and they have it in the parish there. I mean, we say the prayers, you know, before the, in the auditory there, you know, the breath of the gospel and so on, you know? And something about regarding everybody as your brother or sister here, right, you know? So, I'm going to say, hi, brother, or hi, sister, you know, these old, brave women, you know? He's saying, you know, regarding each other as brothers and sisters, right, huh? That's the high sister. They're taking it, right? Yeah. You're getting in some trouble these days. Hi, brother, hi, brother. That's what the father told us to do, you know? You're my brother, you're my sister, you know? But, you guys call each other brother, right? But in the convent, do they call each other sister or what? Yeah, yeah. Yeah. Well, someone asked me about the difference between the gift of the Holy Spirit, which is pietas, right, and the gift of the Holy Spirit, which is the fear of the Lord, right, huh? Because in some text, Thomas says, you know, they're both proceeding from reverence for God, right, huh? See what's going into the difference between the two, but, you know, the gift of the Holy Spirit, there's pietas, huh, regards God as a father, right? And that's why he takes his name from the virtue. It has the same name as the virtue of pietas, which is regard to your human father, right, huh? And then, you know, if you have this pietas, the virtue of pietas, right? Well, the guy's objecting, you know, to this name of this gift of the Holy Spirit should be called religio, right? Because religio is higher than pietas towards your earthly father, right? So religio worships God, right, huh? You know, he renders to God what injustice is due to him, right, huh? Right, pietas renders to your earthly father what is due to him. Religio is higher than what? Pietas. But the gifts of the Holy Spirit are higher than the moral virtues, right? So it shouldn't be named from the higher of him, religio, rather than from pietas, right? Well, Thomas, you know, admits that religio is higher than pietas, right, the virtue now. But, he says, the gift of the Holy Spirit, this pietas, right, regards God as a father rather than as the Lord or creator. And that's even higher than regarding him as the Lord or the creator, right? I was kind of struck by that because Thomas, you know, he's looking before and after here, he says, the gifts of the Holy Spirit, they direct, you know, prudence and fortitude and justice and temperance, right? And they're higher than them, right, in a sense. But they themselves are less than the theological virtues, right? And of course, in the Our Father, which is what Augustine Thomas always explained with, oh, you're taught to regarding his father, right? So you can see how this kind of carries over, you know, to pietas where you're regarding God as your father, right? But it also extends to your neighbor because then it's his brother and sister, right? For all these things, they've got to watch myself, you know? So by the gift of the Holy Spirit, which is pietas, I have to regard my fellow parishioners there as brothers and sisters, right? If I'm supposed to regard my father as father, right? Because Thomas goes back and says that, you know, the virtue of pietas, you have to treat your offspring, you know, your father with respect and so on, you know? Because you're a father, you know? But, you know, there's something in, in, in, uh, it's in, uh, Francis, you know, when we've been doing the, the Lent there, you know, when our Lord says in the thing that's recorded in Matthew and Mark, my God, my God, why have you forsaken me, right? He addresses him as God, right? But then at the end, when he, when he said, father into thy hands, he addresses him as father, and you're noting that difference there, right? And, uh, it's connected with this, right? Yeah, the first petition is father, forgiveness, and it begins with father. Yeah, yeah. That's the first word. So, whether love is in the concubiscible, huh? It seems that love is not in the concubiscible, right? For it is said in the book of Wisdom in the eighth chapter, I have loved wisdom, right? And what, sought it out, I guess, from my youth, huh? This is baby Solomon speaking, right? In his old age. In his old age. Who said that? Was it Shakespeare said? Yeah. You're old before your, what? Your age, you know? Because you're old before your wives, right? Old before your time. But the concubiscible, since it's a part of the sense-desiring power, cannot tend towards, what? Wisdom, right, huh? Which is not grasped by sense, right? Therefore, amor is not in the, what? Concubiscible, right, huh? And so, we speak at the love world. Wisdom, right? Well, that love must be in the will, so love can't be a what? Sense thing. Yeah, yeah. Well, it's part of the question of the word here, what it's used, but it's a good thing to stop and think about this, right? I remember that Dion had a text there from Dionysius there, you know, where he wants to apply the word in Greek, which corresponds to amor, and it seems to be named more a sensual thing, you know. They apply the word eros, right, to even the love of God, right? There's a reason why he does that, right, in terms of the intensity of it, huh? Moreover, love seems to be the same thing as any passion. For Augustine says in the 14th book of The City of God that the, what, love, seeking to have what is loved is desire, right? And having it, love is, enjoying it is joy, right? Seeing it, it is fear, right? And if it happens, sensing it, then love is sadness, right? So Mary's sadness there under the cross is your love, right? That's the way of speaking, right, huh? Well, you can see that that way of speaking is. But not every passion is in the concubiscible. But fear, which is here enumerated by him, is in the, what? The vassal, right? Yeah. Therefore, it ought, not, what, simply to be said that love is inexplicable. This is because it gives rise to these other things, right, huh? Very speaking. Moreover, Dionysius, in the fourth chapter of the Divine Names, lays down a certain natural love, right, huh? But natural love more seems to pertain to what? Yeah, yeah. Which are of the plant soul, right? Therefore, love is not simply a givesful, right? So they say about some plants, the nursery, you know, that it likes a lot of sunlight. And I've been told that broccoli is a big feeder. Like to eat. But again, this is what the philosopher says in the second book of the Places. So love is in the concubiscible, right? He's got to go to the, you know, scrounges around Aristotle. He goes to the rhetoric sometimes to discuss his emotions, to bring out something, you know. There's a night to leave go of the hand of Aristotle. I was saying to Warren, Warren, the phone today, you know. You know, my, you're talking about Thomas, the commentator in Aristotle, right, you know. And they said, you know, my principle is Aristotle means what Thomas says he means. That's my ruling principle, you know. I say it on the basis of some experience, you know. That's incredible. Every time I've called in, you know, to look at somebody's thesis, something like that, you know. And there's some crazy modern, you know, giving this crazy interpretation of Aristotle, you know. It's just, just, Aristotle means what Thomas says he means, period. That's all you know. You need to know. Okay. I answer, it should be said that love is something, what, pertaining to the repetitive power, right, huh? Since the object of both is the good, right, huh? Whence, according to the difference of the, what, repetitive power, there is a difference of love, right? For there is a certain desire, not following upon the apprehension and the knowing power, right, the grasping, right, of the one desiring. But of another, right? And of this sort is the thing called natural appetite, right? That's what we're talking about in the plant, right? For natural things desire what is suitable to them according to their nature, not through grasping it themselves, right? But through the grasping or knowing of the one instituting the nature, as had been said in the first book, huh? Even when you're dealing with, you know, trying to get a bolt and a hole or a screw or anything, you know, doesn't want to go. We say, right, you know, it's not made for that, right? Doesn't want to go. You got the wrong thing there. Another is the desire falling upon the grasping of the one, what, desiring, but, what, from necessity and not from, what, any free judgment, huh? You bring our victory. And such is the sense desiring power in the, what, in the roots, huh? Which, nevertheless, in men partakes of something of, what, freedom, insofar as it obeys reason, right, huh? Another is the desire falling upon the grasping of the one desiring who has free, what, judgment, huh? And such is the desiring power that's called rational or intellectual, which is called the, what, the will, right, huh? Now, in each of these desiring powers, right, each of these desires, love is said to be that which is the beginning of the motion tending towards the end love, huh? Now, in the natural desire, the beginning of this motion is the, what, agreement with nature, right? The conaturality of the one desiring to that in which it tends, which can be called natural, what, love, huh? Just as the conaturality of the heavy body to the place which is the middle universe, right, the weight, huh? And can be called natural love, right? My love is my weight, as Augustine says, right? On his name, on our man's name. And similarly, the adaptation, you might say, of the sense-desiring power or of the will to some good, that is the, what, agreement, right, of the good, is said to be sense-love or intellectual or rational love, right, reasonable love. Now, the sense-love is in the sense-desiring power, just as the intellectual love is in the, yeah. And it pertains to the concubstable, which is said with respect to the good absolutely, and not by respect to the, what, arduous, which is under the irascible, right? So the object of love or liking is a good, period, right? While the object of the irascible, if it's the good, it's the good that's difficult to achieve, right, huh? Okay. Now, that text from the Book of Wisdom there is talking about intellectual or rational love, so that's easily solved, right, huh? Okay, the second one now, where Augustine is saying, well, love fleeing the evil is fear, love rejoicing in the good is, yeah. The second should be love is said to be fear, joy, desire, and sadness, not, what, essentially, but causality, right, huh? Yeah, yeah. So with the way Aristotle speaks, you know, he called it predication, you know, by causality, right? So Aristotle says that understanding or sensing is an undergoing, really that's the cause of it, right? Because you, something of the thing known has been impressed upon you, right, huh? And the result of that is that you know, right? So the undergoing is really the cause of knowing, right? Okay, but, you know, speak that way sometimes, huh? Now, natural love, huh? Natural love is not only in the powers of the, what, plant soul, but in all the powers of the soul, right? And in all the parts of the body, and in general, in all things, right? Because, as the Dinesha says, to all is the beautiful and the good, what? Lovable, right, huh? Since each thing has a connaturality to that which is suitable to it according to its nature. I was in the doctor's office there in the, I was way now. I was in the doctor's office there in the doctor's office there in the doctor's office there in the doctor's office there in the doctor's office there in the doctor's office there in the doctor's office there in the doctor's office there in the doctor's office there in the doctor's office there in the doctor's office there in the doctor's office there in the doctor's office there in the doctor's office there in the doctor's office there in the doctor's office there in the doctor's office there in the doctor's office there in the doctor's office there in the doctor's office there in the doctor's office there in the doctor's office there in the doctor's office there in the doctor's office there in the doctor's office there in the doctor's office there in the doctor's office there in the doctor's office there in the doctor's office there in the doctor's office there in the doctor's office there in the doctor's office there in the doctor's office there in the doctor's office there in the doctor's office there in the doctor's office there in the doctor This is Smithsonian Magazine, you know, from the museum, so. We knew they were talking, the article, they were talking about the colors of the birds, right? Mm-hmm. And I guess there's some birds that are blue, you know, on the crest there. They're expecting as to why they have this color of blue, you know. It's kind of an odd way that it's produced the color of blue and all these things. But I think it attracts the female, you know, that will find it beautiful. So, I don't think they really. I think man is kind of unique, you know, among animals. They really stick to me and be beautiful, you know. I used to play Mozart for the cat, you know. The cat just sneaked right through the Mozart, you know. And then go out to the kitchen and open the icebox and get a little sandwich meat. And the cat would be right there next to me, you know, waiting for me to open the package of the sandwich meat. I guess you've got to stop here.