Prima Secundae
Lecture 71: Contrariety of Passions and the Eleven Emotions

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to Article 2 now. The second one proceeds thus. It seems that the contrariety of the passions of the irascible is not according to the contrariety of good and bad. For the passions of the irascible are ordered to the passions of the concubiscible. But the passions of the concubiscible are not contrary except according to the contrariety of good and bad. Right. Just as what? Love and hate, joy and what? Sadness. Therefore, what? There are no. Neither the irascible. Neither the passion is irascible. Contrariety except by good and bad, that's what he's saying. Because they arise from the ones of the irascible, right? So that's the clause, right? So. Explained them all. Yeah. You'd think. What the objection thinks, anyway. Yeah. Yeah. Moreover, passions differ according to their objects, just as motions by their, what, terms. But the contrariety is not in motions except according to the contrariety of the terms. It is clear in the fifth book of the physics. The first style distinguishes the kinds of motion, right? Therefore, neither in the passions is there contrariety except according to the contrariety of what? Objects, huh? But the object of desire is the good or the bad. Therefore, in no desiring power can there be contrariety of passions except according to the contrariety of good and what? Bad. Bad, huh? Moreover, every passion of the soul is to be observed according to excess or recess or approach or what? Retire. As Adesana says in the sixth book of naturals. But excess or approach is caused from the, what, ratio? The reason of something good, right? But the recess or the trial is from the reason of the bad, right? It's the reason of the bad, right? That's one way to get ratio in there, by reason of the bad. Because just as the good is what all, what, want, so the bad is what all, what, will flee. It's being said per se, right? Therefore, there can be no contrariety in the passions of the soul except according to the good and the bad, right? But against all this, huh? Fear and boldness are contrary as is clear in the third book of the ethics. But fear and boldness do not differ according to good and bad because both are with respect to some bad things, right? So if you think you can overcome them, you have audazia, boldness. And if you think you might not, then you have timor, right? Therefore, not every contrariety of the passions of the irascible is according to the contrariety of good and bad. Well, I answer, Thomas says, that passion is a certain what? As is said in the third book of the physics, first all takes up what emotion is, right? And then acting upon undergoing. Of course, our word emotion too fits into this, right? Impossuous sort of emotions. Once it's necessary to take the contrariety of passions according to the contrariety of motions or changes, huh? But there is a two-fold contrariety in changes or motions, as is said in the fifth book of the physics. One according to excess and recess from the same term, right? Which contrariety is properly of what? Of changes as opposed to motion in the narrow sense. That is the generation which is a change to being, and corruption which is a change from being. Another which is according to contrariety of terms, which properties the contrariety of motions, huh? As de albatio, huh? Which is a motion, from black to what? As opposed to darkening, blackening, which is a motion from white to what? Blackening, blackening, blackening, blackening, blackening, blackening, blackening, blackening, blackening, blackening, blackening, blackening, blackening, blackening, blackening, blackening, blackening, blackening, blackening, blackening, blackening, blackening, blackening, blackening, blackening, blackening, blackening, blackening, blackening, blackening, blackening, blackening, blackening, blackening, blackening, blackening, blackening, blackening, blackening, blackening, blackening, blackening, blackening, blackening, blackening, blackening, blackening, blackening, blackening, blackening, blackening, blackening, blackening. The same what? Yeah. Now, in the passions of the concussable is found the first contrariety, tantum, only, I guess that means, right? Which is according to what? Objects, right? But in the passions of the irascible, there is found what? Oh. The reason for this is that the object of the concussable, as has been said above, is the good or the bad, the sensible good or bad, absolutely. Now, the good, in quantum moment, the good as good, right, cannot be a term from which, right? Ut ako, but only as ut adquem to which, right? So the good is not that from which you go, but that to which you go. That's important to know that figure in your life. In general, yeah. Okay? Because nothing rejects or flees, right? Refuses, you might say. The good, in quantum mode, right? That's speaking per se, right? But omni appetit ipsum, right? That's what we learned in the beginning of Nicomachean Ethics, right? The good is what all want. Likewise, nothing desires the bad, in quantum use mode, right? As such, right? But all, what? Flew it, huh? I was thinking of the definition of the good, because we're all one. But maybe the bad is what no one wants. Okay? We're all fleek. On account of this, the bad does not have the reason of a term to which, but only of a term from which, huh? So the bad is that from which you move, not that to which you move. Got that? That's a foreign distinction, huh? Tom, so we have these simple distinctions, right? But, you know, very convincing, huh? It's just beautiful the way he leads up, getting off the subject here, but just beautiful the way he leads up, you know, to the procession of the word from the Father, right? And he starts off by saying, you know, as you go from the, what, inanimate things, the only, what, act upon something outside of themselves, right? So fire generates fire into something else. And then you get to the plants where you get to have life. You have the seed coming from within. But as it returns, it falls off. It goes its own way, right? And then you get to the senses, right? Well, then, you know, I get an image of something, right? A color of something. And it goes into my memory, right? It stays within me, right? But, you know, the memory's not the same thing. It's act as a sense, right? So there's still a distinction there. You finally get to the reason. Well, the reason has this. But, that thought remains in the reason itself, right? Because it's building up how it's more and more intrinsic, right? This going forward, right? I don't think it's a guy. It's a beautiful way it leads up to it, you know. It's a very, very, very nice way it leads the mind there, you know, just to kind of... This is on the bare wall? No, well, this is in the first main chapter there in, is it, maybe about 10, you know, 10, 11 there, the fourth book of the Sympathion Gentiles, okay? Therefore, thus therefore, every passion that can keep us full with respect to the good is as in it or towards it, right? As love, desire, or wanting, enjoy, right? In every passion with respect to the bad is, as it were, from it, right? Fleeing it, as hate, flight, or abomination, and sadness, huh? Whence in the passions of the concubiscible, there cannot be contrariety according to the approach and withdrawal from the same, what? Object, right, huh? If it's good, it's all... Yeah, if it's bad, it's all away from, right, huh? But the object of the irascible is the sensible good or bad, not, what, absolute, right? But under, or by reason of some difficulty, huh? Arduousness, right? As has been said above, huh? Now, a difficult good, or a difficult good, right, has the reason that one might, what, tend towards it insofar as it is, what? Good. Which pertains to the passion of, what? Hope. Hope, huh? But also that one might, what, receive from it insofar as it is, what? Arduous or difficult, which pertains to the passion of, what? Yeah. Yeah. So when he despairs about getting the grapes, right? Likewise, the difficult evil has a reason to be avoided insofar as it's something, what? Bad, huh? And this pertains to the passion of, what? Fear. Fear, huh? But it also has a reason that one might tend towards it insofar as, what? In something difficult, which one is, evades being, what? Subject to the evil, right, huh? And thus there tends towards it, what? Audacity or boldness, huh? There is found, therefore, in the passions of the irascible, contrariety according to the contrariety of good and bad, as between, what? Hope and fear. Yeah. Because hope is with respect to something good and fear with respect to something, what? Bad. Bad. But also, in a second way, according to, what? From the same term as between, what? Boldness and, what? Fear or hope and despair, for the same matter, right? That's nice. It's a great subject of philosophy, right? Contrariety, right? In wisdom, it comes up mostly in the 10th book, right? I'm just thinking, you know, the object of hope and despair, it's like a mixture of good and evil, right? Yeah. There's a good there, but it's a mixed of evil in the heart, a bit of a evil. But in the object of fear and daring, you don't really have a mixture of good and evil, do Like, it's just evil. What? But now? With fear and daring, it seems, it's not like the object has a mixture of good and evil. Well, no, but he's saying that when I fear, I tend to run away from it, right? And when I have audacity, I go towards it, right? But the object is evil in both ways. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Where you see, it seems like the hope and despair, it's a mixture of good and evil. Yeah. And fear and daring, it's not a mixture of good and evil, it's just evil. You know what I'm saying? Yeah, but in a sense, it's time to come out later on and say that hope and fear are the chief emotions in the irascible, right? And in a sense, when I'm bold, it's because I have hope of, what, victory, right? So the good of overcoming? Yeah, yeah. So in that sense of? Yeah. So the good of overcoming evil would be like the object of daring? Yeah, yeah. Hope would kind of maybe give rise to the boldness there, right? The boldness towards the beginning. Yeah, yeah. Nevertheless, the boldness is with respect to something bad right now. I can beat that guy. Self-discipline, I mean, because I encourage somebody with this, without understanding all this, but I just, somebody who's trying to start a professional adoration in their parish, and I just said, well, it's not just good, because she was saying it was difficult, because I said, well, it's not just good, it's difficult, but you've got to work hard to overcome basically yourselves, not only opposition to the parish, but yourselves to do it. It's a good way to do it. I mean, sometimes you start to, you know, study something that you have some interest in interest, some reason you know it, and you say, I don't ever understand that. I remember a teacher undergradedary, you know, saying, I picked up a book, you're going to learn something, I'm going to let you know. You guys talk about a straight line that meets itself, you know? Well, I can't comprehend that, you know? But I know people, you know, who won't pick up some author or some, you know, book because it's too, what, it's really difficult, right, huh? So they despair of comprehending it or something, right, or the effort is too much, right? So you can have, you know, the approach to something that's good and also, what, going away from it, out of what? Despair, right, huh? Judas there, right? Despair, that's what they seem to say, right? On themselves, right? Something good there, they despair of that, right? That's why, um... A very dangerous thing, despair. Yeah. A terrible, terrible, dangerous thing, right? It's almost a, um, it's kind of a preoccupation with one's own madness that it can't be overcome or something like that, but, um, that's why St. Gregory says a marvelous thing about King David when he danced before the Ark and humiliated himself for a whole population, and St. Gregory says, uh, because his wife, the daughter of Saul, despised him for that, she despised him for humiliating himself, and he says, oh, I'll lower myself even more, and he says, St. Gregory says, I, I admire David for conquering the Philistines, but even more for conquering himself. Yeah, well, she's, she's, she was a difficult one all the way. There was a great quote from the Christmas, in one of the articles on despair, where he says that the problem of, the real problem is not sin, but despair, in the sense that God can always ruin sin, but you can't, you can't, you can't, you can't do any of the despair. Yeah. So, like the real problems. That's what one of the Debra's fathers said about faith, you know, they, they, I forget, Abba, which is one of the, one of the ancient ones, and, uh, I think he was admired for his wisdom, and so a bunch of monks came to test him and see how wise he really was, and they said, aren't you, uh, I can't remember his name now, but, aren't you so-and-so that you're the fornicator and the thief and the this and the that, and he said, yes, yes, yes, and I don't know why, that's me, that's me. And then, aren't you so-and-so that a heretic? He says, I'm not a heretic. So they said, okay. So explain to us, why do you accept all this, but not that? He says, well, accepting all these is good for humility, because they might say, if I haven't done them, I'm capable of them, and it's good for my soul to be humble and accept those things. He says, but, uh, he says, but heresy separates me from God, and I don't want to be separated from God, so that, and they all went away astounded with his wisdom. So I'm trying to turn this over, well, what's, I mean, don't those others separate from God? Well, they're sinning against charity, yeah, but you can still have faith without charity, so you can go back, but if you're sinning against faith, what do you got from? Nothing. Yeah, none mission, and that's it, it's gone, though, yeah. So that's why they admired his wisdom. Well, that's because when, when, uh, you'd argue... is that, is the opposite of the best the worst? Yeah, for the most part it is, right? But if the lesser, right, involves the loss of the greater, right? You know? So I say to the students, they say, which is better, to breathe or to philosophize? And my students say, well, it's better to breathe, right? And I say, why? I say, well, if you're not breathing, you'd be dead, right? Okay? So, see now, is that a good argument, right, for saying that breathing is better than philosophizing? You're saying the opposite of breathing is worse than the opposite of philosophizing, which is not philosophizing, let's say, right? Well, I say for the most part that's true, that the opposite of the better is worse and the opposite of the worse is the better, right? But if there's a before and after there, right, in the sense of being, right? If I can breathe out philosophizing, but I can't philosophize without breathing, then the loss of breathing is going to be worse than the loss of, what, philosophy, because I lose everything with that, right? Okay? But that's because it's a breathing is before philosophizing in the sense of, what, of being, right? That's why I catch up. I tell them in the early days when I explain the senses and the categories of before and after, and I say, now, later on in the course, you're going to mix these up, right? So they're really arguing that, what, breathing is better than philosophizing because it's before in the second sense of before. And I'm arguing it's before in the second sense in the fourth sense, right? It's like saying Paul, you know, in the greatest of these, right? But you're kind of saying that now, the fatal, right, see? So if you lose hope, you're going to lose charity too, right? So in a way, it's worse to lose charity than if you're saying, and therefore it's your way to lose faith, right? If you lose faith, then you lose hope and charity, right? So it might be that the loss of faith is worse than the loss of charity, but that doesn't mean that faith is greater than charity. The St. Paul sees that, right? It's a very subtle thing, though, right? But it shows the fundamental character that text in the chapter 12, the categories, right? As I was explaining last time with that text of St. Paul, it's magnificent, you know, in terms of the chapter 12, right? There's Titillian there, this St. Paul, right? The chapter, you have to admire this, you know? Well, we were saying last time something about some saint there who was talking about mercy of the God to people like Aristotel, or what? Yeah, I still haven't figured out who that was. I keep thinking about it. It's some medieval mystic, I think, one of the women mystics. I thought it was Gertrude, but I don't think it was Gertrude. Interesting. Unless it's in that, you had given us a biography. I don't think it's, I wouldn't remember it if it had been there, because I've been to that before, I'm reading it right now. Well, it's not in that one. It's in that, you had given us a biography of Gertrude. Oh, it's in that one? I think it may have been and I'll have to go look at it because I can't, because I can't remember anybody else I've read who's like, had anything like that in it. But I'll have to look at it. What was the line? The line was, she was asking, whatever this mystic was, it's saying, asking Christ, what about Aristotel? What about, and she asked some others and he says, where do you, don't, it's not your business to worry about my mercy towards him. Just left it, but he spoke of it in terms of mercy. That's interesting. Now, would there's some passion in soul not have having a contrary, right? To the third, one proceeds thus, it seems that every passion of the soul, every emotion, has some what? Contrary, right? For every passion of the soul is either in the irascible or in the concubiscible, but both passions have contrariety in their own what? Way, right? Therefore, every passion of the soul has a contrary. Moreover, every passion of the soul has either good or bad for an object, which are objects universally of the desiring part. But to a passion whose object is a good is opposed to a passion whose object is what? Bad. Therefore, every passion has a contrary. Moreover, every passion of the soul is by exceeding to or retreating from, as has been said. But to any, what? Approach is contrary. Recess and the reverse. Therefore, every passion of the soul has some what? Contrary. Contrary. Those are pretty convincing arguments, aren't they? Yeah. It seems like a pretty clear either or. Yeah. But against this, anger is a certain passion of the soul, right? But no passion is laid down as contrary to anger, as is clear in the fourth book of the, what? Ethics, huh? See where Thomas says, do you get all this stuff? He's plagiarizing. Yeah. Well, he's not giving credit, you know, part of the rash, right? Therefore, not every passion has a what? Contrary, huh? And Thomas says, I answer, it should be said, it is singular in the passion of anger, right? That it is not able to have a what? Contrary. Neither contrary in the sense of excess to or recess from the same thing, I guess, right? Nor according to contrariety of good and bad, right? So this is why you have this odd number, this odd number of passions, right? We said there was six in the contubisible and five in the irascible, right? Well, contraries come in what? Twos. Yeah. So why don't you have, if everything would be what? If you have a contrary, you'd have an even number, it seems, right? Twelve, which would be very appropriate. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. But instead you have, what? Eleven, right? It's interesting how when they give the apostles, they kind of put them in couples, right, you know? Pairs of brothers. Peter and Andrew, James and John, you know, Philip and Bartholomew, Thomas and Matthew, and then the James of Thaddeus, right? Judas. And Thaddeus. Thaddeus of one name. Yeah. And the poor guy got stuck with it. Judas. Assassination. Okay, I feel sorry. Because, you know, you end up with eleven good guys and one bad guy, so you got eleven now, so you got a problem here with it. No, it's twelve good guys and one bad guy, because Christ is, that's why thirteen is a bad number. Christ and Judas. By Christ with the apostles, one of them is Judas. That's one of the sources of thirteen. Oh, yes, that was thirteen. Yes, but that was after. In these physical refutations, you have thirteen kinds of mistakes, right? Was that right? Yeah. So that's why I had to begin. Okay. So it's singular in the passion of anger that it's not able to have a contrary. Neither in the sense of, what? Approach. Approach or we withdraw from the same thing, right? Nor according to, what? The contrariety of good and bad, huh? For anger is caused from a difficult evil already, what? Laying upon themselves, right? Already present, huh? To whose presence is necessary, right? That either the, what? Appetite succumbs, right? And thus, it does not go out of the terms of, what? Sadness. Sadness, huh? Which is a passion incusable. Or it has emotion to, what? Invading or attacking the evil that is arming, right? Which pertains to, what? Anger, huh? But emotion to, what? Flight. Yeah. It's not able to have, right? Because the bad bad is laid down as present or what? Past. Past. And thus to the motion of anger is not contrary any passion according to the contrariety of excess and what? With God. Yeah. Nor also according to the contrariety of good and bad, because to the bad now lying upon you, right? And you suppose the good already achieved, which cannot have the notion of the arduous and the difficult, right? Nor after the attaining of the good does remain any other emotion except the resting of the appetite in the good, what? Obtained. Which pertains to joy, which is a passion of the, the what? Confuseful, right? Whence the motion of anger cannot have some motion contrary of the soul, right? Some motion of the soul is contrary. But only there's opposed to it the what? It's a seizing from motion, right? As the philosopher says in his rhetoric, right? I know sometimes, you know, you'll quote here sometimes the rhetoric, right? He's talking about these passions also. You see now where he's stealing from, right? Okay. As the philosopher says in his rhetoric, yeah? That meteshire, right? Yeah. A point to that which is to be angry, right, huh? Which is not the contrary opposite, but the negative or lack, right, huh? Okay. So what do you say? Calm down. I guess when Rosalie's brother got angry, you know? On the floor, you know? Who's somebody just sprinkle some water on him? I thought I'd call him probably holy water. A big boy, yeah. That's interesting though, right, huh? That's why we have eleven, right? We have an odd number, huh? We're an odd one. This kind of runs the Greek philosophy, though, you know, that things are based on contraries, right? I guess I guess the 12th Book of Wisdom, of course, he has to, you know, reject the idea that this is the whole story because the first clause has no contrary. But, you know, for the mannequins, there was, what, two, and you had two contraries, right? So the universe is apparently odd rather than even, huh? It's even until you get to that, the last one, and then that's it. Do you prefer odd numbers to even numbers? Sure. Yeah, seven sacraments. Three. Seven gifts of the Holy Spirit, the Trinity. Five books of Moses. When they say, you know, you know the Trinity by natural reason, of course, they quote Aristotle there in the book on the universe, you know, to read the number used in praising God and so on. Aristotle must have known, you know, Thomas said, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no. Okay. Father and Son, Holy Spirit, Amen. God, our Almighty, God, guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor. Pray for us. And help us to understand all that you have written. In the name of the Father, Son, Holy Spirit, Amen. That's interesting if you compare for a second here. The way that the emotions were distinguished, and the way the, what, acts of reason are distinguished. How different they are, right? You know, in logic there, for example, we distinguish some of the acts of reason, right? And Thomas will give this distinction of the acts of reason that at least pertain to the looking reason. In both is premia to logic, right? What is that distinction, right? Well, he distinguishes the first two acts, which are kind of understanding, right? And the third act, which is reasoning, right? But the two acts that are kind of understanding are understanding what something is, and understanding the true or false, which Thomas sometimes calls composition and division, following Aristotle, right? Because you put things together in an affirmative statement, or separate them in a negative statement. So, understanding what a thing is, understanding the true or false, and then reasoning, right? Those aren't contraries, like love and hate, joy and sadness, desire and fugue, as he calls it here, abominatio! But fight, you know? Aversion, turning away from him, huh? And like hope and despair, and fear and boldness or audacity, right? And anger, of course, has not really a contrary, but a privative, right? Okay? Quieting down, you know, or something. So, why is the way these acts, you might say, of the sense appetite, right? Which will be repeated in some sense in the will, right? But with some differences. So it's so different from the way the acts of the reason are distinguished, right? And in particular, why are the acts of the sense appetite seem to be characterized especially by this contrariety, right? Why is that so? Well, it goes back to what we learned there in the sixth book of wisdom, right? That the good and the bad are in things, as Aristotle says, right? And the true and the false are what? Yeah. And in a way, or because we say that there's the same, what, knowledge of opposites, as both Plato and Aristotle, were important to bring out, you know? Even Socrates brings this out, right? And Aristotle even more fully. But there's not the same, what, love of opposites, right? So if the team wins, I have joy if my team wins, let's say. If my team loses, I'm what? They're sad, right, you know? And you just can't put those two together, right? But if I know what courage is, I know what cowardice is, right? If I know what justice is, I know what injustice is, right? No problem there for a reason, right? So you're not distinguishing the actual reason by this counteractivity so much, are you? And if you speak of opposition up there, you might say, okay, well, there's knowing and being mistaken, right? Those are kind of opposites, right? But mistaken, of course, is a defect, right? Why am I being, you know, sad when my little boy or girl is sick or something, right? That's not bad sadness, right? Or am I being joyful when they're feeling better or they're, you know, escaping this illness that they are, right? You see? Because it's going out to the, what's in the child out there, right? And you're having joy over the recovery or sadness over the falling sick or something, the child. So, you know, I'm sad about my sins, you know, or I should be anyway. Joyful being. I was noticing in the, I don't know if this is new to new Mass, I was kind of noticing recently, this is in the canon of the Mass after the consecration and so on and you're praying, you know, for those who have died in the mercy of God, right? That's kind of a beautiful way of saying it, huh? Haven't died in the justice of God. I was thinking, you know, to make a nice little prayer, you know, may I die in the mercy of God, right, huh? And beautiful the way it's said, right, huh? So, there's a connection, I think, then between the way in which the emotions are distinguished and the fact that the object of the emotions is in things, right? The good and the bad, right? What is contrary to the other, right? So, that's why we say that in the sign of that is the fact that, what? If you love virtue, you can't love vice, right? And loving virtue prevents you from loving vice, right? And loving vice prevents you from loving virtue, right? But knowing what virtue is helps you to know what vice is, right? And knowing what vice is helps you to know what virtue is, right? You know? And so, it's according, not to the difference of the things, but the way the mind receives these things, huh? There's the same knowledge of opposites, huh? That's one way they show that reason is immaterial, right? That opposites, you know, which in matter exclude one from the other, right, huh? If I know what, you know, high blood pressure is, you know, I also know what blood pressure should be, right, huh? But my body can't be at the same time with normal blood pressure or healthy blood pressure, way of all, and, you know, over. Yeah, right. Okay. So, one opposite excludes the other in matter, right? Okay. My body's hot, it can't be cold. If it's cold, it can't be hot at the same time, right? But I can know the two of them together, right? I mean, how can I read this page here? I must be able to see white and black at the same time. I often wonder if they printed the letters in white and let the page fly up with it. I could read it with the same thing, huh? Now, this is going to also be found in this last distinction that he talks about here in Article 1, 4, where we left at the beginning today, huh? Where there are some passions, right, that are different in species in the same power that are not contrary to each other, right? To the fourth, then, one proceeds thus. It seems that there cannot be in some power passions differing in species or kind that are not, what, contrary to each other, huh? For the passions of the soul differ by their objects, huh? But the objects of the passions of the soul are good and, what, bad, huh? By the difference of which the passions have contrariety. So that's a contrariety between love and hate and between joy and sadness and so on. Therefore, no passions of the same power and not having contrary to each other differ in species, huh? Well, Thomas has got to understand how love and desire differ, right, in species and desire and joy, right? But they're not really contrary, right, huh? And love gives rise to, what, desire in the absence of the object and joy in the presence of it, right? So it's not contrary, it's the cause of it, right? More of a difference in species is a difference according to form. But every difference according to form is according to some contrariety, as is said in the 10th book of the Metaphysics. That's the book on the one and the many, right? Therefore, the passions, and Aristotle's a long discussion there, contrariety. Therefore, passions of the same power which are not contrary do not differ in, what, species, huh? Moreover, every passion of the soul consists either in excess to or recess to the good or to the bad, right? It necessarily seems that every difference in the passions of the soul is either according to the difference of good and bad, right, huh? Like joy and sadness and so on. Or according to the difference of excess and recess, huh? Like... Hope and despair or boldness, you know, and fear, right? You know, because one you're approaching a thing and the other one you're withdrawing from it. But the first two differences induce contrariety and the passions of the soul. But the third difference is not the diversified species on them, more or less, right? Because they're infinite species of the passions. Because that's the infinite species of the passions of the soul. Therefore, there cannot be, what, passions of the same power of the soul differing in kind that are not, what, contrary. But against all this, love and joy differ in what species and are in the, what, kissable. But nevertheless, they're not contrary to each other, nay, rather, one is, what, the cause of the other. Therefore, there are some passions of the same power which differ in kind, but are not, what, contrary, right? So, in answer, it should be said that the passions differ according to the, what, activa, which are the objects of the passions of the soul, right? When we talk about love in particular, remember, we'll see that again. The first cause of love is what? The good, right? Yeah, which is the object, right, then? And Thomas talks about how in the impeditive powers, right, the object moves it, right, then? Okay. So if a guy comes in with a gun now, I'm going to feel some fear, right? Okay. So the object of my fear is what's causing my fear, right? Okay. He comes in with a nice tray of goodies, you know? Yeah. So the object of my emotion is what causes it, right, then? Okay. Then we'll lock the bagels and be turned off. How'd you guess? Okay. So the differences of the activor, right, can be noted in two ways. In one way, according to the species or the nature of the act of things, as fire differs from what? Water. Water, right, yeah? That's why we say metaphorically that God is what? Fire and his water is called both, right? This must be said metaphorically, right? Because it can't be both water and what? Fire. That's kind of the way the Scripture has it telling us. It's speaking, what, metaphorically, right? Sometimes Scripture is called both, what, fire and water, right? Fire because it inflames our heart, right? And water because it adapts itself to whatever our situation is. Some beautiful things like that, huh? But that must be said metaphorically, right? It can't be both fire and water. In another way, according to a diverse, what, active power. Now, what does this mean here? There's a beautiful way of showing this. Now, he says, This is the diversity of the active or motive power, as he guards its, what, power of moving, can be taken in the passions of the soul according to a likeness to the, what, actual agents, right? So this is a, what, likeness of ratios, right? Now, everything moving draws something in some way, right? The thing, what? Underdoing it. Yeah. Or repels itself, right? Itself. But in drawing something to itself, it does three things in it, right? For first, it gives it a, what, inclination or aptitude so that it will, what, tend towards it. Just as when a, what? Light body. Light body, huh? Which is above the, what? Lightness to a generated body. Generated body. In which it has an inclination or an aptitude to this that it would be, what, above, huh? Or if it gave heaviness, right? It would have inclination to go down. And then, if the body generated is outside its own place, right? It gives it to be moved to its place, right? And then third, when it gets there, it gives it to rest, right? In the place when it arrives, huh? So because the body, or the same thing would be said for heaviness, right? Because it's giving heaviness to the body, it has a, what, aptitude to go down, right, huh? And therefore, if it's not in the lower part, it tends there, right? And then when it gets there, it, what, rests, huh? And the same thing can be understood about the cause of repulsion, right, huh? Now, just also tie up the fact that the good and the bad is in things, right? It gives it to this power. Yeah. Because if I like something or love something, right, huh? But in reality, I don't have it. Then I want it, right? I seek it, right? And then if I get the thing, really, then I have, what? Yeah. I have joy, right, huh? It's the kind of rest. Now, he says, in the movers of the desiring part of the soul, the good has a power to draw things, right? And the bad has a power that is repulsed around, okay? So the good, first in the desiring power, causes a certain, what, inclination, right? Or an aptitude, or it makes one kind of connatural to the, what? The good, huh? Conforms, huh? Sometimes Thomas speaks of love as a kind of conformity of the heart to what? The good, right, huh? Okay. And this pertains, then, to the first passion there of love, right? To which, by contrariety, corresponds hate on the side of the bad, right? Secondly, if the good is not yet had, it gives to it a motion to what? To obtain the good love. And this pertains to the passion of desire, or concubiscent son. And on the opposite side of the part of the bad to aversion or flight, huh? Or abomination, right? Yeah, I don't know how good a translation of abomination is, so that could be taken for hate, too, right? I don't know. I wanted to actually look up, what's the anemology of abomination? Oh. I'm making this pun of Obama's name, the abominable thing. Yeah, yeah. Abomination? Abomination, yeah. And thirdly, when he has attained the good, right? It gives the, what? Desiring power, a certain rest in the good obtained, right? And this pertains to pleasure or joy, right? Which is opposed to the side of the bad, pain, or sadness, right? Now, in the, so notice, that's tied up again with the fact that the good is in things, right? Or the bad is in things, right? So there's really something out there you want to get. Act on us. Yeah. Or something out there you want to avoid, right? Okay. And then, if that real thing out there you actually obtain it, then you have joy, right? And if that bad thing is forced upon you, then you're sad or in pain, right? This is basically, this is the action to which we react. We have our passion, we have love. So love is, in that sense, the cause both of desire and of what? Joy, right? But of one in the absence of the object and the other in the, what? Presence or possession of the object, right? And likewise, hate is a cause of both, what? You're turning away from the object and the sadness or pain when it's forced upon you, right? Okay. So what's the beginning and the end of philosophy, huh? The end is wisdom, right? Okay. So, in the premium to wisdom there, at the beginning of the physics, right? Aristotle shows, one who is the beginning of philosophy and Socrates says this. The end is the beginning of philosophy, right? The end is the beginning of philosophy, right? the potatoes, right? Very clear, there is no other. That's it. And then the wisdom itself is the end, right? That's the goal, right? Now why do you say that wonder is the beginning of philosophy and not say that the love of wisdom is the beginning of philosophy? Because wonder is what? In terms of these, or something like these, right? The will is like what? Love or desire, wonder. Yeah, yeah. The man who wonders is desirous to know, right? Okay. So why does he say that if desire arises from love, why does he say that wonder is the beginning of philosophy and not say the love of wisdom is the beginning of philosophy? What? Because you don't know wisdom. Yeah. But you see, you can love something both in the presence and in the absence of it, right? Okay. Yeah, at least once you actually pursue wisdom, right, huh? Okay. But when you get wisdom, do you cease to love it? No. If it's really the wonderful thing that we think it is, then when you get wisdom, you, what, love it even more, right, huh? Okay. So, if he said that love of wisdom is the beginning of philosophy and is distinguished from the end, no, that's something that is there, what? The end. And it's more, right? Mm-hmm. Right? You see? So, when Thomas talks about love, he's saying that if you get what you love, right, then you really, what, love it more, unless there's something in it that is not lovable, right? Right? But, I mean, insofar as it's something lovable, then you love it more, you're even more conformed to it, right, in its presence than you were in its, what, absence, right? So, the love of wisdom is something that is found in a man who has wisdom, right? Yeah. Yeah. Someone who has to be loved, does receive it. Yeah. But I think perhaps the reason why he speaks of it is that in the beginning, right, huh? You don't have wisdom, right? And you have to pursue it, right, huh? You pursue it out of, what, wonder, right, huh? And the love of wisdom is something that's going to, you know, remain all the way through, right? And be strongest once you have some wisdom. So, you can't use it to distinguish. Yeah. The beginning from the end, right? Mm-hmm. Well, in a sense, it is the beginning, right? Yeah. But it's found more in the end than in the beginning, right, huh? So, it's curious in terms of theological virtues there, huh? Hope is put before charity, right? And, what, the ordinary generation, right? And hope is more like, what, desire, right? You know? But charity in the next world will remain, right? Hope will be gone. Hopeless. Well, we hope this is the next world, right? You get there. I don't know who it was. Yeah. Hopefully. I don't know if those are in hell, but I suppose they still have despair, right? Yeah. But we don't have hope. Well, that makes me wonder, then. So, should it also be written over the gate of heaven? Abandon all the gate of heaven? No more. Give it up. That's more than hope will abandon you. Now, in the passions of the irascible, there is presupposed a certain, what, aptitude or inclination to pursuing a good, right? Or fleeing something bad from the concubiscible, right, huh? Which absolutely, huh? Regards the good or the bad, right, huh? And with respect to a good not yet, what, obtained, there can be hope and, what? Despair. Despair, right, in despair, right? With respect to the bad not yet dwelling in or forced upon one, there is timour, right, huh? And, what, boldness, right, huh? But with respect to the good obtained, there is not any passion in the irascible, huh? Because it does now no longer have the notion of something arduo or difficult, right? Right. But a bad thing now lying upon one, therefore, is the passion of anger, right? Thus, therefore, in the concubiscible, there are three conjugations of passions, right? Love and hate, desire and, what, flight or aversion, joy and sadness, huh? Likewise, in the irascible, there are three. Three, hope and despair, fear and boldness, or audacity, and anger, to which no passion is opposed, huh? But there is a privation, right? Thus, all the passions differing in species are eleven in number, right? Six in the concubiscible and five in the, what? There is an even number in the concubiscible, and an odd number in the, what? Rasscible. Under which all the emotions of the soul are contained, huh? I don't know any place other than Thomas where all these eleven are laid down so clearly, you know? A distinction in the mouth, not any place. He does something like this in the Veritate, too. Now, this, again, is, as I said, a beginning for, what? Understanding the virtues that are concerned with emotions, right? That moderate virtues, right? So, mildness, right? It's a virtue that moderates anger, right? And temperance moderates, what? Desire, joy, anything of this sort. And then there's, what? Courage, right? It moderates fear and audacity and so on. Yeah. Okay. And then there's ones like magnanimity, which are concerned with hope, right? So, an understanding of the emotions is necessary to understand the matter of many of the, what? Virtues that are taken up in the Nicomachean Ethics, right? So, in the third book, Nicomachean Ethics, you take up, what? Courage and temperance, right? And the lesser ones in book four, they're concerned with the emotions, too, for the most part. And then, not the book five to get to justice is in the will, huh? So, but it's also a beginning for understanding, what? Rhetoric, right? That part of rhetoric that is concerned with, what? Yeah, with the moving us by our emotions, right? Okay. And then it's necessary for understanding the, what? Poetics, right? Not only for the representation of people under emotion, right? But for what? Yeah. For the emotional effect of tragedy and comedy and so on, right? Okay. And I suppose it's necessary for, what? Biography, right? I'm just reading it now, another biography of George Washington, right? Oh. And I don't know if you've seen this one by Ron Chernow. It's a very thorough one, as far as I can see, you know. And because I've read Washington Irving's biography and other biographies. But this brings in a lot of things that you don't kind of know too much about him. And I guess they've been gathering, you know, every bit of reference to him, you know, in volume after volume now, you know. So they're kind of reworking his life, you know, and so on. And when he comes out, it's kind of interesting, is, you know, this control that he had of his emotions, but the way they would burst out at times, you know. Yeah. Yeah. And...