Prima Secundae
Lecture 62: The Goodness of the Will: Object, Intention, and Merit

Transcript
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No wonder they say, malo in specia humana uten pluribus, evil for the most part in the human race. One of these big debates you'd have when I was a professor out at St. Mary's College there and ended up, you know, these arguments about government, whether you thought most people are bad or not. You've got to take a much different view as to what the government should be, you know, if you think that most men are bad. See, they say that, Thomas will say, you know, that kingship is the best government, right? Of course, it's most like the, what, the rule of God, right? Because God is king, right? The Lord is king and splendor, oh, the Lord is the Lord, good about the strength, it says, and so on. He's a king, right? But of course, the worst government is the tyranny, right? So the corruption of the best is the worst. You know, if the chances of one man rule being more to be a tyrant than a king, maybe he should, you know, spread around the evil a little bit, right? And that the evil, it hurt itself a bit, you know? Rather than concentrate the evil on a man like his, or Stalin, or Mao Zedong, or somebody, you know? So Aristotle says virtue is about the good and difficult, you know? There's another special difficulty, there's another kind of virtue required, you know? Do another article here before we take a little break. Article 7 here, you know? Whether the goodness of the, what, will depends upon the, what, intention of the end, huh? To the seventh end, one goes forward thus. It seems that the goodness of the will does not depend upon the intention of the end. So some of the writers speak of the purity of, what, intention, right, huh? For it's been said above that the goodness of the will depends on the object alone. But in those things which are for an end, other is the object of the will, and other the end, what, intended. Therefore, in such things, the goodness of the will does not depend upon the, what, intention of the end. Moreover, to will, to observe the command of God belongs to the, what, good will, or pertains to good will. But this can be referred to, what, a bad end, to wit, to the end of empty glory, huh? Or, cupidity, right, when someone wants to obey God for achieving, what, temporal things, huh? Therefore, the goodness of the will does not depend upon the intention of the, what, end. Moreover, good and bad, just as they diversify the will, so also they diversify the end, right? But the badness of the will does not depend upon the badness of the end intended. For who wants to steal, that he might give alms, alms of the way I could give. He has a bad will, right? Even though he intends a good, what, end, huh? So I've been corrupting my grandchildren with, you know, gifts. With, you know, with the, Robin Hood, you know? Right, yeah. Therefore, also, the good is the will, does not depend upon the goodness of the end intended, huh? But against, this is what Augustine says in the ninth book of the Confessions. That the intention is, what, reward, I guess, huh? By God, huh? Purity of intention, huh? Some of the saints say that. But something is remunerated by God because it is good, right? Therefore, the goodness of the will does depend upon the intention of the end, huh? Thomas says, I answer, it should be said that intention can be in two ways to the will. In one way as, what, preceding, coming before. In another way as, what, yeah, or accompanying it. It comes before, in a causal way, right? Intention, the will. When we will something, on account of or because of the intention of some, what? In, right? And then the order to the end is considered as a, what, reason for the, what, goodness of the thing will. As if someone wills to fast on account of, what, God, right, huh? For the fasting has the reason of something good, from this that it is for the sake of, what, God, huh? When, since the goodness of the will depends upon the goodness of what is willed, as has been said above, is necessary that it depends upon the, what, intention of the end, huh? But intention, what, follows the will when it, what, comes to a will already, what, preexisting. As if someone wills to do something, and afterwards he refers that thing to, what, God. And then the goodness of the first will does not depend upon the, what, subsequent intention, right? Except insofar as the, what, act of the will is repeated, I guess, with the, what, following intention, right, huh? Well, it's the same thing that I have it here, does it? It's not what that would kind of result in. It could, but he's talking about when it first was chosen, right, it was not to give you to that end, right, but then later on on the orders it, right? Now to the first there that, you know, the goodness of the act depends simply upon the object, right? When this takes on the character of the, what, object in the sense of the will, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said, that when the intention is the cause of the willing, that's why it's going before, the cause goes before an effect. The order to the end is taken as a certain reason for the goodness in the object, huh? Because we had the sight of the object, right? To the second it should be said, the will cannot be called, what, good, if a bad intention is the cause of the, what, willing, right? For the one who wishes to give alms for the sake of getting some empty glory, right, wishes that which of itself is good, but he wills it under the reason of something bad. And therefore, Therefore, insofar as it's willed by him, it is what? Bad. Whence his will is what? Bad, right? But if the intention is what? Fouling, right? Consequent. Then the will could be good, right? And by the subsequent intention, one is not what? Made depraved, huh? That act of the will which preceded, right? Right, but rather the act of the will which is what? Fouling, right? So if I love wisdom and I desire to pursue wisdom, is that good? Now suppose I discover, hey, people admire me for my wisdom, huh? Okay, I'm going to pursue it more. Well now it's becoming something what? Bad in glory. But my original desire to want to be wise, it was a good thing, right? And that doesn't cease to be good, right? But the subsequent act then, it does, right? Okay? I guess that's what he's saying, huh? Now watch you guys here, huh? Mm-hmm. Watch this. Love is a wisdom, huh? Dangerous people. Mm-hmm. And we stick to our original intention. Yeah, I remember a story they used to tell about De Kahnik there and some famous philosopher whose name will remain mentioned here. But De Kahnik wanted to discuss with him some philosophical question, right? In his office there, I guess, or where he was. And he didn't want to do it, right? Mm-hmm. Next day when they were before a crowd, he wanted to do it. Oh. Well, if you want to discuss something, especially when people have, you know, maybe disagreement, right, huh? Mm-hmm. And where you would hope that the man who's got the best reasons, right, would convince the man who doesn't, right? Mm-hmm. And it's easier for a man to admit his mistake in private than in front of a crowd, right? So, you know, the same thing is, what does this man doing, right, huh? Mm-hmm. Why would he want to, you know, discuss the question in front of a crowd that's not able to judge, you know, these things, and not do it in private, right? Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Is he really interested in the truth, or is there empty glory there, right? Mm-hmm. Like empty glory, right? You know, I got the story right. Socrates and the Socrates? You know, he says in the dialogue, they're the protagoras, right? Mm-hmm. Because, um, protagoras wants to, what, have an audience there, you know, to see him, you know, in his wonderful speeches, right? Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Never would have the name of a protagoras who spread throughout Greece, you know. Mm-hmm. It's kind of funny, because in the beginning of the dialogue, honestly, the young man comes knocking at the door of Socrates, and Socrates is still in bed, right, and getting up. And, uh, what's the matter? So, protagoras is in town, protagoras is in town, I've got to go meet protagoras. And Socrates says, well, it's kind of early to go, you know, to the protagoras' day at some, you know, wealthy man's house, you know, and so on. We'd better wait a little bit, you know, before we go over there, you know. Mm-hmm. And in the meantime, Socrates says, what do you know about him? Oh, he's so good! Yeah. But then when they go over there, right, and begin the conversation, the first thing you see is that the road, you might say, that protagoras wants to take is to give speeches rather than to engage in a dialectical conversation, right? Mm-hmm. So the very way he wants to proceed is not right, huh? And then when Socrates finally gets him to answer some short things, then protagoras starts to, what, contradict himself, right? So it's kind of a lesson there in whom you should listen to, right, huh? Because the first criterion we have for listening to somebody reading him is his fame, right, huh? So protagoras is more famous than Socrates at the time, right? So you might want to listen to protagoras because you've heard so much about him, right? But then when you see the way Socrates, what, wants to proceed in the way protagoras, you say, well, I don't think that protagoras is what? Protagoras? Yeah, yeah. So now you begin to trust Socrates more, maybe, huh? And then finally when protagoras starts to contradict himself, then, well, you know, he's at one of these conventions, and he gets the guy to contradict himself, right? And so he says, now what are you going to do about that? And then the guy says, well, that's a contradiction I've learned to live with. That's a good example, though, so if you come to college and you say, how many chambers in the frog's heart, right? And the biology professor gives you one answer, and the biology student gives you another answer, whom do you believe? Yeah, I guess he's got fame or position, right? But then if you say, now how did you arrive at this? And the student says, well, I've been working in the lab there, and every frog I've cut open seemed to have this number of chambers, right? And the professor says, how'd you arrive at it? Well, I took a deck of cards, and this came out. I say, well, it's like his reputation and his position, right? I better follow the other guy, right? That's a little bit what you see with Socrates there in Protagoras, right? Not quite as obvious, but... Okay. So, we didn't finish quite the article 7, did we? Yeah, we're on the third one here. Okay. To the third it should be said, this has been said, and now he's quoting again, what? Our good friend, hein? Tanishis, right? Malum contingent ex singulari defectibus, right? The bad happens from what? From individual defects, right? The good from a whole integral cause, right? Isn't that true about the beautiful, right? And if your nose is too long, or your ears are too big, or whatever else, right? You can be ugly, right? Ex quacumbre defect, right? While your arm is, you know, like, which of the third is longer or shorter than the other, right? Oh. See? But all these things have got to be right to be beautiful and handsome, right? Well, Witten said that Cleopatra's nose had been a millimeter longer than it. Bodum vero, right? Ex tota integra causa, right? Whence whether the will is of that which is in itself bad, even under the, what? Reason of something good. Or is there something good, but under the, what? Reason of something bad. Always the will is bad, right? Okay? So if you're willing something that is in itself bad, but under the, what? Appearance of the good, it's still not good, right? And if you're, what? Willing something about the good, but under the aspect of appearance of bad, right? In fact, the semper, always the will is bad. But in order that the will be good, it's required that it be of something good, and under the, what? Yeah. Under the piece of something good, or under the appearance, right? Something good. And that is that it wills the good and accounts the good, right? So, a lot of demand there to be good, right, huh? Like with your checkbook, you know? You've got the wrong number in there, to add or subtract, you're going to get the wrong answer, right? And if you have the right numbers, but you add or subtract incorrectly, you're going to, what? Yeah. And most people that I talk to, in my own experience, they never seem to balance, exactly right, you know? My mother would just spend the whole afternoon trying to make the thing come out, exactly right. I don't know if she always succeeded or not, but she used to go, sorry, why don't you care if you're a few dollars off? But there's something like there's some, you know, maybe there's some fee like a bank invader or something you don't know about or some other stupid thing, but... So many, you know, defects, right? You've got to have the right numbers and you've got to add subtract correctly, right? So everything's got to be good for the good, right? But if you have a wrong number or you add subtract incorrectly, then you're going to get the wrong final number, right? So the bad is from any defect, right? Aristotle's what? The prior and the posterior analytics, right? The two books are about argument that produces knowledge in the strict sense, certitude. But the prior analytics is about seeing that the argument's conclusion follows necessarily from the, what? Premises, right? And then the posterior analytics is where the premises themselves are necessarily true, right? So you have two things you need, huh? For the conclusion to be certain, huh? It has to follow necessarily from the premises, and the premises themselves have to be, what? Necessarily true, right? So either defect, yeah. I used to always beautifully, you know, get to, but this argument, I always put it on my exams, you know, I'd say, every mother is a woman. No man is a mother. Therefore, man is a woman is a woman. Now, most of us would think that's okay, right? And it's true that no man is a mother, and no man is a woman, right? Nothing wrong with statements, they're all true. But does this statement, in fact, follows from this too? I fiendishly designed this, right? Because they know this is true, right? And there's some connection between the fact that a man is not a mother, and a mother is always a woman, right? Some connection between that and the fact that no man is a woman, right? So it's a very tie for most of it, right? But if we look at the, take the formula, right? Every B is A, no C is B, right? You say, let's say, every cat is an animal. No dog is a cat. No one would say it follows, we know it's false, false, that no dog is an animal. But it has exactly the same, what? Form, every B is A, no C is B, right? Now, the prior analytics of our study, you would learn that the form, every B is A, no C is B, nothing follows necessarily about C and A, right? But because of the matter you kind of think, well, it looks like a good argument to me, you know? But it's actually a bad argument, right? You know, it hits so many points off. So in calculating and in what? Reasoning, huh? Any defect is going to be a bad argument, right? So this has a defect, now it doesn't want to matter, but the conclusion doesn't follow from the premises. So that's a great principle there, right? Malum contingent, singularly defectibus, right? He's always quoting the great Dionysius, whom he thought was the disciple of St. Paul, yeah, St. Paul converted somebody at the Periapagites, right? So he's known as Dionysius the Arapagite. Now they call him the Sudiapagite. But anyway, we'll take a little break here then, before we continue here. to the eighth one goes forward thus. It seems that the quantity of goodness in the will depends upon the quantity of goodness in the intention. I've seen the saints say something like that, huh? The merit of the thing depends upon the purity of the intention. Because upon that of Matthew chapter 12, verse 35, the good man from the, what, good treasure of his heart brings forth, what, good things? Whence the gloss there, huh? So much of good does he do as he, what, intends, right? For as much as he intends, so much of good he does, huh? But the intention not only gives goodness to the exterior act, but also to the will. Therefore, so much one has of the good will, as much as he, what, intends, huh? Moreover, the cause being, what, augmented, so the effect is augmented. But the goodness of the intention is the cause of the good, what, will. Therefore, the more one intends, or as much as one intends the good, so much the will is, what, good, huh? Moreover, in the bad things, the more one intends them, the more one, what, sins, huh? For as someone throwing a stone intends to commit homicide, he's guilty of homicide, right? Therefore, so even if I miss you, I'm guilty, I guess. I might guard you and turn you down and kill you. I miss you hit the telephone pole or something. Attempting homicide, I think. Yeah. Therefore, for a like reason, in good things, so much is the will good, the more it intends the good. Against this, it is possible for the intention to be good and the will to be bad, huh? Therefore, for a like reason, the intention can be more good and the will less good, huh? So he says, answer. It should be said that as you guard the act and the intention of the end, a two-fold quantity can be, what, considered, right? That's why you pray to our great angel to consider more correctly, right? Because without Thomas we wouldn't consider correctly or socially, huh? One on the side of the object because one wills a, what, greater good, right, huh? Or one, what, does, I guess, huh? Greater good. And another is from the intention of the act because one intensely wills or acts, which is more from the side, now, of the agent than of the, what, object, right, huh? Some saints talk about doing something with great love, right? Doing even little things, right? Giving you a cup of water, huh? With great will, great love, right? If, therefore, we speak of the quantity of both as regards the, what, object, right, it is manifest that the quantity of the act does not follow the quantity of the, what, intention, which on the side of the exterior act can happen in two ways, huh? In one way, because the object that is ordered to the end intended is not proportional to that end, just as if someone gives ten, what, pounds or something, he cannot carry out his intention if he intended to buy a thing worth a hundred pounds, huh? I used to put that, the symbol there, in the English, I used to say, like an L? Yeah. Does it come from the Latin? I wonder, I just saw that, because he said that, asking about money. So, money, yeah. In another way, on account of the impediments that can come upon the exterior act, right? Which are not in our power to be moved, huh? As if someone intends to go as far as Rome, and there occurred to him impediments that he's not able to do this, right? But on the side of the interior act of the will, it is not except in one way. Why? Because the interior acts of the will are in our power, but the exterior acts are not something holy within our power, right? Spending these millions of dollars in these attack ads, you know. If I don't have millions of dollars to attack you with, it's still without my power, baby, too. But the will is able to, what? Will some object that is not proportional to the end intended. And thus, the will which is carried in that object absolutely considered is not as good as the, what? Intention, huh? But because also this intention in some way pertains to the act of the will insofar as it is, what? The reason for it, right? On account of this, it, what? Flows back upon you, might say, right? The quantity of good intention on the, what? Will. Insofar as the will wills some, what? Great good as an end, huh? Even though that through which he wishes to achieve that great good is not, what? Worth that good, right? Worthy of that good, huh? If, however, one considers the quantity of the intention and the act according to the intensity of both thus the intention of the intention redounds both in the, what? Interior act and in the exterior act of the will because the intention in a way has itself formally to both, huh? Although materially speaking the intention existing intense is possible for there to be, what? An interior or exterior act not so intense materially speaking just as when someone does not intensely as intensely wish to take the medicine as he wishes what? Health Yeah For it's right then I have to cut off an arm or something right? Or a leg, you know? Nevertheless this which is to intensely intend health flows back formally in that which is to intensely will, what? Medicine, right? But nevertheless this should be considered that the intention or intensity of the interior act or the exterior act can be referred to the intention as a, what? Object, huh? As when someone intends to intensely will or to intensely, what? Do something Nevertheless not on account of this does he intensely will or operate on because the quiet nature The quantity of the good intended does not follow the what? Because the goodness of the interior or exterior act does not follow the quantity of the good intended, right? And hence it is that what? Not to the extent that someone intends to merit, does he merit, right? Because the quantity of the merit consists in the intention of the act. That's confusing enough, isn't it? Well, I could go back and read it over again. I don't know if I can read it in English. Let's look at the plight of objection and maybe go back to the plight of article. Now, the first objection says that a good man from the good treasure of his heart brings forth good things. And as much of good someone does, as much as he intends, it's a gloss, right? And it says to the first, therefore, it should be said that that gloss speaks as regards the what? Yeah, not the reputation of God in our sense, but what God reputes it to be, right? Which especially considers the intention of the end, right? Once another gloss says there that the treasure of the heart is the what? Intention. The footnote here, but that's a text here from Arbanus, but anyway. For the goodness of the intention, as has been said, redounds in a certain way for the goodness of the will, right? Because it makes also the exterior act meritorious before God, right? What's interesting, God especially considers the intention of the what? End, right? So if I give you what you want because I love you, or because I want you to can't stand your complaints any longer. You know the guy, the woman who, the story there of the treasure didn't want to give her, you know? Well, his intention was, you know, she's just a troublemaker, you know? Maybe I'll give her, I'll set her case, right? Remember that case in the Bible, and our Lord gives that, right? Right. You know? The woman, the widow was there or something, was demanding her thing. Yeah, yeah. And she can't stand her screaming and ranting so much, so I'll render her, right? In other words, he's doing what's just, but not, he's not intending to do what is just, right? He's intending to put a silence to this woman, right? Keep her from assassinating him or something. But if someone was rendering her case out of justice, right, then that would be, I would say, much more meritorious than to give himself some peace, you know, from that woman. The second objection, you augment the cause, you augment the effect, right? But the goodness of the intention is the cause of the goodwill. He said, good argument. Thomas argues there, to the second it should be said that the goodness of the intention is not the whole cause of the goodness of the, what? Will. So, once the argument does not, what, follow. Quite a clear mind he had, huh? He tells the story of Thomas coming in and the students, you know, opposing him, you know, his position, you know. And everybody's kind of shocked, you know, like Thomas is there, you know, and Thomas sits down very calmly, you know, and explains the thing, you know, some link to the students, you know, and, oh, yeah, okay. So, in the Mino there, right, the Socrates seems to be, what, speaking badly of the great men of Athens, right? One of the heroes that gets very angry with Socrates, you know, and Socrates says, go and try to calm that guy down, you know, for the good of Athens. And the third argument, in bad things, right, the more one intends something, the more he, what, sins, right, huh? Thomas says, well, the baddest intention alone suffices for the badness of the, what, will. And therefore, also, the more bad is the intention, the more bad is the, what, will. But it's not the same about, what, goodness, as has been said, huh? Well, why isn't it the same about goodness? It's that about the badness, right? I'm going to go back and look at the body of the article. So, he says, Thomas, I answer that about the act and the intention of the end, a two-fold quantity can be considered. One on the side of the object, because he wishes a, what, greater good, huh? Or he does a greater good, right? Another from the intention or intensity, I guess, huh, of the act, huh? Because the intensity wills or acts, right? Which is greater from the side of the, what, agent, huh? You ever see that article that we saw talking about God's love and so on? Does God love us equally? Or does he love Mary and the apostles more than us? What's the distinction that Thomas gives there, right? Well, he talks about the good that God wills for somebody, right? And the one that he wills a greater good for, he said, to love, what, more, right? So, he wills to Mary a greater good than he wills to the apostles, right, huh? But he wills to the apostles a greater good than he does to the other saints in the church, huh, okay? But what about the intensity, right, huh? Does, is God's love of Mary or his love of the apostles, is the act of love, right, more intense for them than for us, huh? Like he said, he says, no, right, okay? Why, you say, for us, right? I can will the same good, right, for two people, but will it more intensely, right, for one than the other, right? So, I might want this stranger in the hospital not to die, right? I want him to have a successful operation, whatever he's, you know? I want him to have a successful operation, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right And I want the same thing for my child or my wife or something, right? But I more intensely will the, what? Yeah. So I've got willing a greater good for my child than for this stranger in the hospital, right? I want them both to recover from whatever the illness is, right? And so on. When it's in the end of the same illness, it could be even, right? And yet I will more intensely, right? In fact, it even will more intensely a lesser good for my child and will a greater good for somebody else, right? But I will this greater good not as intensely, right? Okay. So there is in us, right, both of these, but not in God, right? God doesn't will more intensely the good of, what, the apostles than of us, right? He does more greater good to them, right? In that sense, he loves them more, right? I think that's the way Thomas explains it in the Prima Paras, remember that? But for us, you have both of these, right, huh? So there's a two-fold quantity to be considered. One is on the side of the object because he wishes a, what, a meuse bono, a greater good, right? The other from the intensity, I guess, right, of the act because he intensely wills it or does it, right? Which Thomas says is not now so much on the side of the object but more on the side of the, what? The agent. The agent, right? If, therefore, we speak of the quantity of both as regards the, what, object, right, huh? It is manifest that the quantity of the act does not follow the, what, intention, right? Now, what does this mean? Which, from the part or side of the exterior act, he says, can happen in two ways, huh? In one way, because the object that is ordered to the end intended is not, what, that end, to that end, huh? Just as if someone gives ten pounds, he's not able to achieve his intention if he intends to buy a thing, what? Yeah. It's like the man who sets out to build the tower, our Lord says, right? And he doesn't, what? And what he needs to, to buy that, right, huh? In another way, on account of impediments that can come upon, right, that can arise, I suppose, huh? So you translate it superveneary, arise, right? To come upon, arise, blah, blah, blah, blah, in regards to the exterior act, right? Which are not in our power to remove, right? As when someone intends to go all the way to Rome, and there occur impediments that he's not able to, what, to do this, right? But on the side of the interior act of the will, it is not except in one way, right? Because the interior act, the inward act of the will, are in our power, right? But the exterior act, but the exterior act, but the will is able to will some object not proportional to the end, what, intended, huh? And thus the will which is carried to that object absolutely considered, but it's not proportional to the end, right, is not as good as is the, what, intention. But because that intention in some way pertains to the act of the will, insofar as it is, what, the reason for it, on account of this, the quantity of the good intention, down to, you might say, right, goes back upon, right, the will, right? Insofar as the will wishes some, what, great good as an end, even though that to which he wishes to achieve so great a good is not, what, worthy of that good, right? So is it as good as his intention? If however one considers the quantity of the intention and the act according to the intensity of both, thus the intensity of the intention redounds both upon the interior act and the exterior act of the will, because that intention in some way has itself formally to both. So, for though materially the intention existing, tense, there can be, what, an interior or exterior act not so intense. Materially speaking, right? As when someone does not so intensely wish to take medicine as he wishes, what, help, right? Nevertheless, this very thing which is to intensely intend and tell, redounds formally, flows back upon that which is to intensely will be, what, medicine. But nevertheless, this should be considered that the intention of the interior or exterior act can be referred to the intention as a, what, object, when someone intends to, when someone intends to intensely will or something other to, or to do something intensely, right? But nevertheless, on account of this, he does not intensely will or act, because the quantity of the good intended, or because the goodness of the interior or exterior act does not follow the, what, quantity of the good intended. And hence it is that not as much as one intends to merit does one merit, because the quantity of the merit consists in the intensity of the, what, act, huh? I'm not sure what it is, but, you know, you talk about a plenary indulgence. And you, if you intend to gain a plenary indulgence, right, well, that's a big thing, right? But there are certain conditions you have to. And I guess you have to have a repugnance not only to mortal sin, but even to, what, fiend sin, they say, right? It says that in the, okay. So, you really do want that plenary indulgence, right? But maybe you're not fulfilling the means, right, in a way that really is such a, what? Yeah, yeah, yeah. Hence, your intention is greater than you're at. You tend, you intend to merit a plenary indulgence, but you're not going to get that much from what you do, right? Because you're not having intensity of what?