Prima Secundae
Lecture 60: The Goodness of the Will: Object, Reason, and Eternal Law

Transcript
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I don't think everyone knows what it is. Yeah, it's hard to say. Okay, now, in regard to this text from Dionysius in the first objection, right? To the first thereof it should be said that the will is not always of the true what? Good. But sometimes of the what? Parent good, right? Which has some what? Braxio. Of good, huh? What is the proper way of translating that does? It's almost... I bet you say it's a kind of character. Notion of character. Notion of character. It has some aspect of good, you know? Yeah, aspect of good. Yeah. I mean, aspect like Braxio has a reference to some knowing power, right? Good at it. It's just, you know, it's just a little idiomatic that they use the word Braxio there in Latin. Which has some Braxio of good, but not simply of, is it suitable for, what? Desiring, right? So we're loving something, what? Bad because it's good in some diminished sense, you know? And an account of this, the act of the will is not always, what? Good. But sometimes bad. But often. Okay. The first thing is I'd hear my teacher Kasurik saying, you know, quoting Thomas over, I was reading, it's fun of it, a little bit of Washington Irving there, you know, the history of New York, I don't know if you've ever read that, you know? And it's kind of making fun of our forefathers, but anyway. He's talking about, you know, how the other animals, you know, some of them have got, you know, claws and some have got horns, you know, and so on. And they fight with these things, and they've been fighting with the same thing for all these years, that we keep on inventing new ways of coming from each other, you know? How much more advanced, you know? Did I tell you how he's paraphrasing Esiad there, you know? He says, some people think for themselves, some people think as others think, and some don't think at all. Because most of them are in these last two categories there. Okay, now the second objection here, right? To the second it should be said, that though some act is able to be, what? The last end of man, in some way, right? Not however such an act is the act of the will. Thomas maintains, you know, that the end of man is an act of the, what? Reason, right? Now, the Lord defines, what? Eternal life there in the 17th chapter of the Gospel of St. John, right? Then he says, it's to know what? Him will be sent, right? Yeah. He seems to make it in the act of the reason, right? We call that the beatific vision, right? Of course, you can love God in himself, in this life, right? But you don't see God as he is in this life, huh? So if loving God were the injured, you'd be there already. Even though the love, the love, you know, of God in heaven is greater than the love that you can have of God in his life, right? But it's not a, what, essentially different thing, right? So the theological virtue of charity that can remain in heaven does remain in heaven, right? But hope and faith do not, right? So Thomas will argue there, you know, that the chief end of man is going to be the act of the reason rather than the act of the will. There's a confusion about that today, you know? But you argue from the fact that the, in these powers that are reflective on themselves, right, their first object is not their own what? Act, right? And this is true about the reason as well as about the will, right? So the first will is not your will to will, but it's something other than willing that you will, right? Just like the first thing reason understands is not its understanding, but it understands something else, right? Once it understands something else, then it can understand its understanding, right? So the first thing the will wills is the last end, and that can't therefore be its own what? Act, huh? So that's the one way Thomas shows this more in the act of the reason, but the last end, huh? And that's a touch-up on here, right? Back to the, now what about the third thing here, huh? Third objection. To the third it should be said that the good by reason is represented to the will as its what? Object. And insofar as it comes under the order of reason, it pertains to the genus of the moral. And it causes the moral goodness in the act of the will. For reason is the beginning of human and what? Moral acts, huh? But Thomas will point it out, you know, that reason in a sense is more proper to man than desire, right? Because you have desire even in the animals, right? And you have even, you know, what they call natural desire in the plants and so on, right? So, you know, they'll say this plant wants a lot of sun or wants a lot of water or something, you know, these, what's that tree that magnolia is? The one that I guess gets some of your pipes, your water pipes and so on. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Some of those really dangerous things, I guess, because they really want water, right? And something in your house. Yeah, yeah, yeah. And so, so wanting is not peculiar to man, right? Everything in the universe wants in some way, either by natural wanting or by, you know, sense. But it's because he has reason that he has this particular kind of wanting that we call the will, right? So it's really the reason makes man to be, what? Man, huh? So we define man as an animal that has, what? Reason, right? Rather than an animal that has will. That follows upon the fact that he has reason. So it's reason that, more than anything else, it makes man to be man, as Aristotle says in the 10th book of the Ethics, huh? Okay. Now, does the goodness of the will take a break now? Everybody just take a break. On to the second article, I guess. Okay, the second one goes forward thus. It seems that the goodness of the will does not depend only on its object. For the end has more affinity to the will than to any other power. But the acts of the other powers receive their goodness not only from the object but also from the end. Therefore, also, the act of the will receives goodness not only from the object but from the end. Of course, the end is going to be the object of the will, I guess. Moreover, the goodness of the act is not only from the object but also from the circumstances. But according to the diversity of circumstances, there can be a diversity of goodness and badness in the act of the will. So, as when someone, what, wills when he ought to, right? Or ought to, and as much as he ought to, and what way he ought to, or insofar he should not, right? Therefore, the goodness of the will not only depends on the object but also from the, what, circumstances, huh? I don't know, maybe circumstances could be objects too. Moreover, ignorance of the circumstances excuses the badness of the will. But this would not be unless the goodness and badness of the will depended upon the, what? Circumstances. Therefore, goodness and badness of the will depend on circumstances and not on the object alone. But against this is that from the circumstances as such, acts do not have their species. While good and bad are specific differences of the acts of the will, right? Therefore, the goodness and badness of the will does not depend on circumstances but on the, what, object alone, huh? Well, what does the Master say now? Well, I answer it should be said that in any genus, the more something is before, the more it is simple and consisting and fewer things, huh? Just as the first bodies are the simple bodies, huh? What we call the proton, it turned out not to be proton at first, but there's a name from being first, right? Proton. And therefore, we find that those things which are first in some genus are in some way, what? Simple. And they consist in what? That's why tragedy is better than what? Epic, according to Aristotle, right? Simpler. And therefore, we find those things, okay. But the beginning of goodness and badness of human acts is from the act of the, what? Will. And therefore, the goodness and badness of the will is to be noted by something, what? Why the goodness and badness of other acts can be noted by, according to diverse things, huh? Now, that which is the beginning in each genus is not by accident, but per se, huh? Because everything that is pro-accident is reduced to that which is, what? Per se, as to a beginning, huh? And therefore, the goodness of the will depends, what? Upon only one thing, right? Which, per se, makes for goodness in the act. To wit, the object. And not from the circumstances which are certain, what? Accidents of the act. That simplifies life, huh? Seems, yeah. Until he answers another question. To the first, therefore, it should be said that the end is the object of the will, right? Not, however, of the other, what? Powers, huh? Now, that's because of the connection between, what? The good and the end, right? That is basically, what? Same thing, right, huh? So when Aristotle talks about the fourth kind of cause, which is, what? Called end, right, huh? He sees that connection between the end and the good, huh? Or they really are the same thing, huh? Whence, as regards the act of the will, the goodness from the object does not differ from the goodness which is from the end, huh? Because they're the same, what? That is the object of the will, right? Just as it takes place in the acts of the other powers, because they can have an object other than the end, right? But then they can be ordered to a good or a bad end, let's go. Except, perhaps, project ends, right? Insofar as, what? One end depends upon another end, right? And one will from a, what? Another will, huh? Smart guy, this Thomas, you know? I think he's, you know, I think I'll continue to follow this guy, right? To the second objection here, huh? To the second it should be said, that supposing that the will is of the good, right? No circumstance is able to make it, what? Not bad, huh? When therefore it is said that someone wishes or wills some good, quando non david, when he ought not to write, or were he ought not, right, huh? This can be understood in two ways. In one way, that this circumstance refers to what is will, huh? And thus the will is not of something good. Because to wish to do something, or to make something, when it ought not to come about, is not to what? Well, the good, huh? So if I will to do geometry, when I should be going to church, right? That's not, that's not, that's not, that's not to will the good. In another way, thus it refers to the act of what? Of willing. And thus it is impossible that someone wills the good when he ought not. Because always man ought to, what? Will the good. And that's perhaps for achievements, huh? Insofar as someone, in willing this good, is impeded, right? Lest he, what? Then, some good that he ought to. And then, the bad does not happen from this that someone wishes that good, but from this that he does not will the other good, huh? And likewise, it should be said about other circumstances, huh? Well, that's a mouthful, huh? Moreover, the ignorance of circumstances excuses the evil of the will, right? That's your objection. But this would not be, unless the goodness and badness of the will depend upon circumstances. Thomas says, to the third, it should be said, that ignorance of the circumstances excuses the, what? Badness of the will, according as the circumstances have themselves on the side of the thing, what? Will. But you weren't willing that, right, huh? To shoot your father there when you were shooting the rabbit, right? Insofar as he is ignorant of the circumstances of the act, which he, what? He wills, right? That you're shooting where your father is, you don't know. You're throwing stone where your father was. Or somebody, this is very common, happened to find us back in the car. No, no idea. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Now, does the goodness of the will depend upon reason, huh? Notice when you say in English, depend upon, we're thinking of the thing that depends upon as being under it, right? Or they're thinking more of it being under it. Yeah. Does the goodness of the will, it seems that the goodness of the will does not hang from reason. And isn't it a different ep over here, isn't it? It's all about it, you know? Yeah. At least in the text it does. For the before does not depend upon the after. But good before pertains to the will, then to reason. And therefore the good of the will does not depend upon what? Reason, huh? It's kind of an interesting objection. That's the object of the will, right? Moreover, the philosopher says in the Sixth Book of the Ethics, that the good of the practical intellect is the truth conformed to rectified appetite, huh? But the rectified appetite is the good will. Therefore, the goodness of practical reason more depends on the goodness of the will than the converse. That's when we used to always, I like to quote, we used to say in the ethics all the time, you know. Erum conforme. Tatatui, recto. We thought you were pretty solid at that, don't you? Okay. I guess you're in trouble, I can see. Isn't it really? Moreover, the mover does not depend upon what is moved, but the reverse. But the will moves reason and the other powers, as has been said, right? Therefore, the goodness of the will does not depend upon reason, huh? That's why the mottos tend to think of the will as being better than the reason, right? Because it's the mover, right? The reason moves the will in a different way, right? By the end, yeah. But against this is what Hillary says in the 10th book about the, what? Twinity, right? Immoderata, huh? Immoderate is every, what? Pertanacity, right? Wills, that is not, or the will is not subject to, what? Reason, huh? But the goodness of the will consists in this, that it is, what? Yeah. Therefore, the goodness of the will depends on this, that it be subject to, what? Reason, huh? We're down at McGovern's office there, you know, in parking. One of his assistants there, you know, at the March for Life, you know? And so, actually, the topic is being done mainly by one of our pediatricians, right, you know, who is an authority because of, you know, his expertise, he's, I was complimenting afterwards how calm he stayed, you know, explaining these things to this woman and so on, you know. I said, well, a woman's right to choice, you know, and so on. I said, well, I'm in favor of choice, he says, too, you know, but you've got to choose the good, you know. There was no reason there, you know. Just, you know, like Orwell says, you know, modern man thinks in slogans and talks in bullets. Oh. That's what these abortionists are, right? They're thinking slogans and people are in favor of this and then they, you know, they're talking to these abortion machines, you know. So I don't think Hillary would approve of these people. Hillary. Hillary would. Poitier, I guess, huh? Yeah. Two L's on one. Yeah. Answer, it should be said, it has been said, the goodness of the will properly depends on its what? Object, right? But the object of the will is proposed to it by what? Reason. For the good understood is the object proportion to the will. Yeah. The sensible good, or the imaginary good, is not proportioned to the will, but to the, what? Sense appetite, huh? So candy is proportioned to my sense appetite, right, huh? Mm-hmm. Not to my will. Because the will is able to, what? Universitably. Yeah. Which reads in acronyms, right, huh? The terrorist says we hate every thief. In every single one of them. Yeah. I hate every terrorist, you know. Yes. But the sense appetite, sense desire, does not tend except to the, what, particular good, huh, which the sense power grasps, huh? And therefore, the good of the will depends upon reason in the same way that it depends upon the object, huh? Well, it's like that, remember in the tweet, it's on love there, you know, we talked about that, huh? What's the cause of love? Well, the first article says, you know, the good is the cause of love, right? And it's the cause of love because the object of love is the cause of love, right? And the good is the object of love, right? But then he goes on in the second article where the reason is a cause of love, right? Or knowledge. I mean, more generally, knowledge is a cause of love. And then he'll say, well, this is really kind of like a condition of the object, right, huh? So it's really the good as known that is the object of love, right? So it's a cause of love in the same way, the way that the good is, that is to stand aside of the, what, object, right? And then you go to the third cause, which is like this is a cause of love, right, huh? And then you have really kind of like a different thing there, right, huh? You know, that's what's the object now, right? So, so notice what he says here at the end. He says, you're very much like that. Therefore, the goodness of the will depends upon reason in the way that it, what, depends upon the object, right? That the object really is the good as, what, known. And in the case of the will, the good is known, understood, right? By reason, okay? And this good is going to depend upon this. That's, that's its object. It retains its object. Now, to the first, therefore, it should be said, huh? It's the object from the before and after, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said that the good under the, what, ratio of the good, huh? That is under the ratio of the desirable, right, huh? Before, before, pertains to the will, then to, what, reason, right, huh? But it pertains to the reason before under the ratio of what? True. True. Then to the will under the, what, ratio of the desirable. Because the desire of the will cannot be about the good unless, before, it's grasped by, what, reason, huh? Okay? So, makes sense. Clear mind, Tom said, huh? Poor man. And he thought in Latin, too, which, you know, Monsignor said, you know, sign of the great mind of Tom, he said, he could think so well in Latin. That's an inferior language, you know? After our style, I was thinking of Greeks. I mean, he had that advantage, you know, and we're thinking in, I'll tell you how he made a comment, you know, and the great thing about Monsignor is he could think so well in French, you know? Which he had self-agreed as, was inferior to English as a language for philosophy, you know? That really annoys the Confederacy and I, when I quote Monsignor, because they can't go against the authority of Monsignor, you know, and everybody admires him, you know? Yet he's saying, you know, his own native language is not as good for philosophy as the language that we foreigners, you know, are. I've got a standing, you know, offer there, you know, anybody to get an exhortation to use reasons to go to Shakespeare's, you know, in 50 words or less. Shakespeare did it in 49. I'll give you 100 words even, you know. Now, for the second, it should be said that the philosopher there in the Sixth Book of the Ethics, right, speaks about the practical understanding according as it is, what, taking counsel and reasoning about those things which are for the enda, about the means. For thus it is perfected to foresight. Prudence means foresight. The English word for prudence is foresight. As anybody who reads so much in church will find out. Okay? But, you know, Thomas, he takes up, you know, prudence there in the secundi secundi, right? One of the, yeah, it's foresight. Well, that's what prudence means. Well, staying from that principal part, right? So, if you, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, in those things, however, which are towards the end, the rectitude of reason consists in conformity, right, to the desire for a, what, suitable end, yeah? But, nevertheless, that desire for a suitable end presupposes a, what, a right grasp of the end, which is the reason, right? Okay? So, reason proposes this as the end, and then the will wills that, and then prudence, yeah, but presupposes that the, what, the will is rectified, right? Okay? Okay? So, unless I want to eat moderate, the reason's not going to find what the amount is, huh? You know, I have some experience with people who drink too much, you know? Not myself, now I understand. But, you know, trumpets usually will not admit that they're drinking too much. Just a couple of lousy beers, because you have more of me, but... You see? I mean, unless you, you will the end, right, you're not going to find the, what, reason can't find the means, huh? Sometimes that leads to what San Jose calls willful inadvertence. I don't want to know the means of that. Yeah, yeah. I don't want to know if you know what that is. That's the history of the end. Somewhere, you know, I read something about Thomas, You say, sometimes I ask Thomas, do you become a saint? He says, we want to be one, he says. But unless you have that will to be holy, right? You're not going to find the way to be holy, right? There's a will, there's a way, huh? Now, what about moving, huh? Well, it should be said that the will in one way moves the reason, and the reason in another way moves the will on the part of the object, right, huh? Yeah, okay. So sometimes the end is said to move us, right, huh? So was there a panzo, who was it, up in the tower there, huh? She moved him to climb the tower, right? Yeah. So, women stick to be an unmoved mover, right? Have you always been pursuing them, you know? They just, you know, they're unmoved by all this. It's like something, you know, it's an appearance there. He wrote an novel about that, called The Unmoved Mover. This is like in Great Expectations, right? Stella's being brought up to be this kind of unmoved mover, right? It's not. See, at the end of the novel, the original end of the novel was that she doesn't accept him, right? Even at the end, even at the end, she doesn't come through these other things. Then Boer, you've got to give a happy ending, you know? You know, I guess he convinced her, I think he should make a happy ending, and Forrester, you know, the bar for that, you know, that the happy ending would be better, you know? But that's not the reason, it's frist. So, you know, I was reading Chesterton, you know, his thing on Great Expectations, you know? It's really more in accordance with that, with what's gone before, right? That she should, you know, finally, you know, continue to persevere in rejecting him, right? Is this an essay or just a book on Dickens? Well, there's, if you look it up on the internet there, you can get the, they're probably, some of them written as, you know, to be at the beginning of the book, you know? Yeah, yeah, but they brought them all together, you know? Well, yeah, yeah, that's where they want to do it. Yeah, he cited a book on Dickens, you see? Yeah, yeah. You know, kind of a biography, what do you call it? But a critical thing as a whole, you know, but there are these individual ones that are supposed to be you guys pretty good, you know, so. Those, I think they were gathered, called GKC as MC. Oh, I see, yeah. That's one title I've seen, all his little introductory works. There's a great one he has for the Curie of Ours, by Henri Guillaume. He has a great, actually, it's like an epilogue. Yeah. But it's his marbles. Yeah. He has a little works on there, you know, Francis and Thomas, you know? Yeah, it's one of the St. Francis, they say it was his most popular one. Yeah, yeah. I had that kind of, that Francis, you know, when I bought it, but the... That's pretty cute. Yeah, yeah, yeah. They say, you must be a third-order Franciscan. I said, no, but I'm going to buy it anyway. I was just going to get this, you know. It's got all the, it's got the famous biographies, you know, and it's got the flowers and so on. But the thing I used to always quote from Francis was, in the prayer there that they always have, you know, they even sing sometimes. He says, he prays that he might more, what, seek to love than to be loved, right? That's beautiful when you're talking about friendship, you know, which is more important, you know. Because friendship consists more in loving or being loved, huh? Right. But it has to be in both, right? You know, I was talking to a student or sending an email to a student who asked me about this. He wrote a treatise on, I mean, a doctoral thesis on Illred, you know? Oh, yeah. And Illred, and Augustine too, go back to Cicero, right? But Cicero's definition of friendship doesn't really give us most essential. He has, you know, love in there, obviously, right? He doesn't make explicit in there mutual love, although I'm sure he knows it involves that, right? And it's got to be mutual love and known that they have this mutual thing, right? And so, loving and being loved, they have to be there, right? I can have benevolence for you if you don't return my love, right? But we don't have friendship then, right? So, but then the question arises, if both are essential to friendship, loving and being loved, in which does it consist more, right? Well, it consists more in loving than being loved, right? But see, here is Francis praying to God that he would more seek to love than to be loved, right? So if he had to pray for that, what about the rest of us slobs, you know? And that don't people really more want to be loved than to love, right? And so this is something you should pray for, right? But Francis kind of teaches us in that beautiful prayer, you know? And that's where they found, you know? I don't know any example of anybody's, you know, prayer he's known for, you know? That is so good to bring out that point, you know? Nothing more typical by my parents. See, what Aristotle does in the ninth book there, he takes the example of the mother, right? Who can't, doesn't have the milk for the baby, right? And so you had to give the baby to another woman to milk, to feed, but now the baby's going to be attached to the one who feeds him, right? So she seeks more to love the baby than to be loved, right? Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. That's why she gives them to the one that can feed them properly, you know. But then you have, you know, these ones where a woman has sometimes, you know, like in Vietnam and so on, where they gave up the baby, right? Because they know they can't, you know, take care of it or something. And so they seek more of the good of the baby, right? But whoever adopts the baby is going to get the baby's love, right? So they seek more to love the baby than to be loved by them, right? You know, because Aristotle, he gives us an example of a woman. It's kind of this perfection of love that a man doesn't have sometimes, you know. So that's very beautiful, too, you know, that Aristotle points out there. But that's the kind of example he gives there, you know, that friendship insists more in loving than in being loved, right? But it involves both, right? It's really part of God, right? I mean, he loves us more than before we love him, right? And you persecute me, huh? How are you doing this? It's really about Peter, I mean, Paul at that time, right? So is that a good thing for now or are we going to stop here? I'm going to go ahead. I'm trying to go forward. Whether the goodness of the will depends upon the eternal law, right? Well, to the fourth one precedes us. It seems that the goodness of the will does not depend on the eternal law, right? I'll bring it back. Like in politics, we quote people out of context, right? Can you imagine somebody quoting these things out of context, these objections, right? Yeah. And as Thomas says, For of one, one is the rule and the what? Measure. Measure, right? But the rule of human will, from which its goodness depends, is right reason. Therefore, it does not depend the goodness of the will upon the eternal, what? Law. Moreover, a measure is homogenous with the measure, then. Okay? So can you measure a surface here by length? No, you can have a square inch or something like that, right? You've got to measure a surface by a square inch, right? And you measure a body by a cubic inch or something, you know? Like a line. Yeah. See? It's just got to be homogenous, right? Okay. So Mozart is the measure of all musicians, right? A composer, so Shakespeare is the measure of all poets. But the eternal law is not homogenous with the human will. Therefore, the eternal law cannot be the measure of the human will, that from it its goodness would depend. Moreover, a measure ought to be most certain. You've got to know the measure, right? But the eternal law is unknown to us. Therefore, it can't be the measure of our will, so that the will, the goodness of our will would depend upon it, right? But now, there's a big guy here called Augustine, I guess. But again, this is what Augustine says in the 22nd book against Palestine, that sin is a thing done or said or wished against the eternal law. He's got some clarity in mind there, Augustine, huh? But the evil of the will is the root of sin. Therefore, since evil is opposed to goodness, the goodness of the will does depend upon the eternal law. Well, I answer it should be said that in all ordered causes, the effect more depends upon the, what, first cause than upon the, what, second cause. Because the second cause does not act except in the power of the, what, first cause, right? So what's moving the caboose in the train? No, it's the next car. Yeah, yeah. But most of all, the engine, right, huh? Yeah, because the wagons in between that, the caboose and the engine, move only insofar as they are moved by the... But you're supposing that there's cars in between the engine and the caboose? Now, that human reason is the rule of the human will from which its goodness is measured, right? It has this from the, what, eternal law, right? Which is the, what, divine reason, huh? So this is the light which enlightens every man that comes into this world, right? So the light of reason there is derived from this other, right? Whence in the fourth psalm it is said, this is a beautiful one that comes out, many say, who will show us good things, right? This is like the day, right? And sealed upon us is the light of your face, Lord, right? As if to say that the light of reason that is in us, right, to that extent is able to show us the good, right? And to rule our will insofar as it is the light of, what, your face, huh? That is one that is derived from your, what, face, huh? It's interesting, huh? Because we speak of seeing God face to face, right? Thomas in the Prayer After Communion, he calls that looks vera, right? Seeing God face to face, looks vera. Whence it is manifest that much more does the, what, goodness of the human will depend upon the eternal law than even upon, what, human reason, right? And where human reason fails is necessary to run back to the, what, eternal reason, huh? Now, to the first objection there, right, it should be said that of one thing there are not many, what, proximate measures, right? But there could be nevertheless many measures of which one is ordered under, what, another, okay? So I measure my mind by Monsignor de Haan, he measures it by Thomas, right? It's looking like that, okay? To the second, it should be said that the proximate measure is the one that is homogenous with the, what, measure. Not, however, the remote measure. And to the third, it should be said that although the eternal law is unknown to us according as it is in, what, the divine mind, it in some way becomes, what, known to us either through, what, which is natural reason, which is derived from it as the very, what, image of it, or in some cases through some revelation, subradhitama. Now, sometimes they talk about Plato and Aristotle there, you know, they talk about the, in the first book of the Ethics there, right? And Plato's saying we've got to measure all things by the good itself. And Aristotle wants to get a measure that's more, what, proximate, right? And so, in the Ethics, we say that the virtuous man is the measure, right? So, you find someone who excels in some virtue, right? And then he becomes, for you, what, the measure, right? Okay? Man is the most imitative of the animals, right? You hear him of imitation, right? And even, you know, imitation of Christ there, right? You know, in terms of the suit, you use that, you know, and so on. But you also sometimes, what, imitate a saint, right? In some virtue, right, huh? Okay? Well, but there's another principle that Plato states that the perfect is the measure of the, what? Imperfect. And every man is, what? Imperfect. So, how can you have a measure that is both perfect and known, right, huh? Well, that's one of the reasons they give for Christ, God, becoming a man, right, huh?