Prima Secundae
Lecture 55: Good and Bad in Human Actions

Transcript
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There is a knowledge of what? Conclusions, right? And from the will, willing of the end, naturally desired, is derived the choice of those things which are towards the end. So also in bodily motions, the beginning is according to what? Nature. But the beginning of bodily motion is from the motion of the what? Heart, huh? No. Whence the motion of the heart is according to nature and not according to what? The will. If your heart keeps on beating all the way through life, I guess, for the most part, right? Maybe it is the will. Okay. For it follows as a per se accident, huh? The life which is from the union of the soul and the what? Body, right? Right? This is the old thing. What is the fundamental part of the soul, of the body? The brain or the heart, right? First of all, it seems to be worth the heart, right? Just as the motion of heavy and light bodies follows upon the substantial form of them, right? Whence they are said to be moved by the one who generates them, according to the philosopher in the Eighth Book of Physics. An account of this, this motion is called what? Vital. Whence a Gregory says that just as the generating power and the nourishing power do not obey reason, so neither the what? Pulsing part, which is vital. The pulsating part he calls the what? Motion of the heart, which is made known to the what? Pulsing veins. Pulsing veins, yeah. I guess you can... Yeah, yeah. What's your pulse? Pulse. Christ says, I stand at the door and I knock. To the theory it should be said, as Augustine says in the 14th book about the city of God, that the emotion of the genital members does not obey reason. And this is from the what? Punishment of sin. That the soul, for its disobedience, disobedience. Yeah, of its disobedience to God. In that member especially, suffers the pain of disobedience, huh? Through which original sin is carried over to one's posterity, huh? But because through the sin of the first parent, as you said below, nature is left to itself, right? They're being taken away, the supernatural gift, which was what? Divinely bestowed upon man. And therefore, it should be considered that the reason, the natural reason, right? Wherefore, the motion of these parts specially do not, what? Obey reason, huh? The cause of which Aristotle signs in the book on the cause of the motion of the animals. Saying that involuntary are both the motions of the heart and of the, what? Memories, yeah. Because from some apprehension, yeah, the members are moved, right? Insofar as the understanding and the imagination represent some things, from which there follows passions of the soul, to which there follows the motion of these, what? Memories, huh? They are not, however, moved according to the command, I guess, huh? Of reason or the understanding. Because for the motion of these members is required some natural alteration of heat and cold, huh? Which alteration is not subject to the command of reason. But in a special way, this happens in these two members, that's meaning the heart, I guess, huh? And the gentle members. Because both of these members are, as it were, a, what? Separate animal, huh? Insofar as it is a principle of life, huh? And a principle is in its power of the whole, right? The core is the beginning of the senses. In a sense, Aristotle sees the senses having the root in the heart rather than in the brain, huh? I don't know if that's all you do there. Anyway. For the heart is the beginning of the what senses. And from the gentle members, the seed-like power goes forth, right? Which is in power, in virtue, the whole, what? Animal. And therefore, they have their own motions naturally, right? Because beginnings necessarily are natural. That's a little interesting thing to bring up to the biologists to see what they say about that, huh? Now, before we go into question 18, let's go back and just swing back to the premium at the beginning of question 6, huh? If you remember, question 6 comes after the determination of what the end for man is, right? What happiness is or what the attitude is. So let's look at the premium again here. Because therefore, it's the beginning of question 6 here, the premium before the article 7. Because therefore, it is necessary to arrive at the attitude through some acts, right? It is necessary, consequently, to our consideration of the attitude, what it is, to consider about human acts, right? That we might know by what acts one arrives at the attitude or by what has impeded the road of what? The attitude, right? And sometimes Thomas says, virtue is the road to happiness and vice is the road to misery, right? And if you want to know that, just take a newspaper, right? You can see that vice is the road to misery, right? There's always some miserable person, right? Who's gotten there by some vice or other, huh? But because operations and acts are about singulars, therefore, every, what? Operative science, practical science, is perfected by a, what? Particular consideration. Moral consideration, therefore, because it is of human acts, first ought to be treated in general, secondly, in, what? Particular, right? That's really a distinction between, what? The rest of the prima secunde and then the secunde secunde, which goes into this and more, what? Detail, right? If that's not enough, you go to, you know. Yeah, patron of moral theologians and moral confessors, right? Okay. Now, about the universal consideration of human acts. First, we're not to consider about human acts, secondly, about the, what? Principles of them, right? And that principle doesn't come down to question 49, it's like a long way to go, right? Okay. Now, human acts, some are proper to man, huh? Some are common to man and to the other, what? Animals. And because beatitude is man's own good, more nearly to beatitude are the acts which are properly human, than those acts which are common to man and the other animals. First, therefore, we're not to consider about the acts which are proper to man, secondly, about the acts which... are common to man and the other animals, which are called the passions or emotions of the soul. And that begins in, what, question 22, huh? Okay. That's why I take the tweets there on love and love and friendship, of course. Now, about the first, which are the acts now that are proper to man. Two things occur to be considered. First, about the condition of human acts. Secondly, about the, what? Distinction of them. That's where we're about to begin there, question, what? 18, right? But notice he calls it the distinction of them. Here, in the beginning of 18, he calls the goodness and badness of them, right? But that is a distinction in human acts that's relevant to moral theology, right? Okay. So we won't go into the subdivision of the first part, but we've just gone through that now, right? Now we've got to get down to the goodness and badness of human acts in general. So after all this, we ought to consider about the goodness and badness, right? Valance of human acts, huh? Or this distinction of these two, right? And first, in what way human action is good or bad? Secondly, about those things which follow upon the goodness or badness of human acts. As for example, merit or demerit, sin, and what? Guilt, huh? And apparently that begins in question 21, right? About the first, there occurs a three-fold consideration. First, about the goodness and badness of human acts in general. Secondly, about the goodness and badness of the, what? Interior acts in particular, and that's the next question, 19. And then about the goodness and badness of, what? Exterior acts, and that's question, what? 20, huh? So, thorough guidance, Thomas, huh? See, he'd walk back and forth, dictating, and then he'd lie down in the car in the car to continue dictating, you know? Maybe a little bit like Napoleon was supposed to have been able to dictate two or three others at the same time. So, about the first, seven things are asked. I didn't know that. Okay? First, whether every action is good or someone is, what? Bad. He doesn't ask whether every action is bad or someone is good. Second, whether the action of man has this, that it be good or bad, from its, what? Object, huh? Third, whether it has this from the, what? End, huh? Fifth, whether some action of man is good or bad in its, what? Species, huh? It reminds you of Aristotle there, you know, in the ethics, when he's talking about how the good is is a mean between two extremes, right? And then he goes on, though, to say that they're on, that there's no mean of the extreme. I mean, if you have to take something like eating, right, huh? Is it good to eat? Well, it's not. If you eat too much, is that good? If you don't eat enough? So, you can't simply say it's good to eat, right? I suppose it's good in some sense. But you maybe have to be more precise, right? Okay. So, if you need too much or too little, right? Okay. Now, what about adultery, you know? It says you not do too much, and don't do too little either, but just the right amount, see? Where Aristotle says there's no, that's an example, adultery, huh? There's no mean of the extreme, right? It's already, right? Or you say like murder, right? Don't murder too many. Yeah, yeah, yeah, just the right number. There's no such thing like that, because it's already, you know, by definition, right? So, whether some action of man is good or bad in sua specie, right? Sure, Thomas has some distinctions for us to see, though, huh? Okay. Whether acts have the species of good or bad from the, what? End, huh? Seven, whether the species, which is from the end, is contained under the species, which is from the object, as under a genus, or is it the reverse, huh? Eight, whether there is some act that is indifferent in its species, huh? And nine, whether some act is indifferent according to the, what? Individual act, I don't know, that's the individual himself or the individual act. Whether some circumstance constitutes or puts a moral act in the species of good or what? Bad. Notice this incident there in that tenth thing there, right? The way moral is used by us differently today, right? Because Thomas is saying, a moral act is not necessarily good or bad, right? I mean, not necessarily good. We use the word moral to say something is what? Good. Good, yeah, that's not what moral means. See? You think of moral as immoral. Yeah. That's what a priest told me once that when he went home to the seminary, his grandmother asked when he was studying, he said, moral theology, and she said, is there such thing as immoral theology? Yeah, that's her conclusion. In moral theology, there must be a moral theology. Okay. And eleven, whether every circumstance increasing the goodness or the badness, right, puts the moral act in some species of good or what? Bad. To the first, one proceeds thus. It seems that every action of man is good and none is bad. This is the optimist. Yeah, yeah. For Dionysius says in the fourth chapter about the divine names, that the bad does not act except by virtue of the good. But by virtue of the good, it doesn't come about as something bad. Therefore, no action is bad, huh? But you have a hard time marking a small secret for the falsehood, right? It's like you understand the false position better than the men who uphold it understand it, right? You say one of the connexional studies was that of Marxism, right? Because that was the dominant thing at the time, right? And we had to study that. And I guess to kind of go to these conferences and there'd be a Marxist giving a paper, right? And there'd be an equation period where someone would say, what did Marx say about this? And the guy wasn't altogether sure what Marx would say. And connexional says, what Marx would say. Oh, yes, that's what Marx would say. And then he'd go on and say why he was wrong. Well, I mean, it's kind of your, you can, you know, state the objections or the positions of the men who are maintaining falsehood better than they can, right? Moreover, nothing acts except according as it is in what? Act, huh? But nothing, but something is not bad according as it is an act. Because the bad is what? The lack is something, right? You're able to have and should have, right? So act is, I mean, bad is not an act, but the lack is something. of an act. But nothing acts except according as it is an act. But something is not bad according as it is an act, but according as it is an ability, deprived of act. Insofar as an ability is perfected by act, it is good, as is said in the ninth book of Metaphysics. That's why Augustine says, what? Sin is nothing, and the man who sins becomes nothing. Okay, it's kind of overstating it a bit, right? But it is a lot, right? Nothing therefore acts insofar as it is bad, right? But only insofar as it is good. Therefore, every action is good and none bad. I feel better already. Cancel my confession of what I thought. I feel better already. I can't remember these things going to confession. Can you hear the confession? Can you really cough these people? I can't answer the objection, I just laugh at them. Moreover, the bad cannot be a cause except for action in some. This is also clear through Dionysius in the fourth chapter of Divine Names. But of every action, there is some what? Per se effect. Therefore, no action is what? Bad. But every action is good, huh? But against us is what the Lord says in John chapter 3. Everyone who does badly, right? Hates the light, huh? Therefore, there is some action of man that is what? Bad, huh? Thomas says, the answer it should be said about good and bad in actions, huh? It's necessary to speak about, what? Good and bad in things, right, huh? In that each thing produces such an action as it itself, what? Is. Now, in things, each thing has just so much of the good as it has of, what? Being. For good and being are convertible, as was said in the, what? First part, huh? Now, God alone has the whole fullness of his being according to something one in simple way. It's very substance, huh? But each other thing has the fullness of its being, right, suitable to it according to what? Diverse things, right? So my substance and my knowledge of geometry are not the same thing, right? And my substance and my mildness are not the same thing, huh? My mildness and my geometry are not the same thing, right? So, you know, in the categories here, and it's already there, the way something can be said of something. Why can you say that my body is healthy, but you can't say my body is, what? Health. So the doctor might say, if I have a good medical exam, it says, your body is healthy, right? You wouldn't say your body is health. It has health. Yeah, yeah. It isn't health itself, right? When Thomas takes up, you know, good in God, you know, the first chapter there in his Summa Congenitia, this is that God is good, right? The second chapter on that is that God is goodness itself, right? And so you might say both that God, say, loves, and God is love itself, right? God is alive, is life itself, right? But, you know, St. Peter makes a good confession of faith there, you know, the son of the living God, right? So God is alive, but he's also, you know? And Thomas explains that in the Prima Paras there, right? And he takes up our knowledge of God in question 12, right? And then our naming, the names of God, so in question 13. And he says both ways of speaking of God are, what? Imperfect, right, huh? But we're forced to speak this way, huh? Because we start with material things, where the form and what has the form are not the same thing, right? And so we say God is, what, wise, huh? Because he truly is wise. But this might, from his way of speaking, imply that he has wisdom, which might imply a distinction between God and the wisdom that he has, has in us. So to avoid that, we say God is wisdom itself, right, huh? Or sweet wisdom, as Richard says, huh? Okay. But for us, right? We don't, huh? Okay. So you could say God is love itself. You could say he's knowledge itself, because it's altogether simple, right? But you couldn't say that I am knowledge itself. I am geometry itself. I am logic. I am logic. You could write a horror story about somebody like that. But you could make, see, I'm a magician, right? Somewhat. Anyway, huh? So God alone, he says, has the whole fullness of his being, according to something one and what? Simple. So he says, what shall I call you, Moses says, right? He says, I am who I am, right? But each other thing, right, has the fullness of its being, the fullness of being that is suitable to it, right? According to diverse things, right? Whence it happens, right? Whence in some things it happens that it regards something they have being, nevertheless to them something, what? But, yeah, lacking for the fullness of being that is owed to them, right? So I should be not only a man, but I should be a geometer and a magician, right? And just and temperate and a lot of other things I'm not, right? Okay? I should all be these, right? I don't have the fullness of being, right? She's not in being a man, right? Just as for the fullness of human being is required that he be something put together from a soul and a, what? Body, huh? Having all the powers and tools of knowledge and motion. Whence if something of these are lacking to some man, huh? And there he fails, right? To him, something of the fullness of what? The being he should have, right? Now, as much as he has of being, so much he has of, what? Goodness, huh? But insofar as he lacks something of the fullness of being, to that extent he, what? Lacks something short of goodness, right? And is said to be bad. Just as the blind man has the goodness that he's alive, right? And bad that he, what? Lacks sight, huh? If however, he had nothing of being or goodness, he would neither be able to, what? Be said to be bad or good, huh? But because it's of the notion of good, the fullness of being, right, huh? Well, I think it's of the notion of good, right? Well, I think it's of the notion of good, right? Well, I think it's of the notion of good, right? Well, I think it's of the notion of good, right? If to something, something is lacking that is owed for the fullness of its being, you will not be said to be simply good, but what? Secundum quid, insofar as he is a being, right? So Hitler is good, what? Secundum quid, you know? Very, very qualified way. Not simply, he wouldn't say simply though, see? But he can be said to be simply right, and in some way, not being right. But Thomas talked about that a lot in the first book, if you remember right. So, if you take substance in accident, by my substantial being, I'm said to be simply right. So when I was conceived, I came to be, period. When I read Euclid, I didn't come to be, except in a qualified sense, I came to be a geometer, right? But, when I came to be just, and so on, and honest, and so on, then I came to be, what? Good simply, right, huh? I was only good in some way, right? So it's kind of a difference there, right? In goodness, sin, what? Being, right? So that whereby I have being simply, I have good only secundum quid. And whereby I have goodness simply, right? Then I am what? I have being only secundum quid, right? Okay? So it's coming to love God, coming to be? That simply, yeah. It might be being good simply, right? Thus, therefore, it should be said, that every action, insofar as it has something of what? Being, right? To that extent, it has something of what? Goodness, right? But insofar as there fails to it something of the fullness of being, which is owed to human action, to that extent, it falls short of what? Goodness, and thus is said to be what? Bad, huh? If it lacks some determined what? Quantity according to reason, or a suitable place, or something of this sort, right? So, see, the first meaning of bad is what? Is a lack, right? The lack is something you're able to have and should have, right? And the second meaning of bad is what? What has this lack, right? So blindness would be an example of bad in the first sense, right? And the blind eye or blind man would be bad in this, what? Second sense, right? And the third sense of bad is what produces a, what? Blindness, right, huh? Look at some condition. Or somebody hitting with a sword or something, you know? So it's a kind of non-being, right, that the badness is, huh? So, what is a bad human act? In general, what did you say about it? Yeah. It's an unreasonable act, right, huh? So it's lacking the order or the measure which reason should give to our acts, huh? So should the doctor have a drink before he goes in to operate? Okay. Yes, sir. So this is what we look for reason to do, to order things and to measure them, right, huh? So a good human act is one, then, that has the order and the measure that reason should impose upon this act, right? And a bad human act is the one that is lacking the order or measure that it should have, huh? So it's possible for a human act to lack that, right? I remember some movie actress there, you know, when she was disturbed, she started to eat, you know, and eat and eat and eat, and she ate so much her stomach burst, you know. Oh, well, that's obviously lacking in the measure of reason, right? And these Italian, these Irish bars, you know, they try to say they can drink that whole bottle of whiskey, you know, straight, I guess, you know, and they'd actually drop dead sometimes, you know, from it, you know. So, you know, if you don't drop dead, it's probably lacking the measure of reason, right? It's silly to drink them, like the... I heard about some teenagers doing some stupid thing, and a guy said to them, You know, when your body gives you pain, that's a sign. You don't do stuff like that. That's a good sign. Don't do that. I get a sharp pain, I get a sharp pain, I get a sharp pain, I grab my leg around my head. Now, to the first, therefore, it should be said that the bad acts in virtue of a, what, deficient good, right? But if there was nothing there of good, neither would there be anything of being, right? Nor would it be able to, what, act. If I were not deficient, it would not be, what, bad, huh? So sometimes, Thomas says, they say that the, what, evil does not have efficient cause, but a deficient cause. I mean, the Shakespeare kind of plays upon that, right? With that old fool there. Once action is caused, an action caused is a, what, certain good that is, what, deficient, right? Which, in some ways, good, but simply, what, bad, huh? But Chesterton says, a man would shoot his mother-in-law between the eyes of 50 paces. I'd say he's a good shot, but I wouldn't say he was a good man. It's good in some way. The second, it should be said, that nothing prevents something to be, what, in some way an act, whence it is able to, what, act. And, in some way to be, what, lacking act, whence it causes a deficient act, right? Just as a blind man, in act, has the, what, power of walking, I guess? To which he can walk, but insofar as he lacks sight, which directs him in walking, he suffers defect in walking, when he, what, walks. Whether it hesitantly, I don't know. Yeah. Stumbling. Okay. We were talking before about how likeness is a cause of error when you don't see the, what, difference, right? So, seeing the likeness of something, to something, right, that gives someone new objections there, like God is in the universe, like the souls in the, souls in the body, like God's in the universe. You see the likeness, but not the difference, right? And you can be deceived because of your, what, lack. You're not seeing the, what? Yeah. Yeah. But you come to this conclusion because you do see the likeness, right? And that enables you to conclude that they're the same, and maybe more the same than they are, right? Because some of you actually didn't see, right? To the third, it should be said that a bad act can have some, what, effect per se, according to that which it has of goodness and, what, being, huh? Just as adultery is the cause of a, what, human generation, insofar as it is the mixture of a man and a male and female, but not insofar as it lacks the, what, order of reason, huh? It's out of order, right, huh? Shakespeare said she had a baby for her cradle, or she had a husband for her bed. That's out of order. Right? You have a baby for your cradle, for your husband for her bed. Before I had it. Yeah. Should we take a little break here now? Sure. Article 2 here. It seems, the second one precedes this, it seems that action does not have goodness or badness from the object, right? For the object of action is a, what? Thing, huh? But in things there is not the bad, but in the use of them by sinners, right? As Augustine says in the third book of, yeah. And therefore, human action does not have goodness or badness from the object, right? In that discussion in, what is it? Athelda, right? Where the lieutenant there, what do you call it? Athelda gets drunk and causes trouble, right? And then he talks about what a curse, the wine is, and so on. And then Iago says, well, it's a good thing, you know, if he's in moderation. So some of you, you know, want to have a prohibition, right? It seems an evil, right? Anyway. Moreover, the object is compared to the action as, what? Matter. But the goodness of a thing is not from, what? The matter, but more from the form, which is an act. Therefore, good and bad are not in acts from the, what? Object, huh? Moreover, the object of an active power is compared to the action as an effect to, what? The cause. But the goodness of a cause does not depend on the effect, but more the reverse. Therefore, a human action does not have goodness or badness from the object, huh? Can you imagine being in a debate with somebody who could rattle these objections off, you know? Yeah, right. Or got a little ear thing, you know? Yeah. But one of my favorite quotes here now from O.C. I'm really fond of this guy. But again, this is what is said in O.C. chapter 9. They were made abominable just as the things which they loved, huh? I used to always quote that in class. So I say, if you love disgusting things, you are disgusting yourself. But man becomes abominable to God on account of the malice of his operation, right? But the malice of an operation is according to the evil objects which a man, what? Loves. And therefore, there is the same reason about the goodness also in action. I answer it should be said that as has been said, the good and bad of action, just as of other things, should be noted from the fullness of what? Being or the defect of it, huh? You know, some more abstract concepts in some ways than Aristotle is the Nicomachean Ethics he talks about in the acts, huh? Now, what first seems to pertain to the fullness of being is that which gives, what? The species to the thing, right? Terms its nature. Just as a natural thing has its species from its, what? Form. So an action has its species from its object just as motion from its, what? Term. From its term. It was to the monastery here today, right? Yeah, then you move it to my house. Okay? So it's not the same movement, is it, huh? Because the term is not the same, right? It's the same rule. Yeah. But I know where I'm coming or going, right? And just as the first goodness of a natural thing is to be observed from its form, right? Which gives its species, right? So also the first goodness of a moral act is to be observed from a suitable, what? Object, huh? Whence from some, this is called good, ex genera, right? From its genus, right? As to use, what? Its own thing. Its own thing, yeah. And just as in natural things, the first evil is that the thing generated does not achieve the, what, specific form. As if not a man is generated, but something in place of a man, right? Sounds like these modern experiments, right? So the first evil in moral acts is that which is, what? From the object has to take, what? Yeah. And this is said to be bad from its genus, huh? Genus taken for, what? Species. Species, huh? In that way of speaking, in which we say that the, what? The brain is what we're saying. The whole genus. Species, huh? Okay. Mm-hmm. Well, I think about that, the English word kind, huh? Mm-hmm. What kind of thing that is, you know? Mm-hmm. I don't know if it's an example of that way of naming, you know, where you have a name set of two, right? And there's Kepa, one is its own. Mm-hmm. And I think it's a new name, right? Mm-hmm. And the species get the new name, right? It adds something to the genus. I miss you. Okay. The first, therefore, it should be said, following Augustine, that although exterior things are in themselves good, right? Nevertheless, they do not always have a suitable, what? Ratio, or proportion to this or that action, right? And therefore, insofar as they are considered as obvious as such actions, they do not have the, what? Okay. Yeah. So I'm going to take your pen home, I think. Why? Is it because if I took home that it's bad, my act? No, what did you do? Well, if I took home your pen, you know, asking for it. Well, that is good. But here he's trying to maintain that it's bad from the object, right, huh? Yeah, but the object there includes disproportionate. Yeah, but your pen is not something I should take home. But if I had a pen, I'd give it to you. I only got a pencil. You know, I haven't met my brother Richard and his wife, you know, first moved to St. Paul, again, when he got a job at the old alma mater, right, huh? And they were staying at the family house but looking for an apartment, right? Well, they didn't have much money to go to any fancy apartment, so whenever they saw some apartment that looked, you know, halfway decent, but, you know, a good price, they'd drop everything and rush off, you know, huh? Leave me with the little child and, but they always brought one of our pens, right? And we were going into a department store, what it was, and they run up some prices around...