Prima Secundae
Lecture 53: Command, Use, and the Order of Voluntary Acts

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Okay, to the third one proceeds thus. It seems that use precedes what? Command, right? For command is an act of reason, presupposing some act of the what? Will, as has been said above. But use is an act of the will, right? As has been said above. Therefore, use precedes what? Command, huh? That would be free if you said that. I guess we're not, we can't quite get out of that. Endless. Moreover, command is something of those things which are ordered to an end, right? But of those things which are towards an end is what? Use. That's more formal, that argument, right? Therefore, it seems that use is before what? Command? Yeah, period. Command. Moreover, every act of a power moved by the will is called use because the will uses the other powers, as has been said. But command is an act of reason insofar as it is moved by the will. Therefore, command is a certain, what? Use. But the common is before the private, not the proper. Therefore, use is before what? Period. Against this is what Damascene says, that the impetus to operation precedes what? Use. But the impetus to operation comes about through command. And therefore, command precedes what? Use. Use, huh? Well, I'll just sort it out. This is, okay? Mine would be left in a mess, huh? Without Thomas to sort things out, huh? The answer should be said that use is of that which is, what? Towards the end, according as, in reason, referring it in the end, right? Precedes what? It precedes choice, huh? As has been said above. Whence much more does it precede, what? Command, huh? But the use of that which is towards the end, according as it is subject to the, what? Executive power follows upon command, huh? In that the use of the one, what? Using it is joined with the act of the one who, what? Which use it. For one does not use the, what, stick, I guess, before in some way he acts through the stick, but command is not together with the act of which, of that which he commands, right? But naturally, before is the command, then one obeys the command. And sometimes it is even before in, what, time. Whence is manifest that command is before, what, use, huh? It seems to be saying, though, in some ways it still is a useless before command, right? Insofar as you're using your reason, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said that not every act of the will precedes this act of reason, which is command, huh? But some precedes to wit choice, right? And some follows to wit, what? Use. Because after the determination of counsel, which is a judgment of reason, then the will, what, chooses. And after choice, reason commands that through which is done what is chosen, right? And then the will of someone begins to, what, use, fouling out the command of, what, reason. Sometimes the will of, what, another, when someone commands another, right? Sometimes the will of the one commanding, when someone commands himself, right? It's going to get me hard to get out of bed tomorrow, I don't know, with all these things, what did I do go to you first? You got to do it all in the right, make sure you do it in the right order. Yeah. Yeah, when there was a breakdown for you, you had breakfast. Yeah. Now to the second. It should be said that as acts are, what, in the way before powers, so objects before acts. That sounds like the thing in the Daniel, right? You know, the powers through the acts and the acts through the objects. But the object of use is that which is towards the end. From this, therefore, that command is towards the end, right? It should be more concluded that command is before the use than that it be, what? Yeah. After, huh? To the third, it should be said that the act of the will, using reason for commanding, precedes the command, right? There he has a use there, preceding, right? Command. So, it is able also to be said that this, what? Use of the will precedes some command to reason, in that the acts of these powers reflect upon the judgment. Well, I think we should just have a little break after that. Treat ourselves on a little break. We can use one time. We can use one time. We can use one time. We can use one time. We can use one time. We can use one time. To the fourth one goes forward thus. It seems that the act command is not one act with the command. For of diverse powers there are diverse acts. But of another power is the act commanded, and of another power the command itself. Because other is the power which commands, and other the one to whom, that is commanded. Therefore is not the same act commanded with the command. Unless the reason is commanding the reason. Unless the reason is commanding the reason is reason. Command you to shut up. Okay. Moreover, whatever are able to be separated from each other are diverse, right? For nothing is separated from what? Itself. Can you be separated from yourself? The soul can be separated from the body, right? You can't separate the soul from itself. But sometimes the act commanded is separated from the command. For sometimes there goes before a command, and it does not follow an act commanded. Therefore, another act is the command from the act commanded. Moreover, whatever have themselves by before and after are diverse, right? That's the axiom of before and after, right? Nothing is before or after itself. But the command naturally precedes the act commanded, right? Therefore, they are diverse. Obviously, Thomas is going to see some distinction that the objector has not seen, right? But against this is what the philosopher says. That where one is an account of another, there, there is one only, right? But the commanded act is not except an account of the command. Therefore, they are, what? One, right? Well, I answer, Thomas says. It should be said that nothing prevents some things from being, say, kundum quid, right? In some perfect way, many, and in some way, one, right? Moreover, or besides this, all things that are many are in some sense, what? One, one. However, as Dionysius says in the last chapter, the divine names. But there is nevertheless a difference to be noted in this, that whatever things are simply speaking, many, right? And a, what? Say, kundum quid, one, right, right? And some things are the, what? Reverse, right? Now, that's the kind of distinction that we meet in other things, right? Some things could be said to be simply good, but in some imperfect way, bad, and vice versa, right? For one in this way is said just as, what? Being, right? For being simply is substance, but being, say, kundum quid is, what? Accident, huh? Or also a being a reason, right? Being some, not simply, yeah. So did I come to be today, here in this room? What did you say? Did I come to be here? Yes. I came to be here, right? But they come to be, yeah. Yeah, you'd have to add, right? See? If you get up, you will cease to be, what? You should be sitting, at least. Yeah, I would say, if you get up, you will cease to be sitting. You won't cease to be, I don't think. Got my subject. You're strange, yeah. Chapter 6. Therefore, whatever things are one, by substance, secundum substantia, are one, what? Simply, right? In many, secundum, what? Quid, huh? So I'm a geometer, and I'm white, and so on, so am I many? Some way I'm many. Multiple. But simply I'm one, right? Just as the whole in the genus of substance, put together from its parts, right? Either its integral parts or its essential parts, body and soul, right? Integral parts, heart and lungs, and so on. Is one, what? Simply, right? For the whole is one in substance simply. And the parts are being in substances in the whole. But whatever are diverse in substance, and one secundum achedens, are diverse simply, right? And one secundum quid. Just as many men are one people, right? And many stones are one pile, right? Which is a unity of putting together or of order, right? Likewise, many individuals who are one in genes or species are simply, what? Many, right? And secundum quid unum, right? Because to be one in genus or species is to be one secundum rationum, right? So what are we here? We're one. Yeah, yeah. But we're not one simply, are we? Simply we're many. But just as in the genus of natural things, some whole is put together from matter and form, as man, for example, from soul and body, who is one natural being, right, huh? Even though he has a multitude of, what? Parts. So also, in human acts, the act of a lower power has itself like matter, right? To the act of the, what? Superior. In so far as the inferior power acts in virtue of the superior moving it, huh? Thus also the act of the mover, the first mover, has itself as a form to the act of the, what? Instrument, huh? Whence it is clear that command and the act demanded are one human act, as some whole is, what? One. But according to their parts, they are, what? Many. Doing something for somebody loved? Or doing something bad for somebody hate? Formally speaking, huh? To the first, therefore, it should be said that if the powers were diverse and not ordered to each other, right, huh? The acts of them would be simply, what? Diverse, right? But when one power is moving another, then the acts of them are, in some way, what? One. For the same is the act of the mover and the mood, as is said in the third book of the, what? Physics, huh? So when I'm hammering the nail, is the act of my hand and of my hammer, this one, kudomoto, he said, right? If I'm kicking you, as you're being kicked, am I kicking you the same? Now, to the second, it should be said that from the fact that the command and the act... commanded can be separated from each other right you can have that they are many in their what parts for the parts of man are able to be separated from them right when you die your soul and body say goodbye good party which nevertheless are one in the what oh to the theory it should be said that nothing prevents in those things which are much are many in parts and one in a whole for one to be what before the other just as a soul in some ways before the body and the heart is before the other what members huh it's your stuff up the heart was the first part generated right yeah the first is the heart and the eye the heart is the first thing to start for the eyes of the last to be perfected it says but death is the other way around the eyes the first thing to go and the heart is the last but he uses that he uses it very well it's very interesting he's one of the one of the first so thomas is very strong about that isn't he now whether the act of the will is commanded right which is fifth one goes forward thus it seems that the act of the will is not commanded for augustine says in the eighth book of confessions the what soul commands that the what wills but nevertheless it does what doesn't make it do that right yeah for to will is an act of what the will therefore the act of the will is not commanded right for to that it belongs to be commanded to which it belongs to what then the command but the will it's not of the will to understand the what command but the will differs from the understanding of whom it belongs to understand therefore the act of the will yeah how can you command saying there's an understanding here but the command is it could be a good argument on his bed they're rolling and laughing you know just think of down through the centuries people will be moreover if some act of the will is commanded for like reason all would be what commanded but if all acts of the will are commanded it is necessary to proceed ad infinitum because the act of the will precedes the act of reason what commanding has been said which act of the will if it again is commanded that in command will again receive another act of the reason right and thus forever but this is unsuitable inconvenient that it proceed in infinitum therefore the act of the will is not commanded but against this can be said that everything that is in our power lies under our what command but the acts of the will are most of all in our power for all our acts are said to be what to that extent in our power insofar as they are voluntary right and therefore the act of the will wills are commanded by us let's see what the master says here i answer it should be said this has been said command is nothing other than an act of reason ordering right but they should in motion something to be done now it is manifest that reason is able to order about the act of the will just as is able to judge that it is good yeah it's good to will something right so is able to what order by commanding that man what will from which it is clear that the act of the will is able to be commanded right does it command the will to love god or can it do that to the first thereof it should be said that as augustine says there right in the confessions the soul when it perfectly commands to itself that it will right then already it what wills but sometimes it commands and does not will this happens in the fact that it does not perfectly what command the imperfect command happens from this that the reason from diverse parts is moved to commanding or not commanding once it fluctuates between two and does not perfectly what yeah someone asked thomas what's necessary to be a saint he says well yeah i want to be one i mean a lot of people could have that but in kind of a what distracted way right yeah i want this but i i want that too yeah yeah yeah yeah what's the problem about the passions or the uh both ignorant ignorant what the ignorance pride pride weakness ignorance ignorance there's four conditions yes the cupid is the other one it's just that excessive love of creatures and then the weakness ignorance now think of it in terms of you turn away from god the creatures who love them too much then if you turn away from god who's power of goodness and goodness you end up being weak you end up being weak and romeo takes poison right and he thinks that juliet has died right juliet stabs herself when she realized that romeo has killed himself over her that's loving her even too much yeah for example to second should be said that just as in our body members each member acts not for itself alone but for the whole body right now because saint paul's making sure that right that the eye sees for the whole body right so also it is in the powers of the what soul for the understanding understands not only for itself but for all the powers and beautifully said and the will wills not only for itself but for all the what powers and therefore man commands to him for himself the act of the will insofar as he is both understanding and what willing now to the third it should be said that sense command is an act of reason that act is commanded which is what subject to reason but the first act of the will is not from the what ordering a reason but from the instinct of what nature or of A higher cause, and therefore it's not necessary that one proceed forever. So do I command myself to will happiness, to desire happiness? I was just naturally moved, right? To want happiness, huh? The same way to know, I think, naturally moved, huh? You know the truth, because that's what, I guess, the desire to know the truth. St. Augustine says, man doesn't want the truth. He asks him if he likes to be deceived. Well, there are certain things I kind of like to deceive. There's a lot of self-deception. You deceived yourself, right? To the sixth, then, one proceeds thus. It seems that the act of reason is not able to be, what? Commanded, right? For it is inconvenient, it seems, not fitting, if something commands itself. But reason is what commands, as has been said above. It's an act of reason, right? Therefore, the act of reason is not, what? Commanded, huh? Moreover, that which is through, what? Essence, huh? Essentially, is diverse from that which is by partaking. But the power whose act is commanded by reason, is reasoned by what? Partaking, right? So you're a style, it says the ethics there, right? You know, the will and the emotions are commanded by reason, right? So they partake of reason, right? So there can be a reasonable love, right? But it's not an act of reason. It partakes of reason, right? There can be a reasonable anger, right? Our Lord gets angry once in a while, right? Okay? There can be a reasonable fear. Fools rush in, or angels fear to tread. But, therefore, is not commanded, which is reasoned, but essentially, right? Moreover, that act is commanded, which is in our power. But to know and to judge the true, which is an act of reason, is not always in our power. Therefore, not therefore, is the act of reason able to be, what? Commanded, right? I know, sir, going back to the previous article, the footnote here. I remember Mancini Dian using this text, you know? Where one member is a member of the other. Each member of the body, right, has its own act and virtue, right? Insofar, therefore, as one member by its power and act benefits another, it is said in Romans 12.5, it's a member of the other. Remember Dian using this text in class all the time? Just as the foot is said to be a member of the eye, insofar as it carries the eye around. And the eye is said to be a member of the foot, insofar as it directs the foot. You look up that in Romans chapter 12. I think that's the text he used. But against this is that what we do by free judgment, right, then, we're able to do by our, what? Command. But the act of reason, the acts of reason are exercised by free judgment. For Damascene says that by gibero arbitrio, right, man scrutinizes, right, and judges and disposes. Therefore, the act of reason is able to be, what, commanded. Well, he says, I answer it should be said that because reason reflects upon itself, just as it orders the acts of other powers, so is it also able to order its own, what, act, huh? Thomas calls, you know, logic the art of arts, right, because reason is ordering its own acts, right, huh? And from reason comes the ordering of all the other ones, huh? All the other arts, huh? So, you know, you learn how to drive a car, right, you're ordering the hands and the feet, and how to use them to stop and make it go, and so on, it goes that way. But, whence also its own act can be, what, commanded, right? But it should be noted that the act of reason can be considered in two ways, huh? In one way as far as the exercise of the act itself. And thus the act of reason is always able to be commanded, right? Just as when it is indicated to someone that he pay attention, right? And uses reason. That's Shakespeare. That's Shakespeare's okay. In another way, as regards the object, huh? With respect to which two acts of reason are to be noted, huh? First, that he grasps the truth about something, right? And this is not in our power, right, huh? For this happens through the power of some light, either a natural light or a supernatural light, huh? And as you encourage this thing, the act of reason is not in our power, nor can it be, what, commanded. To turn off the light. Yeah. To say to yourself, you know, I command you to understand this. I tried it with calculus, it didn't work. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Those guys in those comics there, I said, did you think about it? Yeah, nothing happened. That's like the modern world, right? Yeah. That's not what it really happened. Another act of reason is, when to those things which it grasps, right, it ascends, right, huh? Now, if they were such, the things grasped to which the intellect, what, naturally ascends, right, as the first, what, beginnings, first principles, the ascent to such things, or the descent from them, is not in our power, but in the order of, what, nature, right? And therefore, properly speaking, nor are they subject to command, huh? Quantity is equal to the same, equal to each other, right, huh? I can't command myself to ascent to that. I naturally ascent to it. There are, however, some things apprehended, which do not, to that extent, right, convince the understanding, right, but that it is able to either ascent to them, or to what? Ascent to them. Or at least to suspend dissent or dissent, huh, on account of some cause. And in such things, assent or dissent is in our power and falls under, what, command, huh? Rome has spoken. To the first, therefore, it should be said that reason in this way commands itself, just as the will moves itself, right? In so far as both powers reflect upon, what, their own act, huh? And from one, it tends towards another, from one act to another, right? To the second, it should be said, on account of the diversity of the objects which are subject to the act of reason, nothing prevents reason from partaking of, what, itself, right? Just as in the knowledge of the conclusion, the knowledge of the principles, premises are...