Prima Secundae
Lecture 51: Consent and Use: Acts of the Will and Reason

Transcript
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Go on to Article 3 here now. Whether consent is about the end or about those things that are towards the end. To the third one goes forward thus. It seems that consent is about the end. I wonder what a person, Chris Covington Thomas, says, you know, this guy's got the strangest way of proceeding, right? He always argues, you know, about three times against what he thinks, right? Why does he do that, I mean? Why does he do that? He likes to torment me. Well, I was saying to Warren Murray this morning, I was saying, I went from the other day that I just finished the treatise on the separated substances, right? And come back to assume it, I said, this is really for beginners, you know. This is really, you know, a release, you know, for me. Easy. Or really just good questions on the separated substances, you know. And there you have about, you know, 20 arguments against what he's got to hold, you know. Maybe 10 on the other side or something like that. So, you know, he's very griefer, right? But to someone who's not used to this at all, I mean, why does it come to the point, by the way? Why does he have to argue against it, you know? Well, it's kind of funny, though. When I was first teaching at the college in California there at St. Mary's, I had a good student, you know. And every class, about every class he came up with, a nice objection, you know. Not because I'd heard these all the time, but I was somewhere else, you know. So, I just relax and solve his objection, you know. And he's a bright guy, you know. And he could see how he saw these, you know. And I could just see him when he was like this, you know, like this. And relax and never objection to the class. Well, anyway, after the course one time, we were talking, you know. And he said, you know, I always thought I was going to have you, you know. Today I'll get him, you know. This is the one he won't be on the hands, you know. But I'd already heard all these ones, you know. It wasn't because Thomas, you know. You always hear about these objections, and more subtle objections they come up with, even. And so they, it's all new to them, right, huh? But it makes you think, you know. To the third then, one goes forward thus. It seems that consent is about the end. And this is the old principle. Because on account of which each thing, that more, right? That's the way they state it. And account of which each, that more. I used to expand that in class. And how did I expand it, remember? That's the principle. I think it's said, it can't make fun because it's more of the cause, right? Yeah, yeah. If the same belongs to two things, right? But to one of them, because of the other, to which does it belong more, right? Or the cause, yeah. And then I take these very simple examples, and I say, If sweet is said of sugar, and of my coffee. But it said of the coffee, because of the sugar, which is sweeter. And if wet is said of water, and of the dishcloth. But the dishcloth, because of the water, which is wetter. And if salt is said, if salty is said of salt, and French fries. But of the French fries, because of the salt, which is saltier. So, if good is said of the end, and the means, right? If good or desirable is said of the end, and of the means. But of the means, because of the end, which is gooder? Which is more desirable? The end, yeah. In Aristotle, in the second book of the wisdom there, he says that if the cause is true, right? And the effect is true, right? But the effect is true because of the cause, which is more true? Now, if St. Augustine had come to Aristotle and said, you know what Christ says? He says, I am the way, the truth, and the life, right? And I said, well, that makes sense that he would say he's truth itself, right? Because he's the first cause. And the first cause would have to be, what? Most true, right? Yeah, that makes sense. Yeah, something reasonable about what you're saying, Augustine, huh? I'll have to write a little dialogue, you know. Augustine and Aristotle said, I'll have a talk, right? But this is the famous principle, right? So, if the premises and the conclusion are known, and so it's just, right? But the conclusion is known because of the premises, which is more known. Now, they abbreviate it, huh? Qua unum quadque ilum magis, right? On account of which each that more. But those things, right, that are for the end, we consent to them on account of the end, right? So, I consent to take the, what, medicine? Because of medicine itself, right? I mean, because of health, right? Yeah. I consent more than to that. It would be seem kind of strange enough for me to say that I consent to being healthy, right? But I have to consent to medicine, right? You may have a discussion of documentation, had this medicine, or had this operation, or whatever it is. To consent to the treatment. Yeah, yeah. Moreover, the action of the, what? Intemperate. Yeah. Is his end, huh? Just as the action of the virtuous man is his end, right? But the intemperate man consents in his own, what? Yeah. Act. And therefore, consent can be about the, what, end, huh? But is it as end that he's doing it, right? Do you remember that distinction before? Moreover, desire is of those things which, the desire which is of those things which are for the end, is choice, as has been said, right? If, therefore, consent was only about those things which are towards the end, in no way would it seem to differ from choice, right? Like this is a slippery thing, as Thomas, as Plato says, right? And so you might say that seeing the likeness but not the difference is what leads to the stake, right? So if I put salt in the sugar bowl, right, you might put salt in your coffee or something, right? And maybe I made a cake and see the salt and some sugar, wait a ton, and it tasted terrible. Which is false through Damascene, right? Who says that after disposition, which is called what? There comes to be choice, right? Therefore, consent is not only about those things which are towards what? An end, huh? Against this is what Damascene says there, that sententia, see the consensus, right? Is when a man disposes and loves what he has judged from counsel. But counsel is not except about those things which are towards the end, therefore neither what? Consent, huh? How long did it take Thomas to write these things, I wonder? The answer should be said that consent names the application of the, what, desiring motion to something, what, pre-existing, that is in the, what, power of the one applying it, right? Now, in the order of things to be done, first is necessary to have or to take a grasp of the, what, end, huh? Then comes desire for the end, huh? Then counsel about those things which are for the end or towards the end. Then desire of those things which are, what, towards the end, huh? Then desire of those things which are, what, towards the end, huh? Then desire of those things which are, what, towards the end, huh? Then desire of those things which are, what, towards the end, huh? intends what? Naturally, right? Whence the application of the appetitive motion to an ingrast does not have the notion of what? Consent. But of what? Did you consent to be happy? No. You naturally want to be happy, right? Did you consent to study Thomas Aquinas? Yes, because of the means of the end. Yeah. If you think it's going to make you unhappy, hopefully, you might not consent to me, Thomas. I might not agree with you. About those things, then, which are after the last end, right, insofar as they are towards the end, right, they fall under what? Consul, right, huh? And therefore, there is able to be about them consent insofar as the appetitive motion is applied to that which is judged from consul, right? But the appetitive motion in the end is not, what, applied by consul, right? But more consul, what? It's true to it. It's true to it, yeah. It's based upon it, I guess. Because consul presupposes the desire of the, what, end, huh? But the desire of those things which are for the end, or towards the end, presupposes the determination of consul. And therefore, the applying of the desiring power, or motion, to the determination of consul properly is, what, consent, huh? So after I read you, you know, Pius X, Encyclical, and The Childic Doctor, you agree to, what, reading Thomas, huh? Whence, since consul is not except about those things which are towards the end, what that means? Consent, properly speaking, is not except about those things which are towards the end. You all convinced of that now? To the first, therefore, it should be said, huh? Popter quadunum quadque, and a kind of which each, that more. To the first, therefore, it should be said that just as we know conclusions through the beginnings, right? Through the premises. Of these there is not, what? Scientia, science, which means reasoned out knowledge in this text, but something greater to wit, what? Yeah. So when Thomas talks about, you'll see this later on, he talks about the virtues of looking reason, right? You put intellectus before scientia, right? Natural understanding before reasoned out understanding, right? He's the source of that. So likewise, we consent to those things which are towards the end on account of the end. Now that's the proportion Aristotle uses all the time, right? That the end is like the, what? Premises, right? Yeah. Of which nevertheless, as I say, the end, there is not consent, right? But what is more, namely, what? Simple willing, right? Fundamental act. I naturally will to be happy, right? And therefore, I consent to be baptized. I consent to be baptized. I didn't consent, I guess. Sentence to be baptized. You didn't put it on the table. You put it on the table. Yeah. Or the holy innocence, right? Yeah. To be consent, yeah. To the second should be said that the intemperate man has for his end or goal the delight of the thing he's doing, right? On account of which he, what? Consents in the work more than on the operation itself, right? He's taking the, what? Pleasure in that. So he consents to the doing of it on account of the pleasure, right? Pleasure, yeah. Yeah. But that's his end, right? Yeah. So it doesn't really matter what he does as long as he gets his pleasure. Yeah, yeah. So he's not consenting to the pleasure, but to the act that will be the means to that pleasure, right? To the third, it should be said, huh? About the difference here now. That choice adds above consent a certain, what? Relation with respect to that to which something is, what? Chosen in preference for, huh? And therefore, after consent, there still remains, what? Choice. For it is possible to happen that through counsel there are found plural, many, leading to the end, right? Of which, what? When each pleases, right? In each of them, one, what? Consents, huh? But for many things which please, we take one before another by choosing, right? So I find all these agreeable, right? But if there is found one only that pleases, they, what? Do not differ in re, huh? In reality, consent and what? Choice, huh? But in definition only, right? That consent, it is called according as it pleases one to do, right? Choice, according as it is preferred to those things which do not please, right? Well, that's kind of subtle, right, Thomas? You're getting very subtle for our big minds, huh? Yeah, I tell you, I was thinking, you know, that compared to Aristotle and Thomas and even Eucardt for that matter, I don't know very much. I have to say that, right? If you compare me to God, right? You wouldn't say, I don't know much. You'd say, I don't know anything, right? So then to paraphrase, you know, God's words to Kath and the Siena, right? He said, God would say to Berquist, remember two things, Duane. I am he who knows, and you are he who does not know. That was pretty clever of me, you know? To paraphrase out words. Put that on your tombstone. Yeah. You were, say, Kath and the Siena? He said, remember two things, I am who am, and you are she who is not. He'd say to me, I am he who knows, and you are he who does not know, huh? Yeah. For the rest of our day. For the rest of our day. But if all men by nature desire to know, right, you know, then God himself has put in us, right, that desire to know. And therefore that desire ultimately to really see him as he is, huh? Yeah. Shall we take a little break now? To the fourth article here, to the fourth one proceeds thus, it seems that consent to acting or doing does not always pertain to upper, higher reason, for pleasure follows upon operation and perfects it as beauty youth, that's Aristotle's famous comparison there in the tenth book of the Ethics. But the consent in pleasure, to pleasure, pertains to lower reason, as Augustine says in the twelfth book about the Trinity. Therefore, consent in act does not pertain to only, what, higher reason. Moreover, the action in which we consent is said to be, what, voluntary. But it pertains to many powers to produce, what, voluntary acts. Therefore, not only does higher reason consent in the act. Moreover, superior reason looks towards the eternal, right, things to be looked upon and consulted, right, as Augustine says in the twelfth book of the Trinity. So a lot of people don't know if they have a superior reason then, right, because they don't consult these things. But many times man consents in some act, not on account of the eternal reasons, right, but on account of some temporal reasons, huh, or even on account of some passions of the soul, right. Therefore, to consent in the act does not pertain to only, huh, the higher, what, reason, huh. Well, because it's me, right, you know, for the time being, right. But against, this is what Augustine says in the twelfth book about the Trinity, huh. It's not possible, right, that for a sin to be efficaciously perpetuated, I mean, performed to what, to be discerned by the mind, right, unless that intention of the mind, huh, is according to what, it's according to something other than its higher power, right, uh, moving the, what, members to, what, the work, or prohibiting it from the work, right, yeah, unless it cedes and gives, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, 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Lower reason. Because what is ordered to another pertains to a lower art or power, right? Then the end to which is ordered. Once the art which is about the end is called the architectonic, right? Or the chief art, it is called, right? Arche means what? Chief. Arche, we refer beginning. Beginning. So that's the text of Augustine there, right? Consent and the pleasure pertains to the lower reason. So you explain Augustine's text there, right? But insofar as it is taken as ordered to some action, thus it pertains to a lower reason. For what is ordered to another pertains to a lower art or power, right? Then the end to which it is ordered, right? It belongs to the geometry to the side, but the triangle has its interior angles because it has two right angles, right? Want the natural philosophy to decide that? No. But the order of geometry to natural philosophy pertains to the natural philosopher to determine, right? Okay, to the second it should be said that actions are called voluntary from this that we consent to them, right? But it's not necessary that consent be of any power but of the will itself by which it is called, what? Voluntary. Voluntary, which is in reason, right? Because the other ones are, you know, commanded by the will, right? To the third it should be said that higher reason is said to consent not only because according to the eternal reason it always moves to acting, but also because by the eternal reason it is not dissent, huh? Okay, that's a little obscure to us because we don't quite know higher nor reason yet, huh? So, let's leave it at that, huh? Now we can look at a little bit of... The 16th article, I don't know if it's a whole thing, but... Okay. Then we're not to consider about use, huh? What's the use of this, huh? And about this, four things are what? Past, right? First, whether to use as an act of the will, right? Secondly, whether it belongs to brood animals, huh? Third, whether it is only of those things which are towards the end are also of the end. And then about the order of use to what? Choice, huh? To the first one proceeds thus. It seems that to use is not an act of the will. For Augustine says in the first book on Christian doctrine that uti, use, huh, is that which comes in what? Yeah, uti. And it refers to what? Obtaining for another, yeah. But to refer something to another is a reason of which it is to what? Confer, bring together, and order, right? Therefore uti is an act of reason, right? Therefore not of the will, right? I didn't know all these crazy acts were in my practical life, you know? You ever get mixed up with a practical life, you know? Because you've got to hell. Anyway. My wife was always asking, why don't I apply logic to my practical life? It resists logic for some reason in the practical life. You know, you realize how much money they say Obama's raised, what? A billion dollars for his campaign, right? And all these people are spending millions of dollars, you know? And they're running around, you know, here and there. And no wonder they, all their time and energy has taken up with getting elected, right? And re-elected and so on. There may be time to think about what's good for the country or what they should do for the country. And all the thinking about what they should do, that would help them get re-elected. I hope that, you know, people can see that there's something more to electing a man than how many he's spent on his campaign. Yeah, yeah. That's supposed to be the party of the poor and common person, too. I said the king would not have to worry about getting elected, right? Yeah. So he could devote his serious thinking to what's good for the country, right? Maybe we should have a king, you know, maybe. We were on the wrong track, you know. I realize that's kind of a thing that's inherent now, a democracy, right, huh? Yeah. It's amazing how much money they raise, huh? Millions of dollars. There was that, I didn't mention, that thing with President Garfield. It was at that time where the White House, anyone there could come to the White House and ask for jobs. Yeah. So Garfield mentions, there's a lot of time around the country to have to deal with all those people that are begging for jobs. Yeah. Nickel-dimed that. Yeah. That's usually what the local, either the unions or the party bosses, whoever they are, that's what they, I mean, that's what I told you before, the friend of my family, my mother's family, Jim Quigley, was one of the party guys, one of the party bosses in St. Louis. And she said, at that Quigley's house, it was a steady stream of Irish and Italian and Polish and whoever, the German Catholic immigrant mothers, tears in their eyes because their son's in jail and he said that it needs a job to get him out of jail and this and, and Jim Quigley was just constantly making appeals to politicians for favors. The son's in the old job. That's all they did. My barber back home at St. Paul just told me one time, I guess he used to work in the Capital Barbershop, right? So he, Oh. Some of these big shots, you know, he would cut their hair, right? And the one big shot said, you know, if you ever need a job, just, you know, call me up, you know? Oh. Well, being a barber, I guess in those days the nice job for a barber was on the trains, right? Oh. And so he wanted to get a job as a barber on the trains. So he says, well, what the heck, I'll go see that guy, see if, you know, you know. So he goes up and tells the guy what he's interested in. He says, okay. So he gets on the phone, calls, two or three calls, you know, he's got the job for it. So he says, they worked, he says. Good luck. So. Now that he's got a haircut, he had to take the train. Orbert Damascene says that man, what, makes some impetus, is it? To doing. And he's called, what? Impelled. Impelled, yeah. Then he, what? Uses, and it's called use, huh? Seems obscure, aren't they? But the operation pertains to the, what? The carrying out power, right? The executive power. They still call that president on the executive, right? The executive branch, you know. The act of the will does not follow, the act, however, the will does not follow the act of the executive power, but the executing power, the execution, the act of execution, is ultimate, right? Execution is ultimate. I think that tells us pretty good, doesn't it? That's the guy's on death row, I think. Yeah, yeah. Yeah, Aristotle actually has a thing in the fifth book of metaphysics there on the word mutilate, right? Mutilate, and of course, it's got to have, remember your arm, well, that is something removed, right? But it can't, you know, kill you, right? Because then you'd have to be mutilated. So if a man's head is chopped off, Thomas says, this is not mutilate, this is ultimate, huh? Well, that's capital. Yeah. You can't head and cop with it. Yeah, yeah. So Damascene seems to be saying that uses is after operation, right? And therefore, it's after the executive power that doesn't make any sense for the will, right? So it's an argument against it being an act of the will, right? Moreover, Augustine says in the book of the 83 questions, I wonder what those 83 questions were. It's a little bit like the question is quadibitalis that you have in Thomas, right? It can be about anything you know, and all kinds of odd little things show up there and kind of interesting, huh? Or like the book, you know, Tribute dearest out there about marvelous things. You want to one little thing, you know? So like, like, what's that things to be? Riley's, you know, believe it or not. Ripley's. Oh yeah. Ripley, yeah. Yeah. All things which are what? Done. Are done for the use of man, right? Because he uses all things in judging, right? The reason which is given to what men, huh? Uses all things in what? Judging, right? But to judge about things created by God pertains to looking reason, huh? Spectative reason. Theoretical reason. Which is altogether separated from the will, which is the principle of human acts. No, it's not, it's what Zidion forms us. Therefore, uti is not an act of the will, right? Okay? It's fine, I used to think that, you know, myself, you know. The Gensis is what Augustine says in the 10th book about the Trinity. To use is to take something in the, what? Faculty of the will. What Thomas says, I answer, it should be said that the use of something implies, what? An application of that thing to some operation. Use a hammer, is that what he means? Use a knife? Use a knife to cut the meat or something? I don't understand that, but that's part of my practical life. Just as, what? To ride a horse, make guitar, all right, use. He's a use. To the horse, and to strike is a use of the, what? Staff, yeah. Now, to operation, however, we apply both the inward, interior inward, principles of acting, to it those, what? Powers themselves of the soul, right? Or the, what, members of our body, right? The arm, the leg, right? As the, we use the, what, understanding to, what? I understand, and the eye to see, right, huh? I use my eyes to see, my ears to hear, my tongue to taste. And also, what? We use exterior things as the, what? Staff to striking, right, huh? Strike the children when they get out of line. Yeah. Thomas, it's a little bit of anger when he wrote this, so I don't know. Those examples are going to be, right? But it is manifest that exterior things we do not apply to some operation, except through, what? Intrinsic principles, huh? Which are the powers of the soul, or the habits of these powers, right? Or the organs, which are the members of the, what? Body. Body, right, huh? That's why Thomas, you know, gives us principle that we acquire what is not natural through what is what. Natural, right, huh? So all these tools that we have, right? Hammers and saws and knives, we ultimately acquire it through, what? The hand, right, huh? And, you know, managed by nature, the most imitative of animals, right? And so that natural thing in relation to imitate is how we acquire all kinds of things, huh? To the natural road of reason, right? We acquire the roads that are not natural. But has been shown, however, above, that the will is what moves the powers of the soul to, what? Its acts, right? And this is to apply them to, what? Some operation. Whence it is manifest that to use is first and chiefly, what? Of the will. As of the first, what? Mover, right? So to use my ballpoint pin is originally something of my will, right? Running. Yeah. But to use my hand, or to use my eye, is something, right? Okay. But of reason as something, what? Directing, right? But of the other powers, as it were, carrying out, huh? Which are compared to the will, by which they are applied to acting, as tools to the, what? Yeah. But action is not properly attributed to the tool, but to the, what? Chief agent, right? Just as building to the builder, not however, to a tool, yeah. So it was Michelangelo who made the pie tas, right? Not the chisel. Yeah. Except in a very, it's a kundum quid sense. Whence is manifest that to use is properly an act of the will, right? That's what somebody had visited here, and I guess had not learned much about the inspiration of scripture, and he read some of the Pope talking about how God is the one who is the author of scripture. God didn't write those books! Oh, man. And I said, well, who built the house out here? The hammer and the saw, or the man? And he said, oh, oh, not bad. He started just like that. Yeah. He said, the teacher is one who enlightens. The first effort should be said that reason, to be sure, refers to another, right? But the will tends in that which is in another related through what? Reason, huh? Reason directs it, right? And according to this, it is said that to use is to refer something to another, right? Because you're being directed by reason there, right? To the second, it should be said in this text from Damascene, back in it, huh? He's talking about the use that, according as it pertains to the, what, executive powers, right? That's not the origin of it all, right? Okay. Now the one here from Ancidhyan, right? To the third, it should be said that also, what, that speculative reason, right? Right? Ipsarat suspective, is applied to the work of, what? Understanding or judging by the, what? Will. So that's what Mancini was lecturing on the last time I was adamant to Laval, right? Okay. So there's certain dependence there upon the will to philosophize, what? Will, right? Before it's already theology, right? And that's why, you know, Thomas says that, and Aristotle talks about that too, that pride is a cause of deception, right? And therefore, the speculative intellect, right, is said to be used, as it were, what, moved by the will, right? Just as the other powers that carry out things, right? Yeah, he said something like that when I was reading it, when I was reading it, and it's rather hard to make that point, again, it made a big impression on me, but the most important use of your will is to direct your mind to think about it. Yeah, yeah. When Thomas talks later on, you know, about the facility there in the corrective prudence, right? But it can take in a broader sense there. But, you know, listening to or reading carefully, frequently, and with reverence, the words of those greater than yourself, right? And so, out of pride, I don't read carefully, frequently, and with reverence, the words of those wiser than me in some subject, right? And therefore, I make many mistakes I wouldn't make otherwise, and I'm not called back from the mistakes I have made already, by their words, huh? Or overestimate my ability, right? Just out of pride. And therefore, I apply my mind to judging something I'm not yet ready to judge, huh? So wonder is the beginning of philosophy, right? But wonder is in the will. So wonder is the beginning of philosophy, right? So wonder is the beginning of philosophy, right? So wonder is the beginning of philosophy, right? So wonder is the beginning of philosophy, right? So wonder is the beginning of philosophy, right? So wonder is the beginning of philosophy, right? So wonder is the beginning of philosophy, right? So wonder is the beginning of philosophy, right? So wonder is the beginning of philosophy, right? So wonder is the beginning of philosophy, right? Whither to use belongs to brute animals, huh? The second one precedes us. It seems that to use belongs to the brute animals. For few is more noble than you to enjoy, huh? What is Augustine's famous thing? You know, don't enjoy the things you should use and don't use the things you should enjoy, right? Because as Augustine says in the 10th book about the Trinity, we use those things which we refer to another, right? By which it should be enjoyed, right? But to enjoy belongs to the brute animals, huh? All right. Therefore, much more it belongs to them to use if they have the higher act, right? I think it's something like that, right? Likeness is a cause of deception, right? The book of the Sophistic Anguities where Plato says, likeness is a slippery thing to deceive you. Interesting, in rhetoric on the argument called the entomina, huh? It's an argument from likelihood. Or from science, right? That's the way it's defined, huh? And Aristotle has some interesting things to say about likelihood, right? It's almost outside of reason, right? You know, there's a discussion of that in the poetics, too, you know, about likelihood, huh? And it's more important than what the poet of his age is likely than that before. There's an example they're describing, you know, Cicero talking about his client there in the court, you know. He's a bit delayed because his wife wasn't quite ready yet, you know? Because people are like, oh yeah, it's just like my wife, you know. But, you know, I always tell you a story about, I think I told the story before here, but about on April Fool's Day, right? One of the priests there, this thing, up at the wall there, comes to me and he says, my old teacher, Kasurik, right? Kasurik is going to Russia. I said, he is, yeah. He says, I told De Connick, you know, that Kasurik was going, huh? And De Connick said, I hope he keeps his mouth shut over there more than he does here, he'll never get back. Well, then I walked away and then all of a sudden it dawned on April Fool's Day, right? And I thought, he must have set me up, you know, with this thing, you know. But it was so likely what De Connick would say, because they're always, you know, they're kind of back and forth, you know, kidding each other. It's very likely De Connick could have said that, right? You see? And I used to take the exam in class, suppose you wanted to convince somebody that so-and-so had funct the exam, right? And, well, if he's the sort of guy who hit the bottle after he didn't fucking the exam, you know, yeah, he's already started drinking, you know. It seems so real, right, huh? You know? And so these things that are not true, but are likely, you know, they tend to get us going along with it, you know. Did Kasurik, the student of De Connick, or are they... Yeah, yeah. See, what was interesting was that Kasurik had given up philosophy because he didn't think the teachers down were very good, right? And that even if they, you know, inspected Thomas, you know, they did kind of like, you know, authoritative rather than any reasoning. Then he heard about De Connick, right? So he decided to try once more, right? So he went up to study on the De Connick, and he said to De Connick on the first day, if you teach philosophy the way it's been taught to me in the States, you say I get ready for a major class. Oh. De Connick said, De Connick said, fine. He came, you know, very devoted, of course, to De Connick, because De Connick, you know, gave reasons, and, you know, appealed to his reasons and so on. And De Connick would come down and was, you know, lecture tourist, because he had 10 children. De Connick would arrange, you know, a lot of his talks, and he'd stay at De Connick's house, you know. But De Connick would come up to the talk and the microphone was the right, De Connick would jump out of the audience and go up there, fix the microphone, you know. You know, the sort of thing, you know. So. The kids went up there older, you know, when they went up there than most people would be. It was, you know, a different relation with De Connick. So there's a lot of, you know, back and forth, kidding me, and he'd do them in a moment, you know. I wouldn't tell some of the vulgar jokes. I've heard some singing, you know. But this actually happened to him. De Connick actually said, you know, I hope he keeps his mouth shut over there when he doesn't get back, you know. And I thought that he'd set this up to make it appear like, you know. I said, that sounds pretty clever here, man. I said, that's exactly what De Connick was saying. Of course, De Connick had actually said it in this case. So you can't watch out for likelihood, right? But it's taken from the word likeness, right? And so you see in Shakespeare, this plays a lot, just, oh, very like, you know, you hear that expression. Moreover, to apply members to acting is to use those members. But the brood animals apply their members to doing something, their feet to walking, and their horns to striking, and so on. teeth to biting you. Therefore, it belongs to the brood animals to use, right? Okay. Against all this is what the great Augustine says in the book on the 83 questions, that to use something is not, what, possible, except the animal that is, what, partaking of reason, huh? So to use something is not possible except for the animal that partakes of, what, reason, huh? Again, it might be the word that has some equivocation, right, or some, you know, but the views, we'll see what the great Thomas says, huh? It's a phrase short here. I answer it should be said, as has been said, to use is to apply some principle of action to the action, right? Just as to consent is to apply the appetitive motion to what? There. Saring something as has been said. But to apply something, he's going back to that idea of what to apply means, to apply something to another is not except that that which has judgment over that, huh? Which is not except that that which is able to refer one thing towards another, which pertains to reason, which looks before and after as Shakespeare says. And therefore, only the, what? Rational animal both consents and uses, right? Now what does he say about the animals enjoying things, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said that to enjoy implies the absolute motion of the appetite as opposed to the ordered motion, right? In the desirable, right? But to use, implies the motion of the appetite to something in order to what? Another, right? Okay. If, therefore, one compares yuti et frui to use enjoy as regards or objects, then frui, to enjoy, is more noble than what? Yeah. So you're enjoying your success, huh? because that which is absolutely desirable is better than that which is desirable only in order to another, right? Right? but if one compares as regards the, what, grasping power receding, more nobility is required in the part of what? Use. Because to order one thing to another is a reason. I knew Shakespeare was right, huh? Except the end of the definition of reason, right? Its ability for a large discourse looking before and what? After, right? And order is defined by before and after, right? But one can absolutely apprehend something even the, what? The senses, right? The senses don't know the order of one thing to another, right? It's your reason that's, you know. The second it should be said that animals through their, what? Parts, their members do something by the instinct of, what? Nature. Not through the fact that they know the order of the members to those, what? Operations, huh? Whence they are not said to properly apply their members to acting nor to use their