Prima Secundae
Lecture 49: Counsel, Deliberation, and the Order of Practical Reasoning

Transcript
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Well, this would be said to be continuous because the end of one ratio is the beginning of another ratio, right? But it's not continuous in the original meaning of continuous, is it? But there's a certain likeness to it, right? Okay? Because you might say, you know, in the continuous, this line here is the end of this semicircle according to this direction, and the beginning of this semicircle over here, right? Or this point right there is the end of this part of the line and the beginning of this part of the line, right? So by certain likeness to that, we say this is a continuous, what, proportion, because the end of, what, one ratio is the beginning of another. It's the same number, right? Why, this is not a continuous portion, right? So, Berkowitz, then, speaks of syllogisms as being continuous when, what? It prints the premise of it. Yeah. Okay. So, this is talking about continuous, right? Syllogisms there, right? So, Euclid, you know, will take the conclusion of one and then use as a premise to prove something else, right? The same way with the end, right? Something can be both an end and a means, right? So, money is the end of a money-making activity, but money is for the sake of something else, right? Food or something else, right? So, it can be something like that, continuous, right? The end of one activity can be the means to another end, right? Okay. Nevertheless, he says, it happens that what is an end with respect to some things is ordered to another end, just as that which is a beginning of one demonstration is a conclusion of another, right? And the same thing is true about, what, definitions, right? So, Euclid defines rectilineal plane figure. So, rectilineal plane figure is what is being defined. And then he uses rectilineal plane figure to define, what, square, let's say, right? Okay. Or quadrilateral, let's say. Okay. Then he uses quadrilateral to define square, right? So, is quadrilateral a definer or a defined? Huh? Yes. Both. It's both, yeah. But now it's back to the same thing, right? Okay. It's not defined by what it defines. Get the kids going to that thing, you know. Why are you doing this to me? No, that's what you do this. What sense of the board? What more of the sense of the board? Yeah. And therefore, that which is taken as an end at one inquiry is able to be taken as an end, as to an end, another inquiry, right? And this about it, there'll be counsel, right? So, when I picked up the Nicomachian Ethics, I didn't ask it, do I want to be happy? I was trying to find the way to, the road to happiness, right? Maybe it involves philosophizing or something, right? But that's the end of an investigation, right? Okay. So, there's got to be some end that is, what, supposed, right? And you need inquiry, huh? Okay. And they might say, well, now, if I want to be wise, what must I do? Well, I've got to learn logic, huh? So, I don't know. To the first therefore, it should be said, huh, that that which is taken as an end is already, what, determined. Whence, when it is had in doubt, it is not had as a, what, end, right? And therefore, if counsel is had about it, it will not be counsel about it as an end, but about that which is, what, end. Yeah. That reminds me, you know, I see Thomas speaking again there. He's commenting on the fifth book of wisdom there, where Aristotle is giving a second division of the meanings of one, right? One in number, one in species, one in genus, and one analogy. And he says, one in species, of which there, he says, is the same definition, right? And Thomas says, well, why does he say the same definition for one in species, but not one in genus? Because the genus can be defined too, right? And Thomas says, well, a definition is from what? The genus and differences of a species, right? So, if a genus is defined, it's not defined insofar as it's a, what, genus, but insofar as it's the species of a higher genus, right? So, genus as genus is not, what? Yeah. Genus are sometimes defined, yeah. But not insofar as they're a genus, but insofar as they're a, what? Yeah. That's important to see, right? Okay. And he's saying, there's consul about an end sometimes, right? But not insofar as it's an end, but insofar as it's a means of somewhat further end, right? For which there's no consul, what is a starting point for this, right? Okay. Do you see that? That's an important thing to see, right, huh? What kind of a house would that be, if I say that the genus can be defined? Yeah. Well, it's kind of accidental, too, though, see, as such, as opposed to accidental, right? Right. Okay. It's insofar as the genus happens to be, you might say, a species that can be defined, right? So it's not being defined as a genus, right? Yes. Okay. As it's a species of a... So that's kind of the same kind of distinction that you have here, right? If you take consul about an end, it's not as as an end. And they can say in some way that you take consul about an end, but you're speaking about it, but... Right. Yeah, yeah. Not speaking per se. So it's made as such, right? Can a son be a father? Yeah, right? Is a son as son a father? Yeah. Tell it to Carl more. Yeah. As far as the teacher is learning, he's not a teacher, right? Yeah. But it usually went to season because for the most part, the teacher's always learning when he teaches, right? That's what seems to be, what? Very sad, right? I found that, you know, the Aristotle says that the deception, the fallacy of the accident, right? Deceives even the wise, right? But I think it especially deceives the wise when it happens always, right? It's always the ignorant to learn. Isn't it? Yeah. So you've got to be ignorant before you can learn, right? It's a big help to learn in there for, right? It's necessary, no, but you can say it's accidental though, right? It's necessarily so, isn't it? Therefore, you must be ignorant before you can learn. Is that true? Only sick people get healed, right? Yeah, yeah, yeah. But here, these are things... Things that are true always, right, but they're still what? Accidental, right? Okay. But see, I'm a white man, right? But am I white because I'm a man? Well, I mean, there's lots of men who are not white, right? So you're not going to be so deceived by that, right? But if something is always there, you can easily be what? Deceived. Deceived, yeah. Happens all the time, modern philosophers. All the time, yeah. So up to Article 3 here now. Take a break? Can I take a second one here? Can we do the second or fifth degree? Well, I see. As I was talking about, if some operation, about operations there is counsel, insofar as the order to some end. Once some operation, human operation, is an end, about it, as such, there is not counsel. Okay. I guess you didn't take it up officially, but you're touching upon it, yeah. Okay, Article 3. Whether counsel is about those things, only about those things that are done by us. To the third one who says thus, it seems that counsel is not only about those things that are done by us. For counsel implies a certain, what? Bringing together, right? Collazio. But collazio, among many things, is, what? It can come about even in immobile things, right? Which do not come to be by us. It's about the natures of things, right, for example. Therefore, counsel is not only about those things which are done by us. However, men, sometimes, seek counsel about those things which are established by law. We were talking about that earlier. Whence, what? There are... Consulting. Yeah. Oh, counsel of law. Yeah. Legal counsel. Nevertheless, of those who, what? Seek this counsel, it does not pertain to make laws. Therefore, counsel is not only about those things which are, what? Done by us, right? Moreover, some are even said to make counsels about future events, which are nevertheless not in our power, right? Therefore, counsel is not only about those things which come to be by us. So, I'm not going into that. I'm going to talk about it. Articopes. And pod readers. Moreover, if counsel is only about those things which come to be by us, no one would take counsel about those things which are to be done, right, to another. But this is, what? False, right? Why don't you have these guys, these big salaries, counselors in all the high schools? Okay, I was like that. Therefore, counsel is not only about those things which are done by us. But again, this is what some Gregory says. Well, he's obviously not available on this. We counsel about those things which are in us and are able to come about through us, right? I answer it should be said that counsel properly implies a bringing together, had among many things, right? Which also the name itself designates, right? It signifies. For counsel is said, as it were, what? Concilium, huh? Alongside, I guess. In that many, what? Sit together. Oh, yeah. To bringing together, together, right? At once, yeah. It should be considered, huh? That in particular contingent things, to this that something certain to be known, many, what? Conditions or circumstances are necessarily to be considered. Which, by one person alone, is not easily, what? To consider, right? But by many, it is more, what? Certainly. Received. When one considers something, others, what? It can occur to somebody else, yeah. But in necessary and universal things, there is a more absolute and a simpler, what? Consideration. Consideration, right? Thus that more, to the consideration of this sort, one is able to be more by himself sufficient, right? Doesn't mean he always is, but... And therefore, the inquiry of counsel properly pertains to singular things that are, what? Contingent, right? Now, the knowledge of truth in such things does not have anything great about it, huh? That through itself, or by itself, or for itself, it should be desirable, right, huh? As is the knowledge of universal and necessary theorems in geometry, for example. But it is desired according as it is useful for operation, right, huh? Because actions are about singular contingents, right? So it might be useful to know if the stock is going to go up, right? But in itself, for its own sake, it's good to know this? No? Just so he can put money in or take money out or something, right? Of course, he is in trouble there, you know. He doesn't wear a billion dollars to disappear. There are a kind of investment company there. He used to be governor of New Jersey. Oh, yeah. He was senator from New Jersey, too. Corzine. Oh, yes. Yeah, he's the guy that Obama's trying to get back into office there, you know, and he ran against the, which is he? Christie, yeah, Christie beat him. Okay. He's in deep trouble. He's coming in. Surprise! And therefore, it should be said that, properly speaking, strictly speaking, right, consul is about those things which are done, what, by us, huh? So to the first objection from collatio, right, what Thomas says, well, collatio can be said in other things, too, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said that consul implies not just any collatio, right, but the collatio about, what, the singular circumstances and so on about things to be done, right, for the reason. So now we're talking logical, speak of reason as being, what, collatios and discursivos, right? Bringing together and discursing, right? And that's not consul, right? But consul is this collatio about, you know, everything surrounding this, that seems relevant to this one thing, right? He says in the Mideast there, you know, where the knocking off of these dictators, you know, has made things worse for the Christians, right? You know, I wonder whether the church kind of saw that, you know, from the beginning that this would... Our Patriarch got in the hard water, supposedly he got in the hard water with Obama. Yeah. Because that was his opinion. He expressed it publicly, and so the White House basically said, well, we're not going to meet. Yeah. I guess there used to be, what, like a chameleon Iraqis or Christians, or, I don't know if they're all Catholic, they're just Christians, but, you know, down to, like, 200,000 now, you know? But a lot of them are flinging up to the north to the Kurds, and they're a little feel a little bit better there, you know? But to read about these things, it's really bad, you know, that they're going to come over there. To read about the poor Filipino woman that worked there in Jordan, right? They really have a rough time. It's just... To the first... Okay, we had that first. To the second then, that that which is laid down by law, although, what? It is not from the doing of the one seeking... Consul, nevertheless it is what? Directing one to operating, right? Because this is one reason of doing something, the command of the what? Law. So stop for the red sign, you know? So stop. More sophisticated. These laws are so complicated, you know. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Nobody's read these, you know, huh? Yeah, it's crazy, yeah. It seems like the Constitution was probably written to avoid exactly what they're doing now. Yeah, yeah. Now to the third about the argument. The third should be said that Consul is not only about those things which are done, but also about those things which are ordered to operations. An account to this, Consul is said to come about future events, insofar as man to what? Known future events is directed to doing something or avoiding something, right? What's going to happen if we move our troops out of, you know, Pakistan, I mean, Afghanistan, right? Now, what about this Consul and others? To the fourth, it should be said that we seek counsel about the doings of others, right? Insofar as they're in some way one with us, right? Either through the union of affection, as a friend is solicitous about those things which pertain to his friend, right? Just as about his own, right? Parents and their children, right? Or by way, as a way of being a tool, right? For the chief agent and the instrument are, in a way, one cause, right? Since one is done through what? The other. And thus, the master, dominus. That's what they translate in the Latin there. That text I was talking about, dominus, huh? I mean, dominus and magister. Yeah, that's what it says in the Latin there. In my Latin, I've got the Latin and Greek at home, dominus and magister, you know? But the Greek is kurios, where you had in the kurios, and then didaskalos, huh? Okay? She's very much a teacher, right? They seem as to work to be one cause, and so one acts to the other. And thus, the Lord takes counsel about those things which are to be done. We need, what, seven? A little break here at the halfway point here? Sure. here, right? It seems that counsel is about all things which are done by us, right? For choice is the desire of what has been taken counsel on. But choice is about all those things which are done by us. Therefore also, what? Counsel, right? Moreover, counsel implies the inquiry of reason. But in all the things which are, what? Which we do through the impetus of passion, we proceed by the inquiry of reason. Therefore, about all things that are done by us, there is counsel. Did you say counsel about having breakfast this morning? Not me. Moreover, the philosopher says in the third book of the Ethics that if something can come about through many things, counsel inquires through which most easily and best it comes about. If, however, through one thing, in what way do that come about? But everything that comes to be, comes to be through either one or many. Therefore, about all things which come to be by us, there is counsel, right? Okay. But against us is what some Gregory says, that about those things which are, what? By discipline or art, or art, those works, there is no what? Counsel, right? Okay. Did I take counsel this morning? Did I take counsel this morning? Did I make tea for my wife and I in four minutes, you know, timing? Was that, did I take counsel? Yeah. The answer should be said that counsel is a certain inquiry. But about those things we are accustomed, I guess, I guess, to inquire, which come into doubt. Whence the reason inquiring, which is called, what? An argumentum, is making, what? Faith about a dubious thing, right? But that something in human things to be done is not doubtful can happen from two things. In one way, because to determine what? Ways, roads, one proceeds to determine ends. Just as happens in the arts, which have certain, what? Ways of operating, right? As the writer does not take counsel in how he ought to what? Yeah. For this is determined by the art, right? Another way, because it does not much matter whether it be done thus or thus. And these, right, are small things which little aid or impede with respect to achieving the end. And therefore, about two things do not take counsel, although they are ordered to the end, as the philosopher says. Either about small things, about small things, and about those things which are already determined in what way they ought to come about. Just as in the works of the arts, an account, apart from what? Things, yeah. As Gregory, some Gregory, says, right? As medicinal, negotiate, and so on, right? To the first therefore it should be said that choice presupposes counsel by reason of the judgment or position, right? When the judgment is manifest without inquiry, there is not required the to be what? Investigation of counsel, right? To the second should be said that reason in manifest things does not inquire, but judges at once, right? And therefore it is not necessary in all things which are done by reason, for there to be an inquiry of what? Counsel, right? Should I put the wine bottle away, or should I continue? To acquire counsel? You get certain types, and they want to discern the Holy Spirit in everything. Yeah. I always kind of make fun of that when we go to the fill-up station and say, should I get leaded, or super unleaded? You know, I've got to pray about that. Who cares? It doesn't matter. It's one of those small things. The third should be said that when something is able to come about through one thing, but in diverse ways there can be some, what? Doubt, right? Just as when it comes to be about through many. And therefore there is need for counsel, right? But when not only is the thing determined, but the way, right? Then there is no need for what? Counsel, right? So the loaf was hard as a rock this morning, right? I had a hard time cutting the bread. Then I put it in the microwave for about 20 seconds, 30 seconds, and then it softens up, and I was like, you could eat the damn thing. Was there any counsel there? The father's had this thing about, in the creation story, where it says, God said, let us make man in our image and after our likeness. And they talked about how, you see here, this is only done before man was made, not anything else. It's like God, so the image of God taking counsel, because man is special. It's kind of just beautiful. I think it's John Chrysostom, I guess. They didn't take counsel. But it's in the world. Yeah, yeah, yeah. It's like when in the scripture you have to explain those ways of saying, you know, now I know you love me. Yeah, yeah. You know, you didn't know, right? Thomas has to explain those things. Okay. Now we have these very nice roles, too, that we also got at the place there. But the roles, they get kind of soft, you know, and they lose their flair, right? And you put those in the microwave to heat them, they get even softer. So you've got to start the oven and put it at 200 and put them in there. But the baguette, you've got to put it in the microwave because that gets hard as a rock. You've got to soften it, right? Once I put that in the oven, 200 would be even harder, right? It would be crumbling and soft. Yeah. Somebody pointed out once that the same atmospheric conditions means one kind of getting soft and not quite hard. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Now, this is what a thought that we don't know about. To the fifth, one proceeds thus. It seems that counsel does not go forward in a mode of resonatorial, right? So it's interesting to me now because that's what we talk about in logical terms. Well, counsel is about those things which are done by us, but our doings do not proceed in a, what? But more in a compositive mode, right? So in the resolution, you're going from the composed to the simple, right? But in the composite one, you're going from the simple to the composed. When Thomas explains why Aristotle says that ethics proceeds roughly, right? And Thomas says in a lot in there, it is, by applicando, right? Universalia et supplicia, at singularia, at composita, right? So, therefore, counsel does not always proceed in a positive way. Moreover, counsel is an inquiry of reason. But reason begins from things that come before and arise those things that come afterwards, according to a, what? more suitable order, yeah. Since, when, therefore, the past things are before the, what, present, and the present things before the future, it seems that in counseling, taking counsel, why not do, what? We see it from the present and the past to the, what? Future, right? Which does not pertain to the order of resolution. Therefore, counsel does not serve the order of resolution. So, example is an argument in what? In rhetorical rhetoric, right? In what they call political rhetoric, right? But it's, you know, about action, right? So, you take something in the past and you go to the future, right? Is that resolving? You know. The last time I did that, the woman got upset, so I'll do that again. 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Stop it. To the first, therefore, it should be said that counsel to be sure is about operations, but the reason of the operations is taken from the end. And therefore, the order of reasoning about things to be done is contrary to the order of what? Doing. So I've got a headache. I want to get rid of the headache. And therefore, I want to take aspirin. I don't have any aspirin. Therefore, I want to go to the drugstore. Ah, no, it's something I can do is go to the drugstore. So the end of the inquiry is the beginning of the doing, right? Reason begins, the second should be said, that reason begins from that which is before by reason, but not always from that which is before in, what, time, huh? I don't know if the senses are before, right? To the third, it should be said that about that which should be done on account of the end, we do not, what, if it were not, what, suitable to the end. Right. And therefore, before one considers whether it is, what? The completing the end of its... Yeah. Then one considers whether it would be possible, right? So the mice arrived at the idea that the bell is what was needed to avoid the danger from the cat, that's right, sudden appearance. And then they realized that that was not possible for them because no one is willing to bell the cat, huh? That's right. Yeah. Whatever it is, sir. Okay, now whether the Inquiry Council proceeds... Ad infinitum, right? Ad infinitum. Consul is an inquiry about particulars in which there is what? Operation. But singular is infinite, therefore the inquiry of consul is what? Infinite. Moreover, under the inquiry of consul there follows to consider not only what should be done, but also in what way, what? The impediments should be taken away, right? It's one of the parts of prudence there, right? What's it called? Caution, you know? It's going to remove this tyrant, right? It's actually worse, you know? But any human action can be impeded, right? And the impediment can be taken away through some, what, human reasoning. Therefore it remains to what? Seat to the person. Yeah. Okay. I don't think they'd get in the way of this, right? I'd have an accident, right? Coming up here, right? Going home or going to the grocery store, right? Moreover, the inquiry of the demonstrative science does not proceed forever, because it arrives at some principles per se, what? Nota. Which altogether has certitude, right? But such certitude cannot be found in singular contingent things, which are variable and uncertain. Therefore, the inquisition of counsel proceeds in infinitum, right? Yeah. What's that? Hamlet there, right? Remember that time when Paul VI was a bit of a Hamlet, you know, according to the idea that the Hamlet is? And that's what John XXIII called him? That's what John XXIII called him. I think it was Abiletto, he called him Hamlet. I didn't know that. He'd size him up the way, yeah. Yeah. He called him Abiletto. Against this, no one is moved to that which is impossible to arrive at, right? As is said in the first book about the universe. But it's impossible to go through the infinite, right? If, therefore, the inquisition of counsel is infinite, no one would begin to take counsel, which is clearly what? False, huh? The answer should be said that the inquiry of counsel is limited, huh? Finite, in act, on both sides, huh? From both sides. To wit, from the part of the beginning and from the part of the, what? End, huh? For there is taken an inquiry of counsel, a two-fold beginning. One which is, what? Proper from the very genus of things to be done. And this is the end, about which there is not counsel, right? But as we saw before, it's supposed in counsel as a beginning, right? So it's not infinite in that sense, right? From the beginning of it, huh? Another, as it were, taken from the genus, just as in, what? Demonstrative science. One science supposes some things from another, about which it does not, what? Inquiry, right, huh? Now these beginnings, which are supposed in the inquiry of counsel, some are those which are taken through, what, sense, as that this is, what, bread, or it's iron, or something. And some are taken through some speculative or practical science known in the universal. So, just as that to commit adultery, I guess, huh, is prohibited by God, right? And that man is not able to live unless he be nourished by suitable nourishment, suitable food, huh? And about these things, the conciliator, the one taking counsel, does not, what? Inquiry, right, huh? He always inquired about abortion, right? Yeah. Should be... Yeah. What choice do you have? I mean, it seems that people are being dishonest, almost, you know? That's what I always say, it's the, if it's possible to think you know what you don't know, it's possible to think that you don't know what you do know, which is abortion of repugnative nature. Yeah, yeah. But you hear slogans all the time. Yeah, yeah. Now, the end of the inquisition is that which at once is in our power that we, what, do it, right, huh? Just as the end has the notion of a beginning, so that which is, what, for the sake of the end, has the notion of a conclusion. Hence, that which first occurs to be done has the notion of a last conclusion to which the inquisition terminates. But nothing prevents a consul from being in, what, potency infinite, right? According as, what, forever there can occur things to be inquired by what? What if it's snow? What if it's rain? What if we have a tornado? What if we have a birth question? Reminded reading a story one time saying, you know, history is always more complicated than we think, right? Sometimes, you know, I read an article about some particular thing that I know about in history, right? And I say, oh, I didn't realize all this and that, you know? And so, you kind of see the mistake of Marx. People have this kind of philosophy of history, right? It is, it is. History is always more complicated than you think, right? That's true, right? That's like Dr. Carroll used to say, if anybody's bored with history, they're bored with life. Yeah. Because human lives are interesting and intriguing and there's many things that get your attention. Well, there's talking sometimes, you know, in physics there about the principle of simplicity, right? You know, it's a good principle in history, right? I don't think so, no. Yes. That was his famous line, you know, one man can make a difference. He gives examples of that. It's Constantine, the famous one. One man can make a difference. He gives an example of Muhammad. Muhammad was in that battle. The first battle they were in, a skirmish in the desert. He got hit with a rock, knocked one of his teeth out. What if it hit him in the head and he'd been killed? So, how would history have been different? Because they have one man. Yeah. What if it was father, didn't have his name changed from Shikaboo? Yeah. That would have been very interesting. William Schreier says that, you know, he's imagining these people going, I like Shikaboo. To the first effort, it should be said that singulars are not infinite in act, but in what? Odense, the only. The second. What? That's the kind of unreasonable fear that paralyzes some people more. Yeah. Because they have unreasonable fears of, what about this? What about that? What? There's certain limits. To the second, it should be said that though human action is able to be impeded, right? Not always does it always have a, what? Impediment prepared. Ready in hand. Yeah. And therefore, it's not always necessary to take counsel about, what? Taking right in hand. Yeah. To the third, therefore, it should be said that in singular contingent things, something certain is able to be taken, right? Although not so, what? Simply, nevertheless, as now, as it's taken in the, what? Operation that bread really was. Try this one. For Socrates to sit is not necessary, but for him to sit when he sits is necessary. And this can be taken with certitude, huh? Stop there. It's a good place to stop at the end of it.